William of Ockham’s Early Theory of Property Rights: Sources, Texts, and Contexts

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Centre for Medieval Studies
University of Toronto

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation examines William of Ockham’s theory of property rights in the Opus nonaginta dierum (1332) in the context of the other major Michaelist texts of the period. A corollary of the project is to examine to what extent Ockham, a theologian with no formal training in law, was able to exploit the resources of Roman and canon law to justify his theory of property rights.

The first chapter outlines general methodological concerns. The second chapter describes John XXII’s theory of property rights as it can be found in his major bulls of the 1320s. The subsequent chapters adopt a thematic approach. Chapters three through five analyse in turn the concepts of ius, dominium, and usus, which are hierarchically related concepts in the Michaelist texts. Chapter three examines ius in traditional legal discourse in order to provide a framework for understanding how the Michaelists employed the term; both the issue of positive and natural rights and the interaction of divine, natural, and positive law are examined. Chapter four examines dominium, here primarily understood as proprietary lordship, as it is justified in divine, natural, and positive law; the Franciscan position on the origin of private property also becomes clear. The fifth chapter deals with the Franciscan argument that usus must be understood not only in a legal sense. Franciscan use, they argue, is a rightless and legally indefensible sort of use because it lacks a connection to ius. The sixth chapter explores how the Michaelists explained that one may justly use something that is consumed through use without ever holding property rights over it, while the seventh explores the Franciscan theory of corporate rights in the face of Innocent IV’s and John XXII’s arguments about the supposedly fictive personality of corporations.
Abstract

A concluding chapter and three appendices round out the dissertation. The first appendix illustrates how Michael of Cesena adapted Bonaventure’s theory of a ‘fourfold community of temporal things’. The second compares the structural interrelationship of the Michaelist texts. The final appendix tabulates Ockham’s use of canon and Roman law with respect to the writings of the pope and the other Michaelists.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It gives me great pleasure to give thanks to all the people who have made this thesis possible. The Centre for Medieval Studies boasts a surprisingly large number of talented medievalists, and I had the good fortune to take part in a few foreign language reading groups over the years with several of them, including especially: Tim Budde, Ryan Greenwood, Magda Hayton, Andrew Hicks, Matthew McCabe, Jess Paehlke, and Gur Zak. Ryan and Jess suffered most at my hands, and so they deserve special thanks for reading so many items pertaining to the problems of mendicant poverty. My dissertation committee also gave me encouraging advice and criticism, often at crucial times in the writing process, and they were instrumental, I’m sure, in helping me obtain the financial support of a Canadian Graduate Scholarship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (2004–07) and an Ontario Graduate Scholarship (2007–08), which significantly eased many of the financial difficulties most graduate students face these days. I am happy to thank both SSHRC and the Ontario Student Assistance Program for their support.

My parents have always demanded that my brothers and I pursue careers that will make us happy, and although studying medieval intellectual history may seem an odd choice, they never doubted that I made the right choice. Their unfailing faith in my abilities often kept me afloat, and, each in their own way, they gave me a lofty goal to aspire to.

And, of course, Kim has shared every step of this rocky road. My life has been enriched by her presence and this thesis may never have been written without her help and support. It is to her that I dedicate this—finished!—work.
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ABBREVIATIONS

Please note that all medieval texts with their own divisions will be cited accordingly (from largest to smallest), including line numbers where possible, followed by a reference to the volume (if any) and page(s) of the modern edition. The only exception to this are Ockham’s *Opera politica*, which, owing to their frequency in the notes, will be cited without constant reference to the volume they appear in (I provide that information here). For the Vulgate I use Weber et al. (1994).

Texts & Collections

3 opp. Nicholas of Freising(?), *Tres oppositiones contra appellationem Michaelis earumque refutationes*, in G&F, 479–519

ACC¹ John XXII, *Ad conditorem canonum*, redactio prima (≡ *Ad conditorem¹*), ed. in G&F, 83–88

ACC² John XXII, *Ad conditorem canonum*, redactio secunda (≡ *Ad conditorem²*), ed. in Tarrant 1983; cited by line and page number(s)


AP William of Ockham, *An princeps pro suo succursu, scilicet guerar, possit recipere bona ecclesiarum, etiam invito papa*, ed. in OPol 1.228–267


App.mon. Michael of Cesena, *Appellatio ... contra libellum papae ‘Quia vir reprobus’*, in G&F, 624–866; also referred to as the *Appellatio monacensis*


BF *Bullarium franciscanum*, 7 vols., ed. in Sbaralea and Eubel 1759–1904

BOO Bonaventure, *Opera omnia edita studio et cura PP. Collegii a S. Bonaven-
tura*, 10 vols., 1882–1902


CI William of Ockham, *Tractatus contra Ioannis*, ed. in OP 3.29–156

CIN John XXII, *Cum inter nonnullus*, ed. in Tarrant 1983; cited by line and page number(s)

Comm. Innocent IV, *Commentaria in V libros Decretalium*, ed. in Innocent IV 1968
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Connex.</strong></td>
<td>William of Ockham, <em>De connexione virtutum</em>, ed. in OTh 8.323–407</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **De paup.** | *Tractatus de Christi et apostolorum paupertate*, written for John XXII by various authors:  
- Bonagratia of Bergamo, ed. in Olier 1929  
- Durandus of St-Pourçain, ed. in Miethke 1993  
- Hervaeus Natalis, ed. in Sikes 1937–38 |
| **Dilectissimis** | C. 12 q. 1 c. 2 of Gratian’s *Decretum* |
| **Epist.**   | William of Ockham, *Epistola ad fraternas minores*, in OPol 3.6–17 |
| **Exit**     | *Exit qui seminat* (= VI 5.12.3); a bull of Nicholas III (due to its length, a reference to Friedberg 1879–81 is provided) |
| **Exivi**    | *Exivi de paradiso* (= Clem. 5.11.1); a bull of Clement V (due to its length, a reference to Friedberg 1879–81 is provided) |
| **Expositio**| *Expositio Hugonis de Digna super regulam fratrum minorum*, ed. in Flood 1979 |
| **FF**       | *Fontes franciscani*, ed. in Menestò et al. 1995 |
| **G&F**      | Gál and Flood 1996 (= Nicolaus Minorita: *Chronica*) |
| **Historia** | Angelo Clareno, *Historia septem tribulationum ordinis minorum*, ed. in Rossini 1999 |
| **Improbatio** | Francis of Marchia, *Improbatio contra libellum domini Iohannis qui incipit “Quia vir reprobus”*, ed. in Mariani 1993 |
| **Impug.**   | William of Ockham(?), *Impugnatio constitutionum papae Iohannis*, ed. in Knysh 2000 |
| **IPP**      | William of Ockham, *De imperatorum et pontificum potestate*, ed. in OP 4:279–355 |
| **OND**      | William of Ockham, *Opus nonaginta dierum*, ed. in OPol 1.292–368 (Chapters 1–6), and OPol 2.369–858 (Chapters 7–124) |
| **OPh**      | William of Ockham, *Opera philosophica*, 7 vols., ed. in Gál et al. 1974–86 |
| **OPol**     | William of Ockham, *Opera politica*, 4 vols., ed. in Offler et al. 1956–97 |
| **OQ**       | William of Ockham, *Octo quaestiones de potestate papae*, ed. in OP 1.15–217 |
| **OTh**      | William of Ockham, *Opera theologica*, 10 vols., ed. in Gál et al. 1967–88 |
| **QE**       | John XXII, *Quorundam exigit*, ed. in Tarrant 1983; cited by line and page number(s) |
| **QN**       | John XXII, *Quia nonnunquam*, ed. in Tarrant 1983; cited by line and page number(s) |
| **QPE**      | Peter of John Olivi, *Quaestiones de perfectione evangelica*, ed. in Schlageter 1989 |
| **QQM**      | John XXII, *Quia quorundam mentes*, ed. in Tarrant 1983; cited by line and page number(s) |
| **Quodl.**   | William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, in OTh 9 |
| **Quo iure** | D. 8 c. 1 of Gratian’s *Decretum* |
Abbreviations

QVR  John XXII, *Quia vir reprobus*, ed. in G&F, 553–613 and Ockham’s OND; partially reproduced in Francis’ *Improbatio*

RegB  Francis of Assisi, *Regula bullata*, ed. in Esser 1978, 225–238

Sent.  William of Ockham, *In libros Sententiarum*, in OTh 1–7

SL  William of Ockham, *Summa logicae*, ed. in OPh 1

STh  Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, ed. in Aquinas 1882–, vols. 4–12

LEGAL CITATIONS

(!) indicates that I have corrected the reference

C.  *Causa*; subsection of Gratian’s *Decretum*, part 2

c.  *canon* or *capitulum*

Clem.  The *Constitutiones Clementinae*, promulgated by John XXII

Cod.  The *Codex* of Justinian

D.  *Distinctio*; subsection of Gratian’s *Decretum*, part 1, and of the *de penitentia* and *de consecratione*

d.a.c.  *dictum ante canonem*; for Gratian’s commentary preceding a canon

d.p.c.  *dictum post canonem*; for Gratian’s commentary following a canon

d.econs.  *De consecratione*; Gratian’s *Decretum*, part 3

de.pen.  *De penitentia*; C. 33 q. 3 of Gratian’s *Decretum*

Dig.  The *Digesta* of Justinian

Ex. comm.  *Extravagantes communes*, compiled by Jean Chappuis (s. XV)

Gl. ad  The *Glossa ordinaria*

— ad *Corpus iuris civilis*; as found in Fehi 1627
— ad *Decretum*; as found in Gratian 1561
— ad *Librum extra*; as found in Gregory IX 1561

Inst.  The *Institutiones* of Justinian

Nov.  The *Novellae leges* of Justinian

q.  *quaestio*; subsection of the *Causae* in Gratian’s *Decretum*, part 2

VI  The *Liber Sextus*, commissioned and promulgated by Boniface VIII

X  The *Liber extra* or *Decretales Gregorii IX*
## CHRONOLOGY OF THE PRINCIPAL TEXTS & EVENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>John XXII</th>
<th>Franciscans</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 Aug. 1316</td>
<td>John XXII elected</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Oct. 1317</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26 Mar. 1322</td>
<td>Quorundam exigit</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Jun. 1322</td>
<td>Quia nonnumquam</td>
<td>Littera Capituli Generalis Perusini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jun. 1322</td>
<td></td>
<td>Declaratio Magistrorum facta Perusii</td>
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<tr>
<td>Summer 1322 (?)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bonagratiæ of Bergamo, Tractatus de Christi et apostolorum paupertate</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Dec. 1322</td>
<td>Ad conditorem canonum, redactio prima</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Jan. 1323</td>
<td></td>
<td>Appellatio Bonagratiæ de Pergamo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 1323</td>
<td>Ad conditorem canonum, redactio secunda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Nov. 1323</td>
<td>Cum inter nonnullas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. May 1324</td>
<td>[Appellatio Ludovici de civitate Sachsenhausen]</td>
<td>[Marsilius of Padua, Defensor pacis]</td>
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<tr>
<td>[22 May 1324]</td>
<td>Quia quorundam mentes</td>
<td>Appellatio Michaelis in Avenione</td>
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<tr>
<td>[24 Jun. 1324]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Michaelists flee Avignon for Pisa</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Nov. 1324</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Apr. 1328</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 May 1328</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Jun. 1328</td>
<td>Michael of Cesena, Bonagratiæ of Bergamo, Francis of Marchia, and William of Ockham are excommunicated</td>
<td>Littera excusatoria Michaelis</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Jul. 1328</td>
<td></td>
<td>Appellatio in forma maiore</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Sep. 1328</td>
<td></td>
<td>Appellatio in forma minore</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Sep. 1328</td>
<td></td>
<td>Allegationes religiosorum virorum</td>
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<tr>
<td>post 9 July 1329</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Nov. 1329</td>
<td>Quia vir reprobus</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1329–31</td>
<td>John preaches several problematic sermons</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>early 1330(?)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26 Mar. 1330</td>
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<td>24 Jan. 1331</td>
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<td>1332(–34)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Dec. 1334</td>
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<td>19 Jun. 1342</td>
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<td>29 Nov. 1342</td>
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<td>c. 1345</td>
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<td>Apr. 1347</td>
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<td>Apr. 1347</td>
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<td>c. 1345</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr. 1347</td>
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S o Adrien Douady introduced his thesis some forty years ago, and his words have echoed in my ears many times since I first heard them. To this end I chose to study William of Ockham’s *Opus nonaginta dierum*, which was written in the first half of 1332. The original goal was to produce a study of Ockham’s earliest ‘political’ writings—essentially the *Opus nonaginta dierum* and the first part of the *Dialogus*—in an effort to determine how deep or superficial his mastery of canon law was. This project quickly became too massive and even more quickly too unwieldy to serve as a viable project. Since I found medieval theories of property more interesting than those of heresy, I set aside the *Dialogus* for a later date.

I was fortunate in my narrower topic to be able to benefit from the work of several modern Franciscan editors who had just edited the other major Michaelist writings on Franciscan poverty. We now have an edition of what its editor called the *Improbatio contra libellum domini Iohannis qui incipit ‘Quia vir reprobus’*, written by Francis of Marchia (de Appignano, de Ascoli, de Esculo, de Pignano, and so forth), a lector of the Franciscan convent in Avignon in the 1320s, also known as the *Doctor Succinctus*, and more accessible (and better) versions of the Minister-General, Michael of Cesena’s various writings. The time is surely ripe to take advantage of these developments.

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3. The Michaelists are sometimes referred to as the *Fraticelli de opinione*, but I have preferred to use Michaelist throughout.
4. For the *Improbatio*, see Mariani 1993; it is sometimes known by its incipit in earlier studies: *De patre impio*. Michael’s writings are contained in Gál and Flood 1996, which, although technically a ‘source book’, is an indispensable resource for anyone working in this field, and far more accessible than the BF. (See, however, Miethke 1998, for a more negative—rather too much so—assessment.) Biographical details may be found in the following: *William of Ockham*: Baudry 1950; Brampton 1960a, 1960b, 1962, 1966, 1969; Courtenay 1990, 1999; Etzkorn 1990, 2001; Gál 1982; Kelley 1987; Knysh 1986, 1994; Miethke 1968, 1969, 1994 (a response to Knysh), 2000. Bibliographical guides can be found in Beckham 1992 and Lohr 2005, 249–269. *Bonagrata of Bergamo*: H.-J. Becker...
These new editions allow us to assess Ockham’s contribution to medieval property rights theories much more easily, although we should never forget the pioneering efforts of H. S. Offler in his *apparatus fontium*, and Jürgen Miethke’s *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie* (1969). Now we also have the various papers of Roberto Lambertini as well, who has, amongst his many other studies, tirelessly spent the last several years exploring the interrelationships of the Michaelist corpus. I hope my debt to their work shines through in the notes.

A brief word about my methodology is in order. First of all, I have decided against reviewing the historiography of my subject matter. For many topics there is simply no need to retread ground that has been covered so many times before, and for others there is either too much or too little for it to be a worthwhile or accurate endeavour. The historiography of William of Ockham’s political thought was excellently reviewed by Arthur McGrade some time ago, and recently Takashi Shogimen has done a fair job of recapitulating and updating it (despite how much it has grown since McGrade’s monograph).

In addition to eschewing a historiographical survey, this thesis also assumes that the reader is fairly well acquainted with the broader outlines of the poverty controversy, especially during the pontificate of John XXII. Much has been written about Franciscan poverty and the general contours and key texts of the debate are for the most part well understood. Franciscan poverty tracts following the Council of Vienne (1311–12) deserve

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6. More accurately, Offler revised the work of R. F. Bennett and J. G. Sikes of the first edition of OPol 1 (Sikes et al. 1940), which contained the first (long) six chapters of the OND, while OPol 2 is the fruit of both Sikes and Offler. The revised edition of OPol 1 appeared in 1974 under Offler’s name.

7. McGrade 1974, 28–43; Shogimen 2007, 7–32. See also Parisoli 1998, 6–8, for a brief characterization of the four predominant interpretations of Ockham’s political thought (revolutionary, reactionary, traditionalist, and innovator).

8. The scholarship devoted to Francis of Marchia is exploding as critical editions of his texts continue to appear; see Schabel 2007 for an up-to-date account. For Bonagrattia we now have the extremely detailed work of Eva Luise Wittneben (2003). Michael of Cesena is the most over-looked, partly due to the fact that many of ‘his’ writings were not actually written by him at all (more on this below). The single best study of the Minister-General’s political thought remains, in my opinion, Dolcini 1977.

9. If we limit ourselves to monographs, a deep understanding of the poverty controversy from the time of Francis to Ockham depends on: Burr 1989 and 2001; Damiata 1978–79 (vol. 1); Dufeil 1972; Horst 1996; Lambert 1998; Lambertini 1990 and 2000; Leff 1967, 51–255; Mäkinen 2001; Nold 2003; Tabarroni 1990; and Traver 1996. A succinct overview is Flood 1996; for a short yet fine overview of the controversy leading up to Ockham, see Miethke 1999b, 93–99.
greater attention than they have received, particularly for appreciating Michaelist writings, but I have had to refrain from devoting any serious attention to them.¹⁰

For the texts I do discuss I have opted for a synchronic approach rather than a blow-by-blow account.¹¹ One reason for this decision was that it seemed one of the best ways to decrease the number of places where I would need to repeat myself. As these long tracts are extremely repetitive already this has seemed especially advisable, although there was no way to avoid all repetition. Secondly, because this is ostensibly a thesis that attempts to put Ockham’s theory of property in its proper context, it is more important to have a solid grasp of the theories and sources available to him as a whole than to run through each text in chronological order.

My decision here may frustrate some with respect to Michael’s writings for two reasons. First, it is well-known that Michael of Cesena is not wholly responsible for the texts that appeared in his name. Bonagratia of Bergamo is in fact the likely ghostwriter of ‘Michael’s’ appeals.¹² I have decided to call them Michael’s, however, because he clearly signed off on them as his own, because using ‘Michael’ all the time would be extremely annoying, and because it does not matter who the true author was for Ockham when he composed the _Opus nonaginta dierum_. He doubtlessly knew of Bonagratia’s shadowy role, but in that text there was only an _impugnatus_ (John), an _appellans_ (Michael), and _impugnatores_ (the Michaelists, including Michael’s _Appellatio monacensis_). Throughout Ockham provided the _impugnatores_’ responses to _Quia vir_, which at times meant explaining what the _appellans_ had _really_ meant by a certain phrase or claim. (The Michaelists took a dim view of John’s ability to understand what other people had written.) Those who are particularly annoyed by my separation of Bonagratia and Michael into their own sections are encouraged to read the Michael sections as subsequent elaborations of an earlier Bonagratian position.

The other problem is perhaps more significant. The synchronic method means I treated all of Michael’s writings together. These texts are naturally separated from one another in time, which is itself not a big deal. The problem arises from the fact that it appears that Francis’ _Improbatio_ was begun and/or finished before Michael’s _Appellatio monacensis_. This has been long suspected due to a reference in one of Michael’s letters, but has only recently received serious study. Lambertini has argued that Francis must

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¹⁰ Fortunately one may, in addition to the relevant studies from the note above, consult J. Oakley 1986b.
¹¹ One exception to this is the first few sections of the second chapter where I provide some basic setup for discussing John XXII’s major bulls on Franciscan poverty.
¹² This has been most forcefully argued by Wittneben 2003, esp. 353–79. The crucial starting point, however, was the work H.-J. Becker 1966.
have begun his work early on in 1330. There is at least some truth to this idea, though I do not think the question is definitely settled, for I imagine that these texts were written over an overlapping period of time, and, more importantly, with a lot of informal discussion taking place among all the Michaelist refugees in Munich. The reader should note, though, that the order of presentation adopted here does not try to reflect the historical succession of texts. Since this thesis is mostly unconcerned with dates, I have included a ‘Chronology of the Principal Texts & Events’ to make up for this defect. This should help the reader when I jump from text to text without comment.

As I began the research for what I thought would be a much broader thesis, I also tried to familiarize myself with some of the different critical methodologies available to intellectual historians, not because a rigorous methodology ensures a correct or even useful interpretation, but because I felt that writing history necessarily entails and requires some kind of theory, whether one cares to acknowledge it or not. Avoiding the question of method only serves to obfuscate one’s own biases, not do away with them. I therefore felt that I should be able to explain clearly my own bias and what I had done, and the best way forward seemed to be for me to understand the ways others approach the study of history. Like everything else, this turned out to be a far larger task than I had time for, but certain things did stick with me and they provide a reasonable foil to my own ideas about how this thesis ought to have proceeded. Thanks especially to the original stimulus provided by Elizabeth Clark’s excellent book, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn (2004), I have a much better way of describing my own commitments. This chapter is therefore unabashedly subjective and self-referential; but this is partly to make up for the fact that the remaining chapters read as if I thought of myself as merely an impartial exegete of texts.

This thesis is nominally about William of Ockham, a theologian who did not care to read potentially damning papal constitutions until tapped to do so by a superior


14. For a useful list of papal ‘interpretations’ of aspects of the Franciscan Rule, along with a brief summary of their contents, see Elizondo 1960, 338–55.

15. Cf. De Certeau 1988, 137. De Certeau is discussed by E. A. Clark 2004, 119–24, a book which first showed me the range of competing historiographical theories.

16. I would argue that, technically, this thesis of about H. S. Offler et al.’s Ockham since I worked from their texts, not the one Ockham actually wrote. However, since I hope the correspondence between the two texts is very close, I shall not belabour the point. One not so subtle reminder of this fact is that I refer to Offler, Mariani, Gál & Flood, and so forth in the bibliography, not William, Francis, and Michael. I likewise oppose, in general, the division of bibliographies into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources, although in some circumstances they are justified.
Introduction

(supriore mandante). Following a suggestion of R. G. Collingwood, a proper first question we should ask, is what was this supposedly unwilling theologian trying to do by composing the longest defense of Franciscan poverty ever written? Collingwood argued that a text is meant to answer a specific question, and that it is the job of the historian to determine what question a text was meant to answer. This strikes me as eminently reasonable, and in Ockham’s case I think it breaks down into two famous problems of Ockhamist historiography.

The first has to do with the relationship between Ockham’s ‘philosophical’ and ‘political’ writings. Was Ockham extending his philosophical programme into the sphere of political theory? Can his politics be somehow deduced from his metaphysics? his logic? his epistemology? Or are there actually two Ockhams? A fair amount has been written about this problem, but I do not think it is a particularly serious one. Of course there are not two Ockhams. If we could ask him whether he thought his philosophical views were inconsistent with his political ones, we should bet on him answering in the negative. And since no scholar has argued that his philosophical and political views are inconsistent, there is good reason to place that bet.

How, then, are the two related? Even if they are internally consistent, Charles Zuckerman has argued strenuously that there can be no necessary connection between a person’s metaphysical views about universals and their political views. This seems a reasonable enough thesis given its narrow scope, although it is hard to feel as convinced of this truth as Zuckerman was.

Recently Janet Coleman has tried to draw connections between Ockham’s epistemology (primarily) and his politics. It is an interesting attempt, but altogether too hasty. Coleman believed that she could ‘derive’ aspects of Ockham’s political thought from his earlier philosophical writings. Yet at best she showed only that Ockham’s views are internally consistent: nothing is, in the end, derived. Moreover, the fact that...
committed a few basic errors in her analysis of Ockham’s writings does not fill one with confidence about her broader conclusions.\textsuperscript{25}

A more interesting attempt was made by A. S. McGrade, who followed his excellent \textit{The Political Thought of William of Ockham: Personal and Institutional Principles} (1974), which downplayed but did not dismiss any connections between Ockham’s academic and political writings,\textsuperscript{26} with an article that investigated the possibility of using Ockham’s work in logic as the basis for a study of Ockham’s rights theory. McGrade reached a much more plausible conclusion than other writers. I agree with the sentiment that there are definite affinities between his ‘logical individualism’ and his defense of rights, but that he also realized that the \textit{purpose} of his political writings was not to show their unshakable philosophical foundations but to achieve practical results. In the poverty controversy Ockham wished to convince non-Michaelists of the essential correctness of their position.\textsuperscript{27}

Now presumably Ockham realized that his \textit{Summa logicae} was a little bit beyond the reach of some of this intended audience. So, to adapt McGrade’s argument, it may well be that Ockham felt that ‘an application of his highly technical earlier work on the \textit{Sentences} of Peter Lombard or the logic of Aristotle was the’ worst ‘thing he could do to achieve these goals’.\textsuperscript{28}

I have already suggested that I am curious about the extent of Ockham’s legal knowledge. I am much less surprised by correspondences among Ockham’s own writings than I am between his works and potential juridical sources. But Ockham’s debt to medieval law has not always received the respect it deserves. According to some we should notice or be disappointed by Ockham’s sketchy and shallow legal knowledge,\textsuperscript{29} according to others we should notice and be disappointed by Ockham’s inability to evade the terms of the debate dictated by the pope.\textsuperscript{30} Recently, though unconvincingly, it has been suggested that Ockham reframed the poverty debate in more theological and Bonaventuran terms.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{25} Coleman 1991\textit{b}, 85 and n. 31, e.g., suggests that the \textit{impugnatores} of the \textit{OND} are Ockham’s opponents rather than the Michaelists. She likewise suggested (1991\textit{b}, 79 and n. 11; cf. 2000, 180), that Ockham thought corporations were \textit{persona ficta}, that is ‘represented and imaginary’, and thus unable to exercise real acts or possess real rights. This is either wrong or misleading: all Ockham was arguing was that corporations, \textit{were} they represented and imaginary, would not be able to do these sorts of things; but they are not imaginary, for they in fact consist of individuals.

\textsuperscript{26} See his chapter one in particular, where he surveyed the problem in previous historiography, and the start of chapters three and four.

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. Miethke 1991, 94.

\textsuperscript{28} McGrade 1980, esp. 157, 183.

\textsuperscript{29} Today this is sometimes treated as common knowledge (e.g., Coleman 2000, 169), but earlier the opposite opinion was also expressed; see the survey in Tierney 1954, 41–42.

\textsuperscript{30} Cf. Leff 1967, 250; Tierney 1972, 212.

\textsuperscript{31} Shogimen 2007, 36–71. The discussion of Michael’s writings is too superficial to serve as a real point of comparison; the comments about Michael and Bonagratoria are either incorrect (42) or exaggerated.
In contrast, when I came to this topic I was hoping that Ockham’s arguments would demonstrate an even deeper familiarity with the *ius commune*, since that would have given me a more explosive subject to work with. I do not now think this to be the case, but I also do not think we can fairly qualify Ockham’s juristic dexterity as overly shallow. I do not think anyone deserves ‘credit’ for avoiding legal definitions and concepts, but, if anyone does, it is Francis. As for the idea that Ockham was stuck in the argumentative ruts John had set for him, this only displays an overly simplified reading of the interaction between the two.

The course of the debate ran much differently. As the ‘Chronology’ (p. xii)—itself far from complete—makes clear, there was a far larger series of texts in circulation. The relationship among all the texts is easier to describe in a picture than with words (Fig. 1.1). These inner relationships are even more important to understand for this thesis than knowing their date of composition. A simplified version goes like this. Many texts had been written on evangelical and Franciscan poverty before John drafted the first version of *Ad conditorem*, both for and against some form of the Franciscan position. He even solicited some with his bull *Quia nonnunquam* with the intention of holding a consistory debate on the subject. *Ad conditorem* thus responds to many of these texts, one of which was Bonagratia’s tract on the poverty of Christ and the apostles, while two other important ones were the two documents drafted at Perugia. Bonagratia officially appealed against *Ad conditorem* as the Procurator General of the order. John’s response was to jail Bonagratia and re-draft *Ad conditorem* in a newer, and presumably better, version. *Cum inter* followed a few months later, though the target was different this time. While the first dealt with Franciscan poverty, the second dealt with evangelical poverty. Some see this as a distinction between discipline and doctrine. For the Michaelists, though, the two were entwined.

(46, 60–62); cf. Shogimen 1998, 520–21. And of course the context in which Bonagratia composed his *De paup.* (as a response to *ACC*1) is very different from Ockham’s (as a response to *QVR*). And should we ever really say (62) that the other Michaelists besides William thought Christ’s poverty was (merely) a juristic theory, not a ‘biblical fact’? However, I do find Shogimen’s study commendable and quite convincing in general; he did a fine job by attempting to locate Ockham’s political views in the context of the political discourse of the thirteenth and fourteen centuries.

32. Nold 2003, argued that the *Cronica* of ‘Nicholas the Minorite’ (identified as Nicholas of Freising: G&F, 18*) is of limited historical value since it is the product of post-*QVR* Michaelist concerns. This chronicle apparently paints a black-and-white picture that does not reflect the realities of the early 1320s. That may be, though I find Nold’s argument rather too strongly worded, but luckily the focus here is on the texts themselves, not whether anyone was trying to record a tidied up account of what really happened between John and the Michaelists.

33. These are edited in G&F, 67–70 and 71–83, dated the fourth and seventh of June 1322; they are sometimes known as the shorter and longer Perugian Encyclicals. I count these as part of the ‘various texts’ in the diagram.

The Emperor Louis of Bavaria also contributed to the poverty controversy, doubtlessly at the urging of (some) Franciscan(s), but also because he had his own problems with the pope.\footnote{On this see the recent article of Miethke (2002).} This text, the \textit{Sachsenhausen Appeal}, deals with poverty at the end, responding to some of the claims of \textit{Ad conditorem} and \textit{Cum inter}. It is not a particularly important or savvy treatment of the topic, yet \textit{Quia quorundam} is in large measure a response to this text. \textit{Quia quorundam} also defends his previous bulls on poverty.
Michael’s appeal from Avignon is an outlier to our main concerns, even more so than the Sachsenhausen Appeal because it does not contain any serious evaluation of property or poverty. It deals with Exiit and the fact that John confirmed Clement V’s bull, Exivi, in VII libro—what we call the Clementines. His two Pisan appeals followed shortly, however, and they were detailed responses to the three bulls. The fact that longer and shorter versions were drafted suggests fairly clearly that the Michaelists were interested in promoting their cause beyond the immediate circle of Franciscans.

John responded to the shorter version in Quia vir; there is not much evidence he bothered to read the longer one, and some evidence that he did not. Francis and Michael each responded to Quia vir around the same time; Ockham drafted the Opus nonaginta dierum shortly thereafter. Michael kept to the method of listing and deconstructing the various errors John had made in his bulls. Francis’ approach was to defend the positions taken in the Pisan appeals (particularly the longer one) and at the same time expose John’s errors, which ran from mis-reading Michael’s arguments to getting the historical and theoretical aspects of evangelical poverty just plain wrong—as only a pertinacious heretic could. Ockham mimicked Francis in this way, although he de-personalized it by avoiding proper names. Ockham described himself as a recitator of these people’s opinions, claiming that he would express his own views later on.

This disavowal of authorship is partly to blame for the idea that John set the terms of the debate and Ockham could not fight his way clear of them. It is a rather preposterous idea, however. He did, first of all, inject some of his own views into the debate—unless we attribute everything for which there is no obvious source to other dissidents such as Henry of Thalheim, who did not write any (surviving) tracts of their on the poverty question. The terms of the debate, moreover, evolved only slowly, and they were certainly determined by more people than John. Ockham’s method also means that he was constrained by what Michael had written at least as much by what John had written. Since this was a deliberate choice we should fault him for unoriginality or whatever else as much as we should when we read, say, his commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics.

37. See OND 83.17–27, 644; the corresponding passage of QVR is not discussed by Francis. However, cf. QVR, 593, with App mai., 239.
38. See Accrocca 1994–97, for a brief listing and discussion of the twelve principal errors.
40. Henry, Bonagratia, Francis, and William appear as the authors of the Allegationes religiosorum uiorum: G&F, 524. This text does not deal with poverty. It recites some of the actions taken against Michael and then argues that Michael’s deposition as Minister-General was invalid and that the Chapter held at Paris was not legitimate.
Yet Ockham’s claim to be a mere reciter of the opinions of others has led some to question whether Ockham deserves to be called an author at all. The problem is not as acute in the case of the *Opus nonaginta dierum* as it would be in the later recitative works. In the *Dialogus*, for example, the student asks the master to present an array of answers to his questions, where the master’s own opinion is just one of many—lest he be swayed by the authority of the master. Hardened skeptics will already point to the danger in automatically assuming that the master’s hidden view must necessarily be Ockham’s own, although this strikes me as overly cautious. The *Opus nonaginta dierum*, in contrast, only has two competing points of view: the pope’s and the Michaelists’. Ockham admitted that there are differences to be found in the details of the Michaelist arguments, but Ockham argued that these were of small importance: on the larger issues all the Michaelists were agreed.

Perhaps we can leave this issue behind us by pointing out that Ockham was certainly the author in the most obvious sense of all: he had conceived of and written a massive, complicated text that would report the various Michaelist claims in relation to what John had written.

Even more than to Collingwood, my approach to Ockham’s texts owes a debt to Quentin Skinner’s version of contextualism, or as some insist, conventualism. I think many of Skinner’s points about method are valuable, but I have certainly not attempted a slavish or even a rigorous application of his method; it has, however, guided my own research and writing more than anything else. The merits of Skinner’s approach were first made plain to me when I was working on another famous text about property: Thomas More’s *Utopia*. Although hints of Skinner’s method were apparent in his review of the Yale Edition of *Utopia*, it was his later essay on *Utopia*, a wide-ranging and yet tightly argued reading of the text in the context of contemporary humanist concerns, that led me to read some of his works on theory.

41. See, e.g., the discussion in Brett 1997, 56 n. 23.
43. *OND* 124.463–466, 857; see Baudry 1950, 158.
44. Cf. Offler’s comments at *OPol* 2.xv. Miethke 1969, 432, has also pointed out that Ockham was accustomed to canvassing other people’s opinions before providing his own in his academic writings.
45. Bevir 1999, 40–42. Bevir’s book was the first that made me think about the shortcomings of contextualism (where conventualism is a subset of general contextualism). Entirely coincidentally I came to read that Skinner also claimed to be influenced by Collingwood (1974, 283–84). See also the helpful discussion in Hamilton-Bleakley 2006, 22–23.
46. Skinner 1967, notably his preference for Hexter’s introductory essay, ‘*Utopia* and Its Historical Milieu’, over Surtz’ on More’s alleged sources.
Skinner’s contextualism can be summarized in fairly simple terms. One aspect of his theory has to do with agency. With regard to understanding texts, Skinner argued that there are two related questions which we must answer: first, the issue of understanding what the text means; second, what the author may have meant. Naturally, we must finally decide whether the author meant what he or she wrote. He was adamant, though, that the meaning of the text cannot be entirely synonymous with the author’s intentions for the simple reason that a complex text contains more ‘meaning’ than an author could have ever intended to put into it.

To get at what the author was up to ‘in writing’ his text, he relied first of all upon James Austin’s theory of speech acts, particularly Austin’s claims about a statement’s ‘intended illocutionary force’. In order to understand a statement, we must grasp this force in addition to the meaning of a statement. The problem of uncovering an author’s intentions can be difficult at times, not least because authors regularly achieve more or less than they ‘intended’ to. Similarly, we occasionally face texts where the writer (wrongly) assumed that his or her audience would have no trouble ‘securing the “uptake”’ of the intended illocutionary act. However, although there are times when it is difficult to discover the the intended illocutionary force, he argued that it is probably not usually that difficult to imagine that if an utterance (of the text) ‘constitutes a retort’ to some argument, then this is to be explained by the fact that its author intended the utterance to be precisely this retort. Readers can usually secure the ‘uptake’ of—that is, correctly grasp—an author’s illocutionary act. Elsewhere he argued as self-evident that for works ‘centered on a definite polemical point or purpose’, ‘this purpose should be one which the author has consciously formulated to himself’. To understand the illocutionary act, therefore, is to understand the author’s primary intentions for its utterance.

49. There is an uncomfortable elision between the act of speech and text in Skinner’s theoretical writings. He argued that ‘texts are acts’, but others have doubted it is that simple: E. A. Clark 2004, 139. I feel that much of what he has said about speech acts is applicable to written texts, but his objectors certainly have a point as well.
51. Austin 1962, a text which I have not read. See Skinner 1972, and as well as 2002, 1.90–102 and 1.103–127.
54. There are both illocutionary forces, which are an exploitable feature of language, and illocutionary acts, which are what agents do when they exploit these forces in communication; Skinner 2002, 1.109. It is important to bear this distinction in mind, for Skinner jumps back and forth quickly between the two.
57. Skinner 2002, 1.98. One thing we must beware is eliding the difference between motives and intentions. Motives—knowing about ‘what prompted’ a speech act independent of their ‘character and truth-
Although I realize this is not a claim that will satisfy everybody, in large measure I suspect that this is true: usually authors of polemical texts are intentionally trying to communicate a point and they are intentionally trying to take the necessary steps for it to be understood in the way they want it to be. Unless there seem to be reasons against adopting this assumption for a particular text, we should feel confident about the author’s intentions. Conversely, if our reading of the different parts of the text seems to lead to a coherent interpretation (and coherence is an expected feature of that particular text), then it is reasonable to proceed, cautiously, on the presumption that we are proceeding in the right vein.

Here is an example.\textsuperscript{58} Imagine John says to William, ‘There is an angry dragon in that cave next to you’. For William to understand what is going on, he not only needs to understand the literal meaning of the words, but also to know what John ‘was doing in saying what he said’. Let us say that John was warning William of the angry dragon; according to Skinner we should say that John’s statement was made with the illocutionary force of a warning. (It is for this reason that Skinner insists that the illocutionary force must be deliberate and voluntary.) Other consequences may follow: he may have managed to persuade William not to enter the cave, or refrain from entering it. But these are achieved by the saying, not in the saying; Austin labelled these consequences ‘perlocutionary’. In short, the (speech) act of warning includes not only the utterance with the form and force of a warning, but we must also ‘mean or intend it to be taken as a warning or its being recognised as an instance of just that intentional act’.

For an author to rely on a text to be recognised as, say, a warning means he must write according to the prevailing conventions of his time. (Other intentions may of course require bending, distorting, or even writing against these conventions.) Thus, the second characteristic of his approach is to stress the importance of context for getting at a text’s or author’s meaning in terms of its illocutionary force. This context is not merely the social context in which a text was written, but represents an attempt to see the text ‘as a meaningful item within a wider context of conventions and assumptions, a context which serves to endow its constituent parts with meaning while attaining its own meaning from the combination of its constituent parts’. Although Skinner argued against exaggerating the value of context,\textsuperscript{59} we must recover at least the ‘prevailing conventions status as utterances’—are not necessarily relevant to the interpretation of a text. Motives actually affect the critic more than is perhaps desirable: knowing that a work was motivated by envy might not tell us much about its meaning, but it is likely to change critics’ reaction if they had previously, but wrongly, thought the work had been written simply to enlighten or amuse. See Skinner 2002, 1.96, 98.

\textsuperscript{58} Adapted from Skinner 2002, 1.104–05.

\textsuperscript{59} Skinner 1975, 227; text and context form a ‘hermeneutic circle, not a means of breaking out of it’. See the more general comments in Skinner 1978, 1.x–xiii.
and assumptions’ if we want to ‘interpret the meaning of a literary text’. The idea is that we should try to uncover what would have been considered a reasonable point of view for the author to have held at a specific time and place.

Contextually speaking, Skinner took up an idea of Wolfgang Iser’s that there are three general ways a text may be related to its background, a spectrum in Skinner’s formulation, which I find a useful way to think about polemical texts. The ‘dominant’ end is comprised of texts where the author’s aim was to ‘affirm a prevailing set of values or attitudes’; the middle of the spectrum is occupied by works where the author’s goal was to submit the ‘ideas or events of the age to discussion and debate’; and the ‘negative’ end is occupied by works in which the ‘aim is fundamentally to reject some cherished value or assumption’.

How, then, does this relate to Ockham? Let us return to the two basic questions Skinner would have us answer. First what is the meaning of the text? I think there are two important ways we should construe ‘meaning’ here. The first is what we might call the simple literal meaning, but we could also think of it as analogous to the (innovative) ‘super litteram’ section Ockham included at the end of each chapter where he discussed the literal meaning of various words and phrases. The second way we need to think about this question is when we take ‘meaning’ in the sense of what Ockham meant by what he wrote in the Opus nonaginta dierum. The second sense of meaning corresponds to the second question: what did Ockham mean by what he wrote?

Regarding this last sense of meaning, it seems to me that we should begin by looking at Ockham’s professed reasons for writing the Opus nonaginta dierum. He suggests a few in the prologue which are worth noting. He began by noting that some people have attacked John’s constitution, Quia vir. He claimed next that truth shines more in the light, the more effectually it has been examined and probed. Since this is what several (nonnulli) people have done by attacking Quia vir, ipsorum motiva duxi praesentibus inserenda, ut, utriusque partis allegationibus intellectis, ipsa veritas clarius elucescat. Ut autem apertius dictae constitutionis sciatur

60. Skinner 1975, 216. He felt this was especially true for heteronomous texts: ‘It seems in short that with strongly heteronomous texts it must be a necessary condition of any purportedly good reading that it should also be a correct one, in the sense that it begins by correctly identifying the polemical purposes of the work, pivoting the rest of its analysis around that central point’ (224). Strongly autonomous texts are a somewhat different matter.


64. Named meaning in Skinner 2002, 1.93. I omit meaning, or meaning in the sense of what this text means to me. It goes without saying that this thesis is the product of what everything I have read means to me.
intentio qualiterque contra ipsam obiectiones adversariorum procedunt magis appareat, ne quis dicat quod verba, non mentem, impugnant, tota constitutio per particulæ cum reprobationibus est ponenda; deinde obiectiones et responsiones impugnantium annectentur. Ad subiciendas vero obiectiones, cum nesciam, minime respondebo; sed quod constitutionis conditor antedictae respondeat, ardenter affecto.

Ockham has as his goal nothing more than having the truth—perhaps we should say the Truth—shine forth more clearly! What he takes to be the prerequisite for this, though, is what is interesting. We, the audience, must learn both the intention of *Quia vir* and how these several people have responded to it—and not only so far as the words, but *Quia vir*’s very meaning. I take it Ockham had in mind a point similar to Skinner: we must determine the (basic, literal) meaning of the words, sentences, and propositions, and the author’s meaning, the ‘illocutionary force’.  

Perhaps the most significant point to notice, though, is that Ockham said that he would not give responses to the claims of these *impugnatores* because he does not know how to. Should we read the last clause ironically then? Did he hope the pope would respond once more so that the Truth would shine forth even more clearly? or did he think that the pope’s only ingenuous response was to admit the errors of his ways? These questions may never be answered with any degree of certainty, but my suspicion is that Ockham was indeed being disingenuous: if the pope responded, the Truth would shine forth even more clearly because either he would admit that the Michaelists were right or he would be forced into even more convoluted and ridiculous claims than he had already made in *Quia vir*.

More importantly, since Ockham did exactly what he claims he would do in the prefatory comments to his work, I take these comments as an accurate representation of Ockham’s illocutionary force in writing what he did. The *Opus nonaginta dierum* thus represents an illocutionary act of explaining the polemical positions of the pope and his attackers—but explaining the pope’s ‘real’ meaning, and explaining how the Michaelists

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66. Let us not exaggerate Ockham’s novelty here. Nicholas, the compiler of the Michaelist dossier known as the *Chronica* wrote something similar in his introduction to 3 opp., 479: ‘Nonnullae oppositiones contra supra dictam sive provocationem praefati fratris, Michaelis, generalis ministri, factae fuerunt, quae cum suis responsionibus ponuntur ut sequitur, ut plenius discussa veritas elucescat.’ One gets the sense that the Michaelists often felt that if people heard the arguments on both sides it would be clear who had the right of everything.
67. The post-*QVR* Michaelist texts often make a point about the pope misunderstanding Michael’s *intentio* or *mens*, or about what John’s ‘actual’ *intentio* or *mens* was (despite his own claims to the contrary).
68. It is worth noting that this is a rather different stance than the one adopted in *OQ* prol.10–21, 1.15; cf. 8.9.39–45, 1.217. And it is a far cry indeed from the introductory comments made in the *Improbatio* and *App.mon.*
respond to his claims. As for the intended perlocutionary consequences of writing these words, the most obvious one is that of alerting the text’s audience to the truth of the matter regarding the nature of evangelical and thus Franciscan poverty. It is a good rhetorical trick to at once disavow giving your own opinion to a problem and yet claim that you could not imagine how to respond to one side of the debate.

For the preceding paragraph to be accurate, of course, we must investigate the literal meaning of the text. At this stage Ockham’s illocutionary intentions are somewhat irrelevant. But if, for instance, he misrepresented his confreres’ words and arguments, or said (unintentionally) some ridiculous or impossible things about property rights, then we need to reassess Ockham’s claims about what he was doing in writing the *Opus nonaginta dierum*.

The bulk of this thesis incidentally answers questions like these simply by examining Ockham’s theory of property rights in the context of what other Michaelists had written. If I may spoil the surprise, one implicit argument of my thesis is that he does not misrepresent the basic Michaelist position, which means he achieved what he said he wanted to; we are, therefore, free to decide for ourselves whether the Michaelist position on the dispensability of property rights is coherent and viable, and—what was more important to fourteenth-century readers—scripturally founded.

This brings us again to the issue of context. It is a widely known criticism of contextualism that contexts are problematic. Skinner downplayed the difficulty of establishing the proper context when he wrote,

> The appropriate context for understanding the point of such writers’ utterances will always be whatever context enables us to appreciate the nature of the intervention constituted by their utterances [i.e., what they were doing in writing that text]. To recover that context in any particular case, we may need to engage in extremely wide-ranging as well as detailed historical research.69

We should note that he did not establish general criteria by which we could infallibly determine the proper context and its extent. However, I doubt he thought we could ever give some formula to this end. I cannot hope to solve this general problem, but let me address one specific issue. This problem is the selection of contexts; Dominic LaCapra once complained that historians fail ‘to explain how historians select the contexts they find pertinent’.70 Clark’s corrective regarding the usefulness of contextualization is that we must remember that ‘contexts may be either unknown or multiple, are variously assigned

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by different readers, and largely come to scholars of premodernity in already-textualized form’.71

My solution may be of limited usefulness, but it seems the only way forward is to describe the context I have deemed appropriate. I agree that any given context is likely to require both detailed and wide-ranging coverage; but ‘wide-ranging’ can in fact turn out to be limitless. Even, I think, specifically-chosen contexts can be effectively limitless. In fact, I would have preferred to have employed a far wider context than I have been able to do, but the constraints of time and space have precluded this possibility.72

Since I wanted to explore the legal dimensions of Ockham’s theory of property rights in a text where he disavowed introducing explicitly any points of his own, there are two obvious contexts that must be considered. First, we have to evaluate what the other Michaelists wrote; and not simply by literal textual comparison either: it is important to see how the theories of property rights matched conceptually—not only because I was interested in these theories at that level, but because one can use different words to mean the same thing.

Medieval jurists comprise the other context. This is due to the fact that I anticipated Ockham’s originality in the *Opus nonaginta dierum* to be more pronounced and I thought that a comparison with the texts of medieval jurists would be particularly enlightening. This has not worked out the way I thought it would, but I think this is still a useful context to employ for the simple reason that it is a context that has not been fully explored, especially within the context of Michaelist writings, which have been explored even less.73

Let us return to the other part of context that Skinner discussed. If we can relate a text to the contextual background in three basic ways as affirming a dominant attitude, neutrally questioning some of the dominant attitudes of the day, or challenging them, how does Ockham’s text fit in? I think we can answer this in a couple of ways. The format that Ockham utilized is clearly meant to relate to the general discussion of evangelical poverty in a ‘neutral’ way. He wrote as much in the prologue. Yet, as I have suggested, by doing this he hoped to show that the Michaelist position is correct; that is, he thought his text would reaffirm the Michaelist theory of evangelical poverty as both the correct

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72. The most obvious lacuna in my thesis is that I ignore virtually all of the poverty texts prior to the 1320s (partly on the assumption that Ockham did not read most of them himself). The same is true regarding earlier publicist literature, although Georges de Lagarde (1962, 78), has suggested that Ockham did not read widely in the previous *de potestate papae* literature; cf. Luscombe 1999, 100.
73. This is not to say that there have been no important studies on the legal context. Kriechbaum 1996, Tarello 1964, and Tierney 1997a, e.g., are key in this respect. But none of these studies fully engages with the Michaelists whole theory of property rights.
and dominant theory, while John’s was the one that deserved scorn. We of course also need to consider how Ockham’s text fares against the wider canvas of juristic thought about property and poverty; that is, can we characterize in any way Michaelist views about property as challenging or reaffirming the dominant juridical views of the time? I shall return to this in the concluding chapter.

The structure of the thesis should be apparent to all, but the order of composition will not be. Once I had settled on the more limited scope of the thesis, I first wrote out a comprehensive account of Ockham’s theory of poverty. This allowed me to determine what terminology I needed to focus on when I turned to other texts and authors. At that point I wrote Chapter 2, which describes the major features of John’s theory of property rights, both in terms of his arguments and conclusions. Not much effort is made to contextualize his arguments, since he is supposed to be the context for Ockham, but the other chapters will shed light on much of what John wrote.74

The other chapters do not proceed individual by individual, but term by term. (The original chapter on Ockham was cruelly dismembered and revised to fit the current format.) Chapter 3 examines *ius*, which is commonly translated into English as either ‘law’ or ‘right’, as, for example, could the French *droit*, the German *Recht*, or the Italian *diritto*. In the first few sections of this chapter I look briefly at how *ius* is employed in the opening sections of the *Digest* and *Institutes* and the *Decretum*. Coupled with these is a brief examination of how two civilian glossators, Azo and Accursius, and several decretists commented on these opening sections. The focus here is primarily on *ius*-as-law, not because I think that medieval jurists had no conception of ‘subjective’ rights, but because I think that in these sections the emphasis is on the law sense of *ius*, particularly divine law, natural law, and positive (or human or civil) law. The remaining sections examine the Michaelist writings, beginning with Bonagratia, and passing on to Michael, Francis, and William. This order is maintained for the other chapters as well.

Chapter 4 takes up the topic of *dominium*, which I consistently translate as ‘lordship’ throughout this thesis. I am aware that *dominium* need not have a proprietary connota-

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74. One problem this gives rise to is that I treat John’s bulls and the Michaelist texts as both merely argumentative texts. It is important to remember that *Ad conditorem*, *Cum inter*, and *Quia quorundam* (but not *Quia vir*, perhaps only because it was written too late?) were incorporated into the *Corpus iuris canonici* as the *Extravagantes Iohannis XXII*, and that a case can therefore be made that we should approach them in a qualitatively different way than I have done. I think this is a problem that deserves serious study; however, I have not done so here because the Michaelists manifestly did not consider these texts as anything but proof of the pope’s manifest heresy, and as texts that needed disproving, although they did acknowledge that Jesselin de Cassagnes compiled and glossed a text known as the *Extravagantes*. See G&F, 415–16. On Jesselin, who was about as staunch a supporter of papal *plenitud potestatis* as they came, see Tarrant 1979.
tion;\textsuperscript{75} in fact, although he was worse than the Michaelists in defining his terms, I believe that John did not always mean it in this way. The same is partly true, I believe, of the Michaelists when they discussed the problem of the \textit{dominium temporale} of Christ (a topic introduced by John). However, I believe lordship is the best term to use in the context of this debate for a few reasons. First by ‘lordship’ I mean something like ‘proprietary lordship’: the controversy after all was about whether various people had property rights, and \textit{dominium} was the most extensive property right one could have under Roman law. We should also be certain that the controversialists usually meant \textit{dominium} in this proprietary way because the word was almost always paired with \textit{proprietas}. Occasionally they even wrote things like ‘iure dominii’ or ‘dominia proprietatis’.

\textit{Proprietas} has caused its own problems for some scholars, but only because they insist in translating the word by its English cognate, ‘property’.\textsuperscript{76} I do not devote a specific section to the word \textit{proprietas}, so it is important to discuss it briefly here. I am of course aware that \textit{proprietas} can be translated felicitously as ‘property’ in many cases. I agree that it is true that the Franciscans do not want to have any property in the modern sense of the term. But it is not that they just wanted to avoid having property: they wanted to avoid having property rights. Property to my mind is too easily confused with things, and the Michaelists did not deny that they had things, but that they held property rights to these things. It is for this reason that I translate \textit{proprietas} by ‘ownership’.\textsuperscript{77}

Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the thorny problem of \textit{usus}, first in general, then as it relates to consumables or fungibles. By this point, we are able to draw on the various distinctions made about \textit{ius} and \textit{dominium} to understand what was at stake between John and the Michaelists. \textit{Usus} is analyzed into its constituent types, of which the two most important are \textit{ius utendi} and \textit{usus facti}. It is in chapter 5 that we see the greatest divergence of views among the Michaelists, although it is perhaps easy to exaggerate these differences. Consumables seem to constitute a special category when it comes to use since using them means they are consumed. They thus deserve separate treatment. It is also one place where we see Ockham has truly provided an answer that no one else had previously developed.

In one sense the topic of consumables represents a specifically Franciscan problem. The same is true of Chapter 7, which deals with one of the least well studied aspects of Franciscan poverty, namely its corporate aspect. It is surprising how little attention

\textsuperscript{75} Cf. the cautionary remarks of Willoweit 1974, 135, and Lahey 2008 (§ 2). Coleman 1988 remains a useful survey of the topic.

\textsuperscript{76} A helpful discussion of the term in Roman law is Willoweit 1974, 139-41.

\textsuperscript{77} However, I have consistently translated \textit{proprietarius} as ‘property-holder’ rather than ‘property-rights-holder’.
Introduction

this topic has received since it was this feature of Franciscan poverty that originally set them apart from the other mendicant orders, and it is often the reason why Franciscan poverty has been thought of as a convenient ‘fiction’. Originally I had tried to treat this topic within the body of the other chapters, but this proved to be too awkward, so I decided to devote a separate chapter to this problem. Unfortunately some overlap with the previous discussions seems unavoidable. I have also given some consideration to Innocent IV’s views on what we might call corporation theory, since he is famous for both his so-called fiction theory of corporations and for inaugurating the papal overlordship (retentio dominii) of the things given or bequeathed to the Franciscan order. Since John renounced this lordship in Ad conditorem and denied the possibility of a corporate entity having any use but that of right because corporations are, legally, merely fictive and represented people, an examination of Innocent’s writings on the subject only seemed appropriate.78

A conclusion and three appendices round out the thesis. The conclusion summarizes the basic Michaelist position, and highlights some of the more interesting differences the Michaelist texts demonstrate. It also examines many of the clusters of legal references Ockham cited and Offler identified in the light of the other texts and with respect to what we can find in the Glossa ordinaria. It is not a comprehensive examination, but it does show that Ockham relied on canon law and not Roman law to make his arguments. That is, he did some ‘original research’ in the Corpus iuris canonici while writing the Opus nonaginta dierum, but he did not make the same effort with respect to Roman law. I suggest one reason why this might be the case.

The first appendix compares how Michael adapted a key passage of Bonaventure’s Apologia pauperum to suit his own ends in the Appellatio maior. I have included this appendix because I ended up referring to it a lot and it seemed best to put it in a convenient place. Neither Francis nor William ever referred to this passage of Bonaventure’s or Michael’s, but there are times when an understanding of what Michael did helps us see what Francis or William were up to. (Bonagratia’s texts, of course, predate the longer Pisan appeal.) The second appendix compares how the texts of John, Michael, Francis, and William compare structurally. It is useful if one wants to locate quickly how the Michaelist response differed (or not) with respect to Quia vir, or how Quia vir relates to the Appellatio minor, since it determined the bull’s own structure. I explain this in

78. Even so, it must be said that this treatment of medieval corporation theory differs dramatically from the standard concerns of medieval historiography, which are usually interested in issues of ‘representation’—e.g., how and under what circumstances a churchman might represent his church, prebend, diocese, etc.—and its ties to subsequent conciliar theories. On these more typical topics, the classic work was revised not long ago: Tierney 1998. A useful recent addition is Pennington 2004.
more detail in the appendix. The last appendix lists all the legal references made in the principal texts under consideration. This will be primarily of use in the conclusion so I shall refrain from mentioning it again, save only to note that although I thought the tedious task of tabulating hundreds of references would be more revealing than it turned out to be, it is still revealing nonetheless. It will be important for deciding the question of both Ockham’s originality and whether he wrote a ‘legalistic’ text—and whether we should mean that in a perjorative way.

A final word should be said about the conventions I have used. Although I follow classical spelling and orthography myself, I have always followed the choices of the editor(s) when quoting a text; it is, after all, their text that I am using. However, I have not hesitated to modify capitalization silently to fit quotations into my own sentences. In the case of the early (re-)printed law books, I have standardized orthographical conventions with a view to classical Latin, but retained the spelling of the text. For all texts I have modernized legal citations, and I have not hesitated to correct references when necessary; these are marked by a ‘(!)’ in the reference.

John’s bull, Quia vir, presents a somewhat unique problem because it exists in multiple versions, and none of them can be considered critical editions. Chapter 2 was originally written using the version of the bull as printed in the Opus nonaginta dierum; later I decided that it would be better to use the version of Nicholas’ Chronica for John’s chapter, but use the text of the Improbatio for Francis’ and that of the Opus nonaginta dierum for William’s. Michael’s would fall back on Nicholas’ since it was part of the same dossier of texts. Although I originally used cross-references to all three texts in the footnotes, this was too tedious and error-prone a chore; Appendix B now provides that functionality instead.

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79. My debt to the editors of these texts should be apparent to all, but I should also make special mention of some of the translations of Ockham’s works that I found useful: Brett 1998; Kilcullen and Scott 2001; Kilcullen et al. 1995; McGrail 1992; McGrail and Kilcullen 1995; and Nederman 2002. Where the text has already been translated, I read through the text in translation first to get a quick overview of the text; but my discussions of these works are based on Ofler’s editions. Obviously, the same could be said of other translated and oft-cited texts.
chapter two

THE POSITION OF JOHN XXII

JoHN XXII, born Jacques Duèse, was elected pope in 1316, shortly after Michael of Cesena was elected Minister General of the Franciscan Order. Both took office after a two-year vacancy, which, itself had come a mere two years after Clement V tried to resolve the spiritual-conventual conflict through the publication of the bull, *Exivi de paradiso* (6 May 1312). Opinions are divided as to whether *Exivi* would have at long last provided a workable solution, though it seems unlikely. In any event, the death of Clement (20 April 1314), and that of Franciscan Minister General, Alexander of Alexandria, six months later, made the question academic. Yet *Exivi* had raised hopes on both sides of the conflict, and the subsequent vacancies dashed them. The collapse of central control, Lambert has noted, allowed for a ‘resumption of persecution’, which, in turn, provided the ‘stimulus to rank heresy’.

1. De regia potestate et papali 22.9–11 (Bleienstein 1969, 195). Significant portions of this chapter and the subsequent sections devoted to William of Ockham appeared in Robinson 2009. I wish to thank Franciscan Studies for allowing me to re-use parts of this paper here.
2. For what is known of his early life see Weakland 1972; the account of John’s pontificate in Renouard 1970 should generally be avoided.
4. On the ‘Clementine Settlement’, see Burr 2001, 111–77, who has noted (159–61) that even Franciscans wavered in how much they supported Clement’s solution, and that we must wonder whether even Clement would have found his solution workable in the long run (202). Miethke 1969, 358–59, was also skeptical of its long-term success; cf. Miethke 2000, 269, Nimmo 1987, 122, on the other hand, has described it as the ‘crowning declaration’ of all bulls dealing with Franciscan poverty.
5. Moorman 1968, 309. In fact, Angelo argued that the spirituals were persecuted more harshly after the conclusion of the Council of Vienne; see Historia, sexta tribulatio (Rossini 1999, 287–88), and Burr 2001, 161–64, for commentary. On the issue of how trustworthy Clareno is, particularly under the ‘tribulation’ of John XXII, see Burr 2005, esp. 286–87.
2.1 From Spiritual Suppression to Conventual Condemnation

Both Michael and John moved with some speed to rectify the lawless state they inherited. At Assisi, Michael and some confreres went to work on revising their order’s statutes (along the lines of those done some fifty years earlier at Narbonne), and he sent out an encyclical that emphasized the importance of observing a regular discipline.\(^7\) The pope, on the other hand, began by summoning friars to Avignon, notably Ubertino of Casale and Angelo Clareno.\(^8\) In terms of the later Michaelist-John poverty controversy, one of the chief results of the pope’s early interest in the spirituals was the bull *Quorundam exigit* (7 October 1317).\(^9\) Although clearly a disciplinary bull in nature, it does provide a definite hint as to what direction John would take in the next decade. That is, *Quorundam exigit* demonstrates that of the three traditional monastic vows, John clearly felt that poverty was the least important:

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\text{Magna quidem paupertas, sed maior integritas, horum est obedientia maximum, si custoditur illesa. Nam prima rebus, secunda carni, tertia uero menti donatur et animo, quos uelut effrenes et liberos ditioni alterius humilis iugo proprie uoluntatis astringit.}\]

There has been some confusion as to how we should translate *integritas*. If simply translated into the English word that resembles it most, it seems as if John is simply making a point about keeping the order whole, that the rift in the order needs to be healed, and that it is obedience rather than poverty which is the greatest means to this end.\(^11\) But as the second sentence makes clear, to translate it thus is incorrect: John was making a point about the three vows. As such, we must translate the word as ‘chastity’, or ‘continence’, and take him to be comparing the relative importance of these vows.\(^12\) In the pope’s opinion, poverty is no doubt important, but it pales in comparison to the

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\(^7\) Baudry 1950, 103–05; Moorman 1968, 310. Burr 2001, 169–70, has highlighted the danger of assuming that Michael of Cesena was elected ‘precisely because’ he was predisposed against the spirituals since his early actions seem ‘evenhanded, attacking excesses of every sort’.

\(^8\) Historia, sexta tribulatio (Rossini 1999, 289–90). Some useful studies of these two on evangelical poverty: Daniel 1973; Davis 1975; Davis 1984; J. Oakley 1986b, 55–67;

\(^9\) Edited in Tarrant 1983, 163–98. One sign that John perhaps did not plan on moving from the spiritual ‘problem’ to a re-evaluation of the whole role the Franciscans should play in the Church is the fact that he described *Exiit* and *Exivi* as decrees ‘super intellectu et obseruantia regule ordinis fratrum minorum declarationes salubriter editas, solidas quidem claras et lucidas multaque maturitate digestas’; *QE* 8–10 (Tarrant 1983, 163–64).


\(^12\) As Moorman 1968, 311; and Burr 2001, 196–97, understood. However, it is possible that John wanted us to keep both meanings in mind.
need for obedience. The use of ‘humilis’ was an added barb, for *humilitas* was no less important to Francis than *paupertas*.

The point about obedience was an old one, stretching all the way back to Francis himself. In short, the problem was that the friars were obliged to obey their superiors in everything—except what was not damaging to the soul or contrary to their rule. Everyone naturally agreed that, as Franciscans, they needed to obey their superiors, but not everyone agreed upon what was salutary and in harmony with their rule. In the case of clothing, like much else, Clement had tried to compromise. So-called cheapness of clothing (*vilitas vestium*) was to be observed by all brothers, but there could be no single definition of what that meant since the environments in which the friars lived could vary quite dramatically. Thus, just what constituted cheapness had to be determined by the ministers, custodians, and guardians of each region. David Burr once wrote that the end result was that disaffected subordinates still felt they were ‘left with the responsibility of judging whether their superiors [were] within the accepted parameters’.

The double vacancy paradoxically made it difficult for the spirituals to work within the law, but served them well when they chose to stray from it. With the election of Michael of Cesena as Minister General, and the election of John XXII shortly thereafter, the situation changed yet again. Michael made it clear how little he cared for the spiritual cause, which left the dissidents with but one option: John.

John became the ‘linchpin of their entire defense’—but only if he agreed with them. The pope, however, chose to side with the conventuals, and *Quorundam exigit* is the best

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14. The clearest example of how confusing it could be to know when to obey or not obey comes from Francis’ *Admonitiones* 3.5–11 (Esser 1978, 64–65). See also *Epistola ad fideles* (*Recensio posterior*) 40–41, *Regula non bullata* 5.2–3 (Esser 1978, 121, 250), and the remarks of Nimmo 1987, 34–47, and Taglioni 2000, 176–77.


16. Burr 2001, 164. That is to say, although *Exivi* tried to confirm that the guardians would insist on a reasonably strict interpretation of Franciscan poverty, and which would not be open to a general debate, those unhappy with their apparently lax superiors were wont to place undue stress on the phrase ‘ita tamen, quod servent [the superiors] in vestibus vilitatem’.


18. J. Oakley 1986b, 67, has suggested that Ubertino da Casale, unwittingly or not, urged a re-opening of the poverty question in the course of his defense of Peter Olivi. It is an intriguing suggestion.

early example of this. On the point about *vilitas*, John explained that the superiors not only decide what clothing is to be worn but also whether it is being maintained.

*Quorundam exigit* also supported the storage of certain consumables, such as wheat and wine, which also did not sit well with the spirituals. Michael, however, used the statements of *Quorundam exigit* as the basis of his investigation of the spirituals detained at Avignon, starting 12 October 1317. Meanwhile, John focused on reining in the other dissidents. To this effect, John published two more bulls within one month of each other, *Sancta romana* (30 December 1317) and *Gloriosam ecclesiam* (23 January 1318), in which he emphasized that it was the Franciscan leaders who are to decide how Franciscans are to live, and that the friars are to be obedient to them (and, a fortiori, that John himself is to be obeyed). Poverty was not yet as serious an issue as it would become, though doubtlessly it lay in the back of everybody’s minds.

It would not be long, however, before the problem of poverty bubbled back to the surface in Avignon. The nature of the link between poverty and obedience was such for the Franciscans that the one always led back to the other. Thus it was that within a few years of the sad tale of the four spirituals being burnt at the stake in the spring of 1318 for withholding their obedience, John had put Niccolo da Prato, cardinal bishop of Ostia, in charge of investigating Olivi’s Apocalypse commentary, and the Minorite view came under fire once again.

The story is a familiar one, famously opening the *Chronica* of ‘Nicholas the Minorite’. Briefly, the story goes like this. Jean de Beaune, a Dominican inquisitor, came across a beguin who insisted that he believed in the absolute poverty of Christ and the apostles.

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20. This is not to say that *QE* was John’s first move in this direction, but the early history has been described elsewhere (e.g., Burr 2001, Damiata 1978–79, Horst 1992, Lambert 1998, Leff 1967, Moorman 1968), and is not directly relevant to John’s theory of ownership.

21. *QE* 174–185 (Tarrant 1983, 177–78). As Burr 2001, 201, has noted, from John’s perspective it was preposterous to imagine that it was up to the ‘subordinates to assume that they could measure their superiors’ decisions on specific practices against some theoretical standard of poverty’.


25. As is well-known, the first sentence of the *RegB* seemingly links the Gospel with ‘vivendo in obedientia, sine proprio et in castitate’ (Esser 1978, 226–7). Peter Olivi was also keenly aware of this connection, and repeatedly claimed that the pope could not modify the vow of evangelical poverty, or expect obedience if he tried to do so; see, e.g., *QPE* 16 ad 12 (Burr and Flood 1980, 57–58).


27. For details, see Burr 2001, 206–12.

Jean, following standard practice, consulted with a number of local experts. One of these was Berengar Talon, a Franciscan lector, who explained that rather than heretical, this was the view of the entire Franciscan order, and enshrined in the decretal Exiit. Undeterred, Jean responded by accusing Berengar of heresy as well, unless he were to revoke his claim. Berengar, of course, was unwilling to do so, and instead—not surprisingly, given the historical success of this method—he appealed to the pope. As David Burr has said, ‘John reacted vigorously and, one suspects, enthusiastically’. The difference this time around, however, was that the reigning pope was not so certain that any Franciscan position on poverty was correct. Rather than putting an end to a small debate in Narbonne, the appeal served as a pretext for a re-opening of the ‘poverty question’.

2.2 John’s Early Account of Poverty: Ad conditorem canonum, redactio prima

No one, I think, would accuse John of being an un-opinionated pontiff, but he has not always been given the credit due him. For instance, John was probably not as rash as it would sometimes seem (as, e.g., Angelo Clarenio has portrayed him), and though he was fond of the academic jousting found in the consistory debates of Avignon, they were not without purpose. Such is true, at least, of the controversy over Christ’s poverty. If

30. Burr 2001, 263; cf. Miethke’s portrayal of John’s personality (2000, 168). Maier 1952 has provided good evidence of John’s surprisingly wide-ranging intellectual pursuits while pope, to the point of even taking a ‘parte attiva’ in the compilations destined for his own use.
31. This he did with QN (Tarrant 1983, 217–21); for a (pro-John) commentary on this bull, see Heft 1986. There is still some doubt as to why John XXII moved from his repression of the spiritual Franciscans to an attack against Franciscan poverty in general. Ehrle 1885–1900, 4.45–50, suggested that it was general Dominican hostility to the Franciscan teaching on poverty. Koch 1933, on the other hand, argued that Franciscan poverty came under fire because it was a necessary preliminary for a full-scale condemnation of Peter Olivi. Lambert 1972, has emphasized the pope’s general dislike of the spiritual interpretation of poverty and its theoretical incoherence; in Lambert 1998, 221–39, he presents a narrative account of this period, loosely following Koch (but questions the completeness of the theory at p. 239). Turley 1989, having reviewed Koch’s thesis (and subsequent criticism) concluded, similar to Ehrle, that it was due to anti-Franciscan pressure (but Carmelite, rather than Dominican). Burr 1993, 244–47, has argued for a return to a somewhat nuanced version of Koch’s hypothesis: once John became aware of the significance of the poverty controversy, the condemnation of Olivi could serve as a ‘weapon in that struggle’; but see Burr 2001, 264–67 for some further reflections on the continuities of papal responses to the Franciscans from Boniface VIII through to John XXII. Nold 2003, 157–58, has recently argued that the pope simply could not accept ‘nominal rather than real’ papal retention of ownership, and saw it as the ‘root cause of the Spiritual problem’. And, finally, Gonzales 2006, 74, has suggested that the pope was not so interested in the poverty issue as in reevaluating the role the Minorites should play in the Church.
32. Miethke 1999b, 519. I tend to agree with Nimmo 1987, 198–99, who argued that John’s decision to side with the Community over the Spirituals was the right decision, despite the latter group’s admirable intentions and the former’s own failings. It is, however, less clear whether the pope’s turn against the Community’s version of Franciscan poverty was also as wise.
33. As Maier 1952 and Duval-Arnould 1989 have shown, John had compiled for himself a massive collection of opinions to study in preparation for CIN. According to Duval-Arnould, ‘On ne peut dire
we take the Berengar incident as the starting point for this controversy, which Nicholas claimed took place in 1321, then we must note that John’s first considered response came only at the end of 1322 (8 December).³⁴

John’s writings on Franciscan poverty very closely mirror Franciscan attempts to explain the theory of evangelical poverty clearly and concisely. Doubtlessly, John felt the first version of Ad conditorem to be an exceedingly clear statement of the (insurmountable) problems of the Franciscan theory and practice of evangelical poverty; however, once people began to look a little more closely at his theory, the cracks kept on growing. Thus, much as Ockham would be limited in how he could modify the poverty theory of his confreres, Ad conditorem¹ is of significance because it provides the broad contours of John’s theory of ownership. In his subsequent bulls, John would fill in the details, but he would do no more than bend or stretch the limits of his theory.

In an obvious echo of Quia nonnunquam, Ad conditorem begins by claiming that ‘Ad conditorem canonum non est dubium pertinere, cum statuta a se vel praedecessoribus suis edita obesse peripit quam prodesse, ne ulterius obesse valeant, providere’.³⁵ Following his point that the pontiff is to remedy harmful statutes, John listed a series of provisions established by previous popes, particularly the papal retention of dominium—only to conclude that ‘Quamquam autem pia consideratione a praedecessore nostro praedicto [Nicholas III] haec fuerint ordinata, ipsa tamen haec tamen profuisset dictis fratribus non percepi majis, sed potius ipsis et aliis multiplice obfuiisse’.³⁶ In particular, John argued that the ‘retentio dominii supra dicta [both moveables and immovables] fratribus ipsis obfuerit’.³⁷ The problem with the papal retention of lordship was in fact twofold. First of all, the ‘perfectio vitae christianae principaliter et essentialiter in caritate consistat, quae ab Apostolo perfectionis vinculum [Col. 3:14] dicitur’—that is, poverty does not play an important role in Christian perfection.³⁸ This leads directly to the second problem:

³⁴ Of course, first he lifted Exiit’s ban on further discussion of evangelical poverty (a term I use to designate both the putative poverty practiced by Christ and the apostles and the Franciscan attempt to emulate it) in QN. According to Damiata 1978–79, 315, the publication of this bull heightened the animosity both between the Franciscans and Dominicans and within the Franciscan Order itself. G&F, 83. Cf. QN 4–8 (Tarrant 1983, 217–18): ‘Quia nonnunquam quod coniectura profuturum creditit subsequens experientia nocium ostendit, non debet reprehendibile judicari, si canonom conditor canones a se uel a suis praedecessoribus editos uel aliqua in eisdem contenta canonibus renocare modificare uel suspendere studeat, si ea obesse potius uiderit quam prodesse.’ The version of QN printed in G&F, 64–65, differs slightly. See J. Oakley 1986b, 139–51, for an analysis of ACC¹.
³⁵ ACC¹, 84.
³⁶ ACC¹, 85.
³⁷ ACC¹, 84; cf. QVR, 586. John consistently stressed that the interior disposition was more important...
rather than pave the way to this perfection (for such is the purpose of the contempt of
temporal goods, which Franciscan abnegation was supposed to inspire), Franciscan poverty
has not diminished their sollicitudo—that is, ‘anxiety’ or ‘anxious care’ for temporal
goods—compared to members of other religious orders. This alone is enough to show
that the friars’ special mode of expropriation can confer nothing ad perfectionem. But
the problem went even deeper. What has in fact happened is that, ‘by reason of [papal]
retention’ (occasione retentionis), the friars have begun to boast hollowly of their highest
poverty. 39 In essence, what we have here is both an axiom and a definition of the problem:
religious poverty, at best, serves an instrumental role on the path to religious perfection; 40
the problem, of course, was that this useless property arrangement was doing more harm
than good. 41

There was even more to it than that. In John’s view the whole theory was flawed. The
theory that had been developed in Quo elongati and Ordinem vestrum, and had been re-affirmed in Exiit was that the lordship and ownership of the things used by the
friars remained with the donors and benefactors; if they refused to keep such control after
the donation, then the lordship would pass to the Holy See. As far as the brothers were
concerned, they could enjoy no more than a simplex usus facti of things. 42

John again chose to discuss this notion in terms of both theory and practice. Although
he did not use the phrase simplex usus facti in the first version of the bull, employing
instead nudus usus facti, there can be little doubt that John saw the terms as approximately
equivalent. 43 In any event, the real problem with papal retention of ownership was that
it could not be true in the case of consumables:

39. ACC1, 84–85. See also Condren 1984, 21; Shogimen 2007, 47.
40. John’s views on poverty have often been compared to those of Aquinas, whom he read carefully,
and who is often thought to be a proponent of an ‘instrumentalist’ theory of poverty (cf. e.g.,
Miethke 1969, 377; Tarello 1964, 418); see, e.g., STh 2a2ae.188.7 (Aquinas 1882–, 10.530–32). My
understanding of Aquinas’ writings on poverty are particularly indebted to Eijnden
41. Nold 2003, 154, has claimed that John’s comments about the connection between poverty and
perfection and their relationship to charity were so ‘inclusive’ that it would have been equally
palatable to the Franciscans as to the Dominicans. But it is not likely that many Franciscans would
endorse John’s instrumentalist understanding of the value of evangelical poverty.
42. Exiit, 2.1113. This was a development of Bonaventure’s account of simplex usus (Ap.paup. 11.5,
BOO 8.312a; cf. 12.20, BOO 8.322b). The relationship between these two texts has often been
noted; the most detailed demonstration is found in Maggiani 1912, but see also the source analysis
43. If anything, John probably felt that ‘simplex usus facti’ was an ill-advised way to pick out what
Roman law meant by ‘nudus usus’. Nold 2003, 150, has argued that this difference meant both
that ACC1 was ‘not primarily focused on the technical term used by Exiit qui seminat (or by
the Chapter General of Perugia) to describe Franciscan and apostolic use’, and that John’s real
Aside from being repugnant to law and reason, he also noted that, in the case of consumables, it is hardly likely that Nicholas III had intended to reserve the lordship of each crust of bread and cheese that the friars ‘used’.  

For the sake of the argument, however, John was willing to suppose (*esto*) that use could be established in the way the Franciscans suggested. Even so, such use could in no way be called *nudus*. The reason is that the use of a consumable by a non-owner does not differ from the use of the one who has full lordship because in both cases the object is wholly consumed. Since we do not say that the one who has full lordship of the object has ‘bare’ lordship, neither should we consider the use of such things ‘bare’. If anything, John noted, since it is always the intention of the donor and the friars that only the friars be granted the profit (*compendium*) of these things, and since the Church neither gains, nor hopes to gain, any advantage (*commodum*) from the arrangement, it should be supposed that the papal lordship of the goods used by the friars that is called ‘nudum, verbale et mathematicum’. And if this is true, then it is hard to see how having or not having the lordship of these goods would ever make one poorer or richer. Other scholars have noted that John was being sarcastic here, or that he was merely pointing out that the idea of papal overlordship of Franciscan goods was a fiction because, under Roman law, there could not be a permanent usufruct.

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44. *ACC*1, 85.
45. *ACC*1, 85.
46. The phrase ‘*usus ... constitui*’ indicates even more John’s affinity with Roman law definitions of *usus*, such as that in Dig. 7.8.1.1.
47. *ACC*1, 86.
48. *ACC*1, 86. In *ACC*2 252 (Tarrant 1983, 250), he called the reservation of this lordship *verbale, nudum ac enigmaticum*.
49. Tabarroni 1999, 74.
50. As Villey 1964, 112, drily noted, bulls like *Ordinem vestrum* and *Exiit* meant that ‘Rome avait l’étiquette et les moines franciscains la chose ; à la Paupauté la fumée, aux Franciscains le rôti’.
I would add that the pope could also have had *Code* 7.25 in mind, which abolished the distinction between a lord who had *nudum* [dominium] *ex iure Quiritium* and one who had a thing *in bonis.*\(^51\) In the first case, the lord had bare lordship (that is, without any right to the use or fruit) according to the *ius Quiritium*, the ancient, formalistic Roman law. The second referred to a *res* that was merely considered to be part of one’s effects (*in bonis esse*); in this case, the lord did not really have ownership of the thing (but could later acquire it through *usucapio*).\(^52\) Justinian evidently felt that this distinction was of no use. In an effort to simplify the complicated system of ownership, *Code* 7.25 ruled, as it were, that a lord is a lord is a lord: ‘sed sit plenissimus et legitimus quisque dominus sive servi sive aliarum rerum ad se pertinentium’. When the pope said it was the papal lordship and not the Franciscan use that was ‘nudum, verbale et mathematicum’ or ‘enigmaticum’ he may well have been alluding to Justinian’s own dislike of *nudum dominium*.

As far as the practical problems associated with this use-lordship arrangement were concerned, John felt that it was not even observed in practice. *Ad conditorem*\(^1\) therefore listed all the things *Exiit* permitted the friars to do with the goods they could use. In certain cases it even was licit for a friar to exchange or give away small items and books (though permission of a superior was needed).\(^53\) Now, he argued, to be able to do this sort of thing went rather beyond the normal definition of use:

Quis enim nudum usuariam poterit dicere cui rem usuariam licet permutare, vendere ac donare? Procul dubio haec naturam usus noscuntur excedere, nec ad usuarium sed ad dominum potius pertinere. Haece evidentem arguunt talem usuariam minime fore nudum, quae quidem de rebus nonnullis mobilibus fratres ipsi faciunt, adserentes sibi per ordinationem huiusmodi hoc concessum.\(^54\)

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\(^51\) Cod. 7.25; ‘Antiquae subtilitatis ludibrium per hanc decisionem expellentes nullam esse differentiam patimur inter dominos, apud quos vel nudum [dominium] *ex iure Quiritium* vel tantummodo in bonis reperitur, quia nec huiusmodi esse volumus distinctionem nec ex iure quiritum nomen, quod nihil aenigmate discrepat nec umquam videtur neque in rebus appareat, sed est vacuum et superfluum verbum, per quod animi iuvenum, qui ad primam veniunt legum audientiam, perterriti ex primis eorum cunabulis inutiles legis antiquae dispositiones accipiunt. sed sit plenissimus et legitimus quisque dominus sive servi sive aliarum rerum ad se pertinentium.’

\(^52\) ACC\(^1\), 84. John’s claims are very reminiscent of the extensive powers Martin IV granted the Franciscans in *Exultantes in Domino* (1283; text in BF 3.501a–02a). The expanded powers were accepted by the order in 1285, a much different reaction than to *Quanto studiosis*, whose privileges were rejected twice (1251; 1260). See FA:ED 3.764–65. Michael paraphrases these aspects of the bull (*App.mai.*, 297), but apparently (and rather surprisingly) finds them to support entirely his version of Franciscan poverty. See Kriechbaum 1996, 25, who noted Michael’s use of the passage (but the reference in the quotation is to Martin IV, not Nicholas IV), and J. Oakley 1986b, 49–50.

\(^53\) ACC\(^1\), 85.
In other words, to say that this or that use is bare has no meaning if what is involved in that use—whether ‘conceded’ by some decree or not—is in fact a standard characteristic of what it means to be master or owner of the object.

Aside from the problem that the papal *retentio dominii* has allowed the friars to proclaim that they are the most perfect followers of Christ and the apostles, it has also caused problems within the order, and within the Church. As far as the Franciscans are concerned, John claimed that this ‘retention’ was dangerous for the brothers in that it has allowed schisms and harmful dangers to arise.\textsuperscript{55} The Church itself suffers from all the litigation ‘pro rebus parvis et vilibus’ in secular and ecclesiastical courts.\textsuperscript{56}

In light of all these considerations, John closed *Ad conditorem*\textsuperscript{1} with a bombshell. After careful scrutiny,

Nos itaque ... volentes tantis malis occurrere ac conscientiis et statui dictorum fratrum necnon et honori dictae Romanae Ecclesiae praeclatorum quoque atque rectorum et aliorum indemnitatibus providere, de fratrum nostrorum consilio sacrosanctam Romanam Ecclesiam tam inutili tamque pernicioso dominio carere potius quam ipsum habere volentes, hoc edicto in perpetuum valuturo censemus quod in bonis praedictis que in posterum conferuntur vel offeruntur vel quomodolibet aliter obvenire contigeret fratribus seu Ordini supra dictis, non plus iuris in illis Apostolica Sedes habeat nec in ipsis seu pro ipsis sibi dominium seu ius aliquod alius adquiratur quam quod habet sibique adquiritur in bonis vel pro bonis quae fratribus aliorum mendicantium Ordinum quomodolibet adquiruntur.\textsuperscript{57}

In one long and convoluted sentence, John forever changed the Franciscan *modus operandi*.\textsuperscript{58} It fell *ad conditorem canonum* to make changes where changes were needed, and thus, if papal retention of ownership was the cause of so many problems, then it had to go. Patrick Nold has suggested that ‘*Ad Conditorem* in its original form is simply a list of harms done and a modest proposal to ameliorate them’.\textsuperscript{59} But if so, to some at least, it must have seemed a modest proposal of Swiftian proportions!\textsuperscript{60}

\textbf{2.3 John Re-acts: Ad conditorem canonum, redactio secunda and beyond}

With the publication of *Ad conditorem*\textsuperscript{1}, John’s position in the controversy became firmly entrenched. It would be tedious to run through each of John’s bulls, particularly when

\textsuperscript{55} *ACC*\textsuperscript{1}, 86. This, as Nold 2003, 157, has suggested, shows that there was a definite link in John’s mind between poverty and the spiritual problem.

\textsuperscript{56} *ACC*\textsuperscript{1}, 86–87. Cf. Jacob 1943, 91.

\textsuperscript{57} *ACC*\textsuperscript{1}, 87.

\textsuperscript{58} So Gagnér 1974, 317, and Leff 1967, 164–65. Note, however, that this change, though momentous, did not affect the arrangement where the donor wished to retain his lordship of the donated goods.

\textsuperscript{59} Nold 2003, 152.

\textsuperscript{60} Cf. Miethke 1969, 378–79.
their contents have been repeatedly summarized in the works of others.\[^{61}\] Instead I shall present a synchronic account of John’s theory of property as it can be found in *Ad conditorem*\[^2\], *Cum inter*, *Quia quorundam*, and *Quia vir*. But before we move on to an appraisal of John’s theory of lordship in general, it is worth describing briefly the content of each bull. In this way, some semblance of historicity will be preserved.

Bonagratia appealed *Ad conditorem*\[^1\] in Avignon on 14 January 1323.\[^{62}\] Of significance was his claim that Nicholas III did not ‘innovate’ in *Exiit*, since this would lead to the interesting parallel discussion about the (im)mutability of papal decrees.\[^{63}\] John responded by imprisoning Bonagratia and with a longer version of *Ad conditorem* in the following days, although he dated it to the date of the first version.\[^{64}\] In this version, John mainly amplified and strengthened his argument about consumables, and reiterated the fact that the Roman Church was no longer the nominal lord of Franciscan goods.\[^{65}\] *Ad conditorem*\[^2\] in some ways treaded more softly than the first version.\[^{66}\] Almost a year later, John published his dogmatic decree *Cum inter* (12 November 1323). In what was probably a very carefully worded and re-worked bull,\[^{67}\] John declared the following: (1) To say that Christ and the apostles practised ‘absolute’ poverty (along Franciscan lines) is heretical; and (2) to say that they had absolutely no rights to the things they used is likewise heretical.\[^{68}\] The pope clearly hoped to settle the issue once and for all,\[^{69}\] but in response to appeals and attacks made against *Ad conditorem* and *Cum inter*, John had to re-clarify his position in *Quia quorundam mentes* (10 November 1324). This is an interesting bull, which has generated its own storm of controversy, and which modern

\[^{61}\] All of the texts which ‘Nicholas’ included in his *Chronica* are summarized in Gál and Flood 1996; the best overview remains Lambert 1998, 221–69, but like Mäkinen 2001, 162–73, the analysis stops short of a full analysis of *QVR*. This is remedied in Brunner 2006, 185–238, who focusses on *QVR*. John is studied in connection to Marsilius of Padua in two recent essays: Gonzales 2006 and (more briefly) Lee 2009.

\[^{62}\] See the summary in Miethke 1969, 379–83.

\[^{63}\] Bonagratia, *App.ACC*, 93: ‘Ex quibus [a brief run-through of earlier papal bulls] liquide patet quod . . . Nicolaus III, in . . . *Exiit qui seminat*, declarando res quibus dictae regulae professores utuntur et uti possunt ad se et ad Romanam Ecclesiam pertinere, rem non novam neque insolitam aggressus est, . . . nec per hoc novum aliquod ius statuit, sed quod erat detexit et in publicam notionem deduxit.’ I leave to one side the fascinating medieval debates concerning what we now call papal infallibility. Tierney 1972, 171–237 examined this topic in the context of the Michaelist-John controversy, and he stirred up a great deal of controversy of his own; for the critiques that deal with the texts of our period, see Heft (1982, 1983b, 1983a); Ryan (1976, 1986), and Tierney’s responses (1977a, 1982, 1986a).

\[^{64}\] Bonagratia’s *App.ACC* is traditionally seen as the reason for the revised *ACC*\[^2\]; see, e.g., Kriechbaum 1996, 52, agreeing with Miethke 1969, 384.

\[^{65}\] Duval-Arnould 1989, 193–94. This is not the only bull John re-issued; see Tarrant 1983, 5.

\[^{66}\] Miethke 1999b, 520.

\[^{67}\] See Duval-Arnould 1984, 418–20, for a comparison of the ‘preparatory’ and ‘definitive’ versions of the bull. See also his later studies (1989, 1999).


\[^{69}\] Miethke 1969, 392.
academics like to argue about almost as much as their medieval counterparts due to its discussion of the keys of power and authority, the reformability of papal decrees, and whether John was in fact altering Exiit. The pope insisted that his interpretation of Exiit was Nicholas’, but that he was no more bound to Nicholas’ declaration than Nicholas was to his predecessors’. Finally, he took the time to re-condemn the Franciscan position as heretical, and excommunicated those who supported it.\textsuperscript{70}

Over the next several years, everyone weighed in with their own special, if not wholly original contribution to the debate. Of particular significance were the longer and shorter Pisan appeals of Michael of Cesena, since the shorter appeal—not the longer one, as Michaelists were wont to point out whenever they could—served as the basis of John’s longest contribution to the debate, \textit{Quia vir reprobus} (16 November 1329), which re-iterates and (re-)re-clarifies his position on nearly every point.

In the sections which follow, I shall present John’s theory of property. Although John’s basic position on the nature and extent of evangelical poverty can be understood in terms of his account of \textit{usus} alone, because he was responding primarily to the Michaelist position, it is useful to frame his theory of use in terms of questions of law, rights, and property. I shall begin with his description of the types of law (§\textsuperscript{2.4}); following this, I shall describe his views on the origin of \textit{dominium} (§\textsuperscript{2.5}); and finally, there follows a discussion of \textit{usus}, and the pre-requisites for just and licit use (§\textsuperscript{2.6}).

## §2.4 John and the Types of Law

Despite the scant attention John devoted to the nature of law in general, from the remarks made in three sections of \textit{Quia vir}, it is clear that he followed the traditional division into divine, natural, and positive law.\textsuperscript{71} John studied and taught both canon and civil law,\textsuperscript{72} and as a canonist, he was well aware of the complex account of law in the first distinction of the \textit{Decretum}; however, he made little use of most of these early chapters.\textsuperscript{73} He referred

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{70} A text known as the \textit{Concordia}, which was later incorporated into Alvarus Pelagius’ \textit{De planctu ecclesiae} 2.59 (see BF 5.256–59, in notes), attempted to show the harmony of \textit{CIN} and \textit{Exiit}. See the discussion about authorship and dating in Oliger 1929, 315–16, though a date between \textit{CIN} and \textit{QQM} does in fact seem reasonable. Throughout history people have tried to determine whether or not John contradicted Nicholas; Heft 1983\textit{a}, discussed many of these attempts before offering his own: namely that John and Nicholas did contradict each other, but not on matters of dogma (254–57).
    \item \textsuperscript{71} \textit{QVR}, 582, 590–91, 592–93. As Pennington 1993, 120, has pointed out that medieval jurists all admitted that divine law, natural law, and the \textit{ius gentium} transcended positive law. See Brunner 2006, 222–24, for some discussion of the pope’s views on divine and positive law.
    \item \textsuperscript{72} Weakland 1972, 163–64.
    \item \textsuperscript{73} In fact, aside from D. 1 c. 1 and D. 8 c. 1, John never cited directly any of the other chapters of the first twenty distinctions (the so-called ‘Treatise of Laws’), though (as noted by Offler) John probably
\end{itemize}
to D. 1 c. 1 only once, and only to note how not everything permissible according to divine law is permissible according to human law. The pope thus recognized that human (positive) law often has to allow or promote one action and forbid another (e.g., driving on one side of the street, but not the other), but that from the perspective of divine law, human law could have just as easily forbidden the one and permitted the other. Divine law makes no claims about the rightness of many actions that positive law has ruled on.

John mostly avoided, intentionally or not, using *ius naturale* in his writings about Franciscan poverty, presumably because his theories had little need for it. In his only serious discussion of *ius naturale* he described the ‘primordial natural law’ as that which ‘omnibus animantibus est commune, cum illud ius nichil statuat, sed inclinat seu dirigit ad aliqua omnibus animantibus communia facienda’. The pope was attempting to cut short the idea that all things are common by natural law. Now the original (*primaevum*) natural law does not actually command anything at all, although it does suggest that *some things* ought to be common to all animals. As the next chapter shall show, John chose to discuss natural law in only one of the many ways the term was used and understood over the previous two centuries.

One significant feature of *ius* in John’s opinion, was that it was intimately connected to ideas about equity and justness. While this is presumably a goal (if not a feature) of any and all theories of law, particularly those which recognize some sort of objective source of law and morality, for the pope this meant not so much that a law need be just to be valid, but that an action cannot be just if it is not also legal. To take the example presented in D. 1 c. 1 again, John argued that Isidore did not accept *fas*, which John linked to divine law, as an intermediate category between just and unjust. While it might be *fas* to pass through another’s field, it is not *ius*, which means, he explained, that it is not allowed ‘de iure humano’.

It would seem, then, that ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ are primarily linked to (human) *ius*.

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75. This is not to say that positive law does make claims about the rightness of some action before the law is passed, only that *once* the law is passed, it does make a claim about which action is legally permitted, or ‘right’, and which is not.

76. *QVR*, 592–93. This seems a clear allusion to Dig. 1.1.1.3; cf. Weigand’s remarks (1967, 13) on Ulpian. In his gloss to Inst. 2.1.1 (s.v. ‘naturali iure’), Accursius also used the phrase *ius naturale primevum* (also discussed in Weigand 1967, 89), though the gloss was not one favourable to John’s argument. I treat this topic at greater length in Chapter 3, starting on p. 51.

77. See Dig. 1.1.1, and the glosses to ‘iuri’ and ‘ars’; cf. Ullmann 1944, 388–92.

78. *QVR*, 582–83: ‘Nec obstat, si dicatur quod immo Isidorus inter iustum et iniustum ponere medium fas videtur, dicens quod ire per agrum alienum fas est, ius non est. Isidorus enim diviserat legem
This will be clearer when we look at his theory of use more closely (§ 2.6), but for now what is important is that, according to John, conformity to the law is what guarantees the justness of an action; and in certain cases, the law stipulates that the actor must have certain rights to the action in question (e.g., a *ius utendi*) for the action to be just. To do otherwise is to act illicitly, which means one would also be acting unjustly.

### 2.5 The Origin of Property

Given the pope’s account of *ius*, it will not be surprising that John maintained that lordships had been historically established through divine and positive law. The source and origin of *all* lordship, however, is God. John cited *Quo iure* for support, easily one of the most important canons for late medieval discussions of property rights. The argument is based on the division of divine and human law that Augustine outlined at the beginning of the *capitulum*, where it is said, wrote the pope, that ‘*ius divinum est, quod in scripturis divinis habemus, humanum vero ius, quod in legibus regum*.’ John’s literal interpretation of this claim allowed him to argue that since someone could say that something was his own before the time of kings, by divine law someone could say that something was his own. Ignoring the preamble to *Quo iure*, where it is suggested that things are common to all by natural law, the pope argued that even in the state of innocence things were not (always) common to all. Before the fashioning of Eve, Adam alone had individual lordship of temporal things, for it could not be common (*commune*), since sharing (*communio*) requires a plurality. Of course, once Eve had been created, the two exercised common lordship in the state of innocence. Based partly on the variant

\[ \text{in divinam et humanam, et imposuerat nomina istis legibus, dicens quod fas lex divina est; ius lex humana. Ude voleus de his exemplum dare, subiunxit: Ire per agrum alienum fas est id est de iure divino licetum est; ius non est, id est de iure humano non licet, ut patet D. 1 c. 1. Non ergo voluit Isidorus inter iustum et iniustum fas pro medio ponere, sed declarare quod aliquid de iure divino licet quod de iure humano non licet.} \]


80. Other important canons of the *Decretum* for this question are D. 1 c. 7, D. 47 c. 8, and *Dilectissimis*. The pope ignored the first two, but had a lot to say about the third; see *QVR*, 562, 564–65, 569, 570, 590, 593–94, 600, and 603–04.

81. *QVR*, 592. For the original text of Augustine, see his *In Ioannem Evangelium tractatus CXXIV* 6.25 (Willems 1954, 66).

82. *QVR*, 590–92.

reading Augustine gives for Genesis 1:28,84 the pope concluded that our first parents had lordship in the state of innocence.85

The other key capitulum of the Decretum on which the controversy turned was Dilectissimis (C. 12 q. 1 c. 2).86 According to the Michaelists, Dilectissimis proved that Adam and Eve had the use of things without lordship of temporal goods.87 John, on the other hand, argued that, far from proving a lack of lordship in the state of innocence, this capitulum clearly showed that they did not have this lordship separately (divisim).88 The pope was playing on the verb dividere and the example of the indivisibility of air and sunlight to argue that lordship had to be common—for, as he concluded, if temporal goods, which are given ‘communiter omnibus ad habendum’, are given by one who can give them (e.g., God) to someone who may receive them, ‘sequentur quod eorum [temporalium] dominium factum fuit’.89 The point, after all, was that God was giving these things ‘to have’, not only to use.90 It was through sin, per iniquitatem, moreover, that this common lordship became divided. This, then, was the origin of one person calling something suum.91

According to the pope, therefore, temporal lordship first came into existence when Adam was alone in paradise. With the creation of Eve, the lordship became common,92

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84. ‘... masculum et feminam creavit eos benedixitque illis Deus et ait crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram et subicite eam et dominamini piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli....’ John XXII apparently had the modern ‘subicite eam [terram]’, but noted that Augustine, when quoting this verse, twice has ‘dominamini eius’ (De civitate Dei 14.21 [Dombart and Kalb 1955, 443]; De Genesi ad litteram 6.8.13 [Zycha 1894, 179]). Miethke 1999b, 523, has pointed out the centrality of this passage for John’s position.


86. As the early part of this text is important for the ensuing discussion, I provide it here: ‘Communis uita, omnibus est necessaria, fratres, et maxime his, qui Deo inreprehensibiler militare cupiunt, et uitam apostolorum eorumque discipulorum imitari uolunt. §. 1. Communis enim usus omnium, que sunt in hoc mundo, omnibus hominibus esse debuit. Sed per iniquitatem alius hoc dixit esse suum, et alius istud et sic inter mortales facta est diuisio. §. 2. Denique Grecorum quidam sapientissimus, hoc ita esse sciens, communia debere, ait, esse amicorum omnia. In omnibus autem sunt sine dubio et coniuges. “Et sicut non potest”, inquit, “diuidi aer, neque splendor solis, ita nec reliqua, que communiter omnibus data sunt ad habendum, diuidi debere, sed habenda esse communia”. Unde et Dominus per Prophetam loquitur, dicens: “Ecce quam bonum et quam iucundum, et reliqua.” This passage was attributed to Clement I, but he did not write this exactly; for a short history of its composition, see Cohn 1970, 193–95. For excerpts from some Summae and glosses on this text, see the appendix in Kuttner 1978, 109–118.

87. John was responding to the claims of Bonagratia, De paup., 489 and 504, and the App.min., 432–33, 435, and 445. Dilectissimis is discussed passim throughout chapters three to six.

88. QVR, 570–71. At QVR, 561, he defined dividere thus: ‘Dividere enim est divisim aliquibus diversas partes rei allicius dare’.

89. QVR, 570. We might note that Huguccio held a similar opinion; see his Summa decretorum ad D. 1 c. 1, s.v. ‘alienum’ (Přerovský 2006, 21): ‘Set nonne dare est dominium et proprietatem in aliquem transferre?’


91. QVR, 564, explaining Dilectissimis.

92. One notable lapse in John’s account, which Ockham will take him to task for is how this supposed individual lordship became common (see below, p. 128).
but with the advent of the first sin, lordship began to be divided up. This account of
the origin of lordship and ownership, thus cuts out the idea of a propertyless natural
state, which had long served as the ideal to which the early community of the apostles
attempted to return. More important than this, though, was the nature of the poverty
of Christ and the apostles. But as temporal lordship clearly already existed at this time,
John focused his arguments mostly on the nature of use. In fact, the pope’s theory of
use guaranteed that Christ and the apostles had property rights—unless, that is, one
wanted to suggest that Christ and apostles used things illicitly and unjustly.

2.6 The Legal Nature of Use

It has often been noted that one of the chief characteristics of John’s argument against
the Michaelists lay in his determinedly legal definitions of *usus* and *uti*. To begin with
the verb, the pope claimed that ‘uti re aliqua nichil sit aliud proprie quam fructus rei seu
utilitatem aliam in solidum uel pro parte recipere, qui ex ea possunt salua rei substancia
prouenire’. John’s definition of the verb derived from his definition of the noun, though
it takes him some time to clearly articulate it. In the redacted version of *Ad conditorem*,
he maintained that,

\[
\text{usus, qui eciam [like usufruct] personalis est seruitus, nichil sit aliud quam ius tantum}
\text{utendi rebus alienis substancia salua rei, id est, ius percipiendi fructus et utilitatem}
\text{aliam in totum uel pro parte suo nomine qui possunt ex re in qua usufructus seu usus}
\text{constituitur prouenire.}
\]

Use demanded the preservation of the substance. Although John did not choose to
mention his source in *Ad conditorem*², he was simply expanding a little on Azo’s gloss to
‘usuus nudus’, which stated that ‘usuus est ius utendi alienis rebus, salva rerum substantia’.³⁷
To put this gloss in its proper context, this particular passage of the *Digest* explained:
‘Constituitur etiam nudus usus, id est sine fructu: qui et ipse isdem modis constitui solet,
quibus et usus fructus’.³⁸ John was thus on solid ground for his claim that (proper and

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93 J. Oakley 1986a, 220–23, has pointed out that the Franciscans attempted to return to the primeval
‘state of innocence’, but the direct model was the early apostolic community which had ‘renovated’
that first state—and only as far as this was possible: there could be no full return. Cf. Lambertini
2006a, 194, and Tierney 1997a, 162.
94 I omit here discussion of the temporal reign of Christ (whether theoretical or actual) as it has little to
do with John’s theory of property. On this, however, one should see Lambertini 1994a (incorporated
into 2000, 249–68).
95 *ACC*² 128–130 (Tarrant 1983, 239). The definition is repeated at *QVR*, 578–79; significantly, this
definition is wholly lacking in *ACC*¹.
96 *ACC*² 108–111 (Tarrant 1983, 238); *ACC*¹ again offers no clear definition of the term.
97 *Gl. ord.* ad Dig. 7.8.1.1, s.v. ‘etiam usuus nudus’. For Azo, see Kriechbaum 1996, 33–34.
98 *Dig.* 7.8.1.1; cf. Inst. 2.5 pr.
licit) use demanded a right of using, as usufruct clearly does. Since this definition requires that the substance remain unimpaired, John argued that there can be no use, according to the proper sense of the term, of anything consumable by use.

Even at this early stage, then, we can see how closely John related use to right. Although John maintained this claim in *Quia vir*, in a later chapter he drew a further distinction, which he clearly thought could lead to some confusion. ‘Aliud est enim’, he said,

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\text{alicui in usum rem aliquam dare, et aliud dare alicui usum alicuius rei. Ubi enim usus alicuius rei usibilis conceditur alicui, usus tantum rei, et non dominium sibi intelligitur esse datus; sed ubi alicui res datur in usum, nedum usus rei, sed et dominium intelligitur esse datum.}
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There was, John thought, a difference between giving someone something ‘for use’ (*in usum*) and giving someone ‘the use’ (*usum*). That is, in the many scriptural examples—John cited Numbers 18.21—where we read about someone having or receiving (the use of) something, it was usually ‘for use’, which means that they also had or received lordship as well.

In short, John might have been willing to agree that (in the case of non-consumables) the Franciscans had the use without the lordship—i.e., not *in usum*. They were not owners in the modern sense of the word. The friars could agree with John as far as it went. Unfortunately, it did not take them very far, for the pope went on to deny both that this use was without *all* rights, and that the distinction between *usus* and *in usum* could not hold in the case of consumables.

Before looking at the way John parsed *usus facti* and *usus iuris* it is important to highlight one of the most significant differences between John and his opponents, one which has, furthermore, rarely been mentioned. This difference has to do with the pope’s separation of the *ius agendi* from the *ius utendi*. The nature and function of the *ius agendi* is crucial for an understanding of the two competing theories of lordship. As the subsequent chapters will show, the Franciscan dissidents assimilated the *ius agendi* to *usus iuris*; the latter, by definition, always included the former. John, on the other hand,

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maintained a sharp distinction between the two concepts. To have a right of using was not equivalent to having a right to action.¹⁰⁴ Although John never explicitly equated the terms, it seems clear that by *ius agendi* he was thinking of what textbooks on Roman law describe as an *actio*.¹⁰⁵

That this is so can be seen where he defined usufruct as a personal servitude, which he then went on to equate with the definition of use. As he explained,

usufructus prout est ius in re constitutus, qui seruitus dicitur personalis et pro quo reales competunt actiones, nichil sit aliud quam ius utendi fruendi....¹⁰⁶

This is a classic definition of usufruct.¹⁰⁷ What we must note here is the point that ‘real actions’ apply to things; hence John’s claim that real actions pertain to usufruct. That is, the usufructuary has an *actio* with respect to the thing over which he has usufruct.¹⁰⁸ A real action indicates that the relationship being urged is between a person and a thing rather than person and person; a real action is when someone is making a claim *in rem*. Thus John was saying that the kind of claim one urges when it comes to usufruct is a *realis actio*. The situation is completely different with the *ius utendi*. John argued that real actions do not pertain to a right of using because that right ‘nec est ius in re, nec seruitus personalis, sed mere ius personale’.¹⁰⁹ A right of using cannot be a servitude because it is an incorporeal thing,¹¹⁰ whereas a personal servitude such as usufruct ‘featured a vesting of all or part of the beneficial interest of the right of ownership in a person other than the owner, the right being personal to that person and so inalienable’.¹¹¹ Usus, a personal servitude, and *ius utendi*, a personal right, were not quite the same thing.

It was surely a fine distinction that John drew, but it was a step on the path towards arguing that a use to which a *ius utendi* belongs ‘est aliud iure agendi; potest enim

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¹⁰⁵. The explicit equation of *actio* and *ius agendi* seems to have first been made in the *App.min.*., 436–37. That John never complained about any terminological imprecision (as both sides were wont to do) suggests that he did not see any significant problems in doing so; at one point he even explained that ‘modus agendi pro istis rebus temporalibus in iudicio’ simply meant ‘certa forma proponendi ius suum in iudicio’. See *QVR*, 593. This seems to be the missing link between *actio*, and *ius agendi*.

¹⁰⁶. *ACC*² 105–107 (Tarrant 1983, 237–38). The sentence finishes with his definition of use; see the quotation on p. 36 above.

¹⁰⁷. Cf. *Gl. ad rubr.* Inst. 2.4 on the definition of usufruct: ‘Et quod haec definitio bona sit, patet tali ratione: ususfructus est ius: id est seruitus constituta in corpore: quo corpore sublato, et ipsum usumfructum toli necesse est.’


¹¹⁰. See especially *Gl. ord.* ad Inst. 2.2.2, s.v. ‘Qua in iure consistunt’ and *Gl. ord.* ad Inst. 2.2.3, s.v. ‘iura’.

alicui competere ius utendi, cui non competit ius agendi’.\textsuperscript{112} The two terms were wholly separate. At the simplest level one, the \textit{ius utendi}, was an abstract right which existed as a relationship between people, while the other, the \textit{ius agendi}, expressed the type of claim (\textit{actio}) being pressed.

The reason John argued that they were two different things is because they had to be in some cases. The right of using is an arrangement that occurs when, say, Paul grants Ulpian the right to the use of some thing (\textit{res}). In this case the right inheres in the person (\textit{in persona}) to whom the right is granted, not in the thing as it would in usufruct. Now if, say, the use of the \textit{res} is obstructed by a third party, the action which must be pressed to recover the \textit{res} has to be an \textit{in rem} claim, a real action. But obviously, all Ulpian has is a personal right of using, no actual right to the \textit{res}. Instead it is up to the owner, Paul, who does have a right in the \textit{res}, to press the claim.

A charitable interpretation of John’s theory of property rights would be that he was trying to preserve the spirit of much of the Franciscans’ desire to be as ‘rightless’ as possible, for one of the big concerns everyone had with the order was the amount of litigation its members seemed to be involved in. The brothers themselves argued that they should engage in none (or, failing that, as little as possible), and those outside the order regularly complained that they engaged in far too much of it for a mendicant order. John’s separation of these two so-called rights explained that while they had to have a \textit{ius utendi}, this did not mean they had a \textit{ius agendi}. They may have to have a right of using, but that does not mean that they could necessarily defend any of the property they used in court.

\textbf{USE OF FACT OR USE OF RIGHT?}

Of course, John did not stop there, which makes us suspect that he was more concerned with describing the mechanisms of use and ownership than avoiding stepping on a few toes. Thus John also creatively interpreted the traditional Franciscan claim that they only had simple use of fact. \textit{Exiit} seemed to make a distinction between use of fact and right of using, but then went on to make the negative claim that absolutely no \textit{professio} can do without the ‘use of necessary sustenance’, and that it was fitting for the Franciscans to abdicate lordship and be content with an \textit{usus necessarius} of the things granted them.\textsuperscript{113} According to John’s exposition of this point, \textit{Exiit} clearly must have granted the order a

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{QVR}, 581.
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Exiit}, 2.1113: ‘nam cum in rebus temporalibus sit considerare precipuum proprietatem, possessionem, usum fructum, jus utendi et simplicem facti usum, et ultimo tanquam necessario egeat, licet primis carere possit vita mortalium, nulla prorsus potest esse professio, que a se usum necessarie sustentationis excludat, verum condecens fuit ei professioni, que sponte devovit Christum pauperem
The pope's argument is essentially a negative one. He first of all argued that Gregory IX, Innocent IV, and Alexander IV all must have meant that the Franciscan order had use of right for what they were permitted to have. In 1230, for instance, Gregory granted the use of utensils, books, and movable goods with the caveat that they are the sort of things which are licit for the order to have; and Innocent IV in 1245 (Alexander IV republished the bull during his pontificate) repeated the claim in *Ordinem vestrum*. This use cannot be a use of fact, however, for,

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\text{Facta quidem que singulorum sunt personam ueram exigunt et requirunt; ordo autem uera persona non est sed representata et imaginaria potius est censenda. Quare que facti sunt sibi uere conuenire nequeunt, licet ei possint congruere que sunt iuris.}
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In other words, when popes like Gregory IX and Innocent IV said that 'ordo habeat usum', they had to mean an *usus iuris*. Orders are legal entities and as such they do not perform actions in the sense that a real person does. Thus any so-called use of fact—a concept John found troublesome at best—cannot belong to a corporate entity like a religious order. John thought his position was self-evident: 'immo per eas [*Quo elongati* and *Ordinem vestrum*] evidenter ostenditur eorum que habere licet ipsis fratribus usum iuris ad ipsum ordinem pertinere'.

This seems a defensible claim, but it is important to realize that John was trading on a very specific reading of *factum*. Able lawyer that he was, John refused in this case to understand 'fact' as anything other than an act or a deed, even though it was not uncommon to use the word to mark a distinction from *ius*. (The Michaelists were unimpressed.) That is, in legal discourse, it was not uncommon for there to be a 'fact' / 'law' distinction; we need only think of the phrases 'de facto' and 'de iure' to

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\text{in tanta paupertate sectari, omnium abdicare dominium et rerum sibi concessarum necessario usu fore contentam'. See Lambertini 1990, 176–81, for discussion.}
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\text{As he succinctly put it at QVR, 580: 'Dicimus quod per verba illa non concessit fratribus simplicem usum facti, immo hoc ipso quod ipsis usum concessit, si concessio valuit, ipsis ius utendi concessit, et sic in illis non habent simplicem usum facti.'}
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\text{114. As he succinctly put it at QVR, 580: 'Dicimus quod per verba illa non concessit fratribus simplicem usum facti, immo hoc ipso quod ipsis usum concessit, si concessio valuit, ipsis ius utendi concessit, et sic in illis non habent simplicem usum facti.'}
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\text{115. QQM 101–122 (Tarrant 1983, 266–67). The topic also comes up again in chapter 7.}
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\text{116. The texts are compared below, on p. 207.}
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\text{118. Gregory IX, *Quo elongati* 77–91 (Grundmann 1961, 22–23); Innocent IV, *Ordinem vestrum* (BF 1.401a, no. 114).}
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\text{119. QQM 104–105 (Tarrant 1983, 266); cf. QQM 209–216 (Tarrant 1983, 274–75). Brunner 2006, 233–34, who kindly sent me a copy of her dissertation to read, has offered the intriguing suggestion that John may also have been influenced by his experiences at the law school of Orléans on this whole topic. On this school see briefly Stein 1999, 67–68.}
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\text{120. Berger 1953, s.v. ‘factum’ (466); for specific examples of the *factum / ius* distinction, see ‘error’ and ‘error facti’ (456), and ‘formula in ius conceptus’ (475). Ockham, it should be noted, did draw this distinction: *OND* 2.149–154, 302.}
see how this distinction (in a sense) holds even today. Hence the pope was trading on a very specific reading of *factum* when he came to explain what Nicholas III had meant when he granted the order ‘usus facti’.

Furthermore, John noted, Nicholas III equated the life of the Franciscans with that of Christ and the apostles, but he never spoke about simple use of fact in connection with them. In fact, John argued that the opposite had to be the case since the alternative would involve a contradiction. What had happened, in essence, was that Nicholas had followed Bonaventure’s arguments against the standard objection that Christ is said to have had a purse. In this case, the Franciscan reply was to say that this was an act of condescension on Christ’s part for the infirmities of the imperfect. But if this is so, John argued, then how can it be said that Christ and the apostles only had simple use of fact. Obviously more was involved.

John doubted that it would even be fitting for the perfect to have simple use of fact, but a more pressing problem was that the terminology itself was flawed. What people should really be speaking about, and in fact were actually speaking about whether or not they realized it, was ‘ab-use’, which he took to mean a use which consumed the thing in question. Use, he thought, implied that the substance would be preserved. When

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121. There is a serious discrepancy between what we read in the Friedberg edition of *Exiit* (2.1110), which, as its apparatus makes clear, is in essential agreement with the text in Sbarlea and Eubel (BF 3.404–416), and John’s quotation as it appears in Tarrant’s critical edition (268, ll. 124–126). As the comparison makes clear, *QQM* is defective. In what follows, I give both texts minus their punctuation. The ‘〈et〉’ marks a word in Friedberg’s version which is not found in Tarrant; the ‘BF:’ marks where the BF text differs.

Hii sunt illi sancte regule professores qui evangeli- Hii sunt illi sanctae regulae professores *quae* evangelico fundatur eloquio vitæ Christi roboratur exemplo fundatorumque militantis ecclesie apostolorum eius sermonibus (et) actibus firmatur. ( *QQM*, Tarrant 1983, 268, ll. 124–126)

The problem clearly lies with Tarrant’s *firmatur*. In Tarrant’s text it is the *professores* who are ‘founded’ and ‘strengthened’, but then they should also be ‘confirmed’ as well (for what else should serve as subject following the ‘-que’?). On the other hand, our uncritical texts all produce understandable results: it is the Rule that is the subject of all three verbs. This reading is also more in tune with general Franciscan apologetics.


126. *QVR*, 575: ‘Item, nec quisquam uti talibus rebus potest, sumendo proprie uti. Usus enim seu uti, si sumatur proprie, secundum leges requirit quod ex re illa in qua nus habere se asserit vel ea vult uti possit fructus vel utilitatem aliam assequi, substantia salva rei, quod non potest in rebus usu consumptibilibus reperiri.’
pressed, the pope pointed out that this was a customary way of speaking in the Roman law tradition.\textsuperscript{127}

In fact, for consumables, \textit{res usu consumptibiles}, defining use as a right of using which must yet preserve the substance means that, technically, they cannot be used, only \textit{ab}-used, or consumed.\textsuperscript{128} The use of the prefix \textit{ab} is meant to indicate this very fact: a preposition, he wrote, is accustomed to augment or weaken the sense of a word (\textit{sentum dictionis}).\textsuperscript{129} This claim derived, not surprisingly, from Azo again: after defining ‘\textit{nudus usus}’, he wrote that ‘\textit{usus non potest esse proprie}’ in consumables, much like usufruct.\textsuperscript{130} Under Roman law, this right, a \textit{ius abutendi} as John called it, was tantamount to a claim of ownership.\textsuperscript{131} It is quite clear that John had a civilian’s understanding of ownership, which in its essence, equated \textit{dominium} with the rights to use (\textit{usus}), the rights to fruits (\textit{fructus}), and the right of disposal (\textit{abusus}),\textsuperscript{132} what we might today call the right to the capital.\textsuperscript{133}

At the same time, however, John had to contend with the Michaelist position, which interpreted the \textit{facti / iuris} distinction as meaning that use of fact was meant to specify that it was only the factual act that was at issue. The pope generally equated the act of using (\textit{actus utendi}) with the verb to use (\textit{uti}), but the force of the definition flowed the other way: the definition of ‘to use’ was derived from ‘use’;\textsuperscript{134} and later in the same section, ‘using itself’ (\textit{ ipsum uti}) is equated with the act of using.

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{QVR}, 576–78, citing especially the \textit{Gl. ord. sup. rubr. ad Dig. 7.5 s.v. ‘consumuntur’}, Dig. 7.5.5.1–2, and Dig. 12.2.11.2.

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{QVR}, 578: ‘Ex quibus [Dig. 7.5.5.1–2, and 12.2.11.2] patet quod legislatores loquentes proprie de rebus quae usu consumuntur, negant usum in illis locum habere, et abusum locum habere concedunt. Quod [OND & Imp.: Qui] quidem abusus, id est rei consumptio, si fiat ab eo cui ius abutendi, id est consumendi competit, erit licius; si vero ab eo, cui ius non competit, illicitus est censendus.’ Cf. \textit{QVR}, 572. Mäkinen 2001, 164–70, has generally confused John’s arguments about consumables, perhaps because her study stopped short of \textit{QVR}, but perhaps also because she did not fully examine the civil law background to John’s arguments. For the use of \textit{abuti} in the \textit{Digest}, see Garnsey 2007, 188.

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{QVR}, 578.

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Gl. ord. ad 7.8.1.1, s.v. ‘etian modus usus’}. See p. 142, below, for the quotation and Michael’s discussion of this passage. John clearly ignored the last bit of this gloss.

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{QVR}, 575–76: ‘... consumptio tamen et actus consumendi locum habet, ut dicit constitutio praedicta, quae tamen non possunt dici simplicia nec a rei quae consumit tur dominio separata, cum ipsa rei consumptione eius dominium pereat et prorsus esse desinat... ‘Ex quo patet quod usus talis, nec simplex nec separatus a dominio dici potest.” Et hoc patet, cum per talem facti usum proprietas et dominium ipsius rei perire noscitur’ (OND 41.12 has the better noscatur.). G&F got the internal quotation of \textit{ACC}\textsuperscript{2}, 208–215 (Tarrant 1983, 246–47) wrong; I have emended the text. As Kilcullen 2001b, 891 n. 43, has noted, Aquinas may be another source for this idea; in \textit{STh} 2a2ae.78.1 co. (9.155), e.g., he claimed that when use of consumables is granted, the thing itself is granted—and thus in a loan (\textit{mutuum}) the \textit{dominium} itself is transferred.

\textsuperscript{132} Miller 1998, 45, but note that this tripartite division is at odds with John’s tacit connection of a \textit{ius utendi} to a ‘ius percipiendi fructus et utilitatem ali am’ (quoted on p. 36 above).

\textsuperscript{133} Honoré 1987, 170.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{ACC}\textsuperscript{2} 108–111 (Tarrant 1983, 238), and \textit{QVR}, 555–56; see p. 36, above.
Quod autem ipsum uti ab aliquo haberi nequeat, dicta constitutio (sequens Augustini sententiam, positam in libro *Confessionum*) clare probat, quia quod non est, haberi nequaquam potest.\(^\text{135}\) Actus autem utendi in rerum natura non est, nec antequam quis utatur nec postquam usus est, nec dum est in actu utendi, prout latius prosequitur dicta constitutio. Quare relinquitur quod haberi non possit.\(^\text{136}\)

As the above quotation shows, John felt that the actual act of using is inextricably bound up with a somewhat Augustinian notion of time. Yet instead of serving as some sort of meditative aporia,\(^\text{137}\) in John’s hands the problems associated with explaining what time is serve to prove that the act of using cannot exist in the perpetually vanishing present moment. As John pointed out, ‘Patet autem quod actus ipse antequam exerceatur aut eciam dum exercetur aut postquam perfectus est in rerum natura non est’.\(^\text{138}\) To explain the surprising argument that the act does not exist while it is being done (*in fieri*), John wrote that,

Quod autem in presenti fit momentaneum seu instantaneum est, quod utique magis intellectu quam sensu percipi potest, unde nec est haberi pro tunc nisi pro momento illo seu instanti in quo sic potest dici actum. Post actum completum, licet si ex facto ipso producta res aliqua fuerit, res ipsa facta haberi ualeat, factum tamen ipsum quod iam transit nisi in memoria prout supradictum est non habetur.\(^\text{139}\)

The pope perhaps recognized how abstruse this might seem because he tried to clarify his point in the *Quia vir*. Certain types of consumables are not (more or less) immediately consumable the way, say, a grain of salt is. Clothes, for example, wear out over extended periods of time. John therefore explained that he was really only talking about the ‘completed’ (*perfectus*) act, and then only according to the discussion in the *Appellatio minor*.\(^\text{140}\) As is clear from the exposition just given, John’s argument is far from complete,

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\(^{135}\) This is not exactly what Augustine said, and the context is quite different; cf. Augustine, *Confessiones* 11.16.21 and 11.21.27 (O’Donnell 1992, 1.156–58). Ockham pointed this out at OND 3.672–676, 328. QVR, 556.


\(^{137}\) *ACC*\(^2\) 172–174 (Tarrant 1983, 243).

\(^{138}\) *ACC*\(^2\) 182–187 (Tarrant 1983, 244–45).

\(^{139}\) *QVR*, 584–85: ‘... sed intellexit [*ACC*\(^2\)] et evidenter expressit quod per usum [*read: actum*] utendi perfectum, per quem res dicuntur usu consumptibles, consumantur. Dixit enim quod per tales usum, id est utendi actum, et in ipso actu [*add: et cum ipso actu*], res huiusmodi consumitur. Posuit enim copulativa ‘utendi actum, et in ipso actu et cum ipso actu’, unde satis expressit quod non per ipsius actus principium consumantur res huiusmodi, sed per actum perfectum. Item, subiunxit quod actus utendi in ipsius rei, scilicet consumptibilis usu, exercetur substantia, nec sine ipsius rei consumptione esse valeat usus talis. Unde cum dicat quod sine rei consumptione esse non valeat usus talis, satis evident expressit quod de usu illo per quem res consumitur, non de eius principio, intellexit.’ The suggestions in square brackets come from OND 73.3–12, 599–600; *Improbatio* n. 791, 352, only agrees with OND in the second case.
but the upshot seems to be that he thought the act of using cannot be ‘had’ \( (haberi) \) because the present is eternally ungraspable; and once the act is completed, it is too late for the act to be ‘had’ (though its fruits are available).\(^{141}\)

So went John’s arguments against the term ‘usus’ and its obtainability. The problem, of course, was that many people could and did argue that \( abusus \)’ primary meaning, both noun and verb, was negative in the sense of ‘abuse’.\(^{142}\) For his part, the pope was convinced by the very fact that ‘abuse’ is used in ‘the law of emperors’ (i.e., Roman law) that the term can be used in a good, or positive, sense.\(^{143}\) Moreover, he added, the verb \( abuti \) appears in a passage of Jeremias (18.23) as well; and ‘cum in Deo abusus in mala parte sumptus non cadat’, \( abuti \) must be taken for a licit act, not an illicit one.\(^{144}\)

This final point introduced the transition to one of John’s main, and certainly one of the most well known, criticisms of the Franciscan position, and it is to this that we must now turn.

**JUST USE IS LICIT USE IS USING BY RIGHT**

As we have seen, the use which the Franciscans have must be a use of right; that is, the order must have a use of right, and individual friars must have at least a right of using all things which they in fact use or consume. In the case of consumables, this right of using cannot be had separately: what is in fact required are the rights of \( dominium \).\(^{145}\) The reason for this is that since a right of using is inseparable from use itself,\(^{146}\) any use—to use the word ‘improperly’\(^{147}\)—must itself be just.\(^{148}\) According to the pope, \( usus \) without \( ius \) would be \( iniustus \).\(^{149}\) John in fact argued from the licitness of an act to the justness of an act, and, not surprisingly, John thought that \( Exiit \) made the point for him:\(^{150}\)

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\(^{141}\) The same reasoning applies for \( concedere actum utendi \) (here ‘act of using’ is understood to be synonymous with the Michaelist \( usus facti \)); see \( ACC^2 \) 153–167 (Tarrant 1983, 241–43). As Kriechbaum 1996, 54–55, astutely pointed out, the owner cannot grant the act of using, only the possibility of using (licitly), which is what the \( ius utendi \) is. Kriechbaum pointed to Dig. 50.17.54 and, less convincingly, to \( STh \) 1a.75.1 obj. 1.

\(^{142}\) Cf., e.g., Berger 1953, s.v. ‘abuti’ (349).

\(^{143}\) \( QVR \), 578.

\(^{144}\) \( QVR \), 578.

\(^{145}\) \( ACC^1 \), 85; \( ACC^2 \) 86–88 (Tarrant 1983, 236). Cf. the \( nova oppositio \) from the consistory debates edited in Tocco 1910, 81–82.

\(^{146}\) \( ACC^2 \) 158–167 (Tarrant 1983, 242–3).

\(^{147}\) See n. 100 on p. 37 above.

\(^{148}\) \( QQM \) 221–224 (Tarrant 1983, 275–76). Unjust acts, of course, can hardly pertain to the state of perfection: \( QQM \) 224–226 (Tarrant 1983, 276).

\(^{149}\) McGrade 1974, 11 n. 35.

\(^{150}\) The relevant passage of \( Exiit \), 2.1114, is as follows: ‘omnium utensilium et librorum, ac eorum mobilium praesentium et futurorum, quae et quorum usumfructum [read: usum facti] scilicet
Quod autem usum talem non iustum conditor canonis fratribus ipsis non [omit: non] intellexerit reseruare probable non uidetur. Immo, quod de iusto intellexerit ex eo potest evidentius apparere quod in eadem ordinacione adiecit, quod illarum rerum duntaxat in se et etiam Romanam ecclesiam recipiebat dominium quare [read: quarum] usum facti liceret habere fratribus seu ordini antedictis, subiungens quod non rerum omnium usum habere debeant frates ipsi. Quantum autem ad usum facti simplicem absque omni iure utendi attinet, nulla rerum potest censeri differentia quo ad fratres. Sic enim uti de facto possunt prohibitis ut permissis. Ex quo sequitur quod usus facti, de quo ordinatio loquitur, de tali intelligi debet qui iustus sit et pro quo competat ius utendi. Et ipse uidetur conditor canonis ex eo etiam sensisse, quod in eadem ordinacione subiunxit quod moderatus usus in expressis prius rebus ipsis fratribus est concessus.

There are a few things to note in this passage. First of all, although John could conceive of a ‘de facto use’ which is without a right of using (for this is to use ‘forbidden’ things), he refused to relate this notion to simple use of fact, which, we remember, had to be understood only as the completed act, not the act of using. In reality, as far as the friars are concerned, there is no difference (differentia) when it comes to use. John was arguing in other words for an equation of just use and licit use, for he began by agreeing that Nicholas III wished to reserve a just use to the friars, but also forbade them to use indiscriminately anything whatsoever. Licit use came from the point that only certain things were permitted for use. Since it is wrong to use things that are not permitted, any such acts of using cannot be just. Conversely, therefore, licit use, or using what is permitted, must also be just use. Just use, however, presupposed a right of using: ‘Impossibile enim est actum humanum extrinsecum esse iustum, si exercens actum ipsum nullum ius habeat illum ex exercendi, immo non iustus seu iniustus necessario convicinuit talis usus.’ Since just use (he argued) presupposed a right of using, then truly licit

151. As Tarrant’s second apparatus lectionum makes clear, the so-called official version of the bull does not have the non (the same is true for G&F, 166, and Heft 1986, 243); cf. Friedberg 1879-81, 2.1234. Obviously, a double negative would negate the point John was trying to make.

152. The same holds here as in the note above, but, even more importantly, her text ignores the fact that this is an essentially verbatim quotation of ACC 194-204 (Tarrant 1983, 245-46), which reads ‘quarum’. G&F, 166, and Heft 1986, 243, both read ‘quarum’ as well; cf. Friedberg 1879-81, 2.1234.

153. QQM 227-236 (Tarrant 1983, 276-78).

154. Reading illum for illud (farily well-attested in the MS. tradition): John clearly meant ‘if someone performing that act were to have no right of exercising the act’ (not ‘the right’, which is what illud would entail). G&F, 168, and Improbatio n. 724, 339, simply read ‘ius habeant exercendi’.

use must also involve a right of using. As Virpi Mäkinen has noted, however, the pope’s argument relied on a shift from ‘not just’ to ‘unjust’ that he had no grounds to make. \(^{156}\)

The connection between licit use and just use holds even in cases where the owner has granted the would-be user a licence of using. As John explained, ‘Si enim aliquis licentiam concedat alicui utendi re sua usibili, ita quod licentia teneat, constat quod iste habet ius utendi re illa cui licentia est concessa’. \(^{157}\) This connection is controlled by the fact that John posited an absolute dichotomy between just and unjust acts, which was fundamental to his whole position in the poverty controversy. This was in fact the second point of *Cum inter*: the pope declared that the assertion Christ and the apostles had no right of using the things they did was heretical because (cum) ‘talis assertio ipsorum usum et gesta eidemter includat in premissis non iusta’. \(^{158}\) Thus, in response to Michael of Cesena’s claim that a licence is different from a right, \(^{159}\) John countered by asking whether this licenced use was supposed to be just, unjust, or neither.

\[\text{Si dicat quod iniuste, concordat utique cum constitutione praedicta quae vult quod qui sine iure utitur, utatur iniuste. Si dicat quod iuste utitur, sequitur per consequens quod et iure, quia quod iuste fit et fit iure, X 5.40.12; }^{160}\text{ C. 14 q. 4 c. 11. Si autem dicat quod ille, cui est licentia utendi concessa nec iuste utatur nec iniuste, hoc falsum est. Impossible est enim actum humanum individualem indifferentem esse, id est nec bonum nec malum, nec iustum nec iniustum. Cum enim actus humanus dicatur qui ex deliberata voluntate procedit, et per consequens qui fit propter aliquem finem, quiquidem [sic] objectum noscitur voluntatis, oportet quod si finis actus sit bonus quod et actus iuste sit bonus, si vero finis sit malus, oportet quod actus sit malus.}\]

Since there are no indifferent actions, it is possible to say that every act is just or unjust in so far as each is good or bad. \(^{162}\) What is significant here is that John has effectively

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159. *App. mai.*, 264; *App. min.*, 438. See below, p. 146.
160. This decretal has been discussed by Tierney 1991 and 1997, 124–26; as he has noted, John interpreted this ambiguous canon contrary to the earlier canonistic tradition. But compare Rufinus’ similar comments in his *Summa decretorum* ad D. 8 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘Differt quoque’ (Singer 1902, 21)—discussed on p. 66, below. See also Kriechbaum 1996, 60, who pointed out the relevance of D. 1 c. 2 (‘ius autem est dictum, quia iustum est’) for this passage; the *Glossa ordinaria* elaborates on this point (below, p. 73).
161. *QVR*, 582; see *ACC*\(^2\) 188–192 (Tarrant 1983, 245) for a similar point about simple use without a right of using.
162. Brett 1997, 54–56, has suggested that John derived (but developed) this argument from Hervaeus Natalis’ *De paup.* (Sikes 1937–38, 235), who had argued that just use requires ‘aliquod ius in tali re’. Cf. Tabarroni 1990, 79–80 n. 12, and Tierney 1997a, 104–08. Mäkinen 2001, 133, has identified a similar argument in Gregory of Fontaines’ works. On the point about human acts, Offler has suggested (OPol 2.557) we compare Aquinas in *STb* 2a2ae.18.9 co. (6.137): ‘Et oportet quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam per quam trahatur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus
claimed that the spheres of morality and law are co-extensive. *Ius* and *iustitia* are, for John, as they were for civilian jurists, two sides of the same coin. What is unjust cannot be licit, and since just use requires a right of using, so too must licit use; and, therefore, so too must licenced use. The way John saw it, when a friar used something, be it a stick found in the wilderness or the Basilica of St Francis, he either had the right to do so, or he used it unjustly and wrongly—like a thief.

### 2.7 A Summary of John’s Theory of Property

John’s theory of ownership can be summarized more easily than most. As John Kilcullen has suggested, the pope’s basic criticism of the general Franciscan conception of poverty centered on two points: first, that no one can justly use a thing without at least a right of using; and, second, that no one can justly use a consumable ‘without having a particular right in it, namely property’. Let us put these two points into a broader context. If we discount God’s obvious lordship over all things, then *dominium*—in the sense of proprietary lordship—first historically arose before the creation of Eve. This was exclusive (*proprium*) lordship, for there was no one else to share it with, and it derived its legitimacy from divine law. Once Eve was created, the lordship became common; presumably this happened ‘naturally’, although the pope never explained how this occurred. Once the two shared paradise, they shared this lordship. Individual *dominia* began after the Fall. *Per iniquitatem*, people began to say that this or that was theirs. As kings and kingdoms came into existence, lordship began to be sanctioned by positive law as well. This became the primary justificatory source of property rights, though not where it came into conflict with divine law. In addition to becoming a source of lordship, positive law introduced the right of action (*ius agendi*).

John explicitly separated this right from the right of using, which he claimed no one could do without if they wanted to use justly. Presumably we could interpret this to mean that John was willing to admit that although the friars had a right of using the goods they licitly and justly used, this did not mean that they necessarily had any rights

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163. Kriechbaum 1996, 60–61, suggested that the identification of the two was stronger ‘in der Legistik’ than in canonist literature.

164. Kilcullen 1999, 308.

165. *QVR*, 593.

166. *QVR*, 593.
to sue in court if someone illegally deprived them of their right to use. John perhaps thought this right belonged instead to the Church.

As far as the use of things is concerned, John distinguished between consumables and non-consumables. For the latter, it is possible for people to use the items in question without holding ownership, but this was impossible when it came to consumables: to use a consumable, which meant the *consumptio rei*, was to be the owner. This was as true for the apostles as it was in the fourteenth century. As Töpfer noted, in the pope’s hands the apostles and early community of believers became a witness against the Franciscan point of view as they were both common and individual *proprietarii* of consumables.\(^{167}\) However, even with non-consumables it was impossible to use them licitly and justly—which were synonymous for John—without a *ius utendi*.

Finally, John basically denied the Franciscan claim to a (*simplex*) *usus facti*. The order itself certainly could not have this supposed use of fact, for it was only a fictive legal entity, and as the word ‘facti’ implies, this use requires a subject who can perform (*facere*) the act. Thus all the order can have is a *usus iuris*. Even more to the point, this simple use of fact is not something that can actually be had. *Usus facti* referred to the completed act, much like *facti* derives from the perfect passive participle of *facere*. This does not mean though, as his opponents would repeatedly claim, that John denied the possibility of someone actually using things.\(^{168}\) What he was trying to argue was that ‘use of fact’ for consumables is not something one can obtain, since by the ‘completed act’ their substance is consumed; and, at this point, there is nothing left to obtain.

To respond to the pope the Michaelists had to deal with a number of different, but related, topics. First, they needed to prove that (simple) use of fact was actually obtainable. But this would be useless unless they could show that their order could have this use of fact, and did not need, or merely have, a use of right. Even more importantly, they had to show that a right of using was not necessary for a just and/or licit use of goods. This in turn meant demonstrating that the origin of lordship in the sense of proprietary ownership derived mostly from positive law in a postlapsarian world. To achieve these goals would suffice for a coherent theory of property rights which afforded the Michaelists the position in society they wished to maintain. But to make this position meaningful, they also had to show that it was modelled after the position of the apostles within the early Christian community.

\(^{167}\) Töpfer 1971, 299: ‘Die Apostel und die Angehörigen der Urgemeinde waren also demnach in schärfstem Gegensatz zur franziskanischen Auffassung nicht nur gemeinsam, sondern auch einzeln volle Eigentümer von Verbrauchsgütern.’

\(^{168}\) After all, John is willing to concede that the Franciscans can, like anyone else, illicitly use things by means of a ‘de facto’ use.
By way of conclusion, we should note that although John’s theory of property was profoundly indebted to the Roman law tradition, it was so really only on the theory of use. Interestingly, he made even lighter use of canon law. Perhaps this was because he believed that a theory of use of lordship could not be as complicated as the Michaelists needed to make it. Thus, we are left with the paradoxical observation that it was the group most interested in proving how few legal rights they had that tended to make the most extensive use of legal sources.\textsuperscript{169} In the following chapters, we shall look at some of these responses.

\textsuperscript{169} Francis of Marchia is a notable exception to this trend.
CHAPTER THREE

THE VARIETIES OF IUS

AT THE HEART of the Michaelist-John poverty controversy was a heated debate over rights, or *ius*. In order to understand William of Ockham’s position and debts to his fellow friars on the issue of Franciscan poverty we must start with an analysis of the word *ius*. Depending on the context, we translate this word into either ‘right’ or ‘law’, though it is not always clear which meaning was (primarily) intended in a given context.

For the Michaelists, and in the context of the poverty controversy, I argue that *ius*, when it refers to law, belongs to one of three basic categories: divine law, natural law, and human positive (i.e., civil or canon) law; when *ius* meant what we typically call ‘rights’, it meant a right which was grounded in, or derived from, one of these laws. The two most obvious rights we need to consider are those based in natural and positive law.

Since the time of Bonaventure’s earliest writings in defense of the Franciscan way of life, the debate made reference to various types of law, but at this stage he used *lex* rather

1. *Defensor pacis* 2.12.3 (Scholz 1932–33, 264).
2. I omit mention of the *ius gentium* because the Michaelists tended to ignore it in their writings on evangelical poverty. In general, however, the *ius gentium* occupies an uneasy place between natural and positive law, and different authors tended to push it closer to one or the other category.
3. In fact, separating divine and natural law is not really this easy: the distinction is a hazy one, and one on which not even the Michaelists seemed to agree (fully and explicitly). This will become apparent in the following sections. Similarly, positive law was not a homogeneous body itself. There was, for instance, *ius positivum ecclesiasticum*, which one (anonymous) Michaelist claimed was the only sphere in which the pope had (in the non-hierocratic sense) *plenitudo potestatis*. See 3 opp., 509:

   ‘Et certum est quod papa in his quae pertinent ad ius positivum ecclesiasticum habet plenitudinem potestatis super omnes. Unde ipse supra ius positivum dispensare potest, X 3.8.4, et de eo quod non est ius, potest ius facere, puta sententiam quae de iure positivo nulla est, potest facere validam, eam ratam et firmam habendo et confirmando de plenitudine potestatis, C. 3 q. 6 c. 10, et notatur C. 9 q. 2 c. 1, in glossa signata super verbo “rata”. Et privilegia etiam in aliorum praecidicium dare, C. 12 q. 2 c. 74.... Et sicut praedicta sunt certa et manifesta, ita certissimum est quod papa non potest contra ius divinum sive legem divinam, nec contra ordinata sive definita a sanctis patribus in fide sive moribus a iure divino introductis aliquid statuere vel definire, nec in his dare aliquam legem novam....’ Cf. the remarks at 3 opp., 511–14. It is worth noting that a statement of this sort cannot be found in Michael’s appeals, Francis’ *Improbatio*, or Ockham’s *OND*. 
than *ius*. While Bonaventure would sharpen his terminology and thinking in the *Apologia pauperum*, as well as place a greater emphasis on *ius* in his text, there was also a tradition of worrying about *iura* in the Rule commentary tradition. These two currents perhaps culminated in Olivi, particularly his eighth question on evangelical perfection—and if not there, then certainly in the roughly contemporaneous bull of Nicholas III, *Exiit qui seminat*.

Another reason to begin with *ius* is that a claim of *dominium rei* (lordship of a thing) generally entails a consideration of *ius*; put another way, it is common to assume that rights are found wherever lordship is found.

*Ius*, of course, is not the only term that is important for understanding the debate, but it is the fundamental category in the sense that the Michaelists were mainly interested in denying that both individual Franciscans and the order as a whole had certain specific (proprietary) rights that are grounded in positive law.

### 3.1 IUS AND THE JURISTS

Jurists, too, thought a great deal about *ius*, and it is worth looking at some of the common opinions about the different varieties of *ius* in order to appreciate better how novel the Michaelist position was. In what follows I briefly outline civil and canon law thinking about natural law and the origins of property. I begin with the *Digest* and *Institutes* and two well known glossators, and then follow it with a brief examination of the *Decretum* and some of the more famous and accessible decretists. This is in no way meant to be

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4. See for instance his *De paupertate quoad mendicitatem* (De perfectione evangelica, q. 2 a. 2 (BOO 5.134–49), where he wrote of *lex naturae* (5.139a), *lex socialis* (5.139b), *lex communis* (5.145b), *lex humana* and *lex divina* (5.146b), *lex Evangelii* (5.147a). This was meant as a response of sorts to William’s own disputed question *De quantitate eleemosynae* (in Traver 1995, 323–32); essential chronology is laid out by Bougerol 1982, 57, and Dufeil 1976, 218–19.  
5. For example: Hugh of Digne’s *Expositio* 4 (Flood 1979, 128): ‘In allis quae fratres licite ad usum recipiunt, nihil iuris iuxta divinam ut volunt legem [est]…’. David of Augsberg (d. 1272) similarly wrote in his commentary (Flood 1993, 221): ‘Fratres nihil sibi nec in singulari nec in communi appropriant iure proprietatis ac perpetuae possessionis …’.  
6. In his *QPE* 8 (Schlageter 1989), Olivi often referred to *ius*; and in *Exiit* we see the phrase ‘nihil iuris’ (2.1113) in the same context as David used it.  
7. Cf. Honoré’s (1987, 165) account of ‘the [modern] liberal concept of full individual ownership’, where he suggests that ‘ownership comprises the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the income of the thing, the right to the capital, the right to security, the rights or incidents of transmissability and absence of term, the duty to prevent harm, liability to execution, and the incident of residuarity’. He discusses the implications of this definition in the following pages. L. Becker 1977, 18–21, used this as the basis of his investigation of the various ways the acquisition of property rights has been justified.  
8. On the origins and development of the term ‘ius posituum’ among the canonists, see Kuttner 1936.  
3. Varieties of *Ius* §. *Ius* and the Jurists

an exhaustive study of the topic, merely meant to provide some basic context against which we can compare Ockham and the other Michaelists. Medieval philosophers and theologians also had much to say about natural law; regretfully, however, it must be passed over in silence ‘ad prolixitatem nimiam evitandam’ (as the Michaelists were wont to say).

**Roman Law & Two Glossators**

In Roman law the *loqui classici* for reflecting upon the multi-faceted meanings of *ius* were the opening title of both the *Digest* and the *Institutes*, known by the title ‘De justitia et iure’. Here one reads that *ius* may be thought of as the ‘ars boni et aequi’. Ulpian then went on to divide *ius* into a private and public branch; the *ius privatum* itself was described as tripartite, and it was in this sub-category where most of the mendicant poverty controversy should be located. There was *ius naturale*, which is what nature teaches all animals, humans included (Dig. 1.1.1.3; Inst. 1.2.1), and which is always fair and good (Dig. 1.1.11). In the *Institutes* it was further described as not only observed by all people, but even, as it was established by divine providence, something that will endure strong and immutable (Inst. 1.2.11).

By natural law all men were born free from the beginning (Inst. 1.2.2), which is partly why some later commentators would refer to a *ius naturale primaevum*, that is, the law that originally held sway over all creatures. The *ius gentium*, on the other hand, was common (only) to all human beings. The *ius gentium* is apparently responsible for the advent of things like wars, nations of people, kingdoms, *dominia distincta*, property boundaries, buildings, commerce, buying and selling, leases and rents, and obligations—though civil law might also share the responsibility for certain specific instances (Dig. 1.1.5). However, the actual phrase, ‘ex hoc iure gentium’, is ambiguous. Were, say,

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10. Readers are encouraged to look at Weigand’s magisterial study of the topic (1967). This topic is well studied in Tierney 1997a (see also 1986a, 1992a, 1980), more cursorily in F. Oakley 2005; the topic also comes up frequently in the Garnsey’s recent monograph (2007).

11. *App. mai.*, 307. For a useful overview, however, see McGrade 1982 and Luscombe 1982a. John Finnis recently wrote a detailed account of Aquinas (1998, see esp. 132–86), which was challenged in certain respects by Tierney (2002, which in turn provoked a few responses in that issue of *The Review of Politics*).

12. The following is based on Dig. 1.1 and Inst. 1.1. For a useful introductory overview, see MacCormack 1998, 1–6. A brief discussion may be found in Tierney 1993a, 309.


14. Michael of Cesena’s *App. mai* is the exception: he instead built on a section of Bonaventure’s *Ap. pauup.*; see Appendix A for discussion of this point.

15. Weigand 1967, 270, 272, listed a few other references; see also Tarello 1964, 433 n. 340. The phrase may also be found in Hostiensis, *Summa aurea* ad X 2.12, n. 2, *Quid sit possessio* (fol. 525), which was a text Michael quoted from.
Varieties of Ius §. Ius and the Jurists

'distinct lordships' introduced 'from the law of nations' in the sense of merely being permitted or are they things written into the substance of the ius gentium itself? The ius gentium is also sometimes described as what naturalis ratio has established among men, since just about (quasi) all humankind uses that ius (Dig. 1.1.9; Inst. 1.2.1).

To pass on to our last category, ius ciuile is described as something not wholly separate from either of the first two categories (Dig. 1.1.7) or at least from the ius gentium (Inst. 1.2.1). More importantly, it can trump the other types of iura. The jurist Paul described it, no doubt idealistically, as what is useful to all or many of the people in a city (Dig. 1.1.11).

At the same time, Roman law is replete with instances of a ius where in English we want to translate the word as 'right'. A famous line from the Digest bears this out: 'Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi' (Dig. 1.1.10 pr.). Clearly, to say 'allotting everyone his law' is the more confusing choice. Yet, as Michel Villey noted some time ago, the Roman law ius seems to be meant in an objective rather than subjective sense. According to Villey, the 'right' of a parricide was to be thrown into the Tiber in a sack of vipers. In another influential article, he noted that the jurist Gaius spoke of ius in such a way that 'right' seemed to be the wrong word entirely. The passage adverted to describes a 'ius ... altius tollendi aedes aut non tollendi', and it is hard to conceive of a 'right of not building higher'.

There is a relatively straightforward answer, of course: the examples just given belong generally to a discussion of servitudes. Personal servitudes include use and usufruct, as John XXII had noted. Servitudes fall under the category of iura in re aliena, rights over another's property. But the right is vested in a beneficiary not as a subjective, personal right but as a right attached to (in) the thing itself, regardless of who happens to own it. Praedial and urban servitudes, to which Villey's example belongs, could not force the owner into doing something, only that he allow or not do something. The owner was also not to act in such a way that he interfered with the beneficiary's right or access to the thing. The servient property was quite naturally servient to the dominant property,
and the relationship could work in various ways. For example, Roman citizens were normally guaranteed that a certain basic amount of sunlight would shine upon their buildings. If someone wanted more than that amount, he would need to acquire—usually by purchase—a servitude that prevented his neighbour from building above a certain point. This was known as a *ius altius non tollendi*. Conversely, some neighbour might want to raise his building (and thereby obstruct some of his neighbour’s access to light); in this case he would need to acquire a *ius altius tollendi*. Even so-called personal servitudes (*servitutes personarum/hominum*) only indicated that the beneficiary was a specific individual. In the case of usufruct, then, the beneficiary had the rights to the use and the fruits of the thing, but not a right to its destruction: whereas the owner had full ownership before (rights to use, fruits, and destruction), by granting a usufruct, all that was left to him was the bare title of ownership (for the term of the usufruct). He cannot even exercise the right of destruction at that point for he would be interfering with the usufructuary’s temporary rights to use and enjoy the thing, although he might still alienate the property.

One of the greatest glossators of Roman law was Azo (fl. 1198–1230). Drawing on the work of others he took *ius naturale* to have five major meanings in his *Summa* on the *Institutes*, one according to the *motus sensualitatis* (i.e., Dig. I.1.1.3), the others according to the movement of reason. It is thus not surprising that Azo tended to conflate *ius naturale* and the *ius gentium* in these latter senses.  

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22. Cf. Dig. 8.2.2 and Gaius, *Institutiones* 2:30–32 (Gordon and Robinson 1988, 60). The important point to understand about praelial servitudes, which give ‘a real right over a particular parcel of land applying in favour of another parcel’, is that they have ‘primarily to do with access’ (if *servitutes praediorum rusticorum*) or ‘to do with the necessary mutual relationship between adjacent properties developed by building’ (*servitutes praediorum urbanorum*). See Miller 1998, 68–69.

23. I have followed Birks 1985, 17 here; cf. Garnsey 2007, 187, who faulted Tierney 1997a, 17, for his Villey-influenced reading. The *ius altius non tollendi* has led to many different opinions regarding what kind of ‘right’ this is. Perhaps what this shows best is that translating *ius* as always either ‘law’ or ‘right’ is a foolish enterprise. Secondly, we should remember that it was in fact the land, and not the people who were burdened with the servitude.

24. Gaius, *Institutiones* 2:30, used the phrase *nuda proprietias*.

25. For Azo’s life and works, see Lange 1997, 255–71.

26. I follow the texts assembled by Weigand 1967, 52–53 (referring to his *Summa institutionum* 1.2.1–3) who discusses Azo’s sources on the following pages. Weigand (1967, 56), quoting Azo’s gloss to Dig. 1.1.1.3 (s.v. ‘animalium’), saw this division into two classes as the key classification.

Azo stressed the immutability of *iura naturalia*, but he added that they could be blocked (*obfuscata*) by *ius ciuile* or the *ius gentium* in certain details,\(^2^8\) which could even add to it.\(^2^9\) Azo also argued that there was a *communis omnium possessio* by natural law, which was to be shared, Weigand explained, in a time of necessity.\(^3^0\) The picture is not entirely clear, however, for Azo also argued that natural law in the sense of divine law allowed for private property, as the Decalogue makes clear:

Immo etiam secundum ius naturale sunt distincta [dominia], quod aliquid est proprium, id est secundum ius diuinum. Dicitur enim furtum non facies. Item non concupisces rem proximi tui. Item non retinebis mercenarii tui mercedem. Item non appares in conspectu dei tui (uacuus). Respondeo et tunc ius erat gentium et secundum illud dicebatur aliquid meum.\(^3^1\)

In addition to the usual common / private division, Azo also pointed out that Roman law designated some things as *publica*: ‘nulla communia’, he wrote, ‘sunt publica, e conuerso’. It was not a straightforward distinction either. Things might be called public because they belong to all peoples in that they pertain to the use of humankind alone, or because they belong to a specific population.\(^3^2\)

Weigand also adduced a related passage from Azo’s *Summa institutionum*, and explained that Azo thought the institution of private property relied primarily on the *ius gentium*, which was recognized and guaranteed by positive divine law.\(^3^3\) This idea can also be seen in his commentary on the *Institutes*, where he claims that *dominia rerum* is acquired by the *ius gentium* or civil law, not natural law. Acquisition of lordship by the *ius gentium* is based on the idea of the *res nullius*; under civil law, acquisition

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28. Weigand 1967, 76, referring to Dig. 1.8.3 s.v. ‘lapilli’; cf. his *Summa institutionum* 1.2.8 (Weigand 1967, 112): ‘Iura enim naturalia dicuntur immutabilia, quia nec possunt ex toto abrogari uel auferri; sed tamen potest eis derogari uel detrahi in especie, ut Dig. 1.1.6 pr.’ This was the medieval view; but it has been suggested that for the Romans, civil law was to be preferred to natural law in cases of conflict: Garnsey 2007, 120.


31. Weigand 1967, 96, referring to Dig. 1.1.5, s.v. ‘discrete gentes’.


occurs through usucapion, prescription, adoption, deportation, succession, and a number of related ways.\textsuperscript{34}

It is perhaps also worth noting that Azo clearly understood that \textit{ius} might sometimes have a more 'subjective' meaning. After explaining that \textit{ius} might refer to various types of law: natural, civil, praetorian, or even that which results from judgment (\textit{pro eo tantum, quod competit ex sententia}), Azo wrote:

\begin{quote}
Ponitur etiam quandoque ius pro actione; quandoque pro obligatione qualibet, quandoque pro haereditate, quandoque pro bonorum possessione.\ldots Sed et ius etiam \textit{sic} in uulgari ponitur pro quodam cibo delicato, quandoque pro potestate: ut cum dicitur, sui iuris est. Et quandoque ponitur pro iuris rigore: ut cum dicitur inter ius et aequitatem, etc. ut Cod. 1.14.1.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

It is clear that Azo saw the objective and subjective side of \textit{ius}, even if it is only vulgarly said that \textit{ius} refers to one’s status as subject to no one else, for, as he wrote elsewhere, everyone is either one’s own master or someone else’s subject.\textsuperscript{36} Thus, it would seem that the very idea of being \textit{sui iuris} meant not merely that one was ‘under one’s own law’, but that one had the freedom to act without reference to dictates of another; this is why Azo said that \textit{ius} can be taken \textit{pro potestate}.

Azo’s pupil Accursius (c. 1185–1263) was responsible for compiling the massive \textit{Glossa ordinaria} to the entire \textit{corpus iuris civilis}.\textsuperscript{37} It has been estimated that the Gloss contains almost 97,000 individual glosses and perhaps about 2,000,000 words.\textsuperscript{38} As many of these glosses were Azo’s, it is no surprise that Accursius held similar views regarding natural law. Similar to his teacher, Accursius thought \textit{ius naturale} could be spoken of in at least four ways. He listed them in two different places, though with some variation. In a gloss to the \textit{Institutes} he mentioned four major ways, but felt obliged to provide a definition from canon law.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Summa Azonis ad Inst. 2.1 nn. 20–21 (1566, col. 1063): ‘Acquiruntur autem dominia rerum non iure naturali, sed gentium vel ciuili. Ciuita multis modis: ut usucapione, praescriptione, arrogatione, monachatione, deportatione, testamento, sucessione, bonorum possessione, haereditatis aditione: de quibus modis, licet non de omnibus tractabitur infra, \textit{commodius est autem a uestutiore incipere: id est a naturali, quod dicitur gentium, quod cum ipso genere humano rerum natura prodidit. Ciuitia enim iura tunc coeperunt esse, cum et ciuitates condi magistratus creari, et leges scribi coeperunt ut infra Inst. 2.1.11. Iureigitur gennentium dominia acquiruntur nobis multis modis, ut ecce in primis per occupatione eorum, quae non sunt in bonis aliquiis’ (italicized words are from the \textit{Institutes}).
\item Summa Azonis ad Inst. 1.1 n. 5 (1566, col. 1048).
\item Summa Azonis ad Inst. 1.8 n. 2 (1566, col. 1055): ‘Est autem haec divisiis talis: quia omnis homo aut est sui iuris, aut alieni iuris, aut dubii secundum quosdam, qui dicit statum alienius quandoque esse in suspensio\ldots Nos contradicimus: esset enim absurdum codem tempore, nec in patris, nec in sua quenquamuisse potestate: ut Cod. 9.51.13.1’.
\item For Accursius’ life and works, including a detailed examination of the fortunes of the \textit{Glossa ordinaria}, see Lange 1997, 335–85.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Et nota quod quattuor modis ius naturale ponitur: Quandoque pro iure gentium ut infra Inst. 2.1.11; quandoque pro iure pactorum ut Dig. 2.14.1 pr.; quandoque pro eius contrario, scilicet pro eo quod rescindit pacta, ut in restitutione minorum, ut Dig. 4.4.1 pr.; quandoque pro instictu nature ut hic. Secundum canones ius naturale quod dicitur in lege mosaica uel Euangelo continetur, ut in principio decretorum.39

On Dig. 1.1.1.3, however, he explained the four ways thus:

Primo lex Mosaica, ut Inst. 4.1.1. Secundo instinctus nature ut hic. Tertio ius gentium ut Inst. 2.1.11. Quarto ius pretorium, ut infra Dig. 4.4.1 pr., et facit, Inst. 1.2 pr.40

Weigand suggested that Accursius perhaps realized over time the significance of D. 1 c. 1 for natural law theories, noting specifically that Accursius explicitly linked one sense of natural law to lex diuina in his glosses to the Digestum novum. The canon law notion that natural law and divine law were in some sense the same was one that Accursius came to respect, but he was hesitant to adopt.41 For us, what I want to note is that he recognized the interchangeability of natural and divine law, and that he thought it could also refer to the ius gentium, which only applies to humans, and the instilled instinct of nature, which is true for all animals. Thus, the coniunctio of Adam and Eve is a product of natural law, following from the instinct of nature,42 even though, as he noted elsewhere, the ius gentium arose as soon as God had created gentes.43

Accursius also recognized the immutability of iura naturalia, but he noted that the idea might be problematic for some. Slavery, for instance, existed licitly, yet Inst. 1.2.2 insisted that all men were born free ‘iure naturali’. Azo had suggested that although natural law could not be completely overidden, it could be modified in part. Slavery and usucaption, Accursius explained, were examples of where natural law was not observed, which need not be considered a derogation of natural law.44 Elsewhere, however, he described it as such. Slaves, for example, are always free ‘inspecto iure naturali’,45 even if

40. Quoted in Weigand 1967, 57. The ‘et facit’ is unclear.
42. Gl. ord. ad Inst. 1.2 pr., s.v. ‘hinc’ and Dig. 1.1.1.3, s.v. ‘coniugatio’, quoted in Weigand 1967, 60, 81–82.
44. Gl. ord. ad Inst. 1.2.11, s.v. ‘Set naturalia’, quoted in Weigand 1967, 112–13: ‘Set quod dicit esse immutabile est contra quod de seruitute dicitur que est contra ius naturale et tamen preualet ut supra Inst. 1.2.2(!). Set dic, non derogatur ob hoc, licet non seruetur (in illo casu). Nam nichilominus bonum et equum est. Et codem modo respondeo ad id quod dicitur infra Inst. 1.16.6, quod est contra. Item (codem modo ut prius respondeo) ad id quod de usucapione dicitur infra Inst. 2.6 pr., quam constat esse contra ius naturale ut Dig. 12.6.14(!).’ Cf. Weigand 1967, 115.
45. Gl. ord. ad Dig. 1.1.4, s.v. ‘datio’, quoted in Weigand 1967, 77.
they are non-persons according to *ius ciuile*.\(^{46}\) This is of course a case where civil law has restricted (derogauerit) natural law in part.\(^{47}\)

Private property is another area where immutable natural law is a little elastic. In the original state of affairs, ‘sub suo iure naturali primaevo’, all things were common;\(^{48}\) but Accursius followed Azo quite closely in arguing that *dominia distincta* existed on the basis of divine (natural) law and the *ius gentium*. Regarding the idea that ‘omnia sunt communia iure naturali’,\(^{49}\) he suggested that one might say that it was on the basis of the *ius gentium* that someone said something was his own, or that it simply meant that things were to be shared. There was no mention that this was true only for times of necessity.\(^{50}\)

**GRATIAN & THE DECRETISTS**

The canon law tradition also provided a fair amount of material for discussions of *ius*. If anything, the opening distinctions of Gratian’s *Concordance of Discordant Canons* were more liable to confuse than illuminate untrained readers.\(^{51}\) But Gratian’s purpose was not to define *ius* so much as gather together what others had said about it. Neither Gratian nor those who came after him imagined that there was a single comprehensive account or definition of *ius*.\(^{52}\) Here I shall only focus on some of the more important capitula, particularly those deemed important by the Michaelists.\(^{53}\)

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\(^{46}\) *Gl. ord.* ad Dig. 1.1.5, s.v. ‘obligationes’, quoted in Weigand 1967, 104–05. Cf. Dig. 50.17.32.

\(^{47}\) *Gl. ord.* ad Dig. 1.1.4, s.v. ‘nacerentur’, quoted in Weigand 1967, 117.

\(^{48}\) *Gl. ord.* ad Inst. 2.1.5, s.v. ‘publicius’: ‘Cuius respectu vera sit opinio [Johannes Bassianus]. Nam communia sunt relicta sub suo iure naturali primaevo, quo omnia erant communia’. And *Gl. ord.* ad Inst. 2.1.1, s.v. ‘naturali iure’: ‘id est iure gentium (quod est naturali ratione inductum ut Dig. 1.1.9) de quo hic loquitur ut infra Inst. 2.1.11 et in fine huius §. Nam iure naturali primeuo etiam alia essent communia.’ The words in parentheses are an addition of the second recension. These quotations come from Weigand 1967, 88–89.

\(^{49}\) Cf. Inst. 2.1.1 pr. The phrase is also used by Gratian, Huguccio and the *Glossa ordinaria* to the decretum (among others); see below p. 60, p. 71, and nn. 130, 144, and 154.

\(^{50}\) *Gl. ord.* ad Dig. 1.1.5, s.v. ‘discrete gentes’ (from Weigand 1967, 96–97): ‘Immo etiam secundum ius naturale sunt distincta, quia secundum ius diuinum aliquid est proprium; dicitur enim “furtum non facies” ... (wie Azo). Et si dicatur “omnia sunt communia iure naturali” expone id est communicanda; (uc dic) etiam tunc quando precepta dabantur erat ius gentium et secundum illud dicebatur aliquid meum; nam cum essent gentes iam coniuncte erat ius gentium ut Inst. 2.1.11.’ Weigand 1967, 91–92, explained the communicanda as an appropriation by both Azo and Accursius of the canonistic belief that things must be shared in times of necessity. It is interesting, however, that neither one makes reference to necessity as a prerequisite.

\(^{51}\) On Gratian and the *Decretum*, see now Landau 2008.

\(^{52}\) Panormitanus’ comments summarize this idea well: ‘Nota novem exempla iuris naturalis que ponuntur hic in textu. Non enim intelligas quod naturale restingatur ad ista exempla, vel quod per ista lex naturalis dffiniatur. Nam multa alia exempla poni possunt.’ Quoted in Pennington 2008b, 567 n. 59.

\(^{53}\) A useful account of Gratian’s sources of law is found in Gaudemet 1950, who separated Gratian’s sources from his own contributions more explicitly than I have attempted here; Gaudement attempted
Gratian introduced the subject by noting that the human race is governed by two things: *ius naturale* and *mores* (D. 1 d.a.c. 1). Regarding the customs, which he described as *longae consuetudines* (D. 1 c. 4), once they have been written down they acquire the name of *lex humana* (D. 1 d.p.c. 1; cf. D. 12 c. 6).\(^5\) Lex itself may thus be human or divine; divine *lex* agrees with ‘nature’, and ‘fas lex divina est’, while ‘ius [est] lex humana’. It is *fas* to pass through another’s field, but not [necessarily] *ius* (D. 1 c. 1). One cannot but conclude with Gratian that *ius* is a general term, which has many species below it (D. 1 d.p.c. 1). It is also so called because it is just; but all *ius* agrees with *leges* and *mores* (D. 1 c. 2).\(^5\)

Yet there is, explained Gratian (D. 1 d.p.c. 5), another division of *ius*. It is reminiscent of Ulpian’s tripartite division we saw from Roman law—natural, civil, or of the nations.\(^5\) Natural *ius* is common to all nations because it is had by instinct of nature rather than an enactment. To qualify for this list it must never be unjust but rather natural and fair (D. 1 c. 7).\(^5\) Natural law in fact receives extensive treatment in the early distinctions. It began at the appearance of rational creatures, and, more importantly, it is immutable (D. 5 d.a.c. 1)—though this statement is rather casuistically qualified a little later on (D. 6 d.p.c. 3). Finally, natural law is said to prevail over other law (D. 8 d.p.c. 1; D. 9 cc. 1–2).

Civil law, by contrast, is proper to an individual people or *civitas* (D. 1 c. 8). The *ius gentium* is so called because ‘eo iure omnes fere gentes utuntur’ (D. 1 c. 9). Gratian also described a *ius consuetudinis*, which we should connect with the *lex humana* of above,
and therefore with *ius civile* (or the *ius gentium*). It emerged only once people began to live together, that is, when Cain built a city (D. 6 d.p.c. 3).

Private property did not exist under natural law. There was a ‘*communis omnium possessio*’ (D. 1 c. 7). Gratian’s introductory remarks to the eighth distinction are worth quoting:

Differt etiam ius naturae a consuetudine et constitutione. Nam iure naturae sunt omnia communia omnibus, quod non solum inter eos seruatum creditur, de quibus legitur: ‘Multitudinis autem credentium erat cor unum et anima una’, etc. [cf. Act. 4.32] uerum etiam ex precedenti tempore a philosophis traditum inuenitur. Unde apud Platonem illa ciuitas iustissime ordinata traditur, in qua quisque proprios nescit affectus. Iure uero consuetudinis uel constitutionis hoc meum est, illud uero alterius.58

Gratian got Plato wrong of course, but he was in good company.59 More to the point, though, by natural law all things were common to all people; only by the *ius consuetudinis uel constitutionis* do we say one thing is ours or another’s. The *Magister* then inserted a text of Augustine’s which supported this very point.60

In order to put this quotation into perspective, I borrow a distinction Samuel von Pufendorf made between negative and positive communities.61 The idea is quite simple. A negative community is one where no one actually owns anything; everything is, to use a Roman law concept, *res nullius*.62 In this scenario original acquisition does not in fact injure anyone else’s rights, though it could be argued that they are at least potentially diminished. A positive community, on the other hand, is one where ‘things are possessed collectively so that people [have] access to resources in common and no one [can] be excluded from using anything’.63 The canonists did not make use of this terminology, unfortunately, but it seems reasonable to say that the community described by Gratian belongs to the latter category. By an instinct of nature—hence our phrase natural law—there was a common possession of all things. By natural law everything is common to everybody.

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58. D. 8 d.a.c. 1.

59. A detailed examination of the history of mis-interpreting Plato’s supposed communism is given in Garnsey 2007, esp. 6–58. Kuttner 1978 is also very useful as he provides (108–18) a series of appendices that documents various canonists’ opinions about what Gratian’s Plato meant in *Quo iure* (and *Dilectissimis*).


62. This term is explained in greater detail below, p. 208.

Gratian’s first distinction discussed ius in a far greater variety of contexts than the one just given, but they are not relevant to our discussion. What remains is to consider ius as it relates to what we call a ‘right’. It is impossible to treat this issue in its entirety, but it should come as no surprise that Gratian felt comfortable using the word in this way. Gratian wrote of a ius consecrandi (D. 68 d.p.c. 2), a ius percipiendarum decimarum (C. 13 q. 1 d.p.c. 1), a ius tumulandi (C. 13 q. 2 d.p.c. 1), or a church’s inability to be deprived of suum ius (C. 16 q. 1 d.p.c. 41). The Roman Church imparts ius and authority upon the holy canons, but it is not bound by them: rather, it has the right of establishing canons. In a telling dictum Gratian explained that while the founders of churches have the ius prouidendi, et consulendi, et sacerdotem inueniendi, regarding the ecclesiastical resources they do not have a ius uendendi, uel donandi, uel utendi tamquam propriis. Let this suffice to show that Gratian also used ius in a way congruent to our modern, general understanding of ‘right’. By this I mean that when Gratian wrote ius utendi, he meant a ‘right of using’ in a way analogous to the participants in the poverty controversy. That is, the ‘right’ is a right because some law protects or instantiates it.

Let us consider briefly some of the writings of the early canonists. The first surviving collection of glosses to the Decretum belong to Paucapalea, which probably dates to the years before 1148 in Bologna. His ‘Introduction’ will be familiar to readers of Gratian in its broad strokes, but his focus is apparently ius ecclesiasticum, which is either natural, written, or customary. Natural law is contained in lege and in evangelio. It began

64. C. 25 q. 1 d.p.c. 16: ‘Sacrosancta Romana ecclesia ius et auctoritatem sacris canonibus inpertit, sed non eis alligatitur. Habet enim ius condendi canones, utpote que caput et cardo est omnium ecclesiarum, a cuius regula dissentire nemini licet. Ita ergo canonibus auctoritatem prestat, ut se ipsam non subiciat eis.’

65. C. 16 q. 6 d.p.c. 30: ‘Si ergo ecclesiasticas facultates potestatem dispensandi non habent multo minus ipsas ecclesias quibuslibet ad regendum committere uel alius auferre ualent. §. 1. Hic autem distinguendum est, quid iuris fundatores ecclesiarum in eis habeant, uel quid non? Habent ius prouidendi, et consulendi, et sacerdotem inueniendi; sed non habent ius uendendi, uel donandi, uel utendi tamquam propriis.’

66. In other words, I am trying to avoid the interesting but difficult question of subjective versus objective right. For what it is worth, it seems obvious that medieval jurists thought and wrote about subjective rights; the article of Charles Reid (1991) is particularly persuasive on this matter. Tierney (1989 [1997a, ch. 2] and 1992b), and Brett (1997) have fruitfully discussed this topic. At the same time, one should not neglect the important study of Kriechbaum (1996), who doubted the importance of the subjective-objective right question in the poverty controversy.

67. Schulte 1890, IX–X, dated the Summa paucapalea to the years 1144–50; cf. Pennington and Müller 2008, 129. Recently, Weigand 1990, 404* (and n. 5), has argued for the tighter date 1146–50; Winroth 2000, 141, cited Weigand with approval, but remained open to the possibility of a later date.

68. Summa paucapalea, Introductio (Schulte 1890, 1): ‘De origine vero iuris restat dicendum. Sed quia ecclesiasticorum iurium aliud naturale, aliud scriptum, aliud consuetudinarium dicitur, quo tempore horum quodque coeperit, merito quaeritur.’ Weigand 1967, 141 has rightly stressed the importance of equity (Gerechtigkeit) for Paucapalea’s conception of natural law; Pennington 2008b, 574, following Kuttner, has argued a similar point about his concern for the common good.
with the introduction of rational creatures, has primacy over other laws, and does not vary over time, always immutable. Following this is the *ius consuetudinis*, which arose as people began to come together to live, which is believed to be when Cain first built a city. It also coincided with the beginning of Nimrod’s (subsequent) oppression of people. Finally, the origin of *scripta constitutio* dates from the time of Moses.

Paucapalea fused the concepts of natural and divine law. On Gratian’s point that divine *leges* agree with nature, he wrote that these laws ‘natura principium habuerunt’, which he then re-explained to mean that they ‘principium a naturali iure habent’. For Paucapalea, the point was to differentiate human law from its superior counterpart.

In terms of property rights under natural law, Paucapalea naturally came down on the side of a *communis possessio*. That is, Paucapalea seems to have followed his *magister*’s opinion that in the original, natural state, there was property in common, as there would be in a positive community. But this was not something that he really argued for; rather, he only used the idea of common possession to explain the difference of *fas* and *ius*.

The *Summa parisiensis*, datable to about 1160 in the emerging Parisian school, provides evidence that Paucapalea’s interpretation was a relatively common one. The author divided *ius* first into natural law and customs, and went on to explain that natural law had its origin in the creation of man *ex prima natura*. It is what is given in the law and the Gospel, though not everything in the Gospel is natural law. But divine law and natural law are conflated: ‘jus naturale quod est lex divina’. The author seems a little confused by the second, *jus Romanum* division of *ius*; he described it as ‘incongrua’. His exposition is not as clear as one would like. On the opening words of D. 1 c. 6, he wrote:

*Jus autem*. Alia juris divisio quae videtur incongrua quia jus Romanum colligit hæc omnia, quare non est hoc vel illud. Resp.: Alia est hoc, alia est illud, ut ad singula juris referas, i.e. omne capitulum juris est tale vel tale. Quod item videtur verum qua quiddam jus naturale fit civile quando communi consensus recipitur et rescribitur.

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69. *Summa paucapalea*, Introductio (Schulte 1890, 1–2).
70. *Summa paucapalea* ad D. 1 d.a.c. 1 (Schulte 1890, 4). Though, as noted by Weigand 1967, 141, it does seem that the *göttliches Gesetz* somehow ‘flows from Nature’ (*aus der Natur erfließen*).
71. *Summa paucapalea* ad D. 1 c. 1 (Schulte 1890, 4). It is worth noting that he did not feel compelled to mention this point again when commenting on D. 8 (Schulte 1890, 14). Cf. Tarello 1964, 368 n. 81.
72. McLaughlin 1952, XXI–XXXIII, argued for c. 1160, but there are arguments in favour of dating it about a decade later; see Pennington 2008a, s.v. ‘*Summa parisiensis*’. See Weigand 2008b, 181–82, for general observations.
73. *Summa parisiensis* ad rubr. D. 1 c. 1, s.v. ‘divinae legis’, and ad D. 5 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘nunc autem’: ‘Incipit distinguere divinum jus ab humano. Non tamen ponit hoc nomen divinum sed naturale quod idem est, etc.’ (McLaughlin 1952, 1, 5). He went on to give an ample list of what the term might refer to: *Summa parisiensis* ad D. 8 d.p.c. 1, s.v. ‘Dignitate’ and c. 2, s.v. ‘Quae contra’ (McLaughlin 1952, 7–8).
Resp.: Omne jus originaliter est hoc vel illud, i.e. habuit primam originem vel ab hoc vel ab illud [sic].

The use of *hoc* and *illud* is unclear, but presumably refers back to Gratian’s explanation of the difference between *consuetudo* and *constitutio* (D. 1 d.p.c. 5). The novel idea here, though, is that natural law can become positive law through it being written down.

The focus on the division between natural/divine law and positive civil law has important consequences for the status of property. Although natural law is unchanging, it can be overridden in specific cases. The author cites the two classic examples from Roman law: slavery and property. He makes an interesting claim, however: natural law which is written down does not change, but unwritten natural law might be modified (*derogatum*)—and the right of liberty and the common good have not been written into law. There is therefore room to manoeuvre on these issues.

The author also considered the issue of ecclesiastical property. All things may indeed be common *iure naturae*, but we must consider the context of the Augustine quotation. *Quo iure* was addressed to heretics, and Augustine simply meant that possessions were said to be possessed *iure imperatoris*, and those who do not wish to worship the author of peace in peace should not possess anything *iure ecclesiae*. Thus, the emperor can, *iure*, take away heretics’ possessions. The author of the *Summa parisiensis* was not sure it was that straightforward, however. Are not, after all, things prescribed to and possessed by the Church *iure divino, i.e. canonico*? His solution depended on whether the law was being interpreted strictly or not. The Bible, for example, tells us to sell what we have (Mt. 19.21) or to not desire what belongs to our neighbour (Ex. 20.17); this is the law being taken strictly. Thus, under the natural law which existed in the beginning, or the *primaeva institutio rerum*, it was as if there were no *proprietas* and all things were under the care of God.

In fact, according to *ius divinum*, we are mere *usufructuarios* of the

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74. *Summa parisiensis* ad D. 1 c. 6, s.v. ‘Jus autem’ (McLaughlin 1952, 2).
75. D. 5 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘dignitate’ (McLaughlin 1952, 5): ‘Vel possimus dicere quod ea que sunt in evangelio, in veteri testamento, sunt de naturali heque, etsi deleantur ad litteram, non tamen delentur ad mysticum. In illud opponitur de servitute et de communi possessione in quibus derogatum est juri naturali. Divino enim jure et humano servi habentur. Monachi etiam quaerunt proprietates sed ad usus pauperum. Ad quod dicimus: jus naturale quod redactum est in preceptum scriptum non mutatur. Jus autem libertatis et communis boni non est redactum in scriptum.’ See Gl. ord. ad D. 4 d.p.c. 3, s.v. ‘abrogate’, which explains the difference between *abrogare* and *derogare* as between total abolishment and partial cancellation.
76. *Summa parisiensis* ad D. 8 c. 1, s.v. ‘Quo jure’ (McLaughlin 1952, 7): ‘Resp.: Jus divinum multum stricte hic accipitur, scilicet illud jus naturale quod fuit in initio, scilicet primaeva institutio rerum quasi non proprietate et Domino curatae sunt.’ The text here is not as clear as one would like. Couvreur 1961, 138 n. 432, gave a slightly different reading (*quae* for *quasi* and *creatae* for *curatae*). Tarello 1964, 369 n. 87, came down on McLaughlin’s side; I do as well. McLaughlin was well aware of the text’s difficult problems; for comment, see pages IX and XXXIII of his introduction.
things of the world: God is the *proprietarius.*

Natural law, in other words, originally ensured a positive community of goods.

That, however, was in the context of natural law. The author of the *Summa parisiensis* did not have trouble allowing for private property. As we know, the content of natural law is not wholly immutable. Certain passages of the Old Testament might now only (need to) be understood *ad mysticum* rather than literally. On *Dilectissimis,* one of the Michaelists’ most cherished capitula of the *Decretum,* our author wrote simply, ‘Re vera in primitiva ecclesia clerici propria habebant’. This was true of the apostles as well. The *Summa parisiensis* insisted that ‘quaerant Apostolorum, inter se erant communia, sed non omnibus aliis’, rather like Plato’s city, where many people had *propria* even though they were to love each other equally.

Among the early decretists Rufinus is perhaps the most interesting of all. One of the more important Bolognese canonists, he is well known to those interested in such matters as the canonist who added a new level of complexity to *ius naturale* thinking. His name appears again and again in Rudolf Weigand’s extensively documented monograph on juristic teaching on natural law as a profound influence on subsequent canonists. One reason for this fame comes from the claim that his *Summa decretorum* might be the first instance of where *ius* is being used in a truly subjective sense. It is considered a subjective use of *ius* because he described *ius naturale* as a ‘vis quaedam humane creature a natura insita ad faciendum bonum cavendumque contrarium’. Yet Rufinus also used *ius* in non-subjective senses, which are no less important to us.

In the preface to his *Summa decretorum* he briefly outlined what Gratian was up to in the *Decretum.* The very first thing Gratian attempted to do in Rufinus’ opinion was to explain the difference between *ius naturale* and the other *iura.* Rufinus followed the *Magister* on this point. He first dismissed the Roman law claim that natural *ius* is what nature taught all animals as too general: he wanted one that applied only to

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77. Tarello 1964, 368–69, said that the idea that ownership (*proprietà*) is a necessary institution was a dominant concept in the *Summa parisiensis* precisely because of this claim. Cf. Weigand 1967, 335.

78. *Summa parisiensis* ad C. 12 q. 1 c. 2, s.v. ‘Dilectissimis’ (McLaughlin 1952, 156).

79. D. 8 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘Differet’ (McLaughlin 1952, 7). Other than that both authors suggested divine law ‘admitted’ ownership, I do not see how the position of the *Summa parisiensis* is similar to what was said by Stephen of Tournai in his *Summa,* as Tarello 1964, 369, asserted. Cf. *Summa Stephani* ad D. 8 c. 1, s.v. ‘Nonne iure humano’ (Schulte 1891, 17). Stephen’s *Summa* was written c. 1165–67: Pennington and Müller 2008, 136–37.


82. Rufinus, *Summa decretorum* ad D. 1 d.a.c. 1 (Singer 1902, 6).

83. Rufinus, *Summa decretorum,* praefatio (Singer 1902, 5): ‘Ante omnia multiplices species et divisiones iurium assignans, differentiam iuris naturalis ad alia iura demonstrat; ubi de inventione, ordine et appellatione iuris canonici satis evidentem explanat.’
One question that needed answering was what natural law consisted of. This was his innovation. It consisted of three different things: commands, prohibitions, and ‘indications’ or ‘recommendations’ (demonstrationes). The first two commanded what was beneficial and prohibited what was harmful. He gave the example of the command to love God and the prohibition against killing. Natural law, which existed iuxta moralia, was immutable with respect to these sorts of things. It was even indispensable when it came to these sorts of things. The ‘recommendations’ are the most interesting category. Natural law recommendations operate between the two absolute spheres of commands and prohibitions by recommending what is appropriate. Two of Rufinus’ examples were that all things be held in common or that there be one liberty for all people.

Natural law surpasses the other types, namely civil law or the ius gentium, in origin, dignity, and breadth. It antedates other iura and surpasses them in dignity because its commands and prohibitions trump the ius consuetudinis aut constitutionis. In ‘breadth’, too, natural law surpasses the other iura. The example Rufinus gave had to do with property. Natural law of course recommended that all things he held in common, but by the ius consuetudinis vel constitutionis we now say ‘hoc meum est, illud autem tuum’.

The recommendations of natural law can thus be diminished. Since nature neither forbids nor commands, but only shows that common possession is good, Rufinus is relatively uninterested in explaining the modes of (first) acquisition of property, other

\[\text{Rufinus, Summa decretorum ad D. 1 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘Humanum genus’ (Singer 1902, 6).}\]

\[\text{Rufinus, Summa decretorum ad D. 5 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘Hec que de privil.’ (Singer 1902, 16), discussed the problem of the apparent mutability of natural law; he explained that only the lex sometimes changed regarding ceremonia, which was a common enough claim among Decretists. Cf. Summa decretorum ad D. 6 d.p.c. 3, s.v. ‘His ita resp.’ (19).}\]

\[\text{Rufinus, Summa decretorum ad D. 13 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘Item adv. ius nat.’ and C. 1 q. 7 d.a.c. 6, s.v. ‘Nisi rigor’ (Singer 1902, 31, 234); the second passage is discussed by Weigand 1967: 395–96.}\]

\[\text{Rufinus, Summa decretorum ad D. 1 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘Humanum genus’ (Singer 1902, 6): ‘demonstrat quod convenit, ut “omnia in commune habeantur”, ut: “omnia una sit libertas”, et huiusmodi’. Cf. Tierney 1997a, 138 and 167.}\]

\[\text{Rufinus, Summa decretorum ad ibid. (Singer 1902, 7). The two are briefly discussed ad D. 1 c. 8, s.vv. ‘Ius civile’ and ‘Ius gentium est’ (Singer 1902, 10).}\]

\[\text{Rufinus, Summa decretorum ad D. 8 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘Differt quoque’ (Singer 1902, 21): ‘In his tribus maxime ius naturale differt a iure consuetudinis et constitutionis, videlicet in origine, amplitudine et dignitate. Et quidem, quomodo origine discrepet, superius premissum est [ad D. 1 d.a.c. 1]; et qualiter in dignitate ... quia quaecumque de consuetudine aut constitutione iuris naturali contraria sunt, utique in mandatis et prohibitionibus, vana et irrita indicantur ... Amplitudine quoque ius naturale a ceteris iuribus differt, quia iure nature omnia sunt communia, iure autem consuetudinis vel constitutionis hec villa mea est, illa autem tua.’}\]

\[\text{Weigand 1967, 370, has suggested that amplitudo refers not to the actual scope of natural law, but its contents in the sense of an inner breadth, grandness, or loftiness, but this makes little sense to me. Natural law is ‘broader’ because all things are common. Other laws do not make claims about all things, only about this or that villa. The Glossa ordinaria did not pick up on Weigand’s reading either; see below, n. 154.}\]
than to point out that res nullius pass into the possession of the person who takes hold of them. Rufinus cannot wholly resist explaining what happened, however. The dilemma was that Dilectissimis famously said that ownership came about ‘per iniquitatem’ but it was also commonly understood that property existed on the basis of positive law—which natural law did not expressly oppose. Thus the objection:

si iure constitutionis hec villa mea est, illa autem tua, cum ius constitutionis ius sit, relinquitur, quod iure villa ista mea, illa autem tua; si iure, tunc non ex iniquitate. Quid est itaque quod alibi habetur: quia per iniquitatem alius dixit hoc esse suum, alius illud? — ut infra C. 12 q. 1 c. 2. Rufinus’ solution involves two parts. The first is that natural law got confused after Adam sinned: ‘deinceps homines nichil putarent fore illicitum’. Post-Fall, the dignity of man was blunted and blinded, but the naturalis vis was not entirely extinct in humankind. And so people came together in an effort to distance themselves from animals by a lex vivendi just as they did by their knowledge. And so they developed ‘modest precepts’ which recalled uncivilized humankind to decent and honourable treaties and taught them to enter upon trustworthy pacts. Whence the ius gentium. Humans now had trouble with natural law, and needed help. It was reformed partially through the Decalogue so that illicit works, but not the worker’s will, were condemned. With the Gospel, natural law was renewed in general. Because lex naturalis followed the bare nature of things, however, only showing that one thing was fair and another unfair, it was necessary to follow good customs for the modification and ornamentation of ius naturalis so that a decent and appropriate order would be preserved.

92. Rufinus, Summa decretorum ad D. 1 c. 7, s.v. ‘Acquis. eor. q. celo’ (Singer 1902, 9): ‘quod enim in nullius bonis est, occupanti conceditur. Si quis vero velit in hoc loco magis supervacue quam fructuose ex traditione legum disserere de rerum acquisitione, quod modis fieri habeat, vel alia plura legistice traditionis documenta vexare occasione horum sequentium capitulorum, que de iuris forensis doctrina pro maiore parte descendunt, notum teneat: quisquis ille est conductor vane laudis, quin instar sacrilegii est canonici tractatus longum cursum extranearum legum inviis remorari.’

93. Rufinus, Summa decretorum ad D. 8 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘Differt quoque’ (Singer 1902, 21).

94. The following is based on Rufinus, Summa decretorum ad D. 1 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘Humanum genus’ (Singer 1902, 6–7). See also Weigand 1967, 362–63, who remarked on how Rufinus developed Gratian’s original position.

95. Rufinus, Summa decretorum, praefatio (Singer 1902, 4): ‘Cum itaque naturalis vis in homine penitus extincta non esset, nimimum satagere cepit, qualiter a brutis animalibus, sicut prerogativa scienti, ita et vivendi lege distaret. Dunque deliberavit homo cum proximis convenire et mutuis utilitabilis consulere, continuo quasi deinter emortuus cineres scintille iustitie, modesta scil. et verecundiora precepta, prodierunt, que agrestes ac feros hominum mores ad concordie subire federa docuerunt et certas pactiones inire: que quidem ius gentium appellantur, eo quod illis omnes pene gentes utantur, sicut sunt venditiones, locationes, permutationes et his similes.’ Tierney 1997a, 62 n. 67, read ‘naturale ius’ instead (cf. Weigand 1967, 146 n. 17), but according to Singer’s apparatus, only one MS. had this reading, and it is not a particularly authoritative MS.; see Singer 1902, XXIX. Tierney did not make this argument in his earlier article on Rufinus (1992a, 555).
The advent of private property seems to work in a similar fashion. Private property may not be necessary, but it is not iniquitous: ‘quia in longum usum derivatum est, non iam iniquitatis perversitate, sed consuetudinis iure exercetur’. Private property might first have been taken up due to a burning cupidity, but what exists on the basis of long custom and the institution of laws (ex longevo usu et legum institutione), cannot be judged blameworthy. This is precisely what the term usucapio refers to, the ‘adeptio dominii per continuationem iuste possessionis vel biennii aut alicuius temporis’—for so it is defined in the Digest. It is noteworthy that Rufinus felt that the issue of whether clerics could now have propria or not was more a matter of a counsel than a precept, although in the primitive Church everyone held things in common.

The Summa ‘elegantius in iure divino’ seu Coloniensis, belonging to the Cologne area and dating from about 1169 provides another counterpoint to early decretist thought on the divisions of law. The text is interesting in that it roughly follows Gratian’s Decretum, but recasts it into an order wholly its own. It begins with a consideration of ius replete with nods to Roman law: ius is the ‘ars equi et boni’, which divides into divine and human law. Divine law, as we have seen, is what is found ‘in lege uel in euangelio’; human law, on the other hand is an enactment (constitutio) of men whereby equity is preserved, injury repelled, innocence safe-guarded, violence reined in, and discord exiled. The terms ius divinum and ius naturale are also used in closely related but different ways.

But it is clear that the author understands this divine/human division to mean that a ius is divine if it concerns divine things and human if it concerns human things. In three capitula, he describes the types of human law:

QVID IVS NATVRALE. Ius humanum aut est naturale ut ‘quod instinctu nature apud omnes est, puta maris et femine coniunctio, liberorum successio, libera eorum que’ in

96. It is noteworthy that the ius consuetudinis is said to have arisen when Cain first built a city: Summa decretorum ad D. 7 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘Ius vero consuet.’ (Singer 1902, 20).
98. Rufinus, Summa decretorum ad D. 1 c. 12, s.v. ‘de usucapionibus’ (Singer 1902, 21).
99. Rufinus, Summa decretorum ad C. 12 q. 1, s.v. ‘Clericos nichil possidere’ (Singer 1902, 320).
100. Fransen and Kuttner 1969, xi, so date the text and call it a product of the ‘French school’. The author is unknown, but the two leading candidates are Geoffrey of Cologne and Bertram of Metz; see Weigand 2008b, 183–84.
101. Cf. Pennington 2008a, s.v. ‘Summa “elegantius”’.
102. Summa ‘elegantius’ 1.2 (Fransen and Kuttner 1969, 1).
103. Summa ‘elegantius’ 1.4 (Fransen and Kuttner 1969, 2). Ius, whether natural or moral, is perpetuated by writing or by use, i.e., by ‘constitutio’ or by ‘consuetudo’; Summa ‘elegantius’ 1.10 (Fransen and Kuttner 1969, 3).
104. Summa ‘elegantius’ 1.38 (Fransen and Kuttner 1969, 10–11); see Weigand 1967, 160, for comment.
nullius bonis ‘acquisitio, uiolentie per uim’ continuata et moderata ‘repulsio, depositi
seu commodati restitutio.’
QVID IVS CIVILE. Aut est positiuum, et hoc si cuius ciuitatis sit proprium ciuile dicitur,
ut cultus numinum et cerimoniarum ritus specialis.
QUID IVS GENTIVM. Sin diuersarum sit nationum, ius gentium uocatur, ut ‘sodium
deuictarum occupatio, legatorum non uiolandorum religio’ et militie ius.

It is interesting that the author has changed the meaning of human law. Human law
is natural or positive, depending on whether it is legislated by a ciuitas or by many
nationes, in which case we call is ius gentium, or it derives from nature. It would seem,
then, that ius naturale is sometimes part of positive human law. This in turn means
that we can have a ‘free acquisition of what is among no one’s goods’. This is clearly
a modification of D. 1 c. 7: for in addition to emphasizing natural law’s sanctioning
of the free acquisition of res nullius, the author omitted to mention here the common
possession of Gratian’s text.

Further on, however, when explaining how we should understand that the ius naturae
is immutable, the author wrote that ‘Iure siquidem naturali una omnium libertas et
communis omnium possesio est’. Even more, our author suggested that ius divinum
privatum—possibly a strange conflation of D. 1 c. 11, C. 19 q. 2 c. 2, and Dig. 1.1.1.2
encourages one to have nichil proprium, to renounce everything for Christ.

The distinction between private and public ius divinum also accounts for the problem
of how all things are common, yet someone can still say that a prebend or a church is
‘his’: the private ius refers to things being common, and the public ius to ecclesiastical
possessions. Similarly, although divine ius is ‘prestantius’, this does not mean that

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105. Summa ‘elegantius’ 1.5–7 (Fransen and Kuttner 1969, 2). The quotation marks are the editors,
denoting parallels with other legal texts.

naturale aut morale, utrumlibet [or: id est] diuinum uel humanum.’ The editors suggested id est
might be better, which is also what Weigand reads.

107. Cf. the text of Summa ‘elegantius’ 1.5–7, ‘Quid ius naturale’ with D. 1 c. 7: ‘Ius naturale est commune
omnium nationum, eo quod ubique instinctiu naturae, non constitutione aliqua habetur, ut uiri et
feminae coniunctio, liberorum successio et educatio, communis omnium possessio et omnium una
libertas, acquisitio eorum, quae celo, terra marique capiuntur; item depositae rei uel commendatae
pecuniae restitutio, uiolentiae per uim repulsio. §. 1. Nam hoc, aut si quid huiu simile est, numquam
injustum, sed naturale equumque habetur.’

108. Summa ‘elegantius’ 1.33 (Fransen and Kuttner 1969, 9); only what has been written down is
immutable, or (possibly) ‘quia non quemadmodum ciuile in contrarium suum mouetur’. See further
Tarello 1964, 374. We might also note that the author seems to implicitly equate ius naturae and
ius naturale.

109. The editors suggest the causa, but the quotation bears reminiscences all three passages.

est publicum, aliud priuatum, ut quod instinctiu Spiritus Sancti cordibus perfectorum diffunditur,
quale est nichil proprium habere, omnibus pro Christo abrenuntiare.’

there should be a common possession of all things simpliciter. *Ius divinum*, here, contains perfection and advises this (*habet suasionem*), but human *ius* contains a command and thus has necessity. Therefore, a common possession does not generally and absolutely hold. After all, divine *ius* does not prohibit human *ius’s* command. Use, in fact, supports or favours human *ius*. The *Summa ‘elegantius’* thus makes use of the increasingly common idea that divine law can prohibit, command, or counsel certain courses of action. A positive community of goods, according to divine law, is only counselled, not insisted upon. And, more importantly, human law does insist on the need for private property, which means that human law is the one that has the binding force.

The last decretist I would like to consider is Huguccio, perhaps the greatest decretist of them all as one legal historian recently wrote. Even a cursory reading through the first of a projected sixteen volume edition of his *Summa decretorum* (c. 1188) suggests that this assessment is probably deserved. His treatment of natural law and its relationship with other *iura* is as clear as his scorn for people who find Gratian’s early distinctions confusing. Huguccio’s predecessors had noted that *ius naturale* differed from other *iura*. This was true, Huguccio explained, in four ways: origin, dignity, breadth, and the rigidity of thought. Gratian spoke about the first two in the fifth *distinctio*, the third in the eighth, and the fourth in *distinctiones* thirteen and fourteen. However, his preface contains his most sustained treatment of *ius naturale*, and serves as the basis for all his subsequent comments. There, Huguccio described four principal meanings for *ius naturale*; at the

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112. *Summa ‘elegantius’* 1.41 (Fransen and Kuttner 1969, 12): ‘Si quod iure licet humano, ob id licet absolute, fortius quod diuino, cum diuimum ius prestantius sit. Ad quod respondetur quod ius diuimum, secundum quod nunc de eo agitur, perfectionem continet et suasionem habet; humanum autem preceptionem, ideoque negotiatum. Proinde non sequitur quod si divino iure, idest celitus inspirata perfectione, commuinis debeat esse omnium possessio, quod ob id generaler et absolute sic esse debet. Humanum enim iuri usus fauet, ideoque secundum ipsum denominatio preualet. Item obicitur quotiescumque hec duo iura sibi adsuntur, illud seruandum esse omnium dignitatem, et cuius sanctior est auctoritas. Hoc autem de divino iure erum est. Ad quod respondendum quod preceptioni prohibitio, non permisso uel consilium, tota facie adsuntur, ideoque cuem hoc permittat uel consulantum ius diuinum, inhebet autem humanum, non est contrarietas. Alioquin in iure dispensationes prohibentibus contrarie fierent.’


116. See his concluding remarks to D. 1 c. 6, s.v. ‘aut ciuile aut gentium’ (Přerovský 2006, 30): ‘Et nota quod non omnia exempla iuris naturalis hic posita referuntur ad eandem accipientem iuris naturalis. Ergo prudentia lectoris erit caute discernere quod exemplum ad quam accipientem iuris naturalis referatur. Set, ne idiote animus in hoc confundatur, de quolibet diligenter assignabimus.’

117. Huguccio, *Summa decretorum* ad D. 5 pr. (Přerovský 2006, 90). (In the thirteenth and fourteenth distinctions Gratian considers the possibility of natural law coming into conflict with itself.)
same time, though, he insisted that natural law could only be considered immutable in the first two ways. It could mean ‘reason’, that is a natural power (vis) of the spirit by which one discerns good and evil, or it might be a judgement of reason like a motion coming from reason directly or indirectly, which leads us to discern, choose, and do good works such as giving alms or loving God. In the third sense, the inspiration and order of nature by which like are propagated by like is called ius naturale. He linked this meaning with the common Roman law definition that natural law is what nature has taught all animals.

We are most interested in the fourth meaning. In this sense, ius diuinum—what is contained in Mosaic and evangelical law—is called ius naturale. This is what the Summa Natura, or God, gave us. Or one might say this because ‘natural reason’ induces us to what is contained in ius diuinum. Ius in this sense is improperly called natural law, for natural law, or rather reason, merely leads us to the content of natural law. Following Rufinus, Huguccio argued that natural law existed in three parts: positive commands, prohibitions, and recommendations (demonstrationes). In short, natural law commands what is beneficial, prohibits what is harmful, and indicates or recommends what is expedient. In terms of what natural law commands or prohibits, natural law is

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118. See Weigand 1967, 215–19, for an extended quotation and discussion of this section, though Přerovský’s text must be preferred for the first twenty distinctiones.


120. Huguccio, Summa decretorum, praefatio (Přerovský 2006, 7): ‘Dicitur etiam secundo loco ius naturale iudicium rationis scilicet motus proueniens ex ratione directe uel non directe, id est quolibet opus uel operari ad quod ex ratione tenetur homo, ut est discernere, eligere et operari bonum, dare elemosinam, diligere Deum et huiusmodi.’ As he went on to note, properly speaking this is rather an effect of natural law.

121. Huguccio, Summa decretorum, praefatio (Přerovský 2006, 7): ‘Item tertio modo dicitur ius naturale instinctus et ordo nature quo similia de similibus propagantur, quo similia similibus gaudent ... et cetera faciunt que secundum sensualitatem, id est naturalem appetitum, habent fieri.’

122. Weigand 1967, 237, does not think this mode (Art) played an important role for Huguccio; I am not convinced this is true. Once the idea shows up in Rufinus, it seems to have caught on; cf. Stephen Tornacensis, Summa decretorum ad D. 1 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘naturali iure’ (Schulte 1891, 7).

123. Huguccio, Summa decretorum, praefatio (Přerovský 2006, 8): ‘Item quarto modo dicitur ius naturale ius diuinum, scilicet quia quinto continentur in lege mosayca et euangelica. Sic accipitur in principio et dicitur hoc ius naturale quia Summa Natura, id est Deus, nobis illud tradidit et docuit per legem et prophetas et euangelia, uel quia ad ea que iure diuinio continentur naturalis ratio etiam sine extrinseca eruditione ducit et impellit. Vide, si audacia detur uerbo, secure dico quod hoc ius impropri dicitur naturale, scilicet quia ad ea que in eo continentur naturale ius, scilicet ratio, impellit et ad ea ex ratione quis tenetur.’ See Tierney 1963a, 413–14 for a discussion of his use of summa natura.

firm and immutable, but its recommendations may be diminished or altered in part.\footnote{125}{Huguccio, \textit{Summa decretorum}, praefatio (Přerovský 2006, 16).}

The solution to the idea that all things are common by natural law is that this is merely one of its ‘indications’, something that would be good, but it is not a command of \textit{ius naturale}. It thus fits into the realm of what we might call ‘permissive natural law’. In fact, Huguccio used this very terminology. At D. 1 c. 1, on the issue of it being \textit{fas} but not \textit{ius} to cross another’s field, he wrote that although human law could prohibit what divine law permits, the two laws are not contrary. Diverse maybe, but not contrary. A permission, after all, imposes no necessity.\footnote{126}{Huguccio, \textit{Summa decretorum} ad D. 1 c. 1, s.v. ‘non est ius’ (Přerovský 2006, 23): ‘Set numquid, quia ius humanum prohibet quod ius diuinum permissit, ideo illa iura sunt contraria? Non. Diuersa quidem sunt set non contraria; quia quod dicitur: “fas est”, loquitur de permissione, quia si preceptum esset, omnes astringeret; quod dicitur: “ius non est”, loquitur de prohibitione. Permissio autem et prohibitio non sunt contraria.... Set numquid peccat iste prohibendo transitum per agrum priuatum, cum sit iure diuino permissum? Non, quia permissio nullam imponit necessitatem, set tantum liberam excitat voluntatem.’ Cf. id. ad D. 1 c. 7, s.v. ‘omnium una libertas’ and ad D. 8 c. 1, s.v. ‘diuinum ius’ (Přerovský 2006, 37 and 125); see also Weigand 1967, 271–72.}

Huguccio’s natural law distinction led to a number of different ways we might understand the idea that all things are common by natural law. It could mean that someone can have or lack individual possessions without sin.\footnote{127}{Huguccio, \textit{Summa decretorum} ad D. 1 c. 1, s.v. ‘non est ius’ (Přerovský 2006, 22). At D. 3 d.p.c. 3, s.v. ‘ne fiant grauiora’ (Přerovský 2006, 69–70), Huguccio expanded on Gratian by suggesting that, loosely speaking, there are three types of \textit{permissio}; oftentimes, things are ‘permitted’ in order to avoid even greater evils. For comment, see Weigand 1967, 404–05.}

Alternatively, it might mean that the judgement of reason approves that all things would have been common had not sin intervened. Due to sin, private possession was inflicted upon humankind as a punishment—a similar idea, Huguccio noted, could be found in theology.\footnote{128}{Huguccio, \textit{Summa decretorum}, praefatio (Přerovský 2006, 11): ‘Vnde et sine peccato quis potest habere propria uel carere propriis. Et secundum hoc eodem iure naturali et aliquid est proprium et aliquid est commune et aliquid est meum et aliquid est tuum’. Cf. Weigand 1967, 316–17.}

A final possibility would be that things are common by natural law in the sense that all things are to be shared in a time of necessity, for reason leads us to believe that we should only keep necessities and share the rest with our indigent neighbours.\footnote{129}{Huguccio, \textit{Summa decretorum}, praefatio (Přerovský 2006, 11–12): ‘Vel potius, cum dicitur iure naturali omnia esse communia, non excluditur proprium nec dicitur commune contrarium proprii, set is est sensus: iure naturali, id est iudicio rationis approbante, omnia sunt communia, id est tempore necessitatis indigentibus communicanda. Naturali enim ductu rationis approbamus nobis tantum...’}
subsequently connect this idea to the divine precept that tells us to treat others the way we would wish to be treated.\footnote{Huguccio, Summa decretorum, ad D. 1 c. 7, s.v. ‘communis omnium possessio’ (Přerovský 2006, 35–36).}

Later on, however, Huguccio showed his dissatisfaction with the idea that private property came about \textit{per iniquitatem}.\footnote{This paragraph is based on Huguccio, \textit{Summa decretorum} ad D. 8 c. 1, s.v. ‘iure ergo humano’ (Přerovský 2006, 127–28).} His dissatisfaction stemmed from the fact that \textit{ius humanum}, in the last analysis, is \textit{ius}. Thus, if things are possessed by human law, we should not say that property came about ‘through iniquity’. After alleging \textit{Quo iure} and \textit{Dilectissimis} on either side of the question, he provided his solution. One possibility was that \textit{iniquitas} merely referred to an (over-)anxious concern for acquiring things: after all, without this concern, no one would say ‘hoc est meum’. On the other hand, the phrase might mean ‘acquisitum per laborem et sollicitudinem’, where iniquity is connected to the \textit{mammona iniquitatis} of Luke 16.9. Alternatively, we might take \textit{per iniquitatem} to mean \textit{per ius gentium uel ciuile}, which is wicked insofar as it is inequitable.\footnote{Cf. Huguccio, \textit{Summa decretorum} ad D. 1 c. 2, s.v. ‘quia instum est’ (Přerovský 2006, 24).} Lastly, it might actually refer to the sin of the first man, whereby being anxious to have things of one’s own was inflicted upon humankind as a punishment. In other words, private property is not wicked in itself, and does indeed exist \textit{iure},\footnote{Cf. Huguccio, \textit{Summa decretorum} ad D. 8 d.p.c. 1, s.v. ‘naturali iuri’ (Přerovský 2006, 131).} but that does not mean that it was not the result of our iniquitous, postlapsarian impulses, or that private property is an equitable arrangement.\footnote{Cf. Weigand 1967, 340; 344; 346–47.}

Huguccio was also somewhat unique in sharing some interest in the matter of (first) acquisition of property.\footnote{Huguccio, \textit{Summa decretorum} ad D. 1 c. 7, s.v. ‘acquisitio eorum que cele’ (Přerovský 2006, 38–39).} The starting point was a gloss to D. 1 c. 7, where Huguccio quoted with approval the idea that a \textit{res nullius} is granted to the person who takes possession of it. As Huguccio saw it, a thing could be accounted as among no one’s goods in five ways: by nature (e.g., a free man), by chance (e.g., inheritance before it is claimed),\footnote{So I read: ‘Casu, ut cum hereditas iacet ante ipsam aditam.’} at a specific time (e.g., buried treasure), by fact (e.g., when something is considered abandoned), or in the people’s opinion (e.g., just as \textit{res sacrae} are considered no one’s but God’s). In short, ‘that which is among no one’s goods is granted to the person who takes possession of it’ is understood to be so either \textit{re} or \textit{spe}, either with respect to the thing or with respect to hope. Naturally, first acquisition can only occur in

\textit{necessaria retinere, reliqua proximis indigentibus debere distribuere.’} See also Tarello 1964, 373, and Weigand 1967, 329–30, whose text (§ 560) includes an added stress on the \textit{tempus necessitatis}.

\footnote{The rest of this paragraph is based on this passage. See Weigand 1967, 352–53.}
the case when things are actually (facto) among no one’s goods, and, he added, if the thing is fit to be occupied, not simply that someone occupies the thing.\textsuperscript{138}

It seems clear that Huguccio thought natural law only recommended a positive community, while a negative community of goods actually existed—outside, that is, of extreme need. Aside from that special case, there was nothing to stop anyone from appropriating unclaimed property. In other words, in the current state of affairs property tended to be individually owned, but common with respect to use—at least when there was need.\textsuperscript{139}

We must, finally, see what kind of light the \textit{Glossa ordinaria} to the \textit{Decretum} throws on our subject.\textsuperscript{140} As the \textit{Glossa ordinaria} is a running commentary on the \textit{Decretum}, we should expect it to conform rather conservatively to the contours delineated by Gratian; at the same time, however, it often provides some much needed clarity to the import of Gratian’s overarching goal in any given \textit{causa} or \textit{distinctio}. Without the Ordinary Gloss, it is easy to lose sight of the forest for all the trees.

The Gloss holds to the traditional distinction between human and supra-human law as well as, in theory, between \textit{ius} and \textit{lex}. \textit{Ius} is designated as such because it is \textit{iustum}, though something may be licit even though it is not equitable.\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Lex}, on the other hand, commands what is \textit{iustum} and prohibits the contrary; and it is called \textit{lex} because it binds one by law.\textsuperscript{142}

Due no doubt to the variety of similar-seeming accounts of what Gratian meant by \textit{ius naturale}, we find a fair amount of glosses discussing the matter—which hardly makes the matter straightforward. Natural law is immediately identified as \textit{diuinum},\textsuperscript{143} but another gloss points out that \textit{natura} is used in many ways. It might mean an innate force whereby like propagates like, it might be an instinct of nature that proceeds from physical desires such as appetite or procreation (cf. Inst. 2.1 pr.), it might be an instinct of nature that proceeds from reason, or it might refer to the ‘natural precepts’, such as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{138} “Occupanti conceditur”: dico: si illud sit aptum occupari, non ut occupet.”
  \item \textsuperscript{139} Tierney \textit{1997a}, 139.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} The \textit{Glossa ordinaria} is primarily the work of Johannes Teutonicus, compiled around 1215–18, and revised somewhat by Bartholomaeus Brixiensis around 1245. Bartholomaeus’ revision was the dominant version beginning in the mid-thirteenth century. See Thompson and Gordley \textit{1993}, xvii, and Brundage \textit{1995}, 207, 219–20. For a masterful account of the development of the \textit{Glossa ordinaria} to the \textit{Decretum}, see Weigand \textit{2008a}.
  \item \textsuperscript{141} \textit{Gl. ord.} ad D. 1 c. 2, s.v. ‘ius generale’: ‘Quia iustum est: nec iudex dicitur, nisi iustus sit: ut C. 23 q. 2 c. 1. Quandoque est aliiquid ius quod non est aequum nec iustum.’ Cf. \textit{Gl. ord.} ad D. 4 c. 2, s.v. ‘iusta’: ‘Aliiter enim non est ius nisi sit iustum: ut supra D. 1 c. 2.’
  \item \textsuperscript{142} \textit{Gl. ord.} ad D. 1 c. 3, s.v. ‘lex est etc.’: ‘iustum praecipiens, et contrarium prohibens. C. 23 q. 4 c. 42, in fine. Et dicitur lex, eo quod legitime ligat. D. 2 \textit{De cons.} c. 21. Archidiaconus [Guido de Baysio].’
  \item \textsuperscript{143} \textit{Gl. ord.} ad D. 1 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘naturali’: ‘id est, diuino.’
\end{itemize}
‘do not kill’.\textsuperscript{144} We shall return to the significance of the third meaning momentarily, but it is again the fourth meaning which is of importance for the relationship of divine and natural law. Another gloss makes a related point: under natural law, nothing is commanded or prohibited unless God wants it to be so. In short, there is nothing in the ‘canonical Scriptures’ that is not also among the \textit{diuinae leges}, for these laws are consonant with nature. The Gloss concludes that whatever is contrary to divine or canonical \textit{lex} is also contrary to natural law and must be subordinate to natural law (\textit{postponuntur}).\textsuperscript{145}

The Gloss agrees that natural law must be immutable. It began to be perceived and is understood as beginning—as regards it being perceived and understood, not its essence\textsuperscript{146}—with the appearance of rational creatures. Its age and immutability are two reasons for its priority among the types of \textit{ius}.\textsuperscript{147} The Gloss also had an ingenious solution to the problem of natural law’s immutability. The Gloss confirms that natural law is immutable, at least with respect to its precepts and prohibitions.\textsuperscript{148} Ultimately, it is a question of recognizing the difference between moral and symbolic precepts. A moral precept, such as do not kill, does not change. But symbolic precepts—the Gloss mentions the sacrifice of a lamb—might change their literal form, but not their meaning.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Gl. ord.} ad D. 1 c. 7, s.v. ‘\textit{ius naturale}’: ‘\textit{Ad intelligentiam istorum nota quod natura multis modis dicitur: [1] quandoque dicitur natura uis insita rebus, similia de similibus procreans. [2] Secundo modo dicitur natura quidam stim ulus seu instinctus naturae ex sensualitate procreans ad appetendum, uel ad procreandum, uel ad educandum. C. 32 q. 5 c. 17; Dig. 25.4.1; Inst. 1.2 pr. [3] Tertio modo dicitur instinctus naturae ex ratione procreans: et ius ex tali natura procreans dicitur naturalis aequitas: et secundum hoc ius naturae dicuntur omnia communia, id est communicanda tempore necessitatis: ut D. 47 c. 8. [4] Quarto modo dicitur ius naturale praecepta naturalia, hoc est: Non furtum facies: Non moechaberis. C. 32 q. 7 c. 16. Inst. 4.1 pr. Et omne ius diuinum dicitur naturale ius. Et secundum istud ius similiter omnia dicuntur communia, id est communicanda. Bene enim fuit aliquid proprium de iure diuinum. Nam ipsi Adae fuit dictum: In sudore uultus tui uesceris pane tuo [Gen. 3.19]. et alibi: Non concupiscites rem proximi tui [Ex. 20.17].’

\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Gl. ord.} ad D. 9 d.p.c. 11, s.v. ‘\textit{Cum ergo}’: ‘\textit{Infert ex supradictis uel continuat ad inferiorea hoc modo, cum in iure naturali nihil praeceptatur uel uetetur quam quod Deus uult fieri uel non fieri, et in canonicca scriptura nihil alius quod in diuinis legibus inueniatur: diuinae uero leges natura consistant: patet quod quae contraria diuinae seu canonicae legi inueniuntur, iuri naturali contraria sunt, et iuri naturali postponuntur. Et facit hic collationem iuris naturalis ad canonicam scripturam et diuinias leges.’

\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Gl. ord.} ad D. 5 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘\textit{exordio}’.

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Gl. ord.} ad D. 5, Casus. Cf. \textit{Gl. ord.} ad D. 8 d.p.c. 1, s.v. ‘\textit{Dignitate}’ (Casus).

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Gl. ord.} ad D. 5 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘\textit{sed immutabile}’.

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Gl. ord.} ad D. 6 d.p.c. 3, Casus: ‘\textit{Sed tamen non omnia quae sunt in lege et in euangelio, cohaerent iuri naturali quantum ad superficiem. Sunt enim in lege quaedam praecepta moralia: ut non occides etc. Ista non mutatur, nec ius naturale in eis. Quaedam mystica praecepta, ut de agno sacrificando, et his similia. Ista mutatur quantum ad superficiem, et non quantum ad hoc ius naturale immobile perseverat et permanet sicut fuit ab exordio rationalis creature.’ Another gloss to this \textit{capitulum} (s.v., ‘his ita[que]’) explains that symbolic precepts may be either sacramental or ritual. Cf. Huguccio, \textit{Summa decretorum} ad D. 6 d.p.c. 3, s.v. ‘His ita’ (Přerovský 2006, 115–16); and \textit{Summa parisiensis} ad D. 5 d.a.c. 1 s.v. ‘\textit{dignitate}’ (McLaughlin 1952, 5).
Civil law receives much less attention in the Gloss, presumably because early decretists felt there was little that needed explaining. Simply put, civil law is what a people or ciuitas establishes as proper to themselves, for either the sake of humankind or God. In the gloss to ius naturale (D. 1 c. 7), we come across four definitions for ius civile. It might refer to all law that is neither natural law nor the law of nations—and in this sense canon law is considered civil law—or it might refer to all law that is not canon law. In more specific uses, it could either refer to the law of the Twelve Tables or be used in contrast to Praetorian law. The ius consuetudinis began at the time of Cain, whereas the lex constitutionis began with Moses. In any case, the Gloss reaffirms that civil law consuetudines or constitutiones contrary to natural law are not binding.

The Gloss also has a lot to say about private property under natural law. The lack of private ownership under natural law is in fact listed as one of the reasons why natural law exceeds the other types of law in terms of scope. Of course, it was not at all clear to the glossators what this really meant. According to the gloss that lists four types of natural law, natural law in the sense of natural equity dictates that all things are common, which is then explained to mean that all things are common in times of necessity. Another gloss to the same capitulum poses the problem quite nicely. The words ‘communis omnium possessio’ might mean that nothing belongs to a person by divine law, or merely that ‘common’ means things are to be shared in a time of necessity. The glosses to Quo iure generally support this picture, though Plato’s community is glossed to mean that everyone ‘loved the other as himself’, clearly passing up the opportunity to align Plato’s city with

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150. *Gl. ord.* ad D. 1 c. 8, Casus: ‘Dictur hic ius ciuile quod populus uel ciuitas sibi proprium constituit causa Dei uel hominum.’


152. *Gl. ord.* ad D. 6 d.p.c. 3, s.v. ‘ius’: ‘Nunc ostendit a quo tempore coepit ius consuetudinarium et constitutionis: et dicit quod a tempore Cain coepit ius consuetudinarium: qui primo aedificauit ciuitatem, quam ex nomine filii sui uocauit Enoch. Sed ius constitutionis a Mose.’


155. See the text of n. 144 above. Weigand 1967, 255–59 and 328–336, provides further examples and discussion.

156. *Gl. ord.* ad D. 1 c. 7, s.v. ‘communis omnium’: ‘id est nihil erat proprium alicui iure diuino. Uel dic communis, id est communicanda tempore necessitatis: ut D. 47 c. 8. Nam etiam secundum legem Rhodiam tempore periculi cibaria maxime erat communia: ut Dig. 14.2.2.2. C. 12 q. 1 c. 2.’
the primeval condition of humankind or the early Christian community.\footnote{Gl. ord. ad D. 8 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘nescit’: ‘Quisque enim tantum diligit alium ut se. Finxit enim Plato quandam rempublicam in qua omnia sunt communia. C. 12 q. 1 c. 2.’} Otherwise, though, the glosses support the idea that private property exists only by \textit{ius humanum},\footnote{Gl. ord. ad D. 8 c. 1, Casus: ‘Quidam haeretici conquerebantur se iniuste expoliatos rebus quas nomine ecclesiae possidebant: contra quos innechit Augustinus dicens eos non posse conqueri. Nam aut possident iure divino, aut iure humano. Si iure divino, omnia sunt communia: et ita res ecclesiae possidere non possunt. Si iure humano: sed iura humana sunt leges Imperatorum, quae statuunt ut haeretici nil nomine ecclesiae possiderent. Si ergo remuntant legibus Imperatorum, per consequens et possessionibus: siue nomine ecclesiae uel proprio nomine uelint possidere: cum apostolus reges praeceperit honorari.’} although there might be certain cases where a thing is possessed by divine law.\footnote{Gl. ord. ad D. 8 c. 1, s.v. ‘nam iure divino’: ‘Ex hoc uidetur quod tantum iure humano aliqua possideantur, et non divino. Et sic obstat infra C. 23 q. 7 c. 1 ubi dicitur quod iure diuino aliquid possidetur.’ The gloss goes on at some length to resolve this apparent paradox. Cf. Huguccio, \textit{Summa decretorum} ad D. 8 c. 1, s.v. ‘Domini est’ (Přerovský 2006, 126).} As far as first acquisition goes, a gloss to \textit{Ius naturale}, pointing to the \textit{Institutes}, explains that goods belonging to no one go to the first person to possess them.\footnote{Gl. ord. ad D. 1 c. 7, s.v. ‘capiuntur’: ‘Haec enim et alia quae in nullius bonis sunt, cedunt occupanti: ut Inst. 2.1.12.’}

Some generalizations are in order. The \textit{Decretum’s} account of natural law incidentally described what Pufendorf would call a positive community under natural law, which was no longer in evidence. The decretists had to explain this anomaly, and they were under greater pressure to do so than the civilians because Gratian had insisted that natural law had precedence over civil law. The general solution most decretists adopted, albeit to varying degrees of explicit completeness, was to argue that natural law only encouraged a positive community, but the actual state of affairs, at least post-Fall, was a negative community where no one owned anything and all was up for grabs. The \textit{Summa parisiensis} was an exception in that its author thought a positive community existed by divine law where God held all property and humans were mere \textit{ususfructarii}. The key development was Rufinus’. Natural law did not only command or forbid things; in many cases it only recommended what would be best. Natural law was thus able to be considered immutable and yet permit things like property to be commonly or privately owned. As Huguccio noted, a common, positive community would have reigned still, if not for the first sin; but it was now acceptable for private property to exist, and it did so justly if not entirely equitably. In many ways, the Michaelists would cleave to this general picture, as the remainder of this chapter and the next will show.

### 3.2 Bonagratia of Bergamo

Bonagratia is in a number of ways the bridge between the earlier canonistic discourse we have been considering and the mature Michaelist position that developed around the
time of *Quia vir*.\textsuperscript{161} He was for one thing well-versed in the arguments about Franciscan poverty, for he had been one of the leading figures in the effort to bring the dissident spirituals to heel in the second decade of the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{162} No less importantly, he had a reputation of being *ius utriusque peritus*, a reputation which has carried on in modern scholarship.\textsuperscript{163}

Bonagratia situated his doctrine of *ius naturale* primarily in the early distinctions of the *Decretum* and the corresponding sections of the *corpus iuris civilis*. Natural law began from the beginning of rational creatures, and is held by all from instinct of nature, not enactment. It cannot, moreover, be dispensed with or changed, for *naturalia iura*—which are observed equally by all—endure by means of ‘a certain ever-strong and immutable divine providence’.\textsuperscript{164} Specific features of natural law include the indispensable command to (take steps to) preserve one’s own life,\textsuperscript{165} and that God specifically commanded our first parents to use some things and not use others—for to eat is in some sense to use.\textsuperscript{166}

Extreme necessity is described as not subject to canon or civil *lex*, a fact that is admitted by both canon and civil *ius*, not to mention *lex imperialis*.\textsuperscript{167}

Bonagratia is as hazy as everyone else about the nature of the relationship between divine and natural law. The terms often appear together, and thus generally seem roughly synonymous in the sense that if something is permitted or prohibited by natural (or divine) law, it is also naturally prohibited by divine (or natural) law.\textsuperscript{168} Yet in some sense they are meant to be separate. When they are meant to differ, the impression one

\textsuperscript{161} Cf. Miethke 1999b, 527–28.

\textsuperscript{162} A useful thumbnail sketch of Bonagratia’s polemical activities can be found in Oliger 1929, 293–304. A far fuller picture emerges in Wittneben 2003.

\textsuperscript{163} See, e.g., G&F, 189, 421, 423, 522–23, 930, 1120, and 1153; Oliger 1929, 320 fervently agreed: Bonagratia, perhaps no great theologian, was nevertheless ‘iuris utriusque peritissimus’.

\textsuperscript{164} Bonagratia, *De paup.*, 503: ‘Preterea usus facti rerum necessiarum ad substentationem nature est de iure naturali, eo quod “ab exordio rationalis creature incepit”, D. 5 d.a.c. 1, et D. 35 c. 8(!), et eo quod ubique et apud omnes instinctu nature, non ex constitutione aliqua habetur, ut in *Decreta*, D. 1 c. 7, et eo quod “natura” hunc usum “omnia animalia docuit”, Inst. 1.2 pr., et Dig. 1.1.1.3. Et ideo nec per legem nec per renuntiationem sive abdicationem nec aliquo modo tolli vel mutari potest, quia “naturalia iura, que apud omnes perque servantur, divina quadam providentia constituta semper firma atque immutabilia permanent”, D. 5 d.a.c. 1 et D. 6 d.p.c. 3; etiam Inst. 1.2.11.’ (The phraseology for ‘quia naturalia iura...’ comes from the last citation.) The thrust of the parallel passage in *App.ACC, *102–03, is quite different.

\textsuperscript{165} Bonagratia, *De paup.*, 503–04.

\textsuperscript{166} Bonagratia, *De paup.*, 504.

\textsuperscript{167} Bonagratia, *De paup.*, 505: ‘Quia neccessitas huiusmodi [sc. extrema] non subiacet legi canonice vel civili, X 3.46.2; X 1.4.4; X 5.41.4.; *De paup.*, 504: ‘Preterea, constat quod tam de iure canonico quam civili, quod tempore necessitatis extreme omnia spectantia ad huiusmodi vite substentationem sunt omnibus hominibus mundi huius communia, ita quod nemo potest dicere hoc proprium esse, quod tempore huius necessitatis omnibus hominibus est commune, et sunt communia, D. 47 c. 8... Lex etiam imperialis dicit quod tempore huius neccessitatatis cibaria omnibus hominibus sunt communia, Dig. 14.2.2.2.’

\textsuperscript{168} See, e.g., Bonagratia, *App.ACC, *102–03.
gets is that (exclusive) divine law is *positive* divine law. Thus all things belong to the Church of all the faithful *de iure divino*, but to insist this is the case would be to press Bonagratia’s texts too far. For instance, if *ius divinum* always meant positive divine law, it would mean that the common possession of everything was a positive command, which would have to be revoked in order for possession by civil law to be valid. This is not a point Bonagratia ever made. We are left with the impression that sometimes natural law and divine law were meant interchangeably, sometimes not. He probably assumed it was self-evident which sense he meant.

Property rights—possessions, properties, and lordships—all come from *ius humanum* of course. Bonagratia in fact argued that a *ius privatum*, an exclusive right, like usufruct or a right of using belongs to someone by human law. And a *ius privatum*, unlike things which derive from divine law, is renounceable. The use of *ius privatum* will remind an attentive reader of the Roman law distinction between private and public *ius*. The canonists were aware of this distinction of course, but they generally paid it less interest in their discussions of natural law. In this Bonagratia seems to be following the canonistic vein, for he clearly meant what we would call a ‘private right’, or what John XXII once described as a *ius personale*. The Michaelists would tend to follow Bonagratia on this point, as in their theories of the categories of law, although the emphasis was often quite different.

### 3.3 Michael of Cesena

Michael, like virtually all medieval authors, used *ius* to mean both ‘law’ and ‘right’ without ever explicitly distinguishing between them in the way that, say, Marsilius of Padua had. At one point he even wrote about a *ius sive lex utendi*, though here the

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169. Bonagratia, *App.ACC*, 93: ‘Cuius Ecclesiae fidelium omnium de iure divino omnia sunt, ut habetur C. 23 q. 7 c. 1; et 1 Cor. 3:22: *Omnia vestra sunt*; et C. 23 q. 7 c. 3.’
170. See, e.g., Bonagratia, *App.ACC*, 94: ‘Et tali communitati quae emanat a iure divino, C. 12 q. 1 c. 2, non est licitum renuntiare.’ This is a clear allusion to Bonaventure’s discussion of the four different communities of goods; see Appendix A.
171. Bonagratia, *De paup.*, 503: ‘Proprietates vero et possessiones et dominia rerum sunt a iure humano, D. 8 c. 1; usufructus etiam et ius utendi est a iure civili, in Inst. 2.2.2, per totum. Certum est autem quod omni iuri privato, quod alicui competat ex humano iure, potest quis reuntiari et illud a se penitus abdicare; unde Esau ex quo semel renuntiaverat iuri primogeniture, ad illud redire nunquam potuit, C. 7 q. 1 c. 8, Dig. 21.1.14.9, cum similibus.’
172. See above, p. 52.
173. See above, p. 38.
174. For all his careful analysis of *ius*, however, Marsilius’ account was not that different from the Michaelist position: *Defensor pacis* 2.12.3 (Scholz 1932–33, 264–65): ‘*Ius* igitur in una sui significacione dicitur de lege,... Que siquidem duplex est: una quidem humana, reliqua vero divina;’ and 2.12.7 (Scholz 1932–33, 268): ‘Est autem et alia quedam *iuris*, et proprie humani, divisio in ius naturale atque civile.’
context seems to be meant to specify that Christ was above not a (subjective) right of using so much as above the actual law or rule as it was legislated—whether in natural or positive law.\(^\text{175}\) In general, however, the term \textit{ius} was the one upon which the poverty controversy turned, and thus it was the term that was employed most frequently.

\textbf{IUS AS LAW}

Michael repeatedly referred to divine, natural, and human \textit{ius},\(^\text{176}\) but tended to treat divine and natural law as synonymous according to a reference to Gratian.\(^\text{177}\) The chief distinction was between divine and human law: in the \textit{Appellatio minor}, for example, he concluded that John’s heresies were proven through the reasons and allegations of divine and human \textit{ius}.\(^\text{178}\) Similarly, those who wished to imitate the life of Christ and the apostles renounced the \textit{iura imperatorum}, content with \textit{ius naturale et divinum}.\(^\text{179}\) Michael could thus quote the \textit{Digest} with approval: ‘Summa rerum divisio in duo dividur, nam aliae sunt divini iuris, aliae humanii’.\(^\text{180}\) But as the earlier reference to D. \textit{1 c. 1} shows, Michael was well aware that both canon and Roman law drew a sharp distinction between human and divine law.

One important feature of divine law was that it was the basis on which certain types of communities could exist. Greatly expanding upon and modifying Bonaventure’s fourfold community of temporal goods,\(^\text{181}\) Michael noted that the second type of community, which emanates \textit{only} from divine law,\(^\text{182}\) is the one by which all things belong to the just.

\(^{175}\) \textit{App.mai.}, 354: ‘Christus fuit supra ius siue legem utendi, vendendi et donandi ac alias res ex aliiis adquirendi’.

\(^{176}\) Michael, naturally enough, described Jesus Christ as the principal origin and foundation ‘omnis iuris naturalis, divini, civilis et canonici’: \textit{App.mai.}, 356; cf. 404.

\(^{177}\) \textit{App.mai.}, 264: ‘Ergo de iure divino, quod dicitur ius naturale, D. 1 d.a.c. 1.’ A better reference would be to the \textit{pars Gratiani} after c. 1 (D. 1 d.p.c. 1): ‘Ex uerbis huius auctoritatis euidenter datur intelligi, in quo differant inter se lex divina et humana, cum omne quod fas est, nomine diuinae uel naturalis legis accipiatur, nomine uero legis humanae mores iure consenti et traditi intelligantur.’ At \textit{App.mai.}, 257, he wrote that John’s position on consumables opposes ‘omni iuri divino et canonico et civili’, which seems to suggest a basic division between positive and non-positive law—though this cannot be the full story since some divine law may also be positive in nature. Cf. Bonagratia, \textit{App.ACC}, 100. See also Dolcini’s (1977, 158) remarks on the separation ‘fra diritto divino/naturale e diritto umano’. I agree that this idea belongs to the ‘Bonaventuran tradition’.

\(^{178}\) \textit{App.min.}, 450.

\(^{179}\) \textit{App.mai.}, 241; cf. Dolcini 1977, 160.

\(^{180}\) \textit{App.mon.}, 842, citing Dig. 1.8.1 pr., which reads ‘Summa rerum divisio in duos articulos deducitur: . . .’. Cf. Michael’s comments at \textit{App.mai.}, 294, where, in the midst of a proof that Nicholas III did not promulgate novelties in \textit{Exiit}, he wrote that ‘in multis aliiis exemplis iuris divini et humani potest hoc faciliter reperiri’. Or: \textit{App.mai.}, 241, where he described the religious who wish to imitate Christ and the apostles as people ‘iure naturali et divinico contenti’.

\(^{181}\) Cf. \textit{Ap.pasp.} 10.13–16 (BOO 8.309a–310a) with \textit{App.mai.}, 335–340. See Appendix A for a comparison.

\(^{182}\) \textit{App.mai.}, 348.
Varieties of Ius §. Michael of Cesena

One can understand the primitive Church’s collective holding of goods on the basis of this communitas.

The precise nature of natural law is perhaps even less easy to specify. For instance, while arguing that whatever the apostles left, it was not ‘a iure naturali et divino’, and that John’s definition of use does not exist ‘a lege naturali et divina’, he explained John’s sort of use, an usus proprius, was from neither the lex naturalis of Dilectissimis nor from the lex divina of Quo iure. In general, however, Michael tended to use the term when he was writing about the state of innocence, that is, before the fall of Adam and Eve, or in situations that, imperfectly, hearkened back to this state; in this case, ius naturale and ius naturae tend to be used interchangeably. Thus we find that Michael described the state before sin as the ‘status innocentiae sive legis naturae’, which, as we shall see, was also before the advent of proprietary lordship. According to the gloss, Michael pointed out, the state of nature was contrary to that introduced per iniquitatem.

Perhaps the defining characteristic of natural law for Michael was its immutability. The fact that it did not change was even used to prove that although the apostles claimed to have left everything behind in Matthew 19.27, we know that this could not have included leaving behind use. After all, not only did the apostles continue to use things after Peter made this claim, it was actually impossible to relinquish all use:

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183. App.mai., 337.
184. App.mai., 401: ‘Et constat quod non reliquerunt illud quod est a iure naturali et divino, sine quo humana natura sustentari non potest, videlicet usum alimentorum, qui est a lege naturali et divina, ergo omne illud ius reliquerunt quod non est a lege naturae et divina. Sed usus, qui est ius utendi in rebus (alienis) salva rei substantia [sic], a iure positivo introductus est, sicut obligatio et haereditas etc., in Inst. 2.2.1. Et talis usus iuris ex quo competit ius agendi in iudicio, dicitur usus proprius, non est a lege naturali, ut in dicto C. 12 q. 1 c. 2, nec a lege divina, D. 8 c. 1.’ Although Michael used lex here, this seems to be more to distinguish between, to use modern terminology, objective law and subjective rights. It is perhaps best to think of it this way, ius may sometimes mean ‘law’, but lex never means ‘right(s)’; e.g., App.mai., 251: ‘secundum leges et iura positiva’. Similarly it is more usual to use lex when writing about the ‘Old Law’ and the ‘New Law’; cf., e.g., App.mon., 638, 781.
185. App.mai., 239; cf. 254. As Dolcini 1977, 158–59, has noted, for the Michaelists the state of innocence and the state of nature are essentially synonymous.
186. App.mai., 239, quoting both glosses to C. 12 q. 1 c. 2, s.v. ‘per iniquitatem’: ‘Per iniquitatem, id est per consuetudinem iuris gentium, aequitati naturali contrarium; vel “per iniquitatem”, id est per sollicitudinem, ut ibi: Facite vobis amicos de mammona iniquitatis [Lc. 16.9].’ Both these ideas are found in Huguccio; see p. 72 above. Cf. the almost identical passage in Impug. § 7 (Knysv 2000, 245). This text is quite possibly an early compilation of Ockham’s attacking John’s pre-QVR bulls. It reads almost like a dossier of notes. Lambertini 2006b, 3:1626 n. 3, however, doubted Ockham’s authorship, but unfortunately did not give any reasons for his opinion. The work is clearly that of a Michaelist, and, I would argue, definitely not the work of a jurist: occasionally, where the text quotes from the App.mai., it even omits the Roman law citations Michael’s text includes. See below, p. 239 n. 19 for one example; here, cf. OND 92.9–63, 669–70; 87.32–35, 653.
187. ‘Tunc respondens Petrus dixit ei ecce nos reliquimus omnia et secuti sumus te quid ergo erit nobis.’
Another related example is that of natural law, *ius naturale*, not being subject to ‘the law’, *lex*, in times of necessity. Ockham would dwell on this at greater length, but Michael merely explained that this is what Nicholas meant when he declared that the friars had, *iure poli*, a means by which they could provide for themselves in times of necessity, ‘cum omni lege huiusmodi necessitas sit excepta’.

One of the many sources for Michael’s belief that necessity was exempted from all law was in his appropriation and elaboration of Bonaventure’s description of the fourfold community of goods. For Bonaventure the first type of community was one that existed ‘ex iure necessitatis naturae’, and it was on the basis of this need—in extreme necessity—that something which had been appropriated by one person became another’s (*illius fiat*). One cannot, he concluded, renounce this community. In Michael’s hands the account changed somewhat: the first community still emanated ‘a iure necessitatis naturae’, but it was now on the basis of the law—*quo iure* instead of *qua (necessitate)*—that one could licitly use them in extreme need, even, he added, without the will or licence of the owner. Thus it was also the case that the use of food in the state of innocence (as it related to preserving one’s life) was imposed ‘*sub praecepto divino*’.

Michael recognized how crucial the divide between natural/divine and positive law was for the poverty debate. It gave the Michaelists room to describe actions that existed outside of the sphere of positive law. It was the pope’s apparent confusion about where to draw the divide or unwillingness to recognize that there was a divide that lay at the heart of the Michaelist position. Proprietary lordship could of course be grounded in positive law just as well as it could be grounded in divine or natural law, a point which we shall discuss in more detail in the next section. But positive law also served as the basis

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188. *App.mai.*, 232.
189. *App.mai.*, 336–37. In such a case, even a thief licitly uses a thing, though ‘in tali re non habet ius proprium a iure positivo sive civili inventum’ (336). Not that the Franciscans were innovators on this point: Roumy (2006) has shown that the idea underlying *necessitas non habet legem* was common to five branches of medieval learning by the end of the twelfth or early thirteenth century.
194. Cf., e.g., Michael’s claims at *App.mai.*, 335 about *QQM*. This was, in fact a central claim of Bonagrata in his *De paup.*: that the question John had asked about the poverty of Christ and the apostles had to about ‘having’ by *ius dominii vel quasi dominii seu proprietatis* rather than either ‘having’ *de facto*, or ‘having’ in the sense of having the administration of ecclesiastical goods. See his *De paup.*, 324–27.
for the third (modified) Bonaventuran ‘community of temporal goods’. This community emanates ‘ex iure civilitatis mundanae’, which is the means by which a group of people become one community. The point was that such a community includes ‘personalem proprietatem in rebus communibus, emanantem ex iure humanitus instituto’.\(^\text{195}\) This was not, however, a point Ockham chose to adopt in his own discussion of the hierarchy of laws, for he preferred to focus on Nicholas’ \textit{ius poli} and its counterpart the \textit{ius fori}.

\textbf{IUS AS RIGHT}

Anyone familiar with Ockham’s political writings will have come across his contention that no one should be deprived of their right without cause or fault.\(^\text{196}\) The kernel of this idea can first be found in the \textit{Appellatio monacensis}, but it is not at all clear that this was Ockham’s source. Unlike Ockham, who was speaking about a positive law-based right in general, Michael was making a point about the nature of monastic poverty. According to Michael monks only had necessities ‘quantum ad usum sive faciendarum utendi’ (against John’s belief that a religious’ vow could not extend to consumable necessities), for they were unable to sell or otherwise alienate these things as they pleased. For, if they could alienate these goods, then, in accordance with civil and canon law, they would be in effect lords of these goods, and abbots would not be able to prohibit the monks from doing whatever seemed good to them, ‘quia re propria et potestate faciendi de ea quod placet nullus privandus est sine culpa sua’.\(^\text{197}\) It is but a small step to go from a \textit{potestas faciendi} to a subjective right.

Rights come in the basic flavours. A natural right was something that existed by virtue of natural law, which is why the terms are virtually interchangeable and are indeed often translated that way. In the context of the poverty controversy only one natural right was ever properly discussed, namely the right in extreme necessity to use another’s goods for the purpose of sustaining one’s own life. The rationale is simple:

Unde tempore talis necessitatis qui auferret ab alio rem etiam contra ipsius voluntatem, furturn non committit, et licite utitur tali re, et tamen in tali re non habet ius proprium a iure positivo sive civili inventum. Et de hoc iure dicit canon D. 47 c. 8, ubi loquens de tempore huiusmodi necessitatis, dicit: ‘Nemo dicat proprium quod est commune.’

Et huic communitati sive iuri non est possibile renuntiare pro eo quod manat a iure

\(^{195}\) \textit{App.mai.}, 338–39. Though Bonaventuran in inspiration, Romanist corporation ideas shaped the point about having a personal stake of ownership in the common goods of the community, particularly Dig. 1.8.6.1, 2.4.10.4, and 3.4.7.1. A gloss to Dig. 1.8.6.1, s.v. ‘veniam’, refers the reader to Dig. 2.4.10.4 and 3.4.7.2 (which does not apply in this context, though § 1 does).

\(^{196}\) See below, p. 91.

\(^{197}\) \textit{App.mon.}, 815–16, citing D. 56 c. 7 and C. 16 q. 7 c. 38.
naturaliter inserto homini.... Nec huic iuri potest derogari per aliquam legem, quia necessitas talis non subiacet legi, X 3.46.2; et X 1.4.4; et X 5.41.4, in textu et glossa.

Ex hoc iure apostoli emerunt ad victum necessaria [cf. Io. 4.8; Lc. 9.52] ... quia, ... tale ius est ius naturale, quod non subiacet legi.\(^{198}\)

The natural right that, \textit{in extremis}, supersedes other claims derives from the first community Michael described in the previous section. This community, which exists ‘a iure necessitatis naturae’ is thus one that exists potentially at all times, though the point is that its laws (now) only supersede at the time of necessity. When the need is dire, however, one may take the necessary steps to preserve his or her life; the right to do this, moreover, is irrenounceable.

The quoted passage also touches upon positive rights. Unlike the natural rights, which can be hard to distinguish semantically from natural law, a \textit{ius proprium}, a personal or exclusive right, is an invention of positive law (\textit{ius humanum vel civile}). Due to his reliance on Bonaventure’s model, Michael in fact described two communities in which positive rights exist. These are the civil and ecclesiastical communities. A civil community is one which emanates ‘ex iure civilitatis mundanae’, which is the means by which any group, from a \textit{societas} to a kingdom, becomes a \textit{communitas} or \textit{respublica}.\(^{199}\) Personal property is a key feature of this community. Though Michael admitted that, in legal circles, it was typical to conceive of the lordship and ownership of the things of a civil and mundane community as shared rather than individual, nevertheless, \textit{secundum quid}, individuals do have individual ownership. The rationale was itself due to the \textit{Digest}: at the dissolution of a corporation or community, the property is to be divided between its members. Alternatively, one who left the community could seek his share or portion. Therefore, he concluded, everyone in this sort of community or college is said to have a \textit{proprium ius personale} to the common things of a college.\(^{200}\)

Michael’s final type of community is ecclesiastical, emanating ‘ex iure ecclesiasticum ratione dotationis Ecclesiae introducto’, that is, after the Church was endowed by the

\(^{198}\) \textit{App. mai.}, 336–37.

\(^{199}\) \textit{App. mai.}, 338.

\(^{200}\) \textit{App. mai.}, 338–39: ‘Et talis communitas includit etiam personalem proprietatem in rebus communibus, emanantem ex iure humanitatis instituto, nam quamvis res communitatis civilis et mundanae absolute non censeantur esse singulorum, sed sint actu universitatis, quoad proprietatem et dominium, Dig. 1.8.6.1; et Dig. 2.4.10.4. Et quod debetur universi, singulis non debetur, Dig. 3.4.7.1, quia tamen secundum quid sunt, quia si dissolveretur comunitas illa, communes pecunias dividunt inter se, et quilibet potest petere partem suam in illo debito quod communitati debeat. Similiter posset petere partem suam quicumque ex legis concessione recederet ab illo collegio, Dig. 47.22.1.2; et Dig. 47.22.3. Et tali respectu quod est collegii, dicitur esse singulorum, ut haec plebe dicatur et notantur Dig. 47.22.1, in glossa ordinaria. Ideo quilibet de tali communitate sive collegio dicitur competere proprium ius personale in rebus communibus illius collegii.’
first Christians. It is obviously meant to be a sort of middle ground between the third and second communities—the fact that it only includes communal *quasi proprietas*, what I shall call restricted ownership, only makes this more evident. Yet it is equally clear that this is a community based in positive law at least in terms of its ‘almost’ ownership.

Michael went on to explain what he meant by *ius ecclesiasticum*:

Ex hoc iure ecclesiastico bona Ecclesiae divisa sunt per ecclesias diversorum locorum auctoritate summorum pontificum, et ecclesiae limitatae et episcopis et aliis praelatis in ecclesia concessa est administratio.

The goods of the Church are divided amongst the churches on the basis of this ‘ecclesiastical right’, and it is the source of the management granted to the churches, bishops, and other prelates. The fact that church officials only had restricted ownership meant that, unlike the civil community just described, although any cleric of the church could sue in court for its possessions, these possessions would not be divided amongst its members if a church or religious group were dissolved:

Et quia pro ipsis domibus, praediiis, possessionibus et bonis quae in communi habent, ipsi communitati datur actio et exceptio in iudicio, dicuntur in bonis ipsius communitatis esse, Dig. 41.1.52. Ideo talis communitas dicitur habere quasi proprietatem et dominium utile, quia sic agere et facere videtur in talibus ut dominus in re propria facere consuevit, et tamen talis proprietas et tale dominium non est proprietas et dominium civile et mundanum, quia si dissolveretur talis communitas, non dividerentur inter illos de illa communitate ecclesiastica illa bona, immo redirent ad Ecclesiam catholicam quae est congregatio fidelium, et essent in dispositione summi pontificis, quia Deo dedicata fuerunt, sicut ex presse habetur VI 3.17.1.

The point about an ‘action in court’ is highly significant. It was, for the Michaelists, one of the key criteria for a positive law right—what the Michaelists insisted their order did without. In some ways it was the deciding characteristic of positive law rights. When, for example, Michael turned to explaining what John XXII had meant by the claim that an *actus* could not be licit if it were not just, which meant one had to have at least either a right of using for non-consumables or (a right of) lordship for consumables, he wrote that

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202. The other source for this community is *ius divinitus institutum*: App. mai., 342
204. App. mai., 342: ‘unusquisque clericus ecclesiae collegiatae habet actionem ad res ecclesiae suae recuperandas et exceptionem ad defendendas’.
205. App. mai., 341.
the pope ‘intelligit de iure utendi civili et mundano, cuiusmodi est ius proprium pro quo
datur actio in iudicio’.\textsuperscript{206}

Michael’s understanding of \textit{ius} was much closer to the modern layperson’s understand-
ing of ‘right’ than to classical Roman law, which did not distinguish between procedural
and substantive law. While John argued that \textit{ius} and \textit{actio} were two separate concepts,
Michael claimed that a \textit{ius} effectively includes the right to protect that \textit{ius} in court.

\section*{3.4 Francis of Marchia}

Francis of Marchia appears to have been quite unaware of juristic thought about \textit{ius}. Indeed, in
general, Francis was uninterested in elaborating a theory of law, preferring
instead to focus on the ‘rights side’ of \textit{ius}. This is evident when we realize that Francis
passed up the opportunity to discuss almost all of the \textit{capitula} of the first distinctions
of the \textit{Decretum}, compared with the how he dealt with the relevant sections of Roman
law.\textsuperscript{207} In this respect, as we shall see, he serves as a perfect foil to Ockham’s much more
profound debt to canonistic literature on the nature of \textit{ius}.

\textbf{Ius as Law}

Francis naturally divided the types of law in the the three traditional categories, namely
divine, natural, and human. Divine law is of course superior to other law, and certain
forms of \textit{dominium} derive directly from it.\textsuperscript{208} Natural law’s relationship with divine law is
left unsaid, and hardly discussed in general. As with John XXII as well as the decretists
we surveyed, though, we may assume that they are in some sense two sides of the same
coin. What is more interesting is that Francis seems to have thought that natural law
has changed. In a section where he was arguing that the nature of lordship itself had
changed with the Fall, he wrote:

\begin{quote}
Set ius nature, derelicium ex primo iure nature, stat cum opposito iuris introducti
per iniquitatem, secundum omnum sui speciem et gradum, quia carens omni dominio
seu iure per iniquitatem introducto, siue universali siue particulari, siue proprio siue
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[206.] \textit{App.min.}, 437; cf. 378: ‘quia usus, prout est iuris, est iuus proprium utendi aliqua re pro qua datur
actio in iudicio habenti tale ius, sicut ex obligatione, ut in Inst. 2.2.2’. See also \textit{App.mai.}, 325, and
\textit{App.mon.}, 759, 839.
\item[207.] See Table C.2 in Appendix C, particularly D. 1 ff., Inst. 2.4–5, and Dig. 7.1–5.
\item[208.] \textit{Improbatio} n. 622, 297: ‘non debent leges ciuiles militare contra legem divinam set potius e conuerso’.
\end{footnotes}
communi, in extrema necessitate constitutus, habet ius nature in rebus proximi sibi necessariis, cum ab omni lege extrema necessitas sit excepta.  

According to Francis, the (current) law of nature left over from the primeval law of nature—which existed in the prelapsarian state of innocence—is opposed to all *ius* introduced after the Fall. Francis’ point is congruent with the claims of the decretists in the sense that both thought natural law was mutable in part, but clearly his terminology differs from the way the decretists framed the issue. Regardless, for Francis, the law of nature supersedes all post-lapsarian law, as the example of extreme necessity dispensing with *omnis lex* demonstrates.

We shall have occasion to examine this relationship again in more detail when we look more closely at his theory of the sources of *dominium*, but for now it is important to note that although Francis alluded to the juristic commonplace that ‘necessitas legem non habet’, he made no argument that connects the theory to the Franciscans lack of rights, nor defended the idea by reference to its sources in canon law. Within Michaelist circles, he seems to be alone in this.

With regard to positive or civil law, Francis’ comments were also few. As far as he was concerned, although John argued otherwise, his various pronouncements about evangelical poverty, particularly when discussing questions of use, had to be understood in the context of civil law alone. Periodically, Francis accused the pope of ‘dragging’ divine law down to the level of positive law, which suggested to Francis that the pope preferred civil law to divine law. However, although Francis would repeatedly try to show that the pope’s comments had to refer to a ‘civil and mundane’ lordship or right of using (despite John’s claims to the contrary), he offered very little about the origins or justification of positive law. The only place where he spoke at any length at all on this

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209. *Improbatio* n. 258, 153–54. Lambertini 2000, 215–17, has noted the mutability of natural law sketched here is at odds with what he wrote in his *Sentence Commentary*. See also Lambertini 2006b, 1626–31, for a discussion of his pre-*Improbatio* views.

210. We should note in passing the double nature of *ius* here: although medieval authors were well aware of the multiple meanings of *ius* and often used the term in very precise and specific ways, this was not always done. Clearly, if we wanted to translate this passage into English, we would want to write ‘... for the one lacking all lordship or *ius* introduced through iniquity, whether universal or *particular* (law), whether proper or common (right)...’. It is also worth noting that Francis seemed to have felt the need to be more precise here as well, by switching from the ‘introduced *ius*’ at the start of the paragraph to ‘every *lex*’, every written law, when talking about extreme necessity.

211. For the references, see the discussion on p. 247 and p. 251, below; cf. Michael’s references on p. 83, above.

212. See § 5.3 below.

topic was when he refuted John’s claim that (proprietary) lordship was not introduced by positive law.\textsuperscript{214}

**IUS AS RIGHT**

Unlike Ockham, for instance, Francis never alluded to the notion that one should not be deprived of one’s right without fault or cause. The only ‘rights’ Francis was concerned with were uses of right, and the *ius utendi* in particular. Two related points stand out in sharp relief: that rights of using and licences of using are fundamentally different, and we know this is the case because a right is defensible in court while a licence is not. We shall examine the nature of a licence and right of using in chapter 5, but for now we should consider what is meant by the idea that a right is defensible in court.

Francis’ often-repeated premise is that a *ius utendi* intrinsically includes a *ius agendi*. Francis started with John’s denial in *Quia vir* that he meant a civil right of using. Francis of course insisted that the pope meant a ‘ius proprium pro quo datur actio in iuditio’,\textsuperscript{215} and he either did not understand or chose not to understand the pope’s claim that a right of using was something other than a right of action. *Ad conditorem*, for Francis, dealt with this very kind of civil *ius utendi*. This right of using was a *litigiosum et contentiosum* right from which just acts of using can be separate. For proof Francis quoted at some length from *Quia quorundam*.\textsuperscript{216} The pope’s problem was that he was responding to Michael, and Michael was speaking about such a litigable right.\textsuperscript{217} (The fact that John was contesting Michael’s own interpretation of the pope’s texts is not discussed.) One also must conclude that *Ad conditorem* meant a civil right of using because of his definition of use, which insisted that the substance of the thing used must be preserved—which is manifestly not an idea taken from *ius divinum*.\textsuperscript{218}

Francis’ other concern was that the right of using under debate was actually a *ius proprium* not a *ius commune*. We shall return to this issue later on (§ 7.5), but we should note now that Francis argued that a *ius proprium*, an exclusive right, can be exclusive to a specific individual or exclusive to a specific community.\textsuperscript{219} The point will be important when we consider Francis’ arguments about the corporate poverty of the Franciscan order.

\textsuperscript{214} See § 4.3 below.
\textsuperscript{215} *Improbatio* n. 714, 328; See above, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{217} *Improbatio* nn. 726–730, 330–332.
\textsuperscript{218} *Improbatio* nn. 738–740, 333–34.
\textsuperscript{219} *Improbatio* n. 732, 332.
3.5 William of Ockham

In contrast to the other Michaelists, many articles have been written about William’s views about *ius*, especially his views on *ius naturale*.\(^{220}\) These studies, however, tend to focus on Ockham’s more mature political writings, particularly the *Dialogus*.\(^{221}\) It would of course be very interesting to trace the evolution of Ockham’s views on natural law/rights, but this lies far outside the scope of this thesis. Instead we must consider what Ockham wrote in the *Opus nonaginta dierum* in comparison with what his confreres had written.

**Ius as Law**

Even when *ius* means ‘law’, it can mean many different things for Ockham. On the one hand, the *Opus nonaginta dierum* makes reference to the traditional division of divine, natural, and positive (civil or human) law; on the other, there is also a lengthy discussion of the differences between *ius poli* and *ius fori*—based on a distinction made in *Exiit*—about halfway through the text.\(^{222}\) These two treatments of *ius* are somewhat different from each other. As I hope to show in this section, the best way to think about the difference between the *ius poli* and the *ius fori* is that the second concept refers to forms of positive law, whether they are human or divine positive law, while *ius poli* refers to non-positive, or ‘moral’ law. That is, human law is always positive, natural law is non-positive, and divine law might be either.\(^{223}\)

Regarding the threefold division current in juristic circles, Ockham gave divine law little attention in the *Opus nonaginta dierum*. However, it is quite likely that he felt that divine and natural law overlap to a great degree.\(^{224}\) Following D. 1 c. 1, Ockham agreed that *fas* properly refers to divine law,\(^{225}\) but most of the time in the *Opus nonaginta dierum* reference is only made to divine law when he is discussing certain types of ‘rights’, such as licences.\(^{226}\)

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\(^{221}\) Especially 3.2 *Dial*. 3.6.

\(^{222}\) See the exhaustive discussion in Miethke 1969, 477–502.

\(^{223}\) Kilcullen 1999, 308, described the *iura poli* as ‘rights under natural moral law’, which begins to get my claim.

\(^{224}\) As circumstantial proof: the goal in 3.2 *Dial*. 3.6 was to explain to the student (1) how divine law could be ‘extended’ to all natural law, and (2) how all natural law could be called divine law.

\(^{225}\) *OND* 66.42–46, 581.

\(^{226}\) See p. 91, below.
Natural law, as I suggested, is a complicated and ubiquitous concept—or even a set of concepts—in Ockham’s writings, and he put it to many uses over the years. In the *Opus nonaginta dierum* one of the most important discussions of natural law occurs during his account of *ius poli*, for ‘omne ius naturale pertinet ad ius poli’.\(^{227}\) Ockham’s definition sounds rather simple:

\begin{quote}
Ius autem poli vocatur aequitas naturalis, quae absque omni ordinatione humana et etiam divina pure positiva est consona rationi rectae, sive sit consona rationi rectae pure naturali, sive sit consona rationi rectae acceptae ex illis, quae sunt nobis divinitus revelata.\(^{228}\)
\end{quote}

Thus, the ‘law of the heavens’ is a natural equity harmonious with right reason, whether this be based on divine revelation or be purely natural.\(^{229}\) The last condition of the definition makes it clear that sometimes we are justified in referring to this ‘law’ as divine law, but these are harder to recognize in principle. For example, although it is consistent with right reason taken on the basis of matters of belief (*ex credibilibus*) that preachers may be sustained from the goods of those to whom they preach, this is not something which can be proven through natural reason.\(^{230}\)

*Ius poli* also covers natural law, the chief principle of which—in the context of the poverty debate—had to do with the oft-repeated case of extreme necessity.\(^{231}\) In times of

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\(^{227}\) OND 65.80–81, 575.

\(^{228}\) OND 65.76–79, 574; cf. 92.20–30, 669, where natural equity is equated with the state of innocence in the context of *Gl. ord.* ad C. 12 q. 1 c. 2, s.v. ‘per iniquitatem’. Natural equity remained a central concept of Ockham’s political writings, a point first studied by Bayley 1949.

\(^{229}\) It is unfortunate that Ockham never formally defined what he meant by ‘right reason’ (cf. D. W. Clark 1973, 13); Tierney (1972, 230) once wrote that right reason ‘in Ockham’s polemical works ... meant simply his own reason’. However, to be consonant with right reason generally seems to be an objective criterion, insofar as it somehow seems to recognize normative propositions—which is not to say that what we believe to be right is actually right (Kilcullen 2001a, 872); Freppert 1988, 81–82, has suggested that God’s will is the norm which guides right reason. In *Connex.* 2.116–123 (OTH 8.355), e.g., Ockham described the first grade of virtue (i.e., the minimum requirements for a virtuous act) as follows: ‘quando aliquis vult facere opera iusta conformiter rationem dictante talia opera esse facienda secundum debitas circumstantias respicientes praeceps ipsum opus propter honestatem ipsius operis sicut propter finem, puta intellectus dictat quod tale opus iustum est faciendum tali loco tali tempore propter honestatem ipsius operis vel propter pacem vel aliquid tale, et voluntas elicit actum volendi talia opera conformiter iuxta dictamen intellectus’. Cf. the claim in *Quodl.* 3.15.93–94 (OTH 9.261): ‘Rectitudo actus non est aliud quam ipse actus qui debuit elici secundum rectam rationem.’ Useful accounts of Ockham’s ethical theory may be found in Adams 1986 and King 1999; Freppert 1988, devoted a whole chapter to the connection between the human will and right reason (see esp. 50–60). For the *Connex.*, the first place to turn is R. Wood 1997, which contains in addition to the text and translation a very useful commentary. Cf. the discussion in 1 *Dial.* 6.77 (fol. 90rb–91ra).

\(^{230}\) OND 65.81–89, 575. He added, by way of example, that this parallels the fact that it cannot be proven through natural reason that what preachers actually preach is useful, true, or necessary.

\(^{231}\) See especially Roumy 2006; the importance of this maxim for Ockham’s political thought was recognized long ago (Bayley 1949).
Varieties of Ius §. William of Ockham

extreme necessity, one may take steps to ensure he or she does not die of, e.g., starvation, ‘quia necessitas non habet legem’. As we shall see, this principle of ‘natural law’ ius manifests in the form of a ‘natural right’ ius, which is common to all and fundamentally irrenounceable. We should therefore note in passing that Ockham has usually been misinterpreted on two points. First, Ockham never tried to maintain that the Minorites had renounced all rights; his point was rather that the friars managed without civil law rights. Second, this natural right is something common to the whole human race, which means it cannot be something that applies to Franciscans qua Franciscans (or apostles qua apostles). It is thus in a sense outside of the scope of the controversy with the pope as far as the Michaelists were concerned. Although most readers of Ockham have not failed to notice this, a final point bears repeating: Ockham was very clear that natural law during times of manifest necessity did not establish any positive rights.

Ius might also refer to civil law. Positive (or civil or human) law has legitimate force only where it does not contravene natural or divine law. A reference to an early gloss in the Decretum, shows that Ockham was aware that ius civile may be spoken of in many ways. But he specified along with his confreres that the primary meaning, at least for the dispute between John and the Michaelists, is ‘human law’. This stipulation was of course very important to Ockham’s argument, for he wanted most of the technical terms of this dispute to be significant only in the context of positive law.

Ockham used the term ius fori primarily to designate this body of law, but it also might exist through positive divine law: ‘ius fori vocatur iustum, quod ex pactione seu ordinatione humana vel divina explicita constituitur’. Later there is the further specification that while a ius poli is a power consistent with (potestas conformis) right

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232. OND 3.416, 322. For discussion, see p. 247, below.
233. The clearest example of this occurs at OND 61.35–43. 559, where it is claimed that ‘ius utendi naturale commune est omnibus hominibus, quia ex natura, non aliqua constitutione superveniente, habetur. . .[people in extreme necessity] non tamen habent ius utendi [natural] rebus alienis nisi pro tempore necessitatis extremae: in quo tempore virtute iuris naturae omni re praeest, sine qua vita eorum salvari non posset, licite uti possunt’ (emphasis added). This point is discussed further in § 5.4 on p. 169.
234. Lambertini 2005, 156.
235. Gl. ord. ad D. 1 c. 7, s.v. ‘Ius naturale’; discussed above, p. 75. Tierney 1986a, 6, has suggested that Ockham’s views on positive law were ‘entirely conventional’.
236. OND 91.25–34, 666.
237. OND 65.40–41. 573–74. This is an example of why we cannot simply equate ius poli and ius fori with natural/divine law and civil law. Although Ockham never gave an example of what a law established by an explicit divine pact is, in 3.1 Dial. 2.20.146–149 the Master explains: ‘Sed pro necessitate licet facere contra preceptum divinum, eciam expressum, in his que non sunt de se mala, sed solum sunt mala quia prohibita. Ergo eciam pro utilitate communi licet facere contra preceptum dei et ordinacionem Christi.’ Köelmel 1953, 83, has suggested that ‘das göttlich positive Gesetz bezieht sich auf die „mala quia prohibita”’. As Professor Goering has pointed out, we might easily think of such a pact as, e.g., a covenant of the Old Testament.
reason without a pact, *ius fori* is a power derived from a pact with no essential connection to right reason.\(^{238}\) For example, everyone who possesses well, does so at least by *ius fori* or by *ius poli*; in the latter case, such a person always possesses well, but in the former, not everyone does.\(^{239}\) That is, the actual state of affairs, such as the existence of a law, may be a necessary criterion, but it is not a sufficient one, for judging whether it is just or valid. However, once such a law has been established, although it may not be entirely equitable, provided it does not violate the positive or negative directives of natural and divine *ius*, it retains legitimate force and cannot be violated at will.\(^{240}\) That is, to recycle an earlier example, once it has been established which side of the street I am to drive on, it is no longer up to me to choose which side of the street I can drive on.\(^{241}\)

**IUS AS RIGHT**

So much for *ius*-as-law. The second basic meaning of the term, ‘right’, is no less complicated—though historically it has certainly generated greater interest.\(^{242}\) Ockham never gave a generic definition of *ius*-as-right. Perhaps the closest we come is the claim that, again based on canon law, ‘nullus autem sine culpa et absque causa rationabili debet suo iure privari’.\(^{243}\) A right was something which was to be respected, not modified at the whim of another, regardless of their personal or political relationship, regardless of which law it was based on. This is an idea to which Ockham would return in later treatises;\(^{244}\) but it was also another canonistic commonplace.\(^{245}\)

Now, any right which comes about through civil law (as established in *ius fori*) is dispensable. This, at least, was the Michaelist claim; naturally, the pope maintained a somewhat different view. This makes sense if civil law derives its initial validity—provided

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\(^{238}\) *OND* 65.274–276, 579: ‘ius fori est potestas ex pactione aliquando conformi rationi rectae, et aliquando discordanti’.

\(^{239}\) *OND* 65.273–279, 579.

\(^{240}\) *OND* 65.46–48, 574.

\(^{241}\) One might compare Aquinas’ views as discussed in McInerny 1993, 209–10.

\(^{242}\) In large measure, this is due to Villey’s claim (1968, 261) that we have with Ockham a semantic revolution, a ‘moment copernicien de l’histoire de la science du droit’.

\(^{243}\) *OND* 61.55–59, 559–60, citing *Gl. ord.* ad X 1.22., s.v. ‘culpa caret’, *Gl. ord.* ad D. 22 c. 6, s.v. ‘prius quam’. This is actually a highly significant feature of Ockham’s general ‘political’ outlook, which Knysh has called a ‘fundamental principle of Ockham’s historical jurisprudence’ (1996, 106). One can find the basic idea again and again in his polemical writings: *AF* 5.20–22, 57–58, 243–44; *Brev.* 2.3.51–54; 115, 2.5.104–107, 119–20, 2.16.13–17, 143; 4.4.11–14; 201; 1 *Dial.* 7.67 (Ockham 1962, fol. 160va–b); 3.1 *Dial.* 1.16 (Ockham 1962, fol. 188va–b); 3.2 *Dial.* 1.23 (Ockham 1962, fol. 242ra–b); *IPP* 6.11–18, 291, 9.29–31, 390; *OQ* 1.7.52–63, 35, 1.11.16–18, 45, 2.2.17–22, 70, 7.4.31–35, 171. See also *Impug.* §§ 12, 18, 21 (Knysh 2000, 248, 250–51).

\(^{244}\) Cf., e.g., *Brev.* 2.3.42–64, 114–15. Cf. Lewis 1940, 156.

\(^{245}\) Tierney 1986b, 8; cf. McGovern 1991, 144 and 147.
of course no norms of divine or natural law are violated—from a pact of some sort. However, not all rights can be renounced. Rights deriving from natural law, so-called natural rights are inherently irrenounceable:

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\text{abdicatio iuris naturalis in usu rei non est sancta, cum illi iuri nemini liceat renuntiare; qui enim tali iuri renuntiaret, non posset in articulo necessitatis extremae de re aliena sine licentia alterius conservare vitam suam: quod falsum est.}\]

Note how different this is from Michael’s position. People have a natural right rather than a licence to the use of a thing in times of necessity; and this right, moreover, trumps any granting or withholding of a licence on the part of the owner. The end result may be the same, but the categories are quite different.

In modern discussions, several types of rights are usually distinguished; and though Ockham’s terminology is far from modern, he also argued for the existence of several different types of rights insofar as they related to discussions of property. One of the most important categories was the \textit{ius utendi}, which Nicholas III had added in \textit{Exiit} to Bonaventure’s other four \textit{consideranda} concerning temporal things. In terms of positive rights, let it suffice for now to mention only the two most important: \textit{ius utendi} and \textit{usus iuris}, which we shall discuss in chapter five.

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In writings on property, *dominium* primarily describes a relationship, either between people or between people and things. Richard Fitzralph, as the epigraph suggests, recognized that this relationship might be rather different if we are talking about God’s *dominium* instead of human *dominium*; in fact, Richard was somewhat unique in distinguishing between divine, angelic, and human *dominium*.

On another point though, Richard and the Franciscans were agreed: namely, that the terms *proprietas* and *dominium* were approximate synonyms, at least when writing about poverty and property. In his first writing in defense of mendicant poverty, where he made the important distinction between *dominium* and *usus*, for instance, Bonaventure argued that the use of temporal things was necessary for human life, but that one could have this use without *dominium* and *proprietas*. Later on in the better known *Apologia pauperum*, he made the point that everything given to the friars passed into the *ius*, *dominium*, and

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1. *De pauperie Salvatoris* 1.1 (Poole 1890, 278).
2. A brief account of the evolution of the general meaning of *dominium* from its early Patristic and Aristotelian blending to the full-blown medieval concept may be found in F. Oakley 1964, 66–75; for the legal background to the term, see especially Coleman 1988, 611–20. The general interchangeability of these terms has led to some confusion in some of the secondary scholarship: Lambert 1998, xii, has translated both *dominium* and *proprietas* as dominion; whereas F. Oakley 1964, 66-67 has refused to translate *dominium* at all because the meaning cannot easily be captured in English. Both positions are, I think, too extreme.
4. Bonaventure, *De perfectione evangelica* 2.1 ad 3 (BOO 5.131b): ‘Nam usus temporalium necessarius est vitae humanae, qui tamen haberis potest absque dominio et proprietate, sicut patet in pauperibus, qui nihil proprietatis habent.’ The concern about *dominium* also manifested itself in the *Rule* Commentary tradition; see, e.g., Hugh of Digne’s commentary of c. 1252 (Flood 1979, 128.9–27).
proprietas of the Roman Church, which suggests again that Bonaventure thought the friars could live without any dominium.

The polemicists of the fourteenth century tended to treat these terms in the same way. Hervaeus Natalis boldly proclaimed in his tract on the poverty of Christ and the apostles that dominium, ius, and proprietas all signified in fact the same thing. And Bonagratia’s tract on the same topic describes by reference to the Digest a key meaning of ‘habere aliquid’ as to ‘iure dominii vel quasi dominii seu proprietatis aliquid obtinere’.

The way dominium was treated by the fourteenth-century polemicists clearly owes something to the Roman law tradition, but it is important to realize that it also differs from that tradition in some profound ways. On one point everyone was agreed: dominium was a ius, if of a special kind. The most important and obvious difference, however, is that Roman jurists treated dominium as an ‘absolute’ right. As Peter Birks described this point, dominium was not entirely absolute in terms of the content of ownership, but it was conceptually. That is, the owner of property did not get to act as if he were an absolute monarch of the things he owned. Although in general the ‘law required scrupulous regard for property rights’, various restrictions did exist in the way an owner could treat his property. He might need, for example, to bow to the needs of the state. Generally, though, to have dominium rei usually meant that one had the rights to the use, fruits, and disposal, although in certain cases it might in fact amount to a ius nudum, that is a bare right ‘with no practical content’. Naturally, the holder of these rights must also have possession of the thing against which he holds these rights. But possessio

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7. Bonagratia, De paup., 324: ‘Primo modo iure dominii vel quasi dominii seu proprietatis aliquid obtinere, Dig. 50.16.188; Dig. 45.1.38.9.’ This passage is put into its proper context on p. 140, below. Michael of Cesena similarly insisted that when John wrote in CIN that it was heretical to say that Christ and the apostles had nothing, he meant that ‘non habuerint aliqua iure proprietatis’; see App.mai., 327. The term quasi dominium deserves more attention than can be given here. Bartolus used it in his commentary to the Digest, and it is discussed briefly in Coing 1953, 365–66.

8. Although this view has not been universally accepted, it is hard to understand why. Skeptics should consult Garnsey 2007, 184–90.


11. See above, p. 42.

is not *dominium* in Roman law, though it could mature into *dominium* with time.

This is not, generally speaking, how the Michaelists treated the concept of *dominium*.

It is not that they disagreed with Roman law ideas about the term, just that they approached it from a rather wider perspective. Let us anticipate a bit and take Ockham as an example.

For his part, Ockham followed in this general tradition. One who has *proprietas* of a thing has *dominium* of it. For Ockham the overlap between *dominium* and *proprietas* is significant:

Unde proprietas, secundum quod hoc nomine scientiae legales utuntur, licet idem quod dominium, accipiendu /'dominium/ quod competit ex iure positivo, non tamen significat idem quod dominium, accipiendu /'dominium/ secundum alias significationes in principio istius opusculi.

In legal discourse, it is best to think of *proprietas* as a type of lordship. That said, however, Ockham believed ‘ownership’ was more or less synonymous with *dominium proprium*, for both terms indicate a level of exclusivity:


As the above quotation makes clear, *proprietas*, like *dominium*, can be held individually or be common to a group. More importantly, this kind of ownership comes in the same two

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13. Dig. 41.2.12.1: ‘Nihil commune habet proprietates cum possessione: et ideo non denegatur ei interdictum uti possidetis, qui coepit rem vindicare: non enim videtur possessioni renuntiasse, qui rem vindicavit.’
17. Early on, Ockham noted that *proprietas* has a very different—and irrelevant—meaning in logic (*OND* 2.434–436, 309); for this, see Baudry 1958, 220–21.
19. *OND* 26.38–49, 484. It is worth noting that this is an idea Fitzralph is careful to repudiate right off the bat; see *De pauperie Salvatoris* 1.2 (Poole 1890, 279).
types of lordship mentioned above: either it allows for the free ordering of the thing (e.g., selling, giving, donating, bequeathing, alienating, using, consuming), or the temporalia were conceded to the individual or group for only certain uses or ways of managing them. Laymen typically have the first type of ownership, while clerics and other religious (and the early Christian community) are limited to the second. Conceptually this restricted ownership seems identical to Michael’s and Bonagratia’s use of quasi dominium uel proprietas, which I have already referred to as ‘restricted ownership’.

4.1 Bonagratia of Bergamo

Bonagratia also paired dominium and proprietas throughout the De paupertate and the Appellatio contra ‘Ad conditorem’. They were, presumably, two sides of the same coin. And as just mentioned, they were iura. Thus when we say someone has something ‘iure dominii vel quasi dominii seu proprietatis’, this means that the thing is counted among an individual’s (or a corporation’s) things. And we say this because (cum) one can claim a legal exceptio while he possesses the thing or have an actio to recover it if he loses it, which he described elsewhere as having in a dominative or possessive way. It should therefore be clear once more that a defining characteristic of a ius for Bonagratia is that the possessor of a ius has a legal claim in court.

This is manifestly not the situation of many ecclesiastical possessions. Prelates have management (administratio) or stewardship (dispensatio) of ecclesiastical things, and they should be considered a steward or executor when it comes to distributing goods to the poor. Strictly speaking, prelates cannot even be said ‘to possess’ beyond the general sense of factual detention. In his response to Ad conditorem Bonagratia clarified his position on the question of ecclesiastical ownership. As a series of canonistic references and glosses make clear, the Church has the ius retentionis, or dominium, of ecclesiastical things. Both Innocent IV and Hostiensis, moreover, explain that Christ ‘habet dominium

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21. On restricted ownership, see p. 84; cf. p. 130, and p. 136 below.
22. In fact, the App.ACC does not deal much with dominium, presumably because it was a response to ACC1 and that bull was concerned more with use than lordship.
23. Bonagratia, De paup., 324, citing Dig. 41.1.52: ‘Rem in bonis nostris habere intellegimur, quotiens possessores exceptionem aut amittentes ad recipierandum eam actionem habemus.’ The exceptio was a legal defense which rendered the plaintiff’s claim invalid. See the account in Inst. 4.13, and Berger 1953, s.v. ‘exceptio’ (458), for further references.
25. Needless to say, this was probably not the classical Roman law understanding of the idea. Dig. 41.1.52 does refer to ownership in a broad sense, but not necessarily or exclusively to true dominium (i.e., dominium ex iure Quiritium): see, e.g., Ankum and Pool 1989, 9 and 32.
26. Bonagratia, De paup., 325. For possessio in its legal sense, see below, p. 99.
et possessionem rerum Ecclesiae’: what men offer to the Church are in fact offerings to God. Although this is never described as divine lordship, he quoted with approval C. 16 q. 3 c. 6, which uses aeternum dominium, and it is clear that he was thinking along these lines.

But this sort of lordship was not at issue. The Franciscans and the pope were actually dealing with normal civil lordship, what later authors sometimes referred to as dominium humanum. This sort of lordship did not exist before sin entered the world. There was no ‘mine’ or ‘yours’ before sin, although there was then a use common to humankind. That is, humans lived in the state of innocence sine dominis distinctis, a feature Christ would reintroduce later on. In the state of nature God gave two precepts—one positive, the other negative—at the moment of Adam’s creation. The first was that he could eat from any tree in paradise; the second was that he could not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Gen. 2.16–17). What this showed, Bonagratia argued, was that usus fell under a divine precept, not that there was any dominium. The pronouns ‘mine’ and ‘yours’ were introduced rather ‘ex iniquitate et cupiditate gentium et per humanum ius’.

Since ownership, possession, and lordship exist by human law, much like usufruct and the right of using exist by civil law, an individual may chose to renounce and abdicate these rights completely—just as Esau did his ius primogeniture (cf. Gen. 25.33).

Christ qua man and the apostles (after they assumed the state of perfection) were neither lords nor property-holders; what they held, they held as stewards and managers, which means that they exercised only restricted ownership in the name of the greater Christian community. For the apostles’ part they abdicated lordship by a vow, and because negative vows always remain in force, the apostles were at no time even capable of lordship or ownership without committing a mortal sin. If Christ or the apostles

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30. Bonagratia, De paup., 504.
31. Bonagratia, De paup., 503: ‘Proprietates vero et possessiones et dominia rerum sunt a iure humano, D. 8 c. 1; usufructus etiam et ius utendi est a iure civili, in Inst. 2.2, per totum. Certum est autem quod omni iuri privato, quod aliqui competat ex humano iure, potest quis renuntiare et illud a se penitus abdicare; unde Esau ex quo semel renuntiaverat iuri primogeniture, ad illud redire nunquam potuit, C. 8 q. 1 c. 8, Dig. 21.1.14.9, cum similibus.’ I cannot see what distinction Bonagratia might have drawn between ius humanum and ius ciuile, but if they were not direct synonyms, then civil law must be a precise type of human law.
32. Bonagratia, De paup., 487.
33. Bonagratia, De paup., 333.
34. Bonagratia, De paup., 489; nor did they ever seek lordship (488).
had a purse, it was thus held only with respect to a stewardship, management, or procuratorship. The lesson we should take from the purse is that the ‘forma ... ecclesiastice pecunie institut(a) in loculis’, as Prosper and Augustine both explained.

Bonagrataia also argued that we could consider the loculi in light of the condescension theory. He did not deny that Christ physically carried, handled, and managed ‘what was put in the purse’, but he explained that when Christ did so, he did in order to condescend to the weak; he did not do so because he wished to appropriate the contents of the purse for himself or the college of the apostles.

Bonagrataia’s two short tracts outlined some of the basic thoughts about dominium and proprietas that would characterize the other Michaelist writings. They are, briefly, that the controversy between the Franciscans and the pope was not about divine lordship or about Christ qua God, but about the lordship introduced through civil law after the Fall. This sort of lordship did not exist in the state of nature, nor among Christ and the apostles. Even a prelate’s control over res ecclesiasticae cannot be considered lordship of this kind. Clearly, Bonagrataia’s account leaves a few too many questions about dominium unanswered at this point to be fully satisfactory. The picture would be fleshed out a bit, however, by his confreres.

### 4.2 Michael of Cesena

Michael recognized that dominium could be used in many different contexts. However, the primary meaning, he thought, was pretty much universal. The term is quite obviously intimately connected with dominus, and one was called a lord from the act of dominating: ‘“dominus” a dominando dicitur’. This tends to be the opposite of the modern view of

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35. *Procuratio* is related to *procurator*, who was an appointed agent. Dig. 3.3.1 pr.: ‘Procurator est qui aliena negotia mandatu domini administrat.’ Significantly, Inst. 2.9.5 allows that a procurator can gain possession and even lordship for the person he represents (even if he be unaware of what is taking place): ‘et hoc est quod dicitur, per extraneam personam nihil adquiri posse: excepto eo quod per liberam personam, veluti per procuratorem, placet non solum scientibus, sed etiam ignorantibus vobis adquiri possessionem secundum divi Severi constitutionem et per hanc possessionem etiam dominium, si dominus fuit qui tradidit, vel per usucapionem aut longi temporis praescriptionem, si dominus non sit.’

36. Bonagrataia, *De paup.*, 490, citing C. 23 q. 7 c. 2 (instead of Prosper, it should be Julianus Pomerius). Not, of course, that this amounted to actual ecclesiastical lordship in the positive law sense. I read the variant *instituta* rather than *institute*, though the difference in meaning is not that great.


38. *App.mon.*, 654. John had said much the same thing; see *QVR*, 570.
the relationship between ‘dominium’ and ‘dominus’, which progresses domus → dominus → dominium.\textsuperscript{39}

Conceptually, Michael located both dominium and proprietas under possessio in the sense that possession often entailed lordship and ownership.\textsuperscript{40} Here he was clearly using possessio in a technical, legal sense. Elsewhere he argued that one needed to have the will to possess in order to possess in a proprietary way:

regulariter nullus potest proprietatem, dominium, immo nec possessionem in rebus ali-
quibus usu consumptibilibus vel non consumptibilibus adquirere nisi habeat voluntatem
sive animum adquirendi sive habendi, Dig. 41.2.3; et Dig. 41.2.8.\textsuperscript{41}

The references are germane. Two opinions contrast of Dig. 41.2.3 naturalis possessio with the clearly legal possession meant in the other laws,\textsuperscript{42} while Dig. 41.2.8 states Michael’s point succinctly: ‘Quemadmodum nulla possessio adquiri nisi animo et corpore potest, ita nulla amittitur, nisi in qua utrumque in contrarium actum est.’ This is why we say, Michael continued, quoting from the Digest, the insane or a ward without his guardian are unable to possess in this sense even if they happen to touch the things in question.\textsuperscript{43}

The importance of willing for the acquisition of of lordship is hard to overstate. The same criterion applies when it comes to ‘giving’. John had held that dare meant to make

\textsuperscript{39} See, e.g., the respective entries in Lewis and Short 1879, 610–11. Michael’s views were current, however: see QVR, 570 and 591, where John cited Ps.-Dionysius to this effect; cf. De divinis nominibus 12.1–2 (Migne 1844, 55–3.970). See also Willoweit 1974, for a general discussion.

\textsuperscript{40} App.mai., 672 [in the context of Luke 14.33]: ‘Ex quibus verbis Christi patet quod volens ipsum perfecte sequi, debet renuntiare proprietati et dominio omnium rerum temporalium, cum dicat “omnibus quae possidet”, et sub nomine possessionis proprietas et dominium continetur, ut notatur C. 16 q. 2 c. 9; et Dig. 50.16.78.’ As usual, Michael was trying to demonstrate that both canon and civil law were on his side; however, C. 16 q. 2 c. 9 has nothing explicitly to do with dominium or proprietas: ‘Possessio territorii conuentum non adimit ideoque nouae basilicae, que conditae fuerint, ad eum proculdubio pertinebunt episcopum, cuius conuentus esse constiterit.’ Dig. 50.16.78 is more to the point, but the use of ‘interdum’ seems to limit its supposedly universal applicability: ‘Interdum proprietatem quoque verbum “possessionis” significat: sicut in eo, qui possessiones suas legasset, responsum est.’ As usual, Michael was trying to demonstrate that both canon and civil law were on his side; however, C. 16 q. 2 c. 9 has nothing explicitly to do with dominium or proprietas: ‘Possessio territorii conuentum non adimit ideoque nouae basilicae, que conditae fuerint, ad eum proculdubio pertinebunt episcopum, cuius conuentus esse constiterit.’ Dig. 50.16.78 is more to the point, but the use of ‘interdum’ seems to limit its supposedly universal applicability: ‘Interdum proprietatem quoque verbum “possessionis” significat: sicut in eo, qui possessiones suas legasset, responsum est.’

\textsuperscript{41} App.mai., 251; cf. App.mon., 725. Brett 1997, 13–20, has stressed the importance of will and dominium in the context of the thirteenth-century poverty debates. (Think, e.g., of Duns Scotus, Ordinatio 4, d. 15 q. 2, n. 2 (Wolter 2001, 40): ‘Ex hoc patet quid requiritur ad instam donationem, quia liberalis traditio ex parte donantis, et voluntas recipiendi ex parte illius cui fit donatio...’). I think it is fair to add that willing was also a conspicuous feature of Roman law views on dominium. It was often phrased in terms of intention, but the point is the same. See, e.g., Dig. 41.2.3.1: ‘Et apiscimur possessionem corpore et animo, neque per se animo aut per se corpore’. Further discussion in Berger 1953, s.v. ‘posessio’ (637), and Miller 1998, 53–55, 58–60. Cf. App.mon., 843–44.

\textsuperscript{42} Dig. 41.2.3.3 and 41.2.3.13; cf. 41.2.1.1.

\textsuperscript{43} App.mai., 251–52. Note that the editors should have marked this passage as quoted from Dig. 41.2.1.3 thus: ‘Unde dicitur quod “furiosus et pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate non possunt incipere possidere”, id est possessionem adquirere, “quia affectionem tenendi non habent, licet (maxime) corpore suo rem contingant, sicuti [si] quis dormienti aliquid in manu ponat”, Dig. 41.2.1.3.’ (The words in the angle brackets are found in the Digest; the first set of angle brackets are my own; the second the editors’.) See App.mon., 843–44, for a fuller list of legal references.
something the receiver’s. Michael disagreed of course. He recognized the Roman law basis of the claim, but denied its universal applicability. When Jesus gave his disciples the loaves of bread and fish in Matthew 14.19, he did not give them ownership or lordship, for had he done so, they would have been able to decide whether or not to give them to the crowd according to their own wishes, which the Code of Justinian describes as a key feature of ownership.

**DOMINIUM DIUNIUM**

The pope made a big deal about the importance of divine lordship in his post-Bonagratia bulls. The Michaelists, however, did not find his views particularly accurate or important. Ockham summed up the point quite well in his *Breviloquium*. Essentially there are different kinds of *dominium* so it is important to delineate carefully which one is meant in the debate. So, regarding John’s stress on the significance of divine lordship, a Michaelist could respond thus:

> Et dominio rerum temporalium quoddam est divinum, de quo non est dicendum ad praesens; quoddam vero est humanum, et illud est duplex: commune toti generi humano, et proprium.

> [Dei] erant et sunt omnia tam iure creationis quam iure conservationis, sine cuius manutenentia omnia in nichilum v[er]terentur.

This passage demonstrates, I think, the general ‘so what?’ attitude the Michaelists had about divine lordship. No one doubted God’s divine lordship over all things: Christ

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44. See QVR, 564, concerning the division of goods described in Acts 4.35: ‘Ergo si data fuerunt eis, et ab illo, scilicet Deo, qui dare potuit, dicendum est quod domini sunt effecti, quia dare est accipientis facere.’ Cf. QVR, 561, 605.

45. Dig., 41.1.20 pr.: ‘Traditio nihil amplius transferre debet vel potest ad eum qui accipit, quam est apud eum qui tradit. Si igitur quis dominium in fundo habuit, id tradendo transfert, si non habuit, ad eum qui accipit nihil transfert.’

46. *App.mon.*, 810: ‘Nam licet dare aliquando sit accipientis facere quantum ad proprietatem et dominium cum res datur ab eo qui dare potest et illi qui recipere potest, sicut patet Dig., 41.1.20, tamen non est hoc semper verum, quod dare sit accipientis facere quoad proprietatem et dominium, sicut probatur Matthaei 14.19, ubi dicitur: Iesus, acceptis quinque panibus et duobus piscibus, benedixit et fregit et dedit discipulis suis, discipuli autem dederunt turbis. Manufestum est autem quod Christus per dationem illam non transulit proprietatem et dominium illorum panum et piscium in discipulos suos; tunc enim fuisset in potestate eorum ipsos dare turbis vel non dare et de ipsis ad suam voluntatem ordinare, quia in re propria quilibet est legitimus moderator et arbiter, Cod. 4.35.21.’ Cf. *App.mon.*, 757-58; much the same can be said of ‘dividere’: *App.mon.*, 811. See also n. 105, below.

47. *Brev.* 3.7.3-6, 36-37 (4.178, 179; Offler’s emendations). As Offler noted, Boehner 1943: 473-75, contextualized this chapter in terms of other, earlier Franciscan writings. However, it is important to note that Ockham’s position on the origins of property differs slightly from the account in the *OND* (Boehner did not utilize the *OND* in his classic article); unfortunately, although it merits serious consideration, I do not have time to pick up this thread here.
showed that he was the ‘true and natural lord of all things,’ just as, as we have seen, he is also the very source of all law.\footnote{App.mai., 355; see above 79, n. 176 above for the description of Christ as the source of law. Cf. Tierney 1980, 168: no one doubted that all ‘licit dominion came ultimately from God.’ But in this sense at least, the Michaelists were far removed from the concerns of Giles of Rome and the idea of dominium cum iustitia, which could only be held, de iure, through the Church: see his De ecclesiastica potestate 2.8 (Dyson 2004, 140–52).} The question was never about whether Christ \textit{qua} God possessed any lordship.\footnote{App.mai., 317: ‘Nec de habere de iure divino quaestio umquam fuit. Nullus enim umquam quaedam facit quin omnia sint in Dei domino, non solum terrena sed etiam caelum et terra et omnia quae caeli ambitu continetur.’}

John had insisted strongly on the temporal \textit{dominium} of Christ.\footnote{As Brunner 2006, 185, opened her chapter on John’s involvement in the poverty controversy: ‘One of the most striking features of John XXII’s theological discussion of the Franciscan poverty ideal was his insistence on the temporal dominion of Christ.’} But from a Michaelist perspective this was untrue: Christ did not exercise temporal lordship—that is, political mastery in the sphere of positive law—but divine lordship, which is grounded in divine law.\footnote{For our present purposes, then, we shall omit discussion of whether Christ \textit{qua} man ever exercised temporal lordship, which was a point explicitly raised only in Quia vir. It is, to be sure, an interesting question, and one discussed virtually \textit{ad nauseam} in the various Michaelist tracts, but it strikes me as of little direct importance for theories of property since all sides already admit that God has lordship over all creation. For those interested in the question though, see especially App.mon., 630–709 (the first two errors he noted in this appeal).} Of course this is not to say that he could not have exercised such lordship had he wanted to. By his infinite power, freed \textit{ab omni lege et iure}, he could act above and against law if he chose to do so. And he could do this without any injustice.\footnote{This position foreshadows Ockham’s own views: 
\textit{Brev.} 3.4–6, 172–78, and 4.10, 212–15; \textit{OQ} 1.10.55–145, 42–45, and 4.3.43–60, 126–27; \textit{CB} 6.5, 277.29–279.26; \textit{AP} 2.172–197, 235; 3.2 \textit{Dial.} 1.25 (Ockham 1962, fol. 243rb–244va). Brief discussion in McGrade 1974, 98 and 101–02. See also Melloni’s important article (1986) on Ockham’s critique of Innocent IV’s \textit{Eger cui lenia}.} It seems it would be a small matter for him to exercise any type of lordship he desired.

There are advantages and disadvantages to the position Michael adopted here. On the one hand, his insistence that Christ, ‘in quantum homo viator’, did not exercise temporal lordship (over all of creation) made it easier to argue that the Church had no control over the temporal affairs of kingdoms, whether Christian or not. Non-Christian kingdoms did and could exist legitimately and the Church could not meddle unless manifest need so required.\footnote{App.mai., 666–67. This position foreshadows Ockham’s own views: 
\textit{Brev.} 3.4–6, 172–78, and 4.10, 212–15; \textit{OQ} 1.10.55–145, 42–45, and 4.3.43–60, 126–27; \textit{CB} 6.5, 277.29–279.26; \textit{AP} 2.172–197, 235; 3.2 \textit{Dial.} 1.25 (Ockham 1962, fol. 243rb–244va). Brief discussion in McGrade 1974, 98 and 101–02. See also Melloni’s important article (1986) on Ockham’s critique of Innocent IV’s \textit{Eger cui lenia}.} The advantage of this position to the Michaelist cause is obvious, for it meant that the emperor whose protection they enjoyed at that moment was an autonomous and legitimate source of authority, not subject, \textit{de iure}, in temporal matters to the decrees of the pope.
of use from lordship. Michael argued, as did his confreres, that one easy way to see how use of fact must be separate from lordship was to consider tithes. God obviously has the lordship of these tithes, just as his ministers are clearly the ones who use them. Presumably, lordship in this case must be divine. But since this is true for all things, it is hard to see why this should be considered a pointed example for this issue. But this is a small matter; the point here was simply that the nature of divine lordship was not really near the root of the Michaelist-John poverty controversy. That was rather a matter of dominium mundanum et civile.

DOMINIUM HUMANUM

Michael presented a simple account of the origins of human lordship. The prelapsarian condition of humankind was one without dominia (discounting, obviously, God’s):

Omnis divisio dominiorum personalis vel collegialis venit causaliter et originaliter ex divisione animorum. Unde quia in statu innocentiae nulla fuisset divisio animorum, nulla fuisset divisio dominiorum.

And, after citing Dilectissimis, Acts 4.32–34, and Proverbs 1.14, he concluded,

et ita, universaliter, secundum Scripturam et secundum veritatem, omnis communitas rerum, bona vel mala, venit causaliter ex communitate proportionali animorum, et omnis divisio dominiorum venit, per oppositum, causaliter ex divisione proportionali animorum seu cordium. Sed perfecta caritas, cum sit vinculum perfectionis secundum Apostolum [cf. Col. 3.14], excludit omnem divisionem animorum.

Although the reference to Colossians can be found also be found in a gloss to Dilectissimis, it was likely a deliberate jab at the pope, who had employed the idea that charity is the bond of perfection to diminish the importance of poverty, and Michael used it to

54. See, e.g., App.min., 433; App.mai., 441–42.
55. If speculation is called for, I suspect that one could make a case that in the case of the tithes, we are talking about direct and unmediated lordship, as opposed to mediated lordship. The analogy would then be with a king having mediated lordship of temporal goods versus the Church having unmediated lordship of the goods that the Franciscans use. This idea of the Church’s unmediated lordship is quite common in the bulls claim of papal lordship of these goods. Sbaralea noted in a footnote to the phrase ‘nullo modo spectat’ in Exultantes in Domino (Martin IV, 1283): ‘Quod antea sanxerunt Gregorius IX., Innocentius, & Alexander IV., ceterique illorum successores praesertim Nicolaus III.’ See BF 3.501b, note e. This is somewhat inaccurate. Gregory IX only wrote that these things pertained ‘ad quos noscitur pertinere’: Quo elongati 87 (Grundmann 1961, 23). This point is only made explicit for the first time in Ordinem vestrum (BF 1.401b), a bull often republished by both Innocent and Alexander. Exit made a similar point, but without using the phrase (2.1114).
56. App.mon., 753.
57. Gl. ord. ad C. 12 q. 1 c. 2, s.v. ‘Cor unum et anima una’.
58. See above, p. 26. We should also qualify somewhat the conclusion of Shogimen 2007, 58, regarding Michael’s attitude towards the supposed ‘Bonaventuran triangle of poverty, charity and perfection’.
make the extra point that this meant that the apostles existed without lordship as well.

Human lordship was introduced through human agency. To be specific, ‘proprietas in rebus fuerit a iure imperatorum sive a iure humano per iniquitatem introducta’.

Michael cited the usual pair of *Dilectissimis* and *Quo iure* to support his case. Earlier he had explained what it meant for the apostles and those who wished to imitate them in the light of *Dilectissimis*. In short, they have assumed and preserved the state which existed before sin, namely,

antequam per iniquitatem introductum esset quod aliquis diceret hoc meum proprium et hoc tuum. Qui status fuit status innocentiae sive legis naturae, statui per iniquitatem introducto contrarius, secundum glossam, quae verbum illud ‘per iniquitatem’ exponens dicit: ‘Per iniquitatem, id est per consuetudinem iuris gentium, aequitati naturali contrarium […] vel “per iniquitatem”, id est per sollicitudinem, ut ibi [Lc. 16.9]: Facite vobis amicos de mammona iniquitatis.’ Haec glossa. Et quod sicut antequam esset peccatum non erat appropriatio rerum temporali introducta, sed fuisse habitus usus rerum usu consumptibilium et non consumptibilium absque aliquo proprietate, sic fuit in apostolis et apostolicis viris.

The idea of ‘mine’ and ‘yours’ was part of the state that resulted from iniquity; and, as the gloss noted, this phrase referred to a state introduced through the ‘tradition’ of the *ius gentium*, which was contrary to natural equity, or, at least, through what we might call ‘anxious care’ (for temporal things).

The possessive pronouns *meum*, *tuum*, *suum* (and the genitive of the demonstrative pronouns) often denote a property relationship, but, Michael pointed out, they do not only indicate this sort of relationship. There are in fact four relevant ways these pronouns can be understood. Lordship and ownership are sometimes meant. Michael tellingly used examples where people denied they had *suum* in this (merely) ‘fourth’ sense. The third sense relates to the scriptural idea that a worker is worthy of ‘his’ food (Mt. 10.10), where ‘cibum suum’ must be understood ‘quoad stipendium debitum et meritum condignum laboris’, for those who preach the Gospel ought to be able to live from it (1 Cor. 9.14). Yet this should not be considered a sign of lordship since preachers were to give and receive freely (Mt. 10.8). The second sense is closely related. This sense refers to the way prelates qua prelates might employ these pronouns. This sense is understood ‘quoad curam et custodiam et etiam quoad ministerium et dispensationem’. Prelates have things in order to look after their flock, but, as the Michaelists insisted, this sort of stewardship

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60. *App.mai.*, 239–40, citing *Gl. ord.* ad C. 12 q. 1 c. 2, s.v. ‘Sed per iniquitatem’.
62. *App.mon.*, 705, citing Acts 4.32 and (after equating *suum* and *proprium*) C. 12 q. 1 c. 10 and c. 11.
63. *App.mon.*, 704.
falls short of true *dominium*. And finally, the first sense Michael chose to discuss is the one that applies to people *alieni iuris*: minors, slaves, and religious. These sorts of people are also allowed to use possessive pronouns when referring to things (e.g., ‘that’s my cloak over there’), but it cannot have the same meaning as it does for those who are *in sua potestate*. For people *alieni iuris*, using a possessive pronoun means something is theirs as it relates to temporal or spiritual *usus*. He cited Augustine for support: ‘Aequalia . . . ad usum nobis sunt, sicut res dominorum dicuntur esse famulorum, non dominio, sed quia ad usum sunt eorum’.

At the same time, another gloss from *Dilectissimis* was relevant here. It reads: ‘Potest ergo aliquis possidere rem cuius proprietatem habere non potest, sicut servus dicitur possidere, id est detinere, Dig. 41.2.24.’ Michael thus concluded that this sort of possession was not a ‘possessio iuris civilis’, but a ‘detentio facti et iuris naturalis’. In other words there is legal possession, a feature of positive law, and a possession in the sense that one is merely holding the thing, which is an action permitted, unsurprisingly, by natural law. And, naturally, one who has legal possession has recourse to the courts if he is despoiled of his physical possession.

Unde et actio datur in iudicio hominibus sui iuris spoliatis rebus suis quantum ad usum vel alium modum habendi licitum et non solum spoliatis rebus suis quoad proprietatem et dominium. Sicut patet in eo qui emit a domino rei usum rei, si dominus rei postea surripiat ab eo rem illam, datur eidem actio furti contra dominum ratione usus, Dig. 47.2.20.1.

Although the use of ‘licitum’ here is liable to confuse since the Michaelists argue that their own use is licit, but not legal in terms of positive law, both the phrase ‘sui iuris spoliatis’ and the reference to buying a use make it clear that Michael meant that these modes are ‘allowed’ by positive law.

At the start of this chapter I alluded to the fact that *dominium* indicates a relationship of some sort. More specifically, *dominium* refers to an unequal power relationship, and, as such, it was something the Franciscans were keen to avoid. Hence the name ‘fratres *minores’*. Power in this context means nothing more than an at least licit, if not legal

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64. *App. mon.*, 703-04.
65. *App. mon.*, 702. Augustine, *Quaestiones evangeliorum* 2.33.7 (Mutzenbecher 1980, 83), is rather different from Michael’s text; the same goes for cross-reference to the text of the gloss to Rom. 8.32 as it is found in Fevrentius, Dadraenum, and Cuilly 1603, 6.114.
66. Michael tidied up the gloss a little bit. *Gl. ord. ad C.* 12 q. 1 c. 2, s.v. ‘possidebat(!)’ reads: ‘Ergo aliquis potest possidere rem cuius non potest habere proprietatem. Argu. contra X 2.26.7(!) Sed dic possidebat, id est detinebat, sicut servus dicitur possidere. Dig. 41.2.24.’
68. *App. mon.*, 759.
69. This passage is dealt with in greater detail below, p. 145.
ability to use, misuse, or consume the object over which one has lordship. Michael occasionally equates the two, as, for example, when discussing what a rich man typically grants his poor guests at the dinner table.\textsuperscript{70} Michael found civil and canon law justification for this point. He first referred to a passage from the Code which states that everyone is a legitimate lord and master of their own things,\textsuperscript{71} and then noted that, as we see in the Decretum, such a person could sell and transfer their possessions to another.\textsuperscript{72} In other words, one cannot have a \textit{ius uendendi} without first having the thing by a \textit{ius proprietatis}, which means it belongs to the person by at least a right of restricted ownership (\textit{ius dominii vel quasi}).\textsuperscript{73}

It is this sort of talk that relates to Michael’s point about power. According to the laws, Michael noted, laymen can dispose of their things as they wish; and it is for this reason that they have the likeness of emancipated sons (in the Roman law sense), for they can dispose of the goods entrusted to them without the consent of their father.\textsuperscript{74} On the other hand, ‘qui in alterius potestate est, nihil proprium habere potest’.\textsuperscript{75} For a Franciscan to consider himself to be ‘in the power of another’ was nothing new, of course: it was a general state that all religious were to be in.\textsuperscript{76} Michael quoted from the

\textsuperscript{70} See, e.g., \textit{App.mon.}, 828; discussed in detail on p. 148, below. Cf. \textit{App.mon.}, 837.

\textsuperscript{71} Cod. 4.35.21: ‘In re mandata non pecuniae solum, cuius est certissimum mandati indicium, verum etiam exstimationis periculum est. Nam suae quidem quisque rei moderator atque arbiter non omnia negotia, sed pleraque ex proprio animo facit: aliena vero negotia exacto officio geruntur nec quicquam in eorum administratione neglectum ac declinatum culpa vacuum est.’ Michael’s claim is, I think, a fair one. See also McGovern 1991, 137–38.

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{App.mon.}, 815–16: ‘... quia in re propria quilibet est legitimus moderator et arbiter, Cod. 4.35.21. Unde et vendere et eam transferre in alium potest, sicut placet, C. 1 q. 1 c. 21, ubi dicitur sic: “Omnis enim dominus quod habet, si vult, vendit.” Et Cod. 4.38.14. Et in Inst. 2.1.40, cum similibus.’ For a similar argument, see \textit{App.mai.}, 315.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{App.mai.}, 315: ‘Licet enim rem immobilem alienam possit quis vendere quoad hoc quia tenet contractus in ipsius vendentis praejudicium, tamen ius vendendi non habet quis rem alienam, praecipue mobilem, nisi habeat in re ipsa ius proprietatis, quia ad eum pertineat iure dominii vel quasi, ut habitur Dig. 18.1.28, in textu et glossa; et in 18.1.34.1.’ This is an abbreviated version of the property right Bonagratia first described at \textit{De paup.}, 324; see above, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{App.mai.}, 274: ‘... tamen certum est quod ali fideles possunt de bonis suis secundum iura motu proprio disponere. Unde filiorum emancipatorum similitudinem habent, qui possunt de bonis sibi concessis disponere absque patris consensu.’

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{App.mon.}, 811.

\textsuperscript{76} This is clearly tied to the issue of obedience, a topic which was important for all religious orders. Examples in Franciscan literature are easy to find as well: e.g., Hugh of Digne, \textit{Expositio} 2 (Flood 1979, 108); Bonaventure, \textit{Regula novitiorum} 14.1 (BOO 8.488a); John Pecham, \textit{Tractatus pauperis} 10 (Kingsford, Little, and Tocco 1910, 31). Even Peter Olivi with his ‘activist’ rather than ‘institutional’ understanding of Franciscan life (Flood 1999, 158–60) stressed the importance of obedience, particularly in his first question on poverty; see Schlageter 1989, 118. (Olivi’s question on obedience is as yet unedited, but see Burr 1989, 166–72, for a discussion of this aspect of Olivi’s thought in the context of the events that surrounded him.) Finally, although I cannot agree with all the details, Brett 1997, 10–20, has an interesting discussion of the importance of an abdication of lordship over one’s own will in the Franciscan tradition.
Michael read this monastic commonplace in the light of Roman law. If someone is ‘in alterius potestate constitutus’, that means that he is unable to have anything of his own. Michael recited a long list of authorities in favour of his position. Elsewhere he expanded on this idea and his legal references to argue that someone who is in another’s power ‘aliquid iure proprietatis et dominii habere non potest’. And slaves, he quoted from the Digest, are not considered people with respect to civil law. And the same goes for religious, who are in another’s power. Therefore, he concluded, religious are unable to have lordship or ownership over anything—as is also clear from canon law.

The Franciscans, of course, fall under the authority (sub sua gubernatione, protectione et correctione) of the Roman Church. That is the message of the first and twelfth chapters of the Regula bullata. They are, in short, like sons who have been entrusted and subjected, ‘quodam peculiari et speciali iure’, to the care, obedience and power of the holy Roman Church. The point about sons, like the references to slaves and monks elsewhere, was naturally to emphasize their (legal) incapacity to claims of lordship—which was the point of the, in this context, oft-cited Inst. 2.9.1.

It might seem counter-intuitive or disingenuous to some for Michael to have argued that positive law insisted on the Franciscans’ legal incapacity for any lawful dominium.

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77. App.mon., 814. Cf. Lawrence 2001, 27, who noted that for St Benedict, ‘The monastic life began with the intention to renounce self-will and to place oneself under the will of a superior’. St Basil held a similar position: ‘The novice was to renounce his own will and obey the superior in everything, in spirit as well as in act, on the model of Christ, who was “obedient unto death”’ (Lawrence 2001, 9–10).

78. App.mon., 702 [with respect to the idea that Jacob’s exclamation in Gen. 37.33, Tunica filii mei est, cannot be taken to mean that Joseph had ownership and lordship of the tunic: ‘cum adhuc Joseph esset puer, in patria potestate constitutus, ut ibi patet, et qui in alterius potestate est, aliquid proprium habere non potest, Dig. 41.2.49.1(!); Dig. 48.5.22(21); Dig. 41.1.10.1. Et Inst. 2.9.1 et 3, cum similibus, quae omnia praedicta inconvenientia illata et quam plura alia brevitatis causa omissa sunt, ridicula et frivola.’

79. In the citation above the editors suggest ‘ff. [41.2] De adquirenda possessione, l. [1] Possessio; [29.2.6] Qui in aliena’ but the reference is actually to Dig. 41.2.49.1: ‘Qui in aliena potestate sunt, rem peculiarem tenere possunt, habere possidere non possunt, quia possessio non tantum corporis, sed et iuris est.’

80. Dig. 50.17.32: ‘Quod attinet ad ius civile, servi pro nullis habentur: non tamen et iure naturali, quia, quod ad ius naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt.’

81. App.mon., 843: ‘Nam qui in alterius potestate est, aliquid iure proprietatis et dominii habere non potest, Dig. 41.2.49.1; et Dig. 41.1.10.1; et Dig. 48.5.22(21); et in Inst. 2.9.1 et 3. Et quantum ad ius civile attinet, servi pro nullis habentur, Dig. 50.17.32. Et idem est in religiosis qui in alterius potestate sunt. Unde in aliqua re proprietatem et dominium habere non possunt, ut dicto C. 12 q. 1 c. 11; et X 3.35.6 in fine. Et qui tamquam mundo mortui reputantur, C. 16 q. 1 c. 8; et Cod. 1.3.54(56). Et religiosi, servi propter Deum effecti sunt D. 54 c. 23. Nec habent velle nec nolle, VI 1.6.27; et C. 32 q. 3 c. 1.’

82. App.mai., 274.
After all, if the intention is to show that a group of people do not want a certain set of rights, one’s time might be better spent on describing what they have instead, rather than only describing what they do not have. However, the Michaelists were in the paradoxical situation of wanting to describe a right-less state but having no way to do so without articulating how lordship works. When the discussion turns to use we shall see the more constructive aspects of the Michaelist theory, but for now we must deal with the historical problem of how *dominium* worked in the context of the *ecclesia primitiua*.

**DOMINIUM AND THE EARLY COMMUNITY OF BELIEVERS**

The division of *dominium* into a divine and human component was important for understanding the property relations of the early community of believers. In the prelapsarian state of nature, as we have seen, Adam and Eve lived without human-based lordship. One of the things Christ did on earth was lead the apostles back to the *status* in which no one said anything was his own.\(^8^3\) It should be noted, however, that this was not a full return to the state of innocence, despite the claims of some contemporary scholars.\(^8^4\) As Michael wrote, Christ ‘ad statum innocentiae, in quo nullus aliquid proprium sibi esse dicebat, *quantum ad hoc prout fuit expediens*, revocavit’.\(^8^5\) As far as the Michaelists were concerned, the only practical outcome of this return seemed to be that apostles’ *modus vivendi* was one that did not involve ownership and lordship, but remained content solely with use.

The real starting point for Franciscan apologists was, of course, Christ’s poverty. The idea that Christ voluntarily chose to be poor, based as it is upon 2 Cor. 8.9, can be found in St Francis’ own writings,\(^8^6\) and the idea is often repeated in Franciscan literature.\(^8^7\)

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84. As Lambertini 2006a, 194, rightly stressed.

85. *App. mai.*, 238 (emphasis added); other passages, e.g., *App. mai.*, 327–28, need to be read in light of this point.


87. Many examples could be given; let the following suffice: Thomas of Celano, *Vita prima S. Francisci*, 1.28.76 (AF, 10.57); *Iuliani de Spira vita sancti Francisci* 47.5 (FF, 1066); *Compilatio Assisiensis* 51, 114 (Bigaroni 1975, 114, 354); Thomas of Celano, *Vita secunda S. Francisci* 2.43.73 (FF, 512); Bonaventure, *Legenda maior* 7.7 (BOO 5.524b), and his sermon on the translation of St Francis (ed.
He was after all the ‘forma et exemplar evangelicae renuntiationis’. Of course, it was never in doubt that Christ was poor, but there was a lot of confusion about what form his poverty took. As we know, Bonagratia discounted the idea that *Ad conditorem* asked about Christ’s poverty insofar as he was God; instead it had to be about the time at which he began to preach publicly, that is, when he began to call the apostles.

This answer proved unsatisfactory to John. And in *Quia vir* he argued that Christ had lordship and, more importantly, acquired more of it over time while on earth. Michael described this as the first of the principal errors of the pope’s bull. However, to consider the nature of Christ’s lack of lordship would take us beyond the scope of Michael’s theory of property rights, so it must suffice for now merely to note that this was the Michaelist position. Much more important for this theory is the nature of the apostolic renunciation of lordship, for the nature of apostolic poverty corresponded directly to the type of poverty that the Franciscans wished to emulate.

The crucial starting point for the Michaelist position was that Christ enjoined the need to live without lordship, and that the apostles vowed to follow this way of life. He constantly repeated that the Franciscans follow as best they can in the footsteps of the apostles. This is the very thing that the *professio apostolica* consists of: the absolute abdication of the ownership of all temporal things. And, at an individual level, all religious vow to live *sine proprio*, as the rules of Sts Basil, Augustine, Benedict, and Francis demonstrate.

John, at least in Michael’s interpretation, denied that the apostles had made the sort of vow Michael described. In the *Appellatio minor* Michael quoted a part of *Quia quorundam*:

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90. *Bonagratia, De paup.*, 323.
92. See, e.g., *App.mai.*, 281, 339 (cf.), 355; and *App.mon.*, 635, 668–69, 672–73, 714, 788.
93. We have already seen what John thought of the triple monastic vow of poverty, chastity, and obedience (above, p. 22). Michael never explicitly dealt with *QE*, but he did mention repeatedly the importance of this vow for all religious; see, e.g., *App.mai.*, 228, 248, 262, 335, 361.
95. *App.mon.*, 721; cf. 811. Of course, this vow does not entail the abdication of the *use* of all temporal things: *App.mai.*, 233. Michael wrote at one point that the Franciscans vowed to follow Christ ‘in abdicatone proprietatis usus et rei cuiuscumque dominii’ (*App.mai.*, 261), but *usus* as it is described in the next quotation.
Tum quia in dicto statuto *Quia quorundam* expresse improbat sententiam adserentium quod abdicatio iuris in cuiuscumque rei proprietate et in eius usu per quod potest sic utens pro usu huiusmodi quomodolibet contendere vel in judicio litigare, est meritoria et sancta et a Christo in se ipso servata apostolisque imposita et ab ipsis sub voto assumpta’. 96

This was precisely the vow the Franciscans and, a fortiori, the apostles had vowed. 97 The apostles vowed *potentissime* a vow of possessing or having nothing by right of property; 98 The basis for this idea derived ultimately from a passage in the *City of God*, where Augustine described Matthew 19.27—*Ecce, nos relinquimus omnia*—as a vow made *potentissime*. 99 Michael did not tire of repeating this passage, 100 nor did he refrain from building upon it. The verse from Matthew, a favourite of Franciscan apologists, said that the apostles had ‘sent everything away’; to Michael that meant it was a vow ‘omnia relinquendi sive dimittendi’, and that a ‘modus relinquendi sive dimittendi omnia quoad proprietatem et dominium’ therefore fell under such a vow. 101

A related point was that this vow was not, as the pope had suggested, merely a vow of renunciation ‘quoad curam et affectionem’. 102 Michael interpreted Luke 14.33—*sic ergo omnis ex vobis qui non renuntiat omnibus quae possidet non potest meus esse discipulus*—to mean that this had to be a vow of renouncing ‘simpliciter et absolute’, for this is what ‘everything one possesses’ means. And to renounce everything ‘solum quoad affectionem et curam’ is only to renounce ‘secundum quid’. 103 In his earlier *Appellatio maior*, Michael quoted from the *Decretum* to the same effect. To renounce in the way the pope suggested, in short, would be to renounce imperfectly, not perfectly, which is surely not the way Christ intended. 104 And although this perfect renunciation means renouncing lordship and ownership, it does not and cannot include as well the use of things necessary for life. 105

There were, of course, more than apostles in the early Church, and it was a feature of Michaelist ecclesiology that one’s status within the Church was reflected in the level of expropriation to which they were committed. As Acts 2.44–45 and 4.32–35 show, the

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97. *App.mon.*, 726.
100. See *App.mai.*, 233, 352; *App.mon.*, 724; cf. *App.min.*, 432.
102. *QVR*, 563.
103. *App.mon.*, 672.
104. *App.mon.*, 673.
early community of believers opted for a sort of communism whereby all things were held in common and distributed on the basis of need. Michael took this to mean among other things that no one of the believers had personal lordship or ownership of any temporal thing. This lack of lordship was, furthermore, not only true ‘ante distributionem’, but held afterwards as well. After all, it was a division of use, not of lordship and ownership. Since a gloss of Bede’s noted that ‘qui ita vivunt ut sint eis omnia communia in Domino, coenobitae vocantur’, the conclusion was felt to be obvious:

Monks thus hold the form of the first believers, which is the point of X 3.35.6 when it explains that present-day monks must live sine proprio. Thus, although Michael sometimes would compare monks to apostles, the comparison sat uneasily with him, and he would periodically be forced to elaborate that this was only true ‘quoad abdicationem propriorum’.

The fact that we can talk about monks as holding the form of the apostles but also (more accurately) holding the form of the first believers provides the clue to how Michael would understand Nimis prava (X 5.31.17), which stated that both the Franciscans and Dominicans ‘in artissima paupertate Christo pauperi famulentur’. Among Christ’s disciples things were still held in common without any individual lordship. John had suggested that many disciples had had things in a proprietary sense, at least after they had returned from the preaching mission Christ had sent them upon. But Matthew

106. App.mon., 675: ‘Tum quia erant illis omnia communia; ubi autem sunt perfecte omnia communia, sicut erant in illa communitate, ibi nihil est proprium, cum idem apud eosdem non possit simul esse commune et proprium. Et idem, scilicet quod “suum” ibi intelligatur, id est “proprium”, probatur C. 12 q. 1 c. 8; et g; et 11… Et ita per se manifestum est quod in illa multitudine credentium nullus habuit proprietatem et dominium alicuius rei temporalis…’


108. App.mon., 804–05; the reference to Bede is to a marginal gloss to Acts 4.32, s.v., ‘communia’ (Fevardentius, Dadraeum, and Cuilly 1603, 6.1025).


110. App.mon., 806; App mai., 231.

111. App.mai., 273–73.

112. E.g., App.mon., 672, 715.

113. App.mon., 724. It is important to remember that the monastic vow of poverty, at least as Michael saw it, extended even to necessities: App.mon., 814.

114. QVR, 601.
applied equally to the disciples, for the apostles were essentially just a special class within the disciples.\textsuperscript{115}

There was, however, still a big difference between the apostles and the other disciples. This difference is seen in the level of expropriation each group vowed and practiced, much like the contemporary difference between the mendicant orders. In terms of the apostles’ individual lack of lordship, they served, along with the disciples, as the model for all religious.\textsuperscript{117} But, considered as a whole, the entire community of the apostles also had no \textit{dominium}. The apostles were a distinct group within that community, and their collective lack of lordship was one of the external manifestations of this fact. Here the basic problem with the pope’s account was that it confused the ecclesiology of the early Church. John had thought that as far as the divestment of worldly goods was concerned, there were only two groups to consider, for Christ never gave a separate \textit{lex vivendi} for the disciples and apostles.\textsuperscript{118}

In Michael’s ecclesiology the disciples inhabit a hazy position; but perhaps it is because we are simply to know that they fall in an intermediate position between the apostles and the multitude of believers. In terms of their poverty, the disciples left all behind. John had written that some disciples had had many things, such as Joseph of Arimathea, Lazarus, Martha, Mary Magdalene, and Tabitha—and it was also, he claimed, the point of \textit{Dilectissimis}, which had said a common life was necessary for those who wished to imitate the life of the apostles and their disciples.\textsuperscript{119} Michael detailed the contradictions that would arise from such a position. If Christ gave the same rule to the apostles and disciples, as the pope had said, and certain disciples had individual lordship, then the apostles, after having attained the apostolate, would have been able to have individual lordship as well.\textsuperscript{120} The solution was that the pope had obviously confused the status of some of the believers. Martha and Mary were not subject to the prohibition issued in the synoptic gospels (Mt. 10.9–10; Mc. 6.8–9; Lc. 9.3) against possessing gold, silver, or money since they were the ones who ministered to Christ from their own resources; and the same goes for Tabitha, who gave alms, and Joseph, who was admittedly a rich man.\textsuperscript{121} The real disciples—Joseph is described as a ‘discipulus occultus’—the seventy-two disciples, were

\textsuperscript{115} This was in fact the pope’s sixth ‘error’ in \textit{QQM}: see \textit{App.mon.}, 746–47. Cf. \textit{App.mai.}, 345.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{App.mon.}, 718: ‘... apostoli, qui fuerunt primi et potissimi discipuli Christi...’. And \textit{App.mon.}, 719: ‘... cum constet quod apostoli non fuerunt minus perfecti post assumptionem ad apostolatum quam post assumptionem ad discipulatum...’.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{App.mon.}, 672.
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{QVR}, 600: ‘Nec reperimus quod Iesus, Dominus noster, aliam legem vivendi discipulis dederit et aliam apostolis suis.’
\textsuperscript{119} See \textit{QVR}, 600.
\textsuperscript{120} \textit{App.mon.}, 736.
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{App.mon.}, 737.
marked out by being enjoined by Christ to preach, and none of the people mentioned by John belonged to this category.

On a similar note, we know that Christ also gave a different law and mode of living regarding poverty, chastity, and obedience. As for poverty, Matthew 19.21, provides explicit instructions for those who wish to be perfect. These instructions provide the boundary line between an observance of the precepts of necessity and the counsels of supererogation. The implication is that only the apostles are entirely subject to these counsels, but Michael muddied the waters by insisting then that it would 'destroy all religion' if there was no difference between the 'observantiam necessitatis praeeptorum et observantiam supererogationis consiliorum evangelii'.\footnote{122}

Michael's description of poverty in the ecclesia primitiua offers us some clear parallels with the institutional Church. The Church belongs to the adapted version of Bonaventure's fourth communitas temporalium rerum.\footnote{123} The fourth community describes the ecclesiastical community, which 'includit quasi proprietatem, non personalem sed collegialem, non civilem et mundanum sed ecclesiasticam'.\footnote{124} This is what the oft-cited passages of Acts and the decree Futuram (C. 12 q. 1 c. 15) refer to.\footnote{125} The crucial point is that though a ius ecclesiasticum only provides quasi proprietas to the houses, estates, and other goods held in common by the ecclesiastical community, this community can take action and sue in court. This is why we say that the ecclesiastical community is said to have quasi proprietas and dominium utile, or what I have elsewhere called 'restricted ownership':

\begin{quote}
quia sic agere et facere videtur in talibus ut dominus in re propria facere consuevit, et tamen talis proprietat et tale dominium non est proprietas et dominium civile et mundanum, quia si dissolveretur talis communitas, non dividetur et inter illos de illa communitate ecclesiastica illa bona, immo redirect ad Ecclesiam catholicam quae est congregatio fidelium.\footnote{126}
\end{quote}

That is, the Church can, although in a more limited fashion, treat its goods in the same way that a secular lord can, but these common goods do not revert to individual members

\footnote{122. App. mon., 737–38. He cited Mt. 19.12 and Mt. 16.24 as examples of the supererogatory counsels of chastity and obedience.  
123. See Appendix A.  
125. Although it is not at all clear from the text of G&F, 340, Michael went on to quote half-tacitly, but liberally from this and C. 12 q. 1 c. 16.  
126. App. mai., 341. Michael went on to quote from the commentaries of Innocent IV and Hostiensis to X 2.12.4; see Innocent IV, Comm. ad X 2.12.4 nn. 3–4 (fol. 222ra–b), and Hostiensis, In Decretalium V libros commentaria ad X 2.12.3(4) (Hostiensis 1963a, fol. 42va; pagination restarts with book). Feenstra 1974 is the classic study of dominium utile in medieval thought. Briefly, it is simply a form of lordship that is—as Ockham would say—less than dominium plenum. Among the glossators, it referred to the lordship a vassal might have of land in his long-term possession.}
at the community’s dissolution in the way a secular corporation would.\textsuperscript{127}

Although the other religious orders share clear parallels with the form of the primitive Church, it is important to remember that they exist on the basis of this fourth *communitas*.\textsuperscript{128} Dominican common ownership, e.g., is grounded in the fourth Bonaventurian community, not the third; that is, in the *ius ecclesiasticum*, not *ius civile*. Significantly, he noted, this sort of ownership did not exist in the time of Christ and the apostles, nor even in the primitive Church. After the Church was endowed, however, monks and canons regular had things in common. So did the mendicant orders, but they had less than they needed, which meant that they needed to beg. Thus, Gregory IX said in X 5.31.17 that these mendicants serve Christ in the highest poverty with respect to the other religious orders, who do have a sufficient amount of goods in common and are not compelled to beg, though they do not have individual property. Here is the crucial point: they do not serve Christ in the highest poverty ‘simpliciter et absolute’, which Christ, the apostles, and those following them perfectly in the primitive Church observed—not appropriating for themselves, that is, a home, place, or anything else in common.

The significance of *dominium* to Michael’s ecclesiology is clear, although the exact details remain elusive insofar as he does not always distinguish clearly between the three groups that made up the early Church. Sometimes he contrasted apostles to the multitude of believers, sometimes apostles to disciples, and sometimes gentile converts to the faith to Jewish converts. From these scattered comments, however, it appears that Michael tended to the view that the degree of expropriation of temporal goods corresponded to three basic groups within the Church: the general multitude of believers, the disciples, and the apostles.

If we examine the correspondence between medieval religious and those who were a part of the early Church in terms of *dominium*, there are some obvious parallels (Table 4.1). The apostles and the Franciscans line up perfectly as we expect from a Franciscan author. Christ’s disciples and the other mendicant orders line up well as well. Both practice the highest poverty, but do so *secundum quid*. For the mendicants, what distinguishes them from monks is that they hold lordship in common, but in an insufficient quantity of goods, which forces them to have to beg on occasion.\textsuperscript{129} In this they are thus like the apostles. Presumably the need to beg was true of the disciples as well when they were

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\textsuperscript{127} See below, p. 219 for references.
\textsuperscript{128} What follows is a lengthy paraphrase of *App. mai.*, 346.
\textsuperscript{129} This is in many ways a nuanced version of what Bonaventure said in *Ap. paup.*, 7.4–5 (BOO 8.273a–b), where the divide is between apostles and the *turbu credentium*; Bonaventure compared these two groups to mendicants and monks respectively. Olivi quoted part of this in his *Tractatus de usu paupere* (Burr 1992, 154); cf. *QPE* 8 (Schlageter 1989, 178–79). Lambertini 2000, 164, called this second group disciples, which seems slightly misleading.
sent on preaching missions. Monks, like the general community of believers, voluntarily choose personal poverty, living from the common goods of their community. Monks are also like the general community in that they do not exercise an active pastoral ministry. There is one further difference that truly sets the Franciscans apart from the other forms of religious life. The way Michael describes contemporary religious life, monks and other mendicants are grounded in the *ius ecclesiasticum*, which only came to be after the endowment of the Church by Christian princes. Yet because Franciscans have renounced what is, in the final analysis, merely a temporal community, content instead with the second community (which is based on divine law), they are a group that truly emulates the lifestyle of their exemplars, the apostles.

This is not a picture that would likely appeal to non-Franciscans, of course, which may explain why the Michaelists often based their counter-arguments on the claim that John’s position actually enervated the root of all religious orders by turning them and the rest of the early community of believers into individual property-holders.

Overall, we could say that Michael described lordship as a necessary evil, or at least the necessary result of a non-necessary evil. In the state of innocence the natural resources that produced food (*res ad pastum deputatae*) were common. But ‘*usurpatio ius privatum sive proprium introduxit*’ and ‘*appropriate in rebus temporalibus fuerit introducta per iura humana sive regum et imperatorum*’. The unlawful seizure of what had been common things introduced private *ius*; subsequent appropriation was then introduced through positive law. The missing middle step was well-described by some of the decretists. As Rufinus suggested, what derives from long use is done *iure consuetudinis*, not *iniquitatis*.
Yet these laws can be renounced. This is what the religious do, which means they make do without lordship, remaining content with natural and divine law instead. This means they have renounced a certain type of power relationship. When they made a ‘votum simpliciter temporalia relinquendi’, this necessarily included a ‘carentia potestatis habendi temporalia et non solum actus volendi et habendi ea’. Their vow means that they have given up even the power to have temporal goods in a legal capacity.

To conceive of dominium as a power was not new with Michael, but it is useful for understanding why the Michaelists insisted that the papal retentio dominii was not bare, empty, or useless. The fact that lordship is a legal power shows that it cannot be useless or prevent the one holding it from being considered dives. God, after all, who holds universal lordship, never enjoys the fruits of temporal things, yet we do not hesitate to call him rich. Conversely, then, lacking lordship does in fact make one poorer.

4.3 Francis of Marchia

Compared with what little Francis had to say about law and rights in general, he had a wealth of things to say about dominium. Like Michael, he felt this was partly due to the fact that Scripture was not precise when talking about property, which has led to some confusion on the matter. The Bible often spoke about something being ‘his’ or ‘hers’, ‘mine’ or ‘yours’ (suum, meum, tuum), but it used the term equivocally and interchangeably as regards lordship and use. One purpose of Francis’ text is to clear up ambiguities like these in order to appreciate who did or did not have lordship at various moments in biblical history with a view to what implications this would have for the Franciscan order. We shall follow in this section the same approach employed for Michael. First we shall look at the the distinction between divine and human lordship, then we shall consider human lordship as it existed and was instituted from the time of Adam and Eve through to that of Christ and the apostles.

130. See above, p. 67.
133. App. mon., 724.
135. App. mai., 313.
136. Note that Francis also dealt with the issue of dominium and the types of ius, particularly as it existed in the status innocentiae in his commentary on the Sentences. The usual problems of time and space have prevented me from including this material, but Roberto Lambertini has written a few interesting pieces on this issue (1994b [=2000, 189–227], Lambertini 2006b, 2007). It is interesting to see how Francis’ opinion changed due to the poverty debate.
137. Improbatio n. 250, 149.
DOMINIUM DIUINUM

All lordship comes from God. While this was an important point for authors of a hierocratic persuasion, Francis did not think this was a surprising or highly significant point. On the basis of a line from the Psalms, where it is said that God ‘terram dedit filiis hominum’ (113.16), Francis explained that God gave the land for the management and regulation (dispositioni et ordinationi) of humankind; and for that reason it is not necessary to have some immediate and individual licence from God—even if it is true that the division of lordship was mediately introduced by the will of God. The important point, as we shall see, was that this division was immediately introduced by human law, not divine. Interestingly, the source of this part of Francis’ refutation derived from the pope’s forced reading of Augustine in C. 23 q. 7 c. 1. According to the pope, when Augustine said ‘Quamuis res quecunque terrena non recte a quoquam possideri possit, nisi iure divino, quo cuncta iustorum sunt, iure humano quod in potestate est regum terre’, he only said this when he was disputing with heretics, not that he held this as true. The pope was reaching here for this was neither Augustine’s point in the context of the actual letter, nor a common reading of this text in canonistic circles. Francis, however, seems not to have known this, for in his response he explained that Augustine spoke there ‘de iure diuinio quo omnia sunt communia et nichil alicui proprium, et non loquitur de iure diuinio quo aliquid alicui appropriatur quoad dominium proprietatis, de quo est questio’. That is, Francis dismissed the pope’s point because he had confused questions of proprietary lordship with those of use.

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138. Loosely speaking, hierocratic thinkers tended to the belief that secular rulers derived their legitimacy from the pope, and the pope from God. But this is hardly to do justice to a complex topic with a rich historiography of its own. A useful but lengthy introduction to this topic may be found in Watt 1988; McCready 1974 and 1975 are also quite lucid.

139. *Improbatio* n. 895, 384: ‘Ideo Propheta dicit quod terram dedit filiis hominum, id est tradidit dispositioni et ordinationi filiorum hominum: unde non oportet aliam licenciam specialem et immediatam Dei habere, etsi usum est quod diuisio dominiorum de voluntate Dei introducta est mediate, quomodo omnia sunt a Deo mediate que sunt ab homine immediate, set immediate introducta est a iure humano et non diuinio.’

140. *Improbatio* nn. 857–858, 372.


142. The *Gl. ord.* ad C. 23 q. 7 c. 1, s.v. ‘divinio’, e.g., argues that Augustine meant *ius divinum* in the sense of *ius canonicum* (an idea found in *Gl. ord.* ad D. 8 c. 1, s.v. ‘nam iure divino’). A quick look through Rufinus (Singer 1902, 412), and the *Summa paucapalea* (Schulte 1890, 102–03) add nothing; the *Summa parisiensis* (McLaughlin 1952, 220) is merely concerned with returning goods to converted heretics; the so-called *Summa magistri Rolandi* (Thamer 1962, 95–96) stresses the importance of possessing *iure*. Finally, Huguccio, *Summa decretorum* ad D. 8 c. 1, s.v. ‘Quo iure’ (Přerovský 2006, 126), seems to take Augustine at his word. No one seems to doubt Augustine’s sincerity.

143. *Improbatio* n. 896, 384.
In certain other cases we can imagine that God had a *dominium speciale* different from his *dominium actuale*, which is held over everything in general.\(^{144}\) This special lordship, which is of sacrifices and offerings, is ‘liberum et absolutum’—and God’s alone: his priest and ministers use these things, but they certainly do not have free and absolute lordship of them, even if the thing in question is consumed through their use.\(^{145}\)

The only other lordship directly instituted by God was of a very unique type. Although the first division of things was introduced immediately by human will, and the general division of all lordships was introduced universally through the laws (*iura*) of kings and princes, Francis was still willing to admit that ‘quoddam dominium speciale’ of the Jews in a certain portion of the earth was introduced by divine law.\(^{146}\) However, Francis is careful to point out how different this was from the *dominia* that we are accustomed to thinking about:

\[\text{Set illud fuit dominium quoddam speciale privilegiatum, quod se habuit ad dominium commune humana voluntate introductum sicut privilegium speciale ad legem communem et generalem, iodo fuit introductum posterius tempore, humano dominio, et finaliter etiam cessit tempore Romanorum, et subest nunc etiam, humano iuri seu dominio, propter quod tempore Christi, mota questione utrum debenerent dare tributum Cesari an non, Christus respondit: Reddite que sunt Cesaris Cesari et que sunt Dei Deo (Mt. 22. 21), ubi Christus clare ostendit dominium proprietatis illi populo a Deo traditum, iuri humano tunc temporis dedisse locum.}\(^{147}\)

Thus, aside from the fact that this specific lordship ended with Christ, it was also introduced *after* the division of lordships introduced by positive law. In a sense, this privilege was the complete reverse of the ‘privilege’ that the Franciscans sought: the Jews gained a lordship founded in divine law, while the Franciscans abdicated a lordship founded in positive law. More importantly, this unique example only highlighted the fact that the lordship ‘de quo est questio’ was one of human lordship.

**DOMINIO HUMANUM**

Unlike John, who took *Dilectissimis* to mean that there was lordship in the state of innocence and that the division of lordship took place ‘per peccatum primorum parentum’,\(^{148}\)

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\(^{144}\) *Improbatio* n. 10–11, 50–51. This distinction seems to be original with Francis, but remained little used by Ockham; see, e.g., *OND* 103.85–98, 766, and 106.66–83, 772.

\(^{145}\) *Improbatio* n. 12–14, 51–3; cf. *Improbatio* n. 395, 210–11, where the same argument is made, but with a slightly greater emphasis on what implications this has for determining whether use can be separate from lordship.

\(^{146}\) *Improbatio* n. 879. 379.

\(^{147}\) *Improbatio* n. 880. 380–81. Ockham would make a similar claim.

\(^{148}\) *Improbatio* nn. 252–253, 151–52. *Improbatio* n. 267, 157: ‘Hec sunt uerba sua [John XXII] ad litteram, in quibus uerbis dicit ... quod primis parentibus omnia temporalia fuerunt “data ad habendum”’
Francis argued that there was no proprietary lordship at that time. There was a common type of lordship then, it is true, but this was of a very different type of lordship from what we experience today. According to Francis, as even a completely rightless person has a 'ius nature [derelictum ex primeuo iure nature] in rebus proximi sibi neccessariis' in the case of extreme necessity, so:

multo magis primeuum ius seu dominium nature, institutum ante lapsum, fuit alterius generis et conditionis a quoque dominio seu iure per iniquitatem, siue proprio siue communi, quia illud fuit dominium iure libertatis et perfectionis naturalis; istud uero est dominium seruilis neccessitatis et coacte potestatis quia nisi homines coactua potestate prohiberentur, quilibet, ut plurimum, uellet, si posset, totum usurpare.\(^\text{149}\)

Present day lordship is one of servile necessity and of forced rule because, after the fall, humankind must be restrained by this coercive power because nowadays individuals would want to usurp everything they could for themselves. Prelapsarian common lordship, however, was completely different: it was one based on the law of liberty and natural perfection. Therefore, he concluded, although all things were common in the state of innocence ‘quoad dominium naturale’, there was not yet any proprietary lordship, which was only introduced through sin.\(^\text{150}\)

In addition to the lordship found in the state of nature being different from that which currently exists, Francis further explained that this natural lordship was always common. John, as we have seen, believed that Adam had individual lordship in Paradise before the formation of Eve.\(^\text{151}\) But Francis, on the basis of Genesis 1.27–28,\(^\text{152}\) argued that since the concession of lordship came after the blessing, it is clear that he gave it to both together in common.\(^\text{153}\) Francis also argued that this was clear by reason as

\(^{149}\) *Improbatio* n. 258, 153–54.

\(^{150}\) *Improbatio* n. 259, 154. Francis also provided (n. 256, 153) what might be termed a philosophical account of why these two types of lordship are different: ‘Consimiliter dominium introductum “per iniquitatem”, siue proprium siue commune, est alterius generis a dominio communi naturali omnium quod fuisse si homo non pecasset, et distat ab eo plusquam acutum a uino, quia se habet ad illud sicut corruptibile ad incorruptibile, et divisible ad indiivisible. Quod patet quia illud quod contineat eminenter perfectionem duorum genere distinctorum, est alterius generis ab utroque genere eminenter contento; set dominium commune collatum ante lapsum primis parentibus continebat eminenter perfectionem dominii particularis et dominii uniuersalis per iniquitatem introducti, quia illud dominium non fuit minoris perfectionis in se quam sit utrumque dominium, particolare et uniuersale simul sumptum, post lapsum introductum. Que duo dominia, uniuersale et particolare, sunt genere distincta; ergo illud dominium fuit alterius generis ab omni dominio per iniquitatem introducto, siue uniuersali siue particulari, siue proprio siue communi, siue immediato siue mediato.’

\(^{151}\) Above, p. 34.

\(^{152}\) Quoted above, p. 35 n. 84.

\(^{153}\) *Improbatio* n. 862, 373–74; see also nn. 476–479, 246–47; and 482–485, 248–50. Miethke 1999b, 528, argued that this was one of Francis’ unique contributions to the debate; cf. Lambertini’s extended discussion (2000, 205–15).
well, for God would never take back this lordship once it had been conferred upon Adam except ‘demerito peccati’. According to Francis, were God to have conferred individual lordship upon Adam before the creation of Eve, then when he conferred common lordship upon the two of them, Adam would have lost his earlier sole lordship ‘nulla causa peccati interueniente’. Indeed, had there been no first sin and all remained in Paradise, any offspring would share in that common, natural lordship as well, for ‘illud dominium non fuisset sibi traditum pro se solo, set pro omnibus contentis uirtualiter in ipso’. Ockham would make virtually the identical points, both about the wrongness of depriving one of his (property) rights without cause and about how primeval dominium was common to all, but with one crucial difference: he appealed to a canon law maxim to legitimize his argument.

Had there been no sin, of course, there would have been no division of things ‘quoad dominiorum proprietatem’: all would have been common to all. Specifically, Francis argued that everything would be common in three ways, namely, with respect to lordship, the power of using, and a shared means of support (commune solatium rerum). This mirrors what has happened since the Fall: now division has occurred in three ways, namely, an appropriation of lordship, an appropriation of the right of using, and the appropriation of private means of support and joy.

After the Fall, and discounting the special privilege the Jews had directly from God, humankind was directly responsible for the division of lordship, either through the law of kings and princes as it was commonly done in Francis’ day, or through the authority of those who held the place of princes. In this way Cain and Abel were possibly the first to hold proprietary lordship; that is, though they were not kings, in some way they nevertheless held the place of princes (or, failing that, they could do this by the authority of Adam, for he held the place of princeps primus). After the Flood, Noah was in a similar situation: even if he had individual lordship over the wine he drank (Gen. 9.20–21), ‘fuit magis iure humano quam iure diuino’. The reason Francis offered is reminiscent of John of Paris’ famous theory that lordship could be acquired by means of one’s own industry. According to Francis, this was more by ‘ius humanum’—the term could equally be translated as ‘right’ or ‘law’ here—in quantum scilicet plantavit uineam

154. *Improbatio* n. 863, 374; see also nn. 486–487, 250.
155. *Improbatio* n. 864, 374; see also nn. 488–489, 250–51.
156. *Improbatio* n. 80, 83.
157. *Improbatio* n. 263, 155.
158. *Improbatio* n. 883, 381.
159. Francis is quoting John from *Improbatio* n. 845, 369.
161. *See Improbatio* n. 892, 383, for Francis’ doubts about whether this claim is true.
ex qua natum est uinum, et ita fuit suum, si fuit eius proprium, ratione laboris proprii quo ipsum acquisuit et non collatione immediata Dei’.162

After the Flood, God conferred what Francis called a ‘dominium commune omnium inferiorum Noe et filiis eius’ and ‘non diuisit inter eos dominia rerum’. However, according to Genesis 9.1–4, it was clear to Francis that ‘ipsi postea et filii ipsorum diuiserunt inter se rerum dominia’.163

In other words lordship was introduced ‘uoluntate humana immediate et non uoluntate diuina’, both before the Flood and after. And later on a ‘diuisio generalis omnium dominiorum per iura regum et principum universalter introducta est’. This, he concluded, was what Augustine had been trying to get at in Quo iure.164

DOMINIUM AND THE EARLY COMMUNITY OF BELIEVERS

Earlier generations of Franciscans were relatively uninterested in relating their community to the state of innocence.165 They wished instead to emulate the early apostolic community. The secular-mendicant controversy that began in the 1250s, as well, devoted a lot of space to arguing over the extent to which Christ and his apostles could be considered to be poor.166 Thus it is not suprising that even the Doctor Succinctus had a lot to say on this topic.

Like all Franciscans, Francis believed that their founder, the ‘Christi signifer insignis’, had patterned his Rule after that of the lives of Christ and the apostles.167 It is for

162. *Improbatio* n. 891, 383. As John of Paris famously claimed in the *De regia potestate et papali* 3 (Bleienstein 1969, 82): ‘temporalia laicorum non sunt communitatis, ... sed quilibet est dominus suae rei tamquam per suam industriam acquisitae...’; see also the fuller account in chapter seven (Bleienstein 1969, 96–98); discussed in Lambertini 2000, 148–151. For John of Paris’ theory of property, I am especially indebted to: Coleman 1985, 1987, 1991a; and Swanson 1997.
164. *Improbatio* n. 878–879, 379. It may be of interest to note that while Francis recognized that this text was found in the *Decretum*, he also gave its correct location in the Augustinian corpus (mentioned above, p. 60).
165. Miethke 1999b, neatly surveyed many of the interesting developments in the Franciscan tradition. See also Potestà 2002, who provided some brief analysis of juridical views regarding the state of nature.
167. *Improbatio* n. 358, 194: St Francis ‘uolens immediate fundare et directe suam religionem iuxta formam et modum uiiendi proprium Christi et apostolorum...’. Of course, this idea, combined with the general approbation it received from various popes over the years, often leads to the boot-strapped argument that concludes that St Francis would not have imposed (nor the Church approved) a poverty more severe than that practiced by Christ and the apostles; and since the Franciscans hold no property individually or in common, nor possess any rights to the things that they use, it is clear that this would have been true for Christ and the apostles as well. Cf. *Improbatio* n. 360, 195; nn. 285–286, 163–64. It can even be taken further: if the apostles had to be at least as poor as the Franciscans, then Christ had to be at least as poor as the apostles, for as Jerome noted,
this reason that mendicants hold better the place of apostles, that they ‘expressius et perfectius “tenent figuram apostolorum”’ than do monks.\textsuperscript{168}

If the state of innocence was the foundation for the idea that lordship was a human invention that did not come about unmediatedly through divine law, then the situation of Christ and the apostles was meant to give historical reality to the idea that people could and did get by without owning any property—and that this was, in fact, an admirable thing to do. Of course, for this to make sense, one first had to show that Christ himself was poor, and not just poor in some vague sense (everyone agreed to that to some extent), but that he was poor in the same way that the Franciscans claimed they were poor. This was a much more difficult task.

A lot of this has to do with whether Christ ever possessed some sort of temporal overlordship while on Earth.\textsuperscript{169} According to Francis, Christ, insofar as he was a man, was neither lord nor king of temporal things.\textsuperscript{170} Christ moreover made this clear to all through word and deed.\textsuperscript{171} Attached to this claim was the corollary that, in the course of his life, he never acquired lordship or ownership of anything. In my opinion it is this second claim that is more interesting for understanding Francis’ theory.

Essentially, an argument against Christ having ever acquired property of his own has to be a series of arguments against specific scriptural passages which make it sound like he did have a few things after all. Christ, Francis maintained, assumed material poverty on our behalf just as he assumed mortality for us.\textsuperscript{172} Thus, he had no home ‘quantum ad proprietatem et dominium temporale’, as it is attested in Matthew 8.20 and Luke 9.58; this, furthermore, must be understood to be true \textit{de iure}, not just \textit{de facto}.\textsuperscript{173}

The pope had also provided a long list of places where something was said to be Christ’s (\textit{eius, suus, cuius}).\textsuperscript{174} Francis challenged this idea on the grounds that pronouns

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{168} ‘Non potuit dominus habere quod prohibuerat in seruis’; see \textit{Improbatio} nn. 1017–1018, 424–25; cf. n. 1000, 417. For Jerome, see \textit{Epistulae} 22.19.6 (Hilberg 1996, 170).
\item \textsuperscript{169} This is the subject of what Francis’ editor, Nazareno Mariani, has designated the fifteenth chapter, the longest chapter of the \textit{Improbatio}. Lambertini 1994\textit{a} is a useful starting point into this topic.
\item \textsuperscript{170} At \textit{Improbatio} nn. 996–999, 416–7, Francis argued that there was papal sanction for this idea starting with Gregory IX in \textit{Nonis prava} (X 5.31.17). This decretal claimed that the mendicants follow Christ in the highest poverty—which, Francis noted, could hardly be true if he retained lordship of a temporal kingdom. John had quoted this as well as Alexander IV’s \textit{Non sine multa} in \textit{QQM} 177–196 (Tarrant 1983, 272–73), as Francis noted.
\item \textsuperscript{171} See, e.g., \textit{Improbatio} n. 989, 413 and n. 429, 225, where \textit{Exit} is cited as the linchpin of this argument.
\item \textsuperscript{172} \textit{Improbatio} n. 1010, 421.
\item \textsuperscript{173} \textit{Improbatio} n. 987, 412. Francis actually used this statement to infer that Christ did not have, ‘quantum ad temporale dominium’, ‘regnun seu imperium’ since temporal lordship of a kingdom or empire includes temporal lordship of a \textit{hospitium}—‘sicut totum includit partem’. It is left unstated, but Francis clearly meant mediate lordship, the sort exercised by kings over the affairs of their citizens.
\item \textsuperscript{174} See, e.g., Mt. 17.2: ‘Eius uestimenta facta esse alba sicut nix’ (Francis’ phrasing). John is quoted at
do not necessarily denote ideas of ownership. In a characteristic turn of phrase, he argued, 
‘eadem ratione sequitur quod stella, que apparuit in natuuitate Christi, fuisset Christi 
quod proprietatem et dominium’. And much the same could be said of ‘Christ’s’ cross 
(He. 19.25) or ‘Paul’s’ chains (Col. 4.8). The whole idea, he concluded, was ridiculous.176 

In regard to the classic objection that Christ had a purse, Francis stood by the classic 
Bonaventuran condescension defense.177 The short answer, in Francis’ words, was that 
‘Christus in loculis suscepit personam infirmorum’, which was an idea first enunciated by 
Augustine.178 The argument is tortuous. John had suggested that to have ownership of a 
thing in common does not detract from the perfection of the highest poverty ‘due to the 
type of performed work’ (ex genere operis operati); and since Christ is known to have 
carried a purse, holding things in common cannot detract from this highest poverty.179 

But, Francis argued,

Francis hedged his words, but stood firm. Christ’s action in this case does not detract 
from perfection because, although it pertains to perfection on the basis of the type of 
work and so does not detract from perfection, condescension to the weak and imperfect 
does not fall under perfection in another way, because condescending to the weak and 
imperfect is in a sense to conform one’s self to them on the basis of an imperfect type 
of work. To have a purse in common therefore does detract from the perfection of the

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175. Mt. 2.2: ‘vidimus enim stellam eius in oriente et venimus adorare eum.’ 
177. See above, p. 98, for references. 
178. *Improbatio* n. 367, 197. Francis noted three places where Augustine defended this idea: *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 103 sermo 3.11 (Dekkers and Fraipont 1956, 1509–10); *De opere monachorum* 5.6 (Zycha 1900, 539–40); and an unidentified *Super Iohannem*. 
179. The technical terminology is Francis’, not John’s: *Improbatio* n. 367, 197. What John had argued was that Augustine could not have supposed that the apostles vowed to have nothing in common since his own Rule was founded on Acts 4.32, 35, which emphasized that all things were common; he concluded: ‘Cum igitur beatus Augustinus et eius frater res habuerint et habeant in communi, non est reuocandum in dubium quin beatus Augustinus apostolos habeuisse supposuerit in communi’ (*Improbatio* n. 340, 187–88). In all honesty, John was probably the one who read Augustine rightly. Crucial studies on this topic are: Lawless 1987; Sanchis 1962; Verheijen 1967 and 1979; and Zumkeller 1987. 
180. *Improbatio* n. 367, 197–98.
highest poverty on the basis of the type of the performed work (i.e., considering only the action itself), even though on the part of the one doing the condescension it would be of the greatest perfection. And of course, when Christ took on the persona of the weak and imperfect, he did so with respect to *dominium proprietatis*, *ministerium pietatis*, or *usus necessitatis*. But since the principle that condescension needs to detract from perfection *ex genere operis*, all these options lead to the conclusion that lordship of the purse would take away from the perfection of the highest poverty. The reason runs as follows: If lordship of property itself is the condescension, the principle holds that it has to take away from perfection. If it is the ministry of piety, since it, too, would hold, then lordship of property would detract even more insofar as it redounds less to the advantage of others than does to the ministry. And finally, if the use of the purse detracts from the highest perfection *ex genere operis*, then the lordship of the purse would detract even more from that perfection, for lordship of such things is less necessary *per se* than use is for human life.\(^\text{181}\)

Naturally, it was not only Christ who lacked lordship of temporal things: he also commanded the apostles to do without lordship as well, both in common and individually.\(^\text{182}\) According to Francis, the apostles vowed to follow Christ, which consists principally in preserving his precepts and counsels. And since this vow included leaving all behind, it is clear that they did so.\(^\text{183}\) In fact, the goal or limit (*terminus siue limes*) of the apostolic profession was to relinquish every temporally concupiscible thing.\(^\text{184}\) There are, of course, numerous scriptural passages which lend themselves to the Franciscan belief that the apostles were absolutely propertyless. Francis insisted that these passages were to be interpreted *simpliciter*, even though he was guilty at times of reading a scriptural passage via the Ordinary Gloss.\(^\text{185}\)

To the standard objection that this vow of poverty might be more a mental than physical matter,\(^\text{186}\) Francis gave a standard response: If Peter’s words ‘Ecce nos reliquimus omnia’ (Mt. 19.27) are only to be understood ‘quantum ad affectionem et curam’, then when Christ promised those who left home, field, brothers, or sisters on his behalf would

\(^{181}\) *Improbatio* nn. 368–376, 198–99. Francis may well have had in mind the distinctions Bonaventure made at *Ap. paup.* 1.9–10 (BOO 8.238a–39a).

\(^{182}\) *Improbatio* n. 834, 364.

\(^{183}\) *Improbatio* n. 326, 180. Without worrying overmuch about the issue of vows, we may note that Francis believed the apostles vowed *absolute* (n. 327, 180); and that one cannot, *simpliciter*, get rid of the *voluntas habendi* without a vow (nn. 328–329, 180–81). Cf. n. 1023, 426.

\(^{184}\) *Improbatio* n. 217, 135.

\(^{185}\) On reading the passages *simpliciter*, see: *Improbatio* n. 274, 159; n. 443, 230; and n. 449, 233. For an example of using the gloss to prove his reading is the correct one, see: n. 198, 127 and n. 325, 179–80.

\(^{186}\) E.g., *Improbatio* n. 188, 123. See p. 26 above for John’s argument.
receive a hundred times as much in this age and eternal life in the future (cf. Mt. 19.29; Mc. 10.29; Lc. 18.29–30), he more or less promised nothing:

\[ \ldots \text{quia dicere quod omnis qui reliquerit domos, aut agros, quantum ad affectionem et curam, retinendo sibi proprietatem et dominium, cencies tantum accipiet domos et agros in hoc tempore, nichil esset penitus dictum, quia quoad quid deberet cencies tantum accipere in hoc tempore, ex quo sibi proprietatem et dominium retineret?}^{187} \]

After all, one can be unduly attached to, or concerned about, things that one can never obtain.\(^{188}\) This is not to deny that evangelical poverty does not contain an ‘inner’ component; but even if this inner disposition is more important, poverty requires the outer, material aspect—as is the case for chastity or obedience.\(^{189}\) Indeed, when Peter says ‘secuti sumus te’ (Mc. 10.28; Lc. 18.28), this should be understood ‘quantum ad sequelam operis possibilem et non solum cordis’, much like the other half of the verse ‘ecce nos dimisimus’ should be understood ‘quantum ad rem in effectu possibili et non solum \ldots affectum mentis’. As he noted, the one necessarily follows from the other the way the completion of an effect follows from the completion of the cause.\(^{190}\)

The word Francis used was ‘burst forth’ (\textit{prorumpat}): not always, but sometimes virtue must burst forth into a proportionate and appropriate work. So too, with respect to the perfection of evangelical poverty, sometimes it must shine forth in an exterior expression (\textit{habitus exteriori}) according to the proportion of the interior disposition (\textit{habitus interioris}).\(^{191}\)

As I have already mentioned, John believed in the ‘communism’ of the early community of believers; Acts 2.44 and 4.32–35 are pretty explicit on this point.\(^{192}\) Franciscan apologists therefore had to deal with the issue of how this communism related to the apostles within the early Church. The Michaelists argued that the community of apostles was in fact a sort of ‘sub-community’, or \textit{collegium apostolorum} within the early Church. As Francis explained it, the apostles’ abdication of temporal goods in the general community of believers was not higher or more perfect with Christ outside of that community.\(^{193}\) However,

\(^{187}\) \textit{Improbatio} n. 195, 126.

\(^{188}\) \textit{Improbatio} n. 197, 127.

\(^{189}\) \textit{Improbatio} n. 422, 222; for chastity, see nn. 419–422, 221–22; for obedience, n. 426, 224. Francis cited X 3.35.6 in support of this idea; \textit{Improbatio} n. 423, 223: ‘\ldots quia abdicatio proprietatis, sicut et custodia castitatis.’

\(^{190}\) \textit{Improbatio} n. 433, 226–27.

\(^{191}\) \textit{Improbatio} n. 436, 228.

\(^{192}\) See p. \textit{122} n. \textit{179} above.

\(^{193}\) Francis’ point here may seem ambiguous; what he is saying is that the apostles’ abdication while they were with Christ and ‘extra illam [generalem] communitatem’ was not greater than their abdication inside of—i.e., as members of—that general community.
Because what is proper to a part cannot be common to the whole, Francis concluded that the apostles had no ownership or lordship of temporal goods, individually or in common, as far as their special community was concerned, because that thing, whatever it might be, would not then be common to the whole multitude of believers (as we read in Acts).

Francis’ account of the apostolic sub-community leaves much to be desired. This community stood in relation to the larger multitude of believers in the same way that an individual believer was related to the larger multitude. And the *raison d’être* for the sub-community to hold the place of one person was only because the abdication of ownership individually and in common is more perfect than an abdication made only in terms of individual property.\(^{195}\) (To be fair, it is important to remember that Francis believed the apostles’ abdication of ownership had already been established, though in the *Improbatio*, the real arguments for this come a little later on.\(^{196}\)

In other words, Francis seems to have missed entirely the reason normally posited for the apostolic sub-community—or at the very least a response to the pope’s claim that an order, and by implication a sub-community within the Church, was not a real entity (which could have *usus facti*). Francis was well aware of John’s objection,\(^ {197}\) but when he came back to explaining the nature of a ‘communitas specialis’, he simply re-iterated that it ‘se habet ad communitatem generalem sicut se habet una persona singularis ad unam communitatem specialem’.\(^ {198}\)

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194. *Improbatio* n. 281, 162.
195. *Improbatio* n. 283, 163: ‘Item, communitas apostolorum in illa multitudine credencium, quoad abdicationem proprietatis, tenuit locum unius persone specialis seu singularis quia, sicut nulla persona specialis retinuit sibi aliquam proprietatem in speciali in illa multitudine, ita nec tota communitas apostolorum propria retinuit sibi aliquam proprietatem in illa multitudine credencium; communitas apostolorum non retinuit, quoad abdicationem proprietatis, locum unius persone specialis in illa multitudine nisi quia abdicatio proprietatis in speciali et in communi, quacunque communitate speciali citra communitatem generalem totius Ecclesie, cuius tipum et figuram geregat illa Ecclesia primitiua, est perfectior et maioris excellencie quam abdicatio proprietatis omnium tantum in speciali et non in communi.’
197. *Improbatio* n. 718, 328–29. For a discussion of John’s position, see p. 40 above. This forms the subject of chapter 7.
198. *Improbatio* n. 743–335.
What set the apostles apart from other believers was that they lived by a different *regula*. Yet, like Michael, Francis also favoured a three-tiered ecclesiology of the early Church, which distinguished between general believers, the seventy-two disciples, and the true apostles. There were significant differences, however, particularly in terms of their level of poverty. Believers, who are called ‘discipuli Christi generaliter’, were not forbidden from having individual riches and temporal things just as many good Christians have many temporal goods. Francis numbered Joseph of Arimathea among this group.

A second group were the ‘discipuli Christi specialiter’, to whom Christ entrusted the power of preaching and caring for the weak. These people were forbidden from carrying the sack, purse, and shoes (Lc. 10.4); nor do we read that they had any riches, or ownership or lordship of any temporal thing after they became disciples. These two orders account for the list John had provided of examples of disciples who seem to have had possession of temporal goods: it was simply a matter of the pope confusing which order the individual in question actually belonged to. The third group was the order of apostles themselves: those whom Christ specially chose. Inseparable companions and continuous tablemates of Christ, they lived by the same law of expropriation and abdication. This was true before they were sent to preach and remained true upon their return.

It is clear that Francis’ position differed from Michael’s for we cannot map these three groups of ‘disciples’ onto the state of the various *religiones* of fourteenth-century Europe. The level of poverty Francis described instead corresponds to laymen, religious who hold things in common, and the Franciscans. This seems far from Michael’s desire to link the situation of the primitive Church to the Church of his own day. In fact, Francis could not even be sure whether Peter’s ‘Ecce nos dimisimus omnia’ (Lc. 18.28) applied to any disciples other than the apostles. Since Francis also insisted that the primitive Church held things in common, his three-fold account of Christ’s disciples seems rather paradoxical.

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199. *Improbatio* n. 348, 190. See *Improbatio* nn. 349–352, 191 for a short list of the differences; cf. n. 1083, 442.


201. *Improbatio* n. 1078, 440.


203. *Improbatio* n. 1082, 442.

204. *Improbatio* n. 1085, 442–43; but the lengthy proof is carried out in nn. 1086–1120, 443–55.

205. *Improbatio* n. 1121, 457; the proof takes up the rest of the chapter: nn. 1122–1171, 457–76.

206. Compare Table 4.1 on p. 114, above.

207. *Improbatio* n. 1083, 442: ‘In persona autem aliorum discipulorum ad predicandum missorum, utrum Petrus prefata uerba dixerit an non, certum ex scriptura non habetur, nec faciliter posset altera pars comminci.’
Early on in the *Opus nonaginta dierum*, Ockham outlined several different senses of *dominium*. After giving some of the ways the word is used in the non-legal sciences, he noted that, as the word is taken *in iure*, there are only two basic types of *dominium*: divine and human.

### Dominium Diuinum

This distinction explains why Ockham was unconcerned with specifying the nature of divine *dominium*, for neither the source nor extent of divine lordship was an issue for Ockham. For instance, Ockham never discussed whether the lordship which Adam and, after her creation, Eve exercised in Eden was divinely instituted or not. It was, of course, but who would doubt it? The only important question was what did this lordship mean for them? In what sense were they the *domini*, and over what exactly did they exercise lordship (*dominari*)? But questions like these are properly considered questions of ‘human lordship’.

### Dominium Humanum

Human lordship is much more complicated. Ockham described two basic types: the *dominium* which was introduced by unmediated divine ordination, and that which positive law or human institution introduced. Divinely instituted lordship is a historical category. Under the Old Law, various distinct *dominia* were introduced by unmediated divine ordination. (With the promulgation of the Gospel such lordship has ceased to be introduced in this way.) When lordship is instituted in this way, it is possible for the nature of *dominium* to change. Although one might trace this doctrine back to Ockham’s famous account of the *potentia absoluta/ordinata* of God, it is easy enough to imagine

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208. See Gray 1986, 153–57, for a concise account of the various meanings of *dominium* in the *OND*.  
211. In like manner, when Ockham argued that Christ *qua* wayfaring man, and *qua* mortal man, never had (nor acquired) exclusive lordship, he meant human lordship in the same sense (therefore he also never had nor renounced a temporal kingship). Of course, he was ‘inquantum Deus . . . rex omnium’, but he ruled spiritually, and was only called lord *antonomastic* because of the union of human and divine natures; in the few cases where he had to act like a king, he did so *qua* God. All of this is discussed in *OND* 93.166–1111, 674–98; 94.30–123, 706–88; 95.49–111, 716–18; and 96.213–238, 734–35.  
213. For a brief account of how Ockham understood this power, see Maurer 1999, 254–65. For its significance in Ockham’s confrontation with John XXII, see Randi 1986.
that the principle is no more complicated than what Ockham said about privileges: the granter of a privilege may arbitrarily set and revoke the conditions at whim.\textsuperscript{214} This is most clear in Ockham’s account of Adam’s (and Eve’s) prelapsarian lordship.

Adam and Eve’s lordship is historically unique, and not surprisingly rather complicated. Part of the reason for this is due to the pope’s account of this period, in which he tried to show that exclusive lordship \textit{(dominium proprium)} was instituted by God before the Fall.\textsuperscript{215} Ockham did not deny the divine origins of this lordship, but he took issue with the designation ‘exclusive’. One cannot argue, he maintained, from the fact that there is only one lord to the conclusion that that lordship is really exclusive. As an example, Ockham suggested the situation of a solitary monk in a monastery. Simply put, does it make sense to say that one monk, simply because he is the only monk left alive after a raid or a plague, has sole lordship over the monastery’s resources? If so, what happens when another monk joins? Does the first monk have to perform a specific action to relinquish sole lordship (which he should not have in the first place)? The fact that the answer to the last question is ‘no’ shows that the answer to the first question must be ‘no’ as well.\textsuperscript{216}

This, Ockham claimed, is particularly true in the special circumstances of Adam: ‘Quia dominium rerum, quod absque omni donatione, vendicatione et alia humana ordinatione, qua rei dominium transfertur in aliquem, et actu et morte illius potest ad alium pervenire, non est proprium alicui.’ Since, he continued, this is what happened when Eve was created, Adam could never have granted her lordship in the state of innocence. Instead, anyone would simply take and use things as needed.\textsuperscript{217} Ockham’s rationale for this claim was simple: Adam, like everyone else, should not be deprived of his things without cause or fault; but when Eve was made, she would necessarily share in his lordship, which would mean he would lose his exclusive lordship; therefore, whatever lordship he might have had before Eve was formed, it was not exclusive.\textsuperscript{218} Furthermore, it is more appropriate to call Edenic (so to speak) lordship ‘common’ since this often means that it is to be shared.\textsuperscript{219}

It is easy to believe that the circumstances surrounding Adam and Eve’s lordship had to be historically unique, but was the nature of their lordship substantively different from the varieties of \textit{dominium} that might be found throughout the rest of history?

\textsuperscript{214} Cf. Tierney 1986\textit{b}, 4.
\textsuperscript{215} In John’s opinion, Adam became a property holder as soon as he began to use things; see above, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{216} OND 27.55–70, 487; and 88.331–335, 661–62; cf. \textit{Brev.} 3.15.45–66, 4.191–92. See also the discussion in Miethke 1969, 513–15.
\textsuperscript{217} OND 27.74–84. 487–88.
\textsuperscript{218} OND 27.85–94, 488.
\textsuperscript{219} OND 27.143–149. 489, citing \textit{Gl. ord.} ad D. 1 c. 7, s.v. ‘communis omnium’.
The pope seemed to think not, but the *Opus nonaginta dierum* paints a very different picture. Edenic lordship over all temporal things was a ‘potestas rationabiliter regendi et gubernandi temporalia absque eorum resistentia violenta, ita quod homini violentiam vel nocumentum infere non poterant’. At first glance, it would seem that this lordship only concerned ruling and managing things, not using them, but Ockham caught this possible omission and explicitly said that in the state of innocence, the act of using was not separate for consumables, only from any lordship found among mortals (*quod inter mortales est inventum*).

Nevertheless, Ockham still tried to maintain that, at some level, the distinction between use and lordship existed in the state of nature. For, in addition to this perfect power of ruling, Ockham also argued that Adam and Eve were also given a ‘potestas utendi quibusdam rebus determinatis’. That is, they could use most things in paradise, but there was one which was wholly forbidden. It is, however, not surprising that Ockham posited the existence of two distinct powers. For, aside from the fact that he had to account specifically for the tree our first parents were not allowed to use, the distinct powers are meant to cover two different aspects of nature over which Adam and Eve exercised control: the power of ruling existed for dealing with the animals of nature; the power of using had to do with the animals (of course), but also the flora. After all, one does not *regere* over the grains of the world.

Much more common among human *dominia* are those established by positive, or civil, law. This was possible only after the Fall, for sin provided the occasion for the appropriation of things and acquiring common (civil) lordship. Acquiring lordship for Ockham is naturally connected to the will. Michael noted the Roman law precedent for this idea, but Ockham chose not to make use of it, perhaps another little sign that he was less at ease with Roman law than canon law. Alternatively, it is not a stretch to imagine that Ockham felt the importance of willing for the acquisition of lordship was well-known enough to not need any justification.

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220. *OND* 14.75–77, 432. Ockham offered an analogy, which somewhat elucidates what he meant by this ‘potestas ad libitum disponendi de temporalibus’ (for non-moral sitations at least): i.e., that of a servant or boy who is able to rule his lord’s horse ‘ad suae placitum voluntatis, et ... cui resisti non potest’. See *OND* 14.127–156, 433–34.


222. This is more significant than it might seem, for the Franciscan *Rule* is predicated upon the idea that a Franciscan must not appropriate things to himself; see *RegB* 6.1 (Esser 1978, 231).

223. Although this was in a sense a new power, at one point the *OND* seems to suggest that the power would have devolved naturally upon humankind by virtue of being out in the wide empty world: ‘quia quae in nullius bonis sunt, occupanti conceduntur’ (*OND* 14.188–192, 435). This is of course a well-known Roman law maxim, which Ockham had already alluded to earlier (4.209–210, 333): Inst. 2.1.12 and Dig. 41.1.3 pr.
Following Francis, Ockham suggested that the first example of any lordship being established by human law probably occurred in the time of Cain and Abel (Gen. 4.2–5), where each made individual offerings. However, in response to a possible objection, Ockham conceded that it was possible that Adam and Eve made the first division into *dominia propria* when they made girdles for themselves (Gen. 3.7), for this would have been done ‘non ex speciali praecepto divino, sed voluntate humana’.

Human lordship, when established by civil law, comes in two flavours. The most common meaning of *dominium* in this context is that it is a ‘potestas humana principalis vendicandi et defendendi in humano iudicio rem aliquam temporalem’. ‘Human power’ makes it plain we are not talking about God’s lordship; ‘principal’ specifies that the power is to be distinguished from the power of claiming or defending a thing which derives from other relations, such as usufruct; finally, the phrase ‘in a human court’ shows how it is different from a grace or licence. This type of lordship is specified by several different adjectives. The most common is *civile et mundanum*, but it is sometimes called *plenum* or *liberum et absolutum*. But this definition has a stricter sense: it includes all the characteristics of the first definition, but adds that it is also a power ‘[res] omni modo, qui non est a iure naturali prohibitus, pertractandi’. Put another way, the second type of lordship includes the power of the first, but has added the power of ordering the thing freely. Thus the priests today and Levites of days past had lordship in the first sense, but not so in the second sense. It is a limited or restricted type of lordship. Ultimately, though a cleric does not have the ‘full’ lordship of a layman, the lordship they exercise must be considered true (*verum*) lordship, much like the fact that the lordship the Roman Church has over the goods which the Franciscans use is real lordship.

Ockham’s discussion here is clearly indebted to Michael’s account of the temporal lordship that arises from the fourth *communitas*, which is grounded in the *ius ecclesiasticum*, although...
Ockham refrained from this aspect of his Minister-General’s thought. Almost all discussion of *dominium* in the *Opus nonaginta dierum* turns on the unrestricted type of ‘civile et mundanum’ lordship, for Ockham insisted that the pope’s understanding of lordship was limited to this type alone. The reason for this insistence is obvious enough, for the Michaelists wished only to prove that neither Adam and Eve nor Christ and the Apostles ever had this kind of lordship, either in common or individually. In turn, this would allow the Franciscans to dispense with a need to have it either.

**DOMINIUM AND THE EARLY COMMUNITY OF BELIEVERS**

A basic premise of Franciscan poverty is that the apostles, when they became apostles, voluntarily undertook a life of real poverty exemplified by the practice of Christ, who always practiced what he preached. Since whatever Christ counselled was something that he taught, and he carried out in deed what he taught in word, it is clear that he must have lived the life of poverty he counselled.

The apostles also lived in poverty due to their vow to that effect. The advice Christ gave the youth in Matthew 19.21—*Si vis perfectus esse, vade, et vende omnia quae habes, et da pauperibus*—was given to the apostles as well, ‘*sub praecepto vel consilio*’, just as Matthew 19.27 represented Peter’s claim on behalf of the apostles of their fulfilment of this precept or counsel. The apostles, after all, fulfilled all of his precepts and counsels, and it seems as though Christ gave pride of place to the counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience in so far as they are especially useful for converting people to the Christian faith. Hence Augustine’s point that the apostles vowed this vow of poverty *potentissime*.

The reason for the vow is straightforward. Even if some anxiety about temporal goods remains after the vow has been made, the vow must yet contribute something to perfection, otherwise the same accusation could be levelled against the vow of obedience if—‘*sicut saepe accidit*’—one ends up no more obedient after the vow than before. It is rather not only licit, but useful for Christians to vow to neither do nor have those things

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234. See above, p. 112. *Impug.* § 16 (Knysh 2000, 249) gives a slightly different version of ecclesiastical lordship: the priests do not have *proprietas*, and therefore cannot exercise the normal features of civil lordship, but they do have a right of using *iure positivo divino*; cf. *Impug.* § 11 (Knysh 2000, 247).


237. OND 94.75–81, 707.

238. OND 11.82–96, 408–09; cf. 11.312–342, 414.

239. OND 17.182–185, 448.

240. OND 17.126–129, 447.

241. OND 76.647–666, 621.
which involve them in sin: ‘Nam fugere occasiones peccandi est laudabile’.\textsuperscript{242} It is, in short, more perfect and more pleasing to God to vow to follow Christ than to merely follow him without a vow.\textsuperscript{243}

The content of the apostles’ vow was the renunciation of ownership and lordship of all temporal things, both individually and in common. Since Luke 9.62 explains that those fit for God’s kingdom do not look back after putting hand to plow, this means that Matthew 19.27 must be understood as a vow that remained in force ever afterwards.\textsuperscript{244} In fact, those who have perfectly relinquished something cannot even regain (\textit{resumere}) the will to have it. This is what it means to vow to not have something.\textsuperscript{245} The proof that the apostles vowed to not have anything in common is less forcefully upheld. Ockham based his conclusion on the fact that this is what the Franciscans have vowed to do and that their vow cannot ‘exceed’ the apostolic vow on which it is based.\textsuperscript{246}

The vow of poverty included everything in its scope, from the estates in Judea to the necessities of life. Regarding the estates, John was wrong to suggest that the apostles had any (in Judea or elsewhere), and to think that they ever acquired any later on.\textsuperscript{247} As evidence that the apostle’s vow also included necessities, Ockham turned first to the Benedictine and Augustinian Rules. Ockham noted that Benedict insisted that a monk had nothing under his own control, including both material things like clothing and his own will, while Augustine insisted on common ownership of things like clothes.\textsuperscript{248} Ockham then built upon Benedict’s point about a monk not being \textit{in propria potestate}. This is the very reason a slave possesses nothing, and the same logic thus applies to people in religious orders.\textsuperscript{249} The opposite of this position is, moreover, untenable. For if the vow of living without anything of one’s own did not extend to necessities, then monks and other religious would have individual ownership and lordship of things like bread, wine, and clothing. In turn this would mean that their superior would not be able to decree what is to be done with these things; instead the individuals would be able to decide what they want to do with them, including selling them for money.\textsuperscript{250}

\textsuperscript{242} \textit{OND} 114.100–106, 801. Ockham added that it was probably not good for the \textit{tota communitas} to make vows of this sort.
\textsuperscript{243} \textit{OND} 17.161–168, 448.
\textsuperscript{244} \textit{OND} 17.52–65, 445.
\textsuperscript{245} \textit{OND} 17.74–86, 446.
\textsuperscript{246} \textit{OND} 17.110–124, 446–47; 23.26–30, 469. A similar argument was made regarding traditional monastic vows of poverty and the apostles’ vow to renounce all individual ownership; see, e.g., \textit{OND} 17.66–73, 445.
\textsuperscript{247} \textit{OND} 5.46–200, 346–50.
\textsuperscript{248} \textit{OND} 9.615–642, 396.
\textsuperscript{249} \textit{OND} 9.649–665, 397.
\textsuperscript{250} \textit{OND} 9.666–687, 398–99.
Ockham also took issue with the pope’s claim that he abandoned everything only with respect to an inner disposition (cura et affectio). Ockham, like any good internalist, insisted that the interior act was what determined the goodness or badness of an external act: ‘opus externum non sit bonum vel malum, nisi propter actum interiorem’. He thus agreed that one’s mental disposition was a crucial feature of apostolic poverty, though he qualified the pope’s more generic claims about affectio.

The basic questions that needed answering were what kind of affection was left behind, and how much of it. Ockham suggested three possibilities: (1) the Franciscans might have left all affection, both necessary and non-necessary; or (2) they left all everything with respect to all non-necessary affection; or (3) they left behind everything with respect to (only) some non-necessary affection. The first option is impossible, since human life requires temporal things and thus requires at least some affection for temporal things. The third option does not work either, for it contradicts Peter’s claim in Matthew 19.27. It is clear, then, that when Peter claimed the apostles had left everything behind, he meant that they left behind all affection for non-necessary things. The apostles even abandoned the will to have things. When, for example, Peter and Andrew abandoned their nets (Mt. 4.20; Mc. 1.18), they also abandoned the will to have them, and one who abandons the will to have something also abandons ownership and lordship of it. This abandonment, moreover, must include the intention of not re-acquiring the possessions that they left behind.

However, he insisted that the interior disposition cannot be all there is to the apostles’ poverty. As the last example suggests, actual abandonment of lordship and ownership must also take place. It is, in fact, more perfect to do both the interior and exterior act. (Otherwise religious would have abandoned all lordship and ownership in vain.) Ockham elected to make his point by quoting Aquinas at length, and not without a certain degree of gloating.

Aquinas wrote against the idea that the poverty described in Scripture was merely habitualis, not actualis. Ockham drew eight conclusions from Aquinas. The second was that ‘perfectior est abdicatio talis proprietatis paupertate, quae

251. OND 76.616–616, 620. This is a topic that is dealt with more fully on p. 175 below.
254. OND 11.97–126, 409.
in sola praeparatione animi seu voluntate consistit’. The third was that the abdication of ownership pertains to evangelical poverty, and that evangelical poverty was also actual poverty; the sixth was that this type of poverty was preferable to merely habitual poverty; and the fourth, fifth, and seventh were that Christ and the apostles experienced this type of actual poverty.\textsuperscript{258}

The abdication of temporal goods thus described obviously refers only to the individual abandonment of goods; the argument could be made (and indeed often was) that Acts 2.44–45 and 4.32–35 showed that the apostles still retained common lordship of temporal goods. Ockham therefore devoted a fair amount of space to the question of whether the apostles constituted some sort of sub-community within the early church, and whether it exercised any sort of common (civil) lordship over the goods of the church. Ockham chose to follow Francis’ version of the three groups of the early Church. There were three different types of disciple (\textit{in triplici differentia}) in the early Church. Besides the apostles, there were also those specially deputized to preach the faith of Christ (cf. Lc. 10.1–16). The third group were simply those who had converted to the faith but had not taken up the duty of preaching. Both the first and second groups did not have any temporal things as far as lordship or ownership is concerned, while the members of the third could have things if they were so inclined.\textsuperscript{259} Additionally, the apostles were in fact held to a stricter standard than even the second group insofar as Christ imposed certain restrictions upon them—e.g., to not possess gold, silver, or money, to not wear shoes, or take two coats (cf. Matt. 10.9–10)—which he did not impose upon others.\textsuperscript{260}

Yet Ockham was unwilling to commit—\textit{concedunt aliqui}—entirely to either Michael’s or Francis’ position regarding how the three groups were related. He did insist that Christ gave at least two \textit{leges uiuendi}, but he thought that there might be some overlap between how all these ‘disciples’ lived. He was certain that the apostles lived a different life from the regular life of \textit{all} Christians, but he conceded that some of the seventy-two disciples and perhaps even other Christians might have lived the same life as the apostles.\textsuperscript{261}

Regarding the problem of the apostolic sub-community, Ockham maintained that the apostles, as a group, did not have any sort of common civil lordship.\textsuperscript{262} Thus, when John

\textsuperscript{258} \textit{OND} 23.328–352, 476–77.
\textsuperscript{259} \textit{OND} 100.93–104, 750). The additional point that the third group could renounce property rights if they wished goes a long way towards correcting the deficiencies of the accounts of Michael and Francis.
\textsuperscript{260} \textit{OND} 100.60–91, 549–50. Presumably Ockham was thinking of \textit{possessio} in its legal sense, namely as both the physical control of a thing and the intention to hold it under physical control, not as merely the physical holding of a thing.
\textsuperscript{261} \textit{OND} 101.125–128, 751.
\textsuperscript{262} \textit{OND} 4.323–325, 336; see the arguments offered for this position: 23.356–403, 477–78; cf. 6.89–123, 357–58.
XXII noted that after the apostles returned from their preaching mission they ‘had’ bread, fish, and money, not to mention St Peter’s famous two swords. William’s solution was to point out that habere had many senses other than a proprietary one. The apostles, moreover, had vowed and observed perfection in the form of evangelical poverty for all time. And so it was in these other senses that the apostles had things. The apostles had the bread and fish, therefore, only with respect to a licit power of using and some sort of dispensation (aliqualis dispensatio) from the granters’ will. The lordship of some things belonged to, for example, the women who ministered to them from their own resources (Lc. 8.3). As for the money or the two swords, Ockham argued that it cannot be shown that they were ever held in terms of lordship or ownership, and indeed in certain cases it may well have been a situation of necessity. Ultimately, although it often cannot be proven one way or another whether someone had lordship or ownership of a certain thing when the passage in question is considered in isolation from all other contexts, when other pertinent passages are read and compared, it becomes quite clear that the apostles did not have ownership and lordship of any thing after they were appointed to the apostolate.

Rather, things which were common to the community of believers, were also common to the apostles. That is, the sub-community as such did not have any property rights. To the question of who owned the goods of the community, Ockham believed there were three equally viable alternatives: (1) Although the goods belonged to that community in some way, they belonged particularly (specialiter) to God’s lordship. This would entail that neither the apostles nor anyone else would be able to litigate in court for these goods (and, consequently, be somewhat similar to the system of lordship connected with the goods the Franciscans use insofar as they both would only have simple use of fact). (2) Alternatively, it might be that they collectively had some kind of legally enforceable lordship in that someone could litigate for the goods in the name of the whole community.

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263. OND 103.1–32, 764–65.
264. OND 102.51–65, 755. The proof for this vow lies in a quotation of (Ps.-)Augustine, De mirabilibus sacrae scripturae 3.16 (Migne 1857–66, 35,2200–01), which had become commonplace in Franciscan apologetical circles; see, e.g., Ap. paup. 7.12 (BOO 8.276a).
266. OND 103.76–179, 766–68.
268. This was meant to avoid the claim that the donated goods, which are not under the lordship of the early church as far as positive law is concerned, must therefore be considered res nullius.
269. There is one crucial difference: the lordship of the goods in the time of the primitive church remained with God, while the lordship of the goods the Franciscans used remained with the Roman Church. The point in either case was designed to circumvent the claim that the goods in question were actually res nullius, and available for possessio to the first occupans. However, had Ockham followed Michael’s lead with the distinction between the four different communitates rerum temporalium, he would have been able to make this point a little more clearly.
On this view, the apostles would still have only simple use of fact, and their college or sub-community would still lack any sort of lordship specific to that group, but they would share in the right(s) that the whole community of believers all had since these goods were given for the advantage of all believers. The management of such goods, however, would reside with the prelates of the Church (*qua* prelates). (3) Finally, it might have been the case that the common goods mentioned in Acts were common to the apostles ‘quoad licitam potestatem secundum ordinationem illorum, ad quos distributio pertinebat, de ipsis suas indigentias relevandi’. Legally enforceable lordship, however, was common only (*solummodo*) to the believers who had not vowed the renunciation of all lordship. Thus again, the apostles would have had no lordship, but only simple use of fact.  

The lordship exercised by the early Church, however, was not simply generic civil lordship. In Ockham’s terminology, it was not ‘full and free’ in the way it was before they became converts. This is clear insofar as once the goods were given to the community, they could no longer be sold or transferred at will, but only for the sustenance of one or another of the members; in short, they had ‘restricted ownership’—which is not to say that the early community had no ownership whatsoever. Therefore, to the pope’s point that the community had no ownership *in communi* expressly contradicts Scripture, Ockham argued that it was not a question of whether the ownership was individual or common, but rather of what kind of ownership. If we are speaking of the most common meaning of the term (full and free ownership), which allows the owner (*proprietarius*), whether one person or a community, to freely manage, sell, give, bequeath, alienate, use, and consume the thing at will (*ad suae libitum voluntatis*), neither the clergy nor the religious have this kind of ownership. For the cleric’s part, the goods of the church may only be used in certain ways and for certain things; and the religious simply do not have such ownership, either common or individual, of temporal things. This only qualifies as lordship in the looser sense. Similarly, then, when Michael claimed that the early community did not have ownership, he meant precisely this type of ownership. The second type of ownership is much more limited, but also applies to individuals and to groups. This type of ownership gives the owner the power to claim the thing in court, but

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270. *OND* 106.66–114, 772–73. It seems likely that Ockham privately favoured the second option, but he was only interested at this point in proving that the apostles did not have any civil lordship of temporal goods, not precisely who had the lordship. Elsewhere, he explained that the apostles could only correct fraternally, never litigate in court: *OND* 111.13–29, 793. For Ockham’s views on fraternal correction, see Shogimen 2001 (incorporated into 2007, 105–23).


272. See *QVR* 556–57.

273. See above, p. 139.
does not include the power of freely managing, selling, giving, bequeathing, alienating, or using the thing. This is the ownership the early community had in common, for there were several restrictions upon how they could use these common goods.\textsuperscript{274}

An understanding of Michaelist poverty clearly requires an understanding of how lordship worked in the state of innocence and in the primitive Church. The first thing the Michaelists did was to distinguish the various types of lordship. They did not doubt that John knew that \textit{dominium} had many meanings, but they insisted that he had to phrase his question in terms of human lordship. Human lordship, at least in its modern form, did not exist before the Fall. There was no property as such back then. If we can phrase the Michaelist theory in terms they never used, a useful way of thinking about this is to put this claim in the context of positive and negative communities.\textsuperscript{275}

The Michaelists maintained that before the Fall humans lived in a positive community: resources were common to all, and no one could be excluded from using anything. This is the regime that existed under natural law. But things changed with the Fall. Suddenly there was the will to appropriate, and natural law allowed for appropriation beyond cases of extreme need; with time human positive law grew up, which treated the resources of the earth as a negative community where unowned things are merely \textit{res nullius}. Now original acquisition took place, although it still does not injure other people's rights per se. Another key to the Michaelist position was that positive human law is not strictly necessary. One of the many remarkable things that Christ did was to show that it was entirely possible to renounce property relationships based on positive law while at the same time respecting them.

There were differences as well in the Michaelist account of \textit{dominium}. The most glaring in my opinion was how each (excluding Bonagratia) described the early Church. Michael and Francis each broke the Church into three different groups, but accounted for their poverty in slightly different ways. When Ockham came to write his tract he was forced, if he perceived the difference, to choose between the two. He opted to follow Francis on this point, perhaps because Francis' account was much easier to follow. Although I prefer Michael’s version to Francis’, because it was split over two different tracts which were answers to different bulls of John, it is, perhaps unsurprisingly, more difficult to tease out some of Michael’s views. Ockham improved on Francis though by arguing that the general believers could keep property or choose poverty as they saw fit, which in some ways bridged the gap between Francis and Michael.

\textsuperscript{274} \textit{OND} 4.545-574. 342–43. At this point, Ockham was unwilling to commit to whether or not the common ownership was shared by the apostles and the rest of the community. Cf. 2.338–388, 366–08, where it is claimed on the basis of several ‘sacred canons’ that ecclesiastics must have lordship \textit{communiter accepto}.

\textsuperscript{275} See above, p. 60.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE SPECIES OF USUS

So far we have examined in some detail what the Michaelists meant by ius and dominium. The third term, usus, was no less important a term in the Franciscan defense of poverty. Franciscans themselves disagreed about what kind of usus a Franciscan was to have. In the second half of the thirteenth century one of the bigger debates about what form of poverty Franciscans vowed themselves to was the usus pauper controversy. This controversy arose in the wake of Exiit, and continued to rage through the so-called Clementine settlement as laid down in Exivi, and in some ways even eluded the combined efforts of Bonagratia of Bergamo, Michael of Cesena, and John XXII to put the issue to rest.²

Usus lay at the heart of the Michaelist-John controversy, which, as many have noted, hearkens back to the older criticisms against mendicant poverty, namely that usus cannot be wholly separated from all forms of property rights. It has often been pointed out that Gerard of Abbeville (d. 1272) pointed out that usus cannot be separated from property rights according to Roman law,³ but it was William of Saint-Amour who made the connection explicit:

Nec attendunt etiam, quod illarum rerum, quae usu consumuntur (ut sunt alimenta, et vestimenta quotidiana, et pecunia numerata) usus absque proprietate concedi non potest, tamquam impossibile secundum iura; cum eis utendo non possit rerum

1. QPE 8 (Schlageter 1989, 195).
2. As usual the bibliography is huge. In addition to the studies listed on p. 2 n. 9 above, I am still partial to the narrative account of these events in Moorman 1968, 140–204, 307–19; Nimmo 1987 is an excellent companion piece; Robson’s discussion (2006) is too brief. For the controversy surrounding Peter Olivi, see especially: Burr 1975, 1976, 1985, 1989, 1992, and Flood 1999.
Thus, although the separability of use and lordship had been firmly entrenched in Franciscan poverty writings since the time of *Quo elongati*, a determined adversary could find room to carve out a series of devastating distinctions. John XXII saw a series of situations where both Gregory IX’s simple division of *usus* and *dominium* and the more elaborate version employed by Nicholas III failed to account properly for what actually had to take place. There were three related problems. The first was that for any use to be considered just, the *usuarius* had to have at least a *ius utendi*, or, in the case of consumables, at least a property right. Second, the reason one needed a property right for consumables was because the proper definition of use, by which the pope meant *usus* as it was used in Roman law, required that the object of the use remain unimpaired (*salua rei substantia*), and, therefore, one could not, properly speaking, ‘use’ anything that deteriorated with use. And, last but not least, there was the problem that an ‘Order’, which in the eyes of the law was but a legal entity or corporation, could only be granted a *usus iuris*, not a *usus facti*.

The Michaelist responses to these three problems form the basis of the next three chapters. This chapter will examine the basic nature of *usus*. In the context of the Michaelist-John poverty controversy, this means we must examine in turn how the leading Michaelists understood the following related terms: *usus*, *usus iuris*, *ius utendi*, *licentia utendi*, and *usus facti*.

### 5.1 Bonagratia of Bergamo

Prior to *Ad conditorem*, Bonagratia argued that the pope had asked whether it was heretical to assert that Christ and the apostles ‘had’ anything *in common*. He further

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4. William of Saint-Amour, *Collectiones catholicae et canonicae scripturae*. d. 4 (William of Saint-Amour 1632, 360). It is hard to know which text came first. Gerard apparently wrote his in the late 1250s, but waited for an opportune time to publish it, which was much later on in 1269. William seems to have written his text in the early 1260s, so it is possible he influenced Gerard—assuming Gerard revised his own text before publishing it. On the chronology, see Congar 1961, 44–47, Dufeil 1976, 218–19; Traver 1996, 234–71, is perhaps the only detailed study of this ‘prolix, repetitive, and often unoriginal’ text.

5. It is unfortunate that we do not have the precise wording of John’s question, but we can get reasonably close to it if we compare the way Hervæus Natalis and Bonagratia each phrased it:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hervæus Natalis</th>
<th>Bonagratia</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>Ad evidentiam quaestionis qua quaeritur utrum asserez Christum et apostolos nichil habuisse in rebus temporalibus venientibus in usum humanae vitae quantum ad proprietatem et dominium</em></td>
<td><em>In questione qua queritur, utrum asserez quod Christus et apostoli non haberint aliquid in communi, sit hereticum</em> (Oliger 1929, 323).</td>
</tr>
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</table>
specified what the question had to be about in good scholastic fashion: not ‘de Christo inquantum Deus’, not before the apostles were apostles, and not about the apostles ‘prout fuerunt prelati ecclesie militantis constituti et cura animarum eis commissa’: it was rather about them when they were ‘cum Christo et ab eo missi ut predicatores’. The phrase *habere aliquid* was likewise too vague for Bonagratia’s taste. There were three relevant meanings:  

Habere$_1$: iure dominii vel quasi dominii seu proprietatis aliquid obtinere.  

This was the meaning of Dig. 50.16.188 and 45.1.38.9, and it meant that if a person or a corporation had things in this way ‘[ei] datur exceptio, aut si eam perdat, datur actio: Dig. 41.1.52.’  

Habere$_2$: habere largo modo sumendo.  

In this sense, someone ‘tenet de facto, vel ad usum simplicem facti, nichil iuris dominii seu proprietatis in ea sibi vendicans neque habens’. This is the situation of a slave or a religious. In order to show that this was a ‘rightless’ sort of possession, Bonagratia cited a huge mass of canon and civil law.  

Habere$_3$: habere res: cum earum habet administrationem.  

This is the situation of people who hold positions within the church. No lordship of ownership in the proper meaning of this term is had in this case.

Bonagratia’s clearly framed the question in legal terms, though he was not the only one to think in this way. According to his triple distinction Christ and the apostles had things in the second and third sense of ‘having something’, but not in the first, which was what the pope meant to ask. It is not at all clear that this was John’s actual position. In fact, I believe that, if pressed, he would have argued that Christ and the apostles held things in all three senses of the term, but he would have disagreed that the first sense (automatically) included the right to sue in court.

The first and second sense of ‘having something’ are the important meanings for our inquiry. Unfortunately, however, the distinction did not lead to a great discussion
of the nature of use, which can be summarized quite easily. It will sound familiar but underdeveloped. First, Christ, insofar as he assumed a human nature to repair fallen humankind, had to assume a human nature as it existed in the state of innocence; since at that time ‘fuissent homines sine dominiiis distinctis’ as it is said in Quo elongati, Christ must have also done without any individual or common distinct lordship, and managed to get by with only a simple use of fact.9

Bonagratia’s explanation of ususfructus was more comprehensive than other Michaelist accounts. Usufruct, he noted, is defined in the Digest as being a ‘ius utendi et fruendi rebus alienis, salva rerum substantia’, and in the Institutes as a ‘ius quoddam incorporale’. Thus, consumables cannot properly be said to be subject to a usufruct. In like manner it does not make sense to say that usufruct is or is not adjoined to lordship.10 If we might anticipate the subject of the next chapter for a moment, it is worth noting that Bonagratia pointed out that Roman law admitted quasi ususfructus in the case of consumables. Quasi usufruct, a term coined in Justinian law, was a form of usufruct that allowed usufruct of consumables in the sense that security was given to the heir (the term of a usufruct tended to be for the lifetime of the usufructuary) that the same quantity of goods or their monetary value would be returned upon the completion of the term of the usufruct.11 The point though was clear: whether one took usufruct in its proper sense or not, Roman law admitted a separation of use and lordship, even in the case of consumables.

5.2 MICHAEL OF CESENA

Surprisingly, Michael’s analysis of usufruct was not as sophisticated as Bonagratia’s, but he by no means ignored the question. The Minister-General castigated the pope for his

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10. Bonagratia, App.ACC, 106–07: Usufruct ‘est ius utendi et fruendi rebus alienis, salva rerum substantia, Dig. 7.1.1. Et alibi dicitur quod usus fructus est ius quoddam incorporale, in Inst. 2.2.2. Unde illae res quae usu consumuntur, proprie non recipiunt usum fructum, Dig. 7.5.1 et 7.5.2; et in Inst. 2.4.2. Et ideo impropriè dicitur quod usus fructus talium rerum adnexus sit domino, quia in talibus rebus usus fructus proprie non consistit, et usus fructus qui non est, separari vel uniri non potest, Dig. 33.2.26; nec desinere potest usus fructus qui es quam coepit, Dig. 35.1.96.’
11. Bonagratia, App.ACC, 107: ‘Et quamvis in talibus rebus usus fructus proprie non consistat, utilitatis tamen causa ex benigna interpretatione lex statuit quod quasi usus fructus etiam in talibus rebus constitui possit, ut in dicto Inst. 2.4.2, et in dicta lege Dig. 7.5.1 et 7.5.2. Unde cautio praestanda est ab illo cui in talibus rebus quae usu consumuntur relinquitur usus fructus, ut quandocumque per mortem vel capitis diminutionem extinguitur usus fructus, eiusdem qualitatis et quantitatis res restituantur aut aestimatis rebus certae pecuniae nomine cavendum est, quod commodius est, ut dicitur in dicta lege Dig. 7.5.7, quae cautio et actio oriens ex ea succedit loco rei et habens eam ipsam rem habere censetur, Dig. 46.3.55 et Dig. 50.17.15.’ Cf. his De paup., 509–10. Glosses to Inst. 2.4.2, Dig. 7.5.2, and Dig. 7.5.7 cross-reference one another, and Azo said virtually the same thing in his Summa institutionum 2.5, quoted at App.mai., 255–56; see p. 142. For quasi ususfructus, see Berger 1953, 665.
supposed definition of use in all three of his appeals. The basic point Michael and his followers would make over and over again was that John’s definition was not the ‘true’ definition of usus.\textsuperscript{12} Usus had a number of different meanings, and the pope’s was just one of them. Moreover, his was merely a legal definition for all he tried to hide the fact: ‘Uno modo accipitur in lege civili pro iure utendi, et definitur sic: “Usus est ius utendi rebus alienis, salva rerum substantia”. Et haec definitio colligitur Dig. 7.8.1, ex textu et glossa.’\textsuperscript{13} Michael knew the gloss was Azo’s, and in a display of one-upmanship, he also provided a lengthy quotation from Azo’s Summa institutionum, which further described this type of use—as John himself did—as a personal servitude. Azo concluded:

Et tali usu qui est ius utendi rebus alienis salva rei substantia, loquuntur iura quae dicunt quod res quae usu consumuntur non recipiunt proprie usum fructum, licet quasi usum fructum ex Senatus consulti statuto recipient, in Inst. 2.4.2 et sequenti; et Dig. 7.5.1 et 7.5.2.\textsuperscript{14}

At the same time, usus could also be taken to mean actus utendi, which is called usus facti. Azo’s Summa institutionum was cited again: ‘Usus qui est ius vel servitus non potest esse in rebus quae usu consumuntur, cum in eis non possit esse salva rei substantia; sed usus qui est factum vel in facto consistit, ut in bibendo et comedendo bene potest esse.’\textsuperscript{15} When he was dealing with the same point in the Appellatio monacensis, he wrote:

Sed definitio usus a dicto haeretico allegata non est definitio usus universaliter, id est in omni significacione usus sumpti, sed tantum particulariter sumpti, scilicet usus iuris civilis, qui non est usus universaliter sed solum particulariter sumptus.\textsuperscript{16}

Even in Roman law use could be taken for either a ius utendi in the pope’s sense, that is, a usus iuris, or for an usus facti.\textsuperscript{17} Michael thus argued that usus had two primary meanings in the context of the poverty controversy: it could refer to a legal right or to the

\textsuperscript{12} App.min., 436.
\textsuperscript{13} App.mai., 255. Gl. ord. ad 7.8.1.1, s.v. ‘etiam nudus usus’: ‘id est non solum ususfructus. Sed quid est usus nudus? Respondeo: nudus dicitur in respectu quia est sine fructu; et potest ita definiri: Usus est ius utendi rebus alienis salua rerum substantia. Frueendi enim in definitione usus non ponitur: ut infra Dig. 7.8.2.1. Licet in usufructu ponatur: ut Dig. 7.1.1. Ex qua definitione patet quod usus non potest esse in rebus, quae solo usu consumuntur: sicut nec ususfructus: cum in eis non possit esse salua substantia. Licet uideatur contra Dig. 7.5.1 et 7.5.2; ait enim usu consumuntur. Unde uideatur quod usus sit in eis. Sed certe ibi non loquitur de usu, qui est servitus. Azo.’ See also Kriechbaum 1996, 33–34. 43.
\textsuperscript{14} Quoted at App.mai., 255–56. See also Kriechbaum 1996, 33–34.
\textsuperscript{15} Quoted at App.mai., 256–57.
\textsuperscript{16} App.mon., 829. On the following page we read that John’s definition of use is one that only explicitly accounts for using someone else’s things, which is a further sign that his definition only covered usus as a legal term. Cf. App.mon., 839.
\textsuperscript{17} App.mon., 832–33, explaining Inst. 2.5.1.
physical action. This basic divide lies at the heart of the Michaelist defense of Franciscan poverty.

USUS IURIS

A use of right or *usus iuris* is a nebulous term in the poverty controversy. As Michael saw it, there were several types of *usus iuris*; he mentioned three in particular: there was a *usus iuris civilis*, a *usus iuris naturalis*, and a *usus iuris divini*. Apparently, the so-called use of civil right could itself be divided into a ‘universal’ and more restricted sense. Although this point was never elaborated—the focus was always on the use of civil right—we cannot be too far off if we imagine that these sorts of use are guaranteed or legitimized by the corresponding type of law (*ius*).

In general, Michael tended to use *usus iuris* as an approximate synonym for *ius utendi*. John’s general point about *usus iuris* was that this is what kind of use his predecessors had given the Franciscans—i.e., their Order—when they declared that the friars had the use of things. This prompted Michael to explain the term in this context:

Habere autem usum iuris in communi est habere proprietatem in communi, quia usus, prout est iuris, est ius proprium utendi aliquam re pro qua datur actio in iudicio habenti tale ius, sicut ex obligatione, ut Inst. 2.2.2(!).

Thus in Michael’s opinion a use of right was a *ius proprium utendi*, precisely in the sense of being able to sue in court like one could who had an *obligatio*. What Michael meant was that the right, like an obligation, was considered a *res incorporalis*, even though they existed in reference to corporeal things. An obligation, moreover, ‘est iuris vinculum, quo necessitate adstringimur aliiuis solvendae rei secundum nostrae civitatis iura’. Michael was likely thinking of the type of obligation that arises from loans, either a *mutuum* or a

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18. The *App.min.* is a good example of this: it only uses the term twice, and never explains what it is supposed to mean other than it is a civil law term; see *App.min.*, 431 (a quotation from *ACC* 85–88, 236) and 443 (a reference to *ACC*²). See also the relevant passages in *App.mon.*, 833, 841, and 843.
19. *App.mon.*, 830, on John’s strict definition of use: ‘Ergo dicta definitio non est definitio usus universaliter sed tantum particulariter sumpti, scilicet usus iuris civilis, qui non est usus facti, nec usus iuris naturalis, nec iuris divini, nec iuris civilis universaliter et omni modo sumpti...’.
20. See above, § 2.6, p. 39.
21. *App.mai.*, 378. Michael wrote ‘in dicto 1 in I. [2.2] De rebus incorporalibus’, but that makes no sense; perhaps it should be ‘in dicta I.’, where the ‘said lex’ is to the reference to Inst. 2.2.2 in the previous paragraph.
22. Inst. 3.13 pr.; cf. Dig. 44.7.3 pr.: ‘Obligationum substantia non in eo consistit, ut aliquod corpus nostrum aut servitutem nostram faciat, sed ut alium nobis obstringat ad dandum aliquid vel faciendum vel praestandum.’
commodatum, for which a debtor was liable in court.\textsuperscript{23} It goes without saying that the friars were not to be on either side of a relationship of this sort.

Rooted as it was in positive law rather than natural law, the key characteristic of a right of use was that it was inherently actionable: ‘Et talis usus iuris ex quo competit ius agendi in iudicio, dicitur usus proprius.’\textsuperscript{24} This was, as we shall see in the next section, because a \textit{ius agendi}, an \textit{actio}, was itself the result of positive law. Use is exclusive (\textit{proprius}) insofar as it is legally defensible. As we shall see in the next section, this \textit{ius utendi} existed only in the sphere of positive law.

\textbf{IUS UTENDI}

A \textit{ius utendi} or right of using, then, falls under the category of a \textit{usus iuris civilis}, which itself derives from positive, civil law. Michael specifically related the idea to categories of Roman law:

Constat autem quod habere ius utendi in aliqua re, secundum iura civilia includit necessario usum proprium sive proprietatem usus, cum, ut superius est probatum, lex civilis definiat usum talem in haec verba: ‘Usus est ius utendi rebus alienis, salva rerum substantia’, et dicat quod talis usus est servitus personalis et res incorporalis, quae in iure consistit, sicut hereditas et usus fructus, obligatio [cf. Inst. 2.2.2 et actio]. Et ideo sicut qui habet usum fructum, habet proprium usum sive proprietatem in usu, sic et qui habet usum qui est ius utendi re aliena.\textsuperscript{25}

Michael extended the pope’s definition of \textit{ius utendi}. In the context of positive law, a right of using included what we might call ‘personal’ or ‘exclusive’ use or even the ‘ownership of use’. It was a personal servitude, which was a \textit{res incorporalis}, on the same level as the right of inheritance,\textsuperscript{26} usufruct, obligations, or rights to legal action.\textsuperscript{27} Michael turned the pope’s argument on its head. If a \textit{ius utendi} was a personal servitude like usufruct was, then because the holder of usufruct had ‘ownership of the use’, so did the holder of a \textit{ius utendi}. After all, usufruct is essentially a \textit{pars dominii}.\textsuperscript{28}

Were we not already sure of Michael’s conclusion, the reference to \textit{obligatio} and \textit{actio} hints at the direction Michael’s thought was tending. As usual, the \textit{Appellatio minor}

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{23} Inst. 3.14.pr.–2; cf. Cod. 4.10 \textit{passim}.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} \textit{App.mai.}, 401.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} \textit{App.mai.}, 261–62, referring back to his quotations from Azo’s \textit{Summa institutionum} (above, p. 142).
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Berger 1953, s.v. ‘hereditas’ (485), noted two meanings for the term. It can refer to the ‘complex of goods, rights, and duties of the deceased’, or, according to Dig. 50.16.24, it can mean a ‘successio in universum ius quod defunctus habuit’. Michael was surely thinking of this second meaning.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} For \textit{actio} and \textit{servitus}, see above, p. 38.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} \textit{App.mai.}, 262, citing Dig. 7.1.4. But cf. Dig. 50.16.25 pr. Both passages are discussed by Willoweit 1974, 142.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
sums up the ultimate connection quite nicely: John’s use of *ius utendi* had to be ‘de iure utendi civili et mundano, cuisusmodi est ius proprium pro quo datur actio iudicio’—which was one of the very things the apostles left behind. Even the multitude of believers went without any sort of *ius proprium*. For a fuller argument, however, we must look at the *Appellatio monacensis*. An action is given in court, he wrote,

hominibus sui iuris spoliatis rebus suis quantum ad usum vel alium modum habendi licitum et non solum spoliatis rebus suis quoad proprietatem et dominium. Sicut patet in eo qui emit a domino rei usum rei, si dominus rei postea surripiat ab eo rem illam, datur eidem actio furti contra dominum ratione usus, Dig. 47.2.20.1. Et si debitor subtrahat rem quam obligaverat creditori, datur ipsi creditor contra dominium actio furti, in Inst. 4.1.10.30

At first glance this may seem a strange thing for Michael to say. But the emphasis is on being despoiled of one’s right, so any talk of use of ‘licit mode of having’ is one that, in this case, involves a right, or, to use Michael’s terminology, a *ius proprium*. However, it must be said that the use of ‘licit’ here is not helpful, given that the Michaelists often used the word in a non-juridical sense.

In essence, then, Michael argued that a right of using is a *ius proprium*, which itself is a *res incorporalis*, and that it is, in the pope’s terminology, a *ius personale*. More to the point, this *ius proprium* does not derive from natural, but positive law.31 The fact, moreover, that the pope expressly called it a ‘personal right’ only shows that none of the early believers could have had it, for none of them said that anything was his or her own.32

What holds for an individual holds for a community as well: just as an individual may or may not have a right of using, so may a community have or not have the same right. The general community of believers held their houses, estates, possessesions, and goods in common, and these things were said to be of their community such that ‘ipsi communitati datur et exceptio in iudicio’.33 In the corresponding ecclesiastical community, the point is that the community is in some sense a temporal one—one which excludes personal property while allowing *quasi quaedam collegialis proprietas*—in which every cleric of the ‘collegiate’ Church can take legal action in order to recover the goods of this church.

31. *App.mai.*, 263: ‘Et tale ius est ius proprium, ut patet per iura superius allegata, sine quo iure dictus dominus Ioannes intelligit usum simplicem facti haber non posse ... maxime ubi supra dicit quod ius utendi est mere ius personale.... Praeterea, certum est quod ius proprium non est de iure naturali, C. 12 q. 1 c. 2, sed de iure positivo, D. 8 d.a.c. 1.’ Michael was referring back to the quotation from Azo’s *Summa institutionum*; see *App.mon.*, 255–56, quoted above, p. 142.
32. *App.mai.*, 263.
33. *App.mai.*, 341, citing Dig. 41.1.52. Cf. Bonagratia’s comments on p. 140, above.
or allege an exception in order to defend them.\textsuperscript{34} The Franciscans, Michael noted, have renounced such a collegial community, content rather with an ecclesiastical communion alone.\textsuperscript{35} By \textit{ecclesiastica communio} Michael was referring to the ‘communion’ grounded in the second type of \textit{communitas} on which the primitive Church was based. Things are commonly possessed, but only by the bond of fraternal charity, which itself is based on divine \textit{ius}; and they are, moreover, possessed only with respect to use, not ownership or lordship.\textsuperscript{36}

\section*{Licentia utendi}

John was unwilling to distinguish between a right of using and a licence of using. Michael, in turn, unfairly exaggerated John’s argument.\textsuperscript{37} As we just saw, the Michaelists maintained that a key feature of a right, especially a right of using, was that it was inherently defensible in court. In contrast, a \textit{licentia utendi} was not and never could be. Michael found his proof for this claim in both canon and Roman law. After all, he noted, it was in fact a question \textit{de iure}.

Michael’s starting point was a discussion of the \textit{peculium} from Roman law.\textsuperscript{38} A \textit{peculium} referred to a sum of money granted by the \textit{paterfamilias} to his son or slave for their use; usually, the idea was for the son or slave to employ this money in various commercial ventures, though this need not be the case. The reason the \textit{peculium} was attractive to the Michaelists was due to the fact that any \textit{obligatio}—i.e., any rights, duties, or debts—arising from any activity of the \textit{peculium}, is acquired by the head of the household.\textsuperscript{39} In Michael’s words:

\begin{quote}
Nam servus habet licentiam a domino utendi rebus domini sui et tamen non habet in eis ius utendi, sicut patet Dig. 15.1.25, ubi glossa dicit idem esse in famulis dominorum qui utuntur rebus dominorum de eorum licentia et idem est in religiosis qui habent
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{App.mai.}, 342: ‘Unde etiam talis communitas est temporalis, quia licet in ea excludatur personalis proprietas, includitur tamen in ea quasi quaedam collegialis proprietas cuius quilibet de collegio quodammodo particeps esse dignoscitur, dum unusquisque clericus ecclesiae collegiatae habet actionem ad res ecclesiae suae recuperandas et exceptionem ad defendendas.’

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{App.mai.}, 342: ‘Unde Fratres Minores tali communitati collegiali renuntiant, et omnem proprietatem personalem et collegialem a se abdicant, sola ecclesiastica communione, cui non est licitum renuntiare, contenti.’

\textsuperscript{36} See above, p. 79, and Appendix A below.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{App.mon.}, 829–41.

\textsuperscript{38} Dig. 15.1–2 and Cod. 4.26, \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{39} See Evans-Jones and MacCormack 1998, 171.

\textsuperscript{40} Inst. 3.28 pr.: ‘Expositis generibus obligationum, quae ex contractu vel quasi contractu nascentur, admonendi sumus adquiri vobis non solum per vosmet ipsos, sed etiam per eam quoque personas, quae in vestra potestate sunt, veluti per servos vestros et filios.’
licentiam a dantibus vel a praelatis suis rebus, et tamen constat quod non habent ius utendi in eis, ut notatur in praeallegato C. 19 q. 3 c. 9.\(^{43}\)

Michael was perhaps wrong about the gloss, but right to mention peculium.\(^{42}\) The reason for the reference to the gloss is because there were two sorts of peculium according to Dig. 15.1.25, one where the lord gave the slave something for his personal use, and another where the slave had to use something for a certain purpose. The second situation is not an example of a peculium.\(^{43}\) The connection of this point to Si qua mulier, which explained that no matter the situation of the man or woman entering the order, he or she no longer had any property, only served to make Michael’s comparison between a slave and a religious that much more explicit.\(^{44}\)

The licence was also to provide the conceptual framework to understand the example from the opening of the Decretum where it was said that it was fas, but not ius to pass through another’s field. Unfortunately, the reasoning is not as self-evident as Michael seemed to think. The text reads:

Sic etiam dicitur quod quis habet licentiam transeundi per agrum alienum, et tamen non habet ius civile transuendi, D. 1 c. 1. Item, de iure divino fas est, id est licentia conceditur alicui, comedere uvas in vinea proximi sui de Deuteronomii 23.24.\(^{45}\)

At first glance it would seem that having a licence to do an action means that the action is lawful according to divine law, but what Michael must have meant was that divine law

\(^{41}\) App. mai., 264.

\(^{42}\) I have found no gloss to Dig. 15.1.25, Id vestimentum, that compares the situation of a religious to a slave. Perhaps Michael has confused a gloss to C. 12 q. 1 c. 11 (s.v., ‘possidere’), which does make this comparison and refers the reader to Id vestimentum. See below, p. 185 n. 20, for a quotation.

\(^{43}\) Dig. 15.1.25: ‘Id vestimentum peculii esse incipit, quod ita dederit dominus, ut eo vestitu servum perpetuo uti vellet eoque nomine ei traderet, ne quis alius eo uteretur idque ab eo eius usus gratia custodiretur. Sed quod vestimentum servo dominus ita dedit utendum, ut non semper, sed ad certum usum certis temporibus eo uteretur, velut cum sequeretur eum sive ceneri manistravit, id vestimentum non esse peculi.’ The peculium itself is subject to variation; according to Cod. 4.26.10 pr.—1, slaves may have either have a libera peculi administratio or not, and in the latter case they are obviously far more limited in their actions concerning the peculium.

\(^{44}\) C. 19 q. 3 c. 9: ‘“Si qua mulier aut uir monasticam elegerit uiam, et intrauerit monasterium, liberis non extantibus, monasterio, quod ingrediusitur, res eius copetere iubemus. §. 1. Sed si persona liberos habens ante, quam de rebus suis inter eos disponat, monasterium intret, liceat ei postea inter eos diuidere, legitima nulli diminuta, et quod eis non dederit monasterio constet. §. 2. Sed si omnem substantiam inter filios diuidere voluerit, sua persona filiis communerata partem sibi retineat, que monasterio copetere debet. §. 3. Sed si post ingressum moriatur, ante, quam inter eos diuidat, filii legitimam percipient, reliqua substantia monasterio competente.” Constitutione 5. in collatione 1. §. 4. “Nunc autem, cum monachus factus esset, hoc ipso res suas omnes obtulisse uideatur, si prius testatus non sit, exinde, iudicio eius cessante, lege disponitut, ut si liberis habet, in quos aut nichil, aut minus legitima portione quoquo donandae titulo contulerit, eatenus substantiae monasterio destinatæ detrahantur, ne quid contingat circa liberos iniquum.”’

\(^{45}\) App. mai., 264.
‘allowed’ certain actions, they were *fas*, provided one had a licence (or better) to do them; in this case, of course, the licence comes from God, but that need not always be the case. This was the argument found in the gloss to *fas est*, where it is noted that something may be equitable by divine law (insofar as it does not harm someone else), but that it is not necessarily *ius* in the sense that one has a civil action. Conversely, we might add that the granting of a (positive law) licence to do actions that are *contra ius* (*ciuile*) would not make those actions *fas* (by divine law). A licence from a ‘lower’ law cannot grant dispensation from a higher law. Ockham would repeatedly make this point in various formulations.

The classic example, which all Michaelists referred to at some point or another, was that of a guest eating at another’s table. Michael used it in both of his longer appeals; the *Appellatio monacensis* gives the better account:

> Item, manifestum est quod divites pauperibus ad suas mensas vocatis sive invitatis non concedunt communiter omne dominium quod ipsi divites habent in alimentis ipsis pauperibus appositis, quoniam ut plurimum non concedunt eis potestatem nec dominium ipsis alimenta alienandi, nec asportandi vel distrahendi, sed tamen edendi et bibendi, quod tamen dominium ipsis divites habent immediate in eis. Et ita constat quod divites in ipsis alimentis pauperibus appositis sibi retinent aliquod dominium proprium et immediatum quod pauperibus communiter non concedunt.

When a rich man invites the poor to sit at his table, he does not typically give them lordship of the food: that is, they have no power of alienating, carrying away, parcelling up the food (for piecemeal sale), only the power to consume it. Michael continued:

> Alioquin si divites eo ipso quod concedunt pauperibus licentiam comedendi et bibendi de appositis in mensa intellungerentur concessisse per consequens eis omne dominium ipsorum alimentorum, sic quod nihil sibi retinerent, non possent postea eis libere et absolute concedere quod possent ipsa alimenta libere asportare et alienare, quia concedens omne dominium et nihil sibi retinens in re concessa non potest de ipsa amplius alicuius disponere vel ordinare.

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46. *Gl. ord.* ad D. 1 c. 1, s.v. ‘fas est’: ‘id est aequum est, cum subest causa, et innoxius est transitus: ut C. 23 q. 2 c. 3. Item iure diuino licitum est comedere uas in agro alterius, sed non exportare: conterere spicas et comedere licitum est. C. 6 q. 3 c. 1. Sed non mittere falcem: ut infra D. 5 de cons. c. 26. Sed licet sit aequum iure diuino: tamen non est ius, id est ius non dat ciuilem actionem.’ The point is paraphrased in *App. mai.* 265.

47. *AP* 7.41–45, 253–54; see p. 171 n. 174, below, for similar references. On the *AP*, see the excellent article by Nederman (1986).

48. *Impug.* § 14 (Knysh 2000, 248), combines the example of slaves, *filiifamilias*, clerics, and guests invited to dinner in one fell swoop.

A crucial point for Michael was that the licence was only as good as far as it was granted (*quantum conceditur*): if the lord demanded his guests stop eating partway through the meal, there was nothing more to be said on the matter. The licence was revoked and there was no legal recourse to be had. If the licence of using were identical to the right of using, on the other hand, these guests would be free to do more or less as they pleased with the rich man’s food and drink.

This is the sort of licence the friars have. Even in worthless things, the friars have no lordship, ownership, or right, for while they can give away these sorts of things ‘ex causa rationabili, et habita licentia superiorum’, they cannot do more, which is far short of what real owners can do. In the subsequent *Appellatio monacensis*, Michael filled the picture out a little more. Both *Exiit* and *Exivi* show that,

Fratres Minores, quibus tam a dominis eis offerentibus et dantibus res quam a ministris eorum concessa eis licentia sive potestas utendi rebus, habent et habere dicuntur in ipsis rebus simplicem usum facti, quia ut in ipsis capitulis patet, simplex usus facti dicitur ex eo quod separatus est a proprietate et dominio et usu iuris civilis particulariter sumpti, qui est proprium ius utendi rebus alienis, salva earum substantia, pro quo usu competit propium ius agendi in iudicio, non ex eo quod separatus sit a licentia et concessione utendi, quia si esset separatus ab omni licentia et concessione utendi, tunc non esset ius iustum [sic] sed potius abusus illicitus.

We shall return shortly to the questions of lordship and use, but for now the point to note is that what was granted was a licence or power of using, and that this is a sufficient condition to ensure that the action was just. By ‘power’, it is clear that Michael meant a sort of moral power, not the physical capacity for the deed. Thus we should say that the *licentia utendi* was a moral licence, which is not necessarily connected with positive law. This equation of licence and power, moreover, shows that the *dominus rei* is the one who grants something which is called a licence or a power. That is, these are not innate ‘subjective’ qualities—or, as Ockham might describe them, natural powers—for Michael. We should therefore be careful when we read phrases like *potestas utendi*, for they may sound more subjective than they actually are.

Michael also briefly discussed a different kind of licence. We have already seen that necessity can dispense with the laws. When necessity demands it, then, one also has a licence to take the steps necessary for survival. This is the explanation that underwrites

52. *App. mon.*, 839. Presumably, instead of *ius iustum* the text should read *usus iustus* since Michael’s point is about what does or does not constitute simple use of fact.
John 4.8, for example, where the disciples are described as going into the city to buy food. The general prohibitions do not apply, which is why Christ told those who had a sack and staff to take it with them, or to sell their tunic and buy a sword (Lc. 22:36). At the time of present necessity (necessitatis instantis), the normal rules do not apply. But, he added, ‘cessante ipsa causa necessitatis, cessabat et ipsa licentia’. Although Michael leaves this licence relatively unexplained, clearly it is (as it were) a licentia ex necessitate. What the licence allows must depend on the kind of necessity—e.g., using money to buy food. Thus, there must be a licentia utendi that comes into play when one must use the things of another, even against their will, in order to preserve one’s life.

This was, naturally, the licence Nicholas must have meant in Exiit, when he wrote: ‘Quibus rebus fratres licite uti possunt durante licentia concedentis’. Thus, to John’s memorable argument from Ad conditorem that it was ludicrous to believe that Nicholas had intended to reserve the lordship ‘unius ovi seu casei aut frusti panis’, which were only given to the friars for consumption, Michael pointed out that earlier popes had granted that licence to the brothers to give away, so long as the superior agreed (et habita licentia superiorum), cheap things of little value. The conclusion was felt to be obvious: if Nicholas granted an explicit licence, this meant he did not grant them any sort of rights. Otherwise the grant of a licence would be unnecessary and superfluous. Thus, the friars only had a licence, and a mere licence was well short of a right of using.

**USUS FACTI**

Use of fact is the only kind of use the Franciscans were to have. Most Franciscans up to the time of the Michaelist split seemed to believe the meaning of the term was simply self-evident, however even a quick reading through the relevant sources shows that there

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55. *App. mai.*, 264, quoting *Exiit*, 1113.


57. *App. mai.*, 288–89: ‘Quod patet etiam ex eo quod dicti pontifices concedunt licentiam fratribus ut de rebus mobilibus vilibus seu parum valentibus possint ex causa rationabili, et habita licentia superiorum, extra Ordinem elargiri.’


59. Of the various pre-CIN Franciscan responses to John’s question regarding the poverty of Christ and the apostles, most omit a discussion of their use of things; and those who do mention it, tend to take its meaning as unproblematic. The archbishop of Salerno merely wrote that Christ and the apostles had simple use of fact without lordship (Tocco 1910, 75). An anonymous *magister* wrote that the pope’s question cannot be one ‘quoad simplicem facti usum sed quoad dominium’ (Tocco
was no unanimous agreement on what the term meant. Perhaps the best example of this comes from the cardinal Vital du Four (c. 1260–1327). Vital’s *Compendiosa resumptio* made the standard point that the only thing Christ and the apostles had was a simple use of fact. But when he came to talk about consumables, a slightly different picture emerged. An objection was raised that simple use of fact was merely the consumption of something, which only existed during the act of consumption, and which therefore could not be separate from lordship. But since Adam and Eve clearly used consumables in the state of nature, there was at that time use without ownership and lordship: ‘Et sic’, he concluded, ‘tam ipse quam successores habuissent usumfructum paradisi sino [sic] dominio’. God owned the goods Adam used, and Christ, who wanted to return the ‘collegium apostolicum’ as far as possible to the state ‘institutae naturae’, gave them ‘necessarium rerum usum’ without giving them possession or lordship. Perhaps this confusion was due to the fact that this was a *reportatio* of the consistory debates, but at the very least to switch from simple use of fact to usufruct to necessary use indicates that even amongst the so-called Franciscan Community, there was not full consensus as to what Christ and the apostles ‘had’ by their simple use of fact.

The Michaelist definition, on the other hand, was much more consistent. As we saw near the beginning of this chapter, Bonagratia equated simple use of fact with ‘tenere de facto’. This served as the conceptual starting point for all subsequent Michaelist definitions. In his various appeals, Michael re-specified what he thought simple use of fact meant. The shorter appeal is the most elusive of the three. Throughout one gets a sense that Michael was treating *simplex usus facti* and *actus utendi* as synonyms, but this is never stated directly. Of course, Michael continually referred his readers to the longer appeal for the full argument, so it is not surprising that the *Appellatio minor* is somewhat unsatisfactory—just as it is not surprising that John found the *Appellatio minor* a frustrating response to his own bulls.

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60. Bernard de la Tour cited *Exiit* as evidence that simple use of fact can be separate from both usufruct and a right of using, even in consumables (Tocco 1910, 73).
62. Tocco 1910, 81–82: ‘Et contra hanc responsonem objicitur: simplex usus facti non est res aliqua, sed sola consumptio rei in quibusdam, ita quod usus talis non persistit [sic], sed tunc solum est, dum res actu consumitur, et per consequens non potest usus a dominio separari, propter quod haec propositio: iste habet hujus rei simplicem facti usum, non habet multas causas veritatis sed unam tantum, cum in talibus usus et dominium sint inseparabilia. Unde cum dicitur: iste habet talem rerum simplicem usum, ergo habet dominium, non committitur fallacia consequentis.’
63. Tocco 1910, 82–83.
64. On the origins of the Community see now Cusato 2002.
65. See above, p. 140.
The situation was a little better in the *Appellatio maior*, though it still lacks the clarity of either Francis’ or William’s tracts. Use itself, as we saw above, was divided into two general categories: one use as a legal right; the other was an act of using, which is even recognized *in omni iure*. This type of use is called *usus facti*. Sometimes Michael spoke about a ‘simple’ use of fact, but this added specification meant little in practice. The point was simply that it was separate from lordship, ownership, and use taken particularly from civil law (i.e., a right of using), though not necessarily without a licence of using or ‘concessio utendi’.

The sort of use of fact—exercised by Christ, the apostles, and the Franciscans—was also not demuded of *ius divinum*, by which use of all things is common to all.

Thus, like Vital to some extent, Michael argued for the identification of *usus facti* with necessary use: the holy doctors of the Church, explaining and expounding sacred Scripture with the spirit of God, clearly determined and proved that ‘Christus et apostoli in rebus quibus usi sunt non habuerunt nisi usum sine quo humana natura sustentari non potest, qui est usus facti’. Similarly, *in lege naturae*, there was a simple use of fact common to all for all things necessary to sustain human life. Use of fact, then, covers using the things one needs to preserve life. Michael went on immediately to say that Christ and the apostles had assumed ‘illum modum utendi rebus qui fuit in statu innocentiae’, which—of course—was common to all and where no one had ‘plus ius utendi quam alter’ to anything.

This picture gets a little complicated in the *Appellatio monacensis*. In *Quia vir* John had argued that, *post distributionem*, the individual believers described in Acts had become property-holders and lords of their assigned portion regardless of whether their use was only of necessities or not. The solution to this objection required yet another exposition of what Clement had meant in *Dilectissimis*, particularly the bit about how things were common then (after the fashion of sunlight or air being common to everyone without anyone having lordship of the portion they use or enjoy). These sorts of things are common to all, *de iure naturae*, Michael wrote, ‘nec dividuntur quoad dominium proprietatis, licet dividantur secundum diversas regiones quoad facultatem utendi’; and

67. *App.mai.*, 256; see also above, p. 141.
68. *App.mon.*, 839.
70. *App.mai.*, 400.
71. *App.mai.*, 264: ‘Et certum est quod in lege naturae erat usus facti simplex, communis omnibus in rebus ad vitae humanae naturae sustentationem necessariis, nec erat tunc huiusmodi ius utendi quod postmodum per leges exstitit introductum.’
72. *App.mai.*, 400–01.
the same was true of that community: things were only common ‘quoad usum sive facultatem utendi’. Somewhat confusingly, Michael also called the faculty of using a power. Referring to the early community of believers he called it a ‘licita facultas et potestas utendi’. This faculty-and-power to use their assigned portion had to be what the believers received because we know that no one was needy among them, and we know that having lordship of things does not necessarily remove need. The proof for this last claim depended on Ecclesiastes:

Non enim ideo negatur aliquem dictorum primorum credentium dici egentem quia proprietarius et dominus foret quilibet suae portionis. Multi enim habent proprietates et dominia rerum et tamen sunt egeni, quia non habent facultatem utendi ipsi rebus, iuxta quod dicitur Ecclesiastae 6.1–2: Vidi malum sub sole, et quidem frequens apud homines vir cui dedit Deus divitias et substantiam et honorem, ... nec tribuit ei Deus potestatem ut comedat.

It is rather the faculty, a subjective power of using the things necessary for life which removes need. For, just as a father, in a sense (ad sensum), owns all the possessions of the household, the sons and slaves of the family have the use of these necessities, which is why they are not needy; and of course they do not have any ownership or lordship of these things. Much the same could be said of monks and the first believers, who prefigured the monks.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

We can now summarize Michael’s account of usus in the following way (Fig. 5.1). The fundamental division was between a usus iuris and the usus facti, which was but the act of using. Use of right was divided into three kinds: a usus iuris civilis, a usus iuris naturalis, and a usus iuris divini. He further subdivided the ‘use of civil right’ into two categories: a universal and more restricted type. (The reason for this is unclear: perhaps Michael was simply trying to make the pope’s definition seem even narrower.) The ‘particular’ use of right included at least the pope’s right of using and usufruct. In both cases these qualified as individual use or a personal right. The other side of usus

73. App.mon., 808.
74. App.mon., 812, responding to QVR, 561: ‘Dicendum est quod post divisionem aliquid plus habebant quam ante, et tamen illud plus non erat proprietas et dominium ipsarum rerum, sed erat licita facultas et potestas utendi portione sibi assignata.’
75. App.mon., 809.
76. App.mon., 809–10, citing Inst. 2.9.1, 2.9.3, and Dig. 48.5.22(21) and 41.2.49.1. This faculty naturally excludes the ability to alienate, sell, etc.; see App.mon., 815–16.
was the so-called use of fact, which in the context of apostolic poverty referred to the use Christ and the apostles had for the things necessary for survival. The use of necessities, however, falls under a precept of natural and divine law, not civil law.77

Michael also made mention of a facultas utendi and a licentia utendi, characterizing both of them as a potestas. In this context it seems that we should translate ‘potestas’ as ‘ability’: if one has the ‘power’ to use something, one is therefore able to use it. But being able to use something due to a licence is not entirely the same as to use something due to a faculty. A licence is what the dominus rei can grant; the lord could do more than that if he wished, but when he gives his guest something, he is under no obligation to give them a full ius to the thing. Examples of this practice abound, from the peculium of a slave or minor, to guests invited to the dinner table. In all cases, the licence suffices to make the act of using licit, but does not provide anything more than a power to use the thing in the way or ways specified by the owner of the thing in question. In times of necessity, however, all bets are off, and there exists a licence based in natural law by which we are entitled to take the steps needed to preserve our own life. Yet this licence is commanded by natural law, not granted at the whim of some owner. We are essentially required to take these steps—but only so far as the need exists.78 The first communitas rerum temporalium is based on the ius necessitatis naturae, and we cannot renounce it.79

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77. App.mai., 232: ‘... quia usus rerum necessarium ad vitae humanae sustentationem cadit sub praecepto legis naturalis et divinae per quod ad esse naturae conservandum quilibet est indispensabiliter obligatus. Unde tolli non potest, D. 5 d.a.c. 1 in principio capituli; et D. 6 d.p.c. 3.’

78. App.mai., 359, quoting C. 1 q. 1 c. 41; cf. App.mai., 397, citing C. 1 q. 7 c. 7, and App.mon., 789, with further references. See also Gouron 1999.

79. One is reminded of Henry of Ghent’s claim that a criminal on death row is obligated to escape if he
5. Species of Usus  §. Francis of Marchia

It seems to be different with the *facultas utendi*. For lack of a better candidate this faculty seems to be nothing other than the raw ability to use something. When Michael wrote that things were ‘common with respect to use or the faculty of using’, he meant that they had the ability to use these things unlike the people in the example of Ecclesiastes 6.1–2. This is perhaps also why he explicitly qualified the power as *licita*: the faculty of using is not inherently and necessarily licit. A thief, after all, has the raw ability to use things; this is what landed Jean Valjean, the protagonist of *Les Misérables*, in jail. In the primitive Church, however, things were made common on the basis of divine law, by the bond of fraternal charity, so naturally their faculty of using must be considered licit.

It thus seems that all acts of use which include an *usus iuris* are legally licit. And natural, divine, and civil *usus iuris* seem to correspond, vaguely, to the first three *communitates* Michael borrowed from Bonaventure. John’s insistence on the importance of a *ius utendi* belongs far down one of these branches. For *usus facti* to be licit outside of cases of extreme need or things which pertain in common to the entire *congregatio fidelium*, one also needs a *licentia utendi*. This licence is not a *ius*, for the granter of the licence still exercises all aspects of ownership over the thing, permitting it to be used only in specific ways; he also remains responsible for taking legal action to defend or sue for it.

5.3 Francis of Marchia

Francis followed Michael’s lead regarding the pope’s definition of *usus*. His was only one possible meaning, and not even the most commonly accepted one at that; it was, rather, Michael of Cesena who correctly described the term. Ockham would report this idea with approval in his own text. As Francis put it, the definition ‘*usus est a ius utendi rebus alienis, salua rerum substantia*’ is not the ‘*diffinitio usus uniuersaliter, set tantum particulariter sumpti*’. Thus, it is only according to this particular definition that we can say ‘*usus proprie dictus*’ may not be found in temporal things. That this had to be true was evident from the word *alienis*, for it is often the case that we use our own things, rather than someone else’s.

Francis, like the other Michaelists, rejected the pope’s definition in *Ad conditorem* because he ‘*loquitur de usu secundum quod leges loquentur*’, which had as an additional

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80. Presumably, although a ‘use of divine right’ may be licit by divine *ius*, this does not automatically mean that it is licit by another law. It is licit in the sense that it is permitted only, not commanded.  
81. *Improbatio* n. 26, 60.  
82. *Improbatio* n. 27, 60–61. Michael made a similar point.
consequence that his account of *ius utendi* was also dictated by a civil law understanding as well. Although the civil law definition was not a bad thing in itself, Francis found the stipulation that the substance had to be preserved too limiting. What the pope’s definition meant in practice was that all *usus* had to be either *ususfructus* or *ius utendi*. In a distinctive phrase, Francis wrote that the pope was only concerned to talk about ‘*usus habitualis*, inmo uirtualis’, not about ‘*usus actualis*’—and the latter is certainly no less a ‘use properly so-called’.

When St Paul used *uti*, for example, it was clear that he was using the term *naturaliter* rather than *moraliter*, which was in response to the pope’s predilection to use *abusus* or *abuti* to refer to the use / consumption of consumables. This use was natural in that the wine was to be used for a natural reason rather than a moral one. In general, Scripture uses *usus* / *uti* to refer to a ‘*usus substentatiuus nature’*, which is natural to man, and has no necessarily connected ethical considerations. The implication is that both *abusus* (which, according to Augustine, is ‘*usus illicitus*’—and linked by the pope to consumption), and *usus* (as a *ius utendi*) are not free from these same considerations.

Before turning to the constructive aspects of Francis’ theory of *usus*, a little more must be said about the term as a legal term. The pope, in defending his earlier use of *usus* in *Ad conditorem*, wrote that he meant to speak of *usus* and *uti* ‘secundum quod usus diuiditur contra proprietatem et dominium et usumfructum et ius utendi secundum decretalem illam *Exiit*’. But if this were true, Francis asked, how could he then define use explicitly in terms of a right of using?

The conclusion is clear: despite John’s protestations to the contrary, he did not, just as ‘the laws’ do not, take *usus* and *uti* as divided against the other categories mentioned in *Exiit*. *Exiit*, of course, does take *usus* as divided against the other four *consideranda*;

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83. *Improbatio* n. 740, 334.
84. *Improbatio* n. 576, 282.
85. *Improbatio* n. 27, 60; also unique to Francis, was the additional claim in this paragraph that a *ius utendi* ‘non dicit actum, set principium actus’, which was another method for distinguishing use of fact as an act from the right of using, which was an (abstract) right.
86. 1 Tim. 5,23; ‘noli adhuc aquam bibere sed vino modico utere propter stomachum tuum et frequentes tuas ininfirmitates’.
87. For John’s text, see *Improbatio* nn. 696–637, 302. Francis’s refutation: *Improbatio* n. 640, 303.
88. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* 1.4.4 (Martin 1962, 8): ‘Frui est enim amore inhaerere alciui rei propter seipsam. Uti autem, quod in usum venerit ad id quod amas obtinendum referre, si tamen amandum est. Nam usus illicitus abusus potius vel abusio nominandus est.’
89. *Improbatio* n. 563, 275–76. John was referring to where Nicholas III wrote: ‘Nam quum in rebus temporalibus sit considerare praeceptum proprietatem, possessionem, usumfructum, ius utendi, et simplicem factum usum’ (*Exiit*, 1113).
90. *Improbatio* n. 568, 277; see further nn. 570–574, 278–79.
91. *Improbatio* n. 602, 290.
and the reason for this is equally clear: Nicholas’ decretal takes use ‘pro simplici usu facti’.92

USUS IURIS

Francis did not deal well with the term usus iuris. Perhaps that was partly because he was not certain if John thought that a usus iuris was a synonym for ius utendi; he did understand, however, that the pope used usus iuris to mean the exercise of a right or a servitude, especially since he described usus as a personal servitude.93 In general, it seems that Francis did not understand the technical, legal meaning of these terms, but even if he had, we can guess that his response would be to dismiss legal definitions as too limited and not the common or normal meaning of the term. Instead, his overriding goal in dealing with any term that included the word ‘usus’ in it was to emphasize that this, in at least one sense of the term, had to refer to an act of using:

quia sicut ususfructus accipitur dupliciter: uno modo pro usufructu, alio modo pro iure percipiendi fructus, similiter usus iuris dupliciter accipitur: uel pro actu utendi iuris, uel pro ipso iure utendi.94

A usus iuris, then, can be broken down into an act of using of right and the right of using. But a right of using is essential to a usus iuris, for, as he wrote elsewhere, in a use of right there is no use of right without a right of using.95 Beyond this, though, Francis did not see much value in explaining what a use of right was, perhaps because he felt this use of right excluded from itself ownership and lordship, which clearly proved that it could not be the proper definition of the term use.96

One other point deserves mentioning. During one of his many expositions of Dilectissimi, Francis mentioned that there existed a usus iuris naturalis in the state of innocence, which was ‘communis omnibus hominibus magis quam dominium uel eque’ because there was then a communio of things ‘quoad usum iuris naturalis’.97 This seems a valuable clue as to what Michael meant by this term in his writings. (Francis never mentioned the idea again.) That is, in the state of nature there was a natural use of right (sans human lordship), which was thus grounded in natural law. Our hunch in the last section thus seems to have been correct.

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92. Improbatio n. 603, 290. Further arguments along similar lines may be found at nn. 676–678, 315–16 and n. 705, 324.
93. See above, p. 39.
94. Improbatio n. 154, 111.
95. Improbatio n. 88, 86: ‘usu iuris, et usus iuris non est absque alico iure utendi’.
96. Improbatio n. 653, 396.
97. Improbatio n. 261, 155.
IUS UTENDI

The Michaelists were concerned to draw a firm distinction between their simple use of fact and any positive law based right of using. As Francis (following the pope) liked to put it, the former *dividitur contra* the latter. However, Francis had a rather unique account of the Franciscans’ relationship with the *ius utendi*, which seems to derive from his desire to refute the pope on each and every point more than to construct a viable alternative account of the theory of Franciscan poverty.

On the issue of a right of using, then, it will come as no surprise that Francis found the scope of John’s definition too limited. Again we read that, the pope’s definition of *ius utendi* turns out to be taken ‘particulariter et non uniuersaliter’. Francis’ circular proof was to refer the reader back an earlier passage of the text, which turns out to be the proof that John’s definition of *usus* (as we have seen) is particular and not universal.98

Much the same could be said of Francis’ contention that the pope was mis-representing his position by maintaining that a *ius utendi* was not a *ius agendi*. According to Francis, *Ad conditorem* dealt with a ‘litigious and contentious’ (*litigioso et contentioso*) right of using.99 To prove this point, though, he quoted John’s rough quotation of the *Sachsenhausen Appeal* of 1324 in *Quia quorundam*.100 In this appeal Louis the Bavarian had claimed that people were more just and perfect, more acceptable to God and a good example to the world, ‘quanto plenius renunciatum fuerit omni iuri per quod potest sic utens pro usu huiusmodi quomodolibet contendere uel in iudicio litigare’.101 John naturally denied that the *Sachsenhausen Appeal* made any sense on this point, but one of the axes on which the Michaelist case turned was that the pope, whether he wanted to or not,102 had to admit that a *ius utendi* also entailed a *ius agendi*. This meant, in turn, that the pope had to be speaking ‘de iure ciuili et mundano’.103

Francis went on to give a fuller description of the types of *iura utendi*. His account here is unique, and certainly one which Ockham chose not to discuss as one of the opinions of the *impugnatores*. According to Francis a right of using temporal goods may be either

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98. *Improbatio* n. 149, 110. It is no more convincing an argument when he went on to say that ‘tamen in talibus [i.e., consumables] propriis reperitur ius utendi et diffinitio iuris assignata a sanctis et fundata in scriptura’, but without citing any examples.


100. See *Improbatio* n. 722, 329; *QQM* 255–262 (Tarrant 1983, 278–79).


102. This is the force of *Improbatio* nn. 726–730, 330–32.

103. *Improbatio* n. 738, 333–34. And if not, he added (nn. 738–739, 334), then that other right of using, which does not demand that the substance be preserved, will be able to be separated from ownership and lordship in consumables—for that was the sole reason for their inseparability. And, finally, there is never any mention of *ius utendi* in divine law, nor the authorities of divine law. This last seems a bit strange, for we just saw (p. 157) that there was a *usus iuris naturalis* in the state of nature.
a *ius utendi temporaliter* or a *ius utendi spiritualiter*.\(^\text{104}\) For lack of better evidence, it seems that we may assume these two types of *ius utendi* correspond with the ‘particular’ and ‘universal’ forms he described. The pope’s *ius utendi* is particular because it is only the right of using temporally, which is a right particular to positive law. The other right of using is universal because it is not so limited.

Francis based the right of using spiritually on 2 Corinthians 6.10, where St Paul wrote (and Francis then glossed), ‘*tanquam nichil habentes et omnia possidentes. Tamquam nichil*’—*scilicet temporaliter*—‘*et omnia possidentes*’ spiritualiter, quo iure utendi ‘omnia sunt iustorum’\(^\text{105}\). As Mariani noted, the last quotation probably derives from C. 23 q. 7 c. 1, which Francis cited elsewhere via John.\(^\text{106}\) Augustine explained in this *capitulum* that things cannot be rightly (recte) possessed by anybody ‘ nisi uel iure diuino, quo cunta iustorum sunt, uel iure humano...’\(^\text{107}\). This spiritual right of using, then, is one that derives from divine law.\(^\text{108}\)

This is, moreover, the means by which Francis answered John’s charge that licit use must be just use, which must mean, in turn, that one must have a right of using. His argument takes two steps, first to show that this spiritual right is not one that belongs either to a person or a community in a disjunctive fashion. As he wrote, because this right of using spiritually ‘est ius mere equitatis et congruitatis’,

> non diuiditur per proprium et commune, et quoad tale ius utendi unus homo non impedit alium hominem, quia eadem res numero potest immediate subiacere iuri utendi omnium iustorum...\(^\text{109}\)

All just people, then, can equally share in a right of using spiritually. The second step in Francis’ argument was to argue that a *licentia utendi* included this type of a *ius utendi*—and that Michael’s *Appeal* never denied this fact, but (in an interesting phrase) ‘expressly insinuated’ it.\(^\text{110}\) Francis seems to have in mind Michael’s belief that everyone has, naturally, a *facultas utendi*.

We shall return momentarily to examine Francis’ understanding of the *licentia utendi*, but first we must provide an account of what he meant by ‘a right of using temporally’,
which he also described as a civil or canon law right of using.¹¹¹ Not surprisingly, a right of using temporally is a right founded in positive law; and this is the right of using under debate by the pope and the Michaelists.¹¹² A right of using temporally must be either ‘proprium’ or ‘commune’ because a thing the same in number cannot be perfectly and immediately subject to several different people’s *ius utendi* at the same time.¹¹³

Historically speaking, neither Adam and Eve in the state of innocence nor Christ and the apostles in the early Church had a right of using temporally. The prelapsarian situation of man was not without a *ius utendi* of course, but it was of a special kind. In the first place, though Francis was not certain that it was merely tantamount to a common and undivided *potestas utendi*, the prelapsarian *ius utendi* was definitely common to all and proper to none.¹¹⁴ In the case of the early Church, Francis is careful to claim that the apostles, ‘quantum ad communitatem ipsorum proprium’, had no ‘ius utendi ciuile et mundanum in speciali [et] in communi’, along much the same lines we have seen in his account of the apostles’ lack of lordship and ownership. As he concluded, from their lack of a right of using with respect to their sub-community, ‘tamen non sequitur quin potuerint habere aliquod ius in communi quantum ad communitatem generalem credencium, quia aliquid licuit eis in communitate credencium quod non licuit eis in communitate propria’.¹¹⁵ In other words, and it is interesting that Francis avoided phrasing it this way, as members of the general Church, it is not impossible that the apostles could share in the common *ius utendi* as it was held by all members of that community. But what must be remembered is that this right of using was surely the *ius utendi* *spiritualiter*, a right common to all, proper to none, and which derived from divine law.

**LICENTIA UTENDI**

Francis insisted that a licence was not a right: a licence to use was not a right of using. This was a point all Michaelists agreed upon; yet Francis argued for this claim in his own

¹¹¹ *Improbatio* n. 762, 342: ‘sed questio fuit utrum usus rerum temporalium iustus et licitus possit separatari a iure utendi temporali ipsarum, ciuili uel canonico, et non a iure utendi spirituali…’.

¹¹² *Improbatio* nn. 762–763, 342–43.

¹¹³ *Improbatio* n. 759, 341.

¹¹⁴ *Improbatio* n. 260, 154, commenting on *Dilectissimis*: ‘quia in statu innocencie fuissent omnia communia omnibus, non solum quod dominium rerum, set etiam quod usum, siue iuris siue facti: quod usum iuris quia ius utendi quodcumque eis conueniens fuisset commune omnibus et nulli proprium. Ideo, sicut primum parentibus fuit traditum dominium commune et indiuisum omnium inferiorum, ita fuit eis tradita postestas utendi omnibus alimentis communis et indiuisa, ut patet *Genesis* 1.29–30.’

way. The argument begins negatively: If, as the pope has argued, a licence of using does not differ from a right of using, then

\[
\text{quociens religiosus aliquis habet in speciali licenciam utendi aliqua re usu consumptibili, tociens habet in speciali ius utendi illa re, quia in indifferentiis habens in speciali unum, habet in speciali et reliquum, et ius utendi rei usu consumptibilis non separatur a proprietate et dominio, secundum ipsum: ergo quociens religiosus aliquis habet in speciali licenciam utendi aliqua re usu consumptibili, totiens in speciali efficitur proprietarius in ea, et cum nullus religiosus utatur rebus usu consumptibilibus licite nisi de licencia suorum superiorum, sequitur quod omnes religiosi in omnibus rebus usu consumptibilibus eis in speciali concessis, sint in speciali proprietarii: quod est contra omnem religionem habentem uotum paupertatis annexum.}
\]

According to Francis, then, since religious who have vowed themselves to poverty only consume goods at the licence of their superiors, John’s argument would equate an individual licence of using with an individual right of using, which was inseparable from ownership and lordship—and this would in effect make every individual religious (i.e., not just Franciscans) individual property-holders.

Another problem with John’s argument is that Francis believed that a licence of using the things conceded to the brothers ‘existit in speciali fratrum singulorum secundum specialem indigentiam eorum’, while the pope had insisted in Quia quorundam that he had clearly said that a ‘ius utendi communitatis fratrum existit’. This is also why Francis insisted that a temporal right of using was always exclusive (proprium), but that it was exclusive to either a specific person or a specific community. Thus, Francis concluded, even according to John’s own premises, the licence of using and right of using must be different.

Francis’ licentia utendi was a development from his account of the twofold nature of the ius utendi. There are two different licences of using: There is a licentia iuris, which is given ‘secundum formam et apicem iuris’, is non-revocable, and does not depend on the will of the granter; this is the type of licence John was describing in Quia vir. The

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116. See above, p. 46.
117. E.g., Improbatio n. 6, 48–49, quoting John: ‘in rebus talibus, uidelicet usu consumptibilibus, ius utendi spearatum a proprietate seu dominio nequeat constitui seu haberi’.
119. Francis probably used ‘proprietarius’ in this general sense, and not to stress the contrast to another person who has a ius in re aliena (e.g., usufruct) to the same property; see the entry in Berger 1953, s.v. ‘dominus proprietatis’ (442).
120. Improbatio n. 756, 340.
121. Improbatio n. 716, 328. John never used precisely those words in the bull, but see QQM 119–121, 267; and 209–254, 274–78, in general (discussed above in part on pp. 40 and 45).
122. Above, p. 87.
123. Improbatio n. 756, 340.
124. See above, p. 158.
125. Improbatio n. 767, 343–44, referring back to Improbatio n. 749, 337.
other type of licence is a *licentia simplex facti*, which depends solely on the will of the granter, and can be revoked whenever it pleases him. This was the one *Esiit* described, for the decretal expressly says ‘durante licencia concedentis’; the same holds for Michael’s *Appeal*.\footnote{126. *Improbatio* n. 768, 344.}

It is not clear that these two types of licences can be incorporated into the hierarchical picture Francis described for the *ius utendi*. Clearly we should consider the ‘simple licence of fact’ to be the one he described in the following words: ‘Et quoad istud ius utendi spiritualiter, *Appellatio* non negat quin licencia utendi tale ius utendi includat’.\footnote{127. *Improbatio* n. 761, 342.} However, he does not properly relate the licence of right of using to the right of using temporally, which John allegedly described in *Ad conditorem* and *Quia quorundam*. Because licences, according to Francis, can only belong to individuals,\footnote{128. *Improbatio* nn. 756–757, 340–41.} my suspicion is that this ‘licence of right’ should be considered a sub-type of the ‘proper right of using temporally’ (rather than a synonym for the term).

However, this account cannot be fully accurate, for it does not specify the important point that this ‘simple licence’ is one granted by someone else; the point was instead that once this licence was granted, it could in the end be justified in the ‘right of using spiritually’, which was founded in a non-positive source of *ius*.

Francis’ argument differed from Ockham’s here in three ways. First, in his analysis of the difference between a licence and a right, his focus remained only on the licence of using. Second, this analysis relied primarily on the assertion that a licence of using existed with respect to individuals more than to a community, while agreeing with the pope that a right of using applied more to a community than to individuals, in order to prove that a licence and a right were different.\footnote{129. This is especially clear in *Improbatio* n. 757, 340–41.} Ockham, in contrast would offer a much richer account of what a licence was and how it worked. The last difference is the most important. For while Ockham’s version would be useful for maintaining the Franciscan desire to use goods licitly without any connected property rights, Francis’ account of the licence is ultimately useless for this goal. The reason is not hard to see. In Francis’ account, Franciscans, like other religious, use things at the licence of their superiors (and according to their individual need); but if the superiors themselves do not have any rights to the goods in question, then it is not clear why they may grant any licences at all!\footnote{130. Cf. the more restrained use of this point in *App.mai.*, 288–89; discussed above, p. 150.} The purpose of the licence, as Ockham well understood, was not to work within the order, but from the donors to the individuals of the order: only the real owners could grant a licence of using that meant anything.
USUS FACTI

Usus facti also has two meanings; one refers to the act and the other to an abstract counterpart. Part of the pope’s problem was that he did not realize that both Nicholas III and Clement V used the term in both senses without clearly mentioning this fact.131 Francis described the abstract portion of a use of fact as either a potestas or a facultas, which he seems to have treated as synonymous. At one point he described ‘usus actualis facti’ as an ‘actus utendi et potestas utendi absolute’.132 Earlier in the Improbatio he described this double nature so:

Consimiliter usus facti simplex dupliciter accipitur: uno modo pro simplici actu utendi, alio modo pro simplici facultate utendi. Esto autem salua rei ueritate quod simplex actus utendi ‘sic sit utentis proprius quod non possit esse alterius nec alteri communicabilis’, tamen simplex facultas utendi bene potest esse communis pluribus sicut et ipsum ius utendi.133

Thus, though John was right to say that an act of using cannot be shared, a faculty of using can be shared amongst many people—for it is merely the foundation (principium) of a simple act.134 In fact, in response to the pope’s claim that facta (here in the sense of acts of using) require real people, not ‘imaginary or represented’ people like an ordo,135 Francis noted that even if usus facti qua the act of using cannot, per se, belong to a community—and Francis had his doubts about this—, usus facti qua the faculty can well belong to a community; nor, he added, does it need a ‘true’ person any more than it need a ius utendi. And just in case one doubts whether this so-called faculty is anything other than a facultas iuris, Francis immediately pointed out that ‘talis facultas simplex est quedam facultas media et innominata proprio nomine supra facultatem nature omnibus communem et infra facultatem iuris propriie dicti consituta, licet largo nomine posset dici simplex facultas iuris’.136 That is, this unspecified faculty of using exists precisely in the region between our common faculty of nature and a faculty of right. Francis was thus trying to make a point similar to one Ockham would later explain more clearly:

131. Improbatio n. 155, 111–12; cf. n. 702, 323.
132. Improbatio n. 632, 301. This is not the same potestas utendi found in the prelapsarian state of nature; see Improbatio n. 260, 154; and n.263, 155.
133. Improbatio n. 154, 111. The quotation refers back to John’s words at Improbatio n. 145, 108.
134. Improbatio n. 155, 112.
135. See above, p. 40.
136. Improbatio n. 156, 112. This distinction is important to bear in mind in other passages where he seems to have divided simple use of fact into the act and power of using, then refer to these two as an ‘actus utendi’ and a ‘ius talenm actum exercendi’; see, e.g., Improbatio n. 632, 301, where it is said that any civil laws that deny this division are not to be listened to against divine ius, which admits it.
that the scope of positive law (as legislated) does not cover the full range of possible human actions, and that natural law did not prescribe one’s actions in all these other situations (i.e., it forbade some, promoted others, and remained indifferent for the rest). Had Francis paid more attention to the divisions of natural and positive law, I suspect he would have had an easier time explaining what he meant here.

Splitting *usus facti* into the components of act and faculty provided the means by which Francis was able to argue that a specific community or order could be granted a use of fact rather than of right, but his poverty theory still needed to account for its general separability from lordship or ownership. Naturally, the *Doctor Succinctus* made a number of arguments to support this claim. The first focused on thinking about the separability of personal use from personal ownership, much like the situation described in Acts 4:32–35, or of contemporary monastic practice.\textsuperscript{137} Even John himself, Francis said, could not deny that, before the division of their goods, the first believers,

\begin{quote}
habebant usum talium separatum a proprietate et dominio speciali, quoniam ante diuisionem illam rerum, nullus eorum habuit in speciali proprietatem alicuius rei, set erant eis omnia communia; et tamen quilibet ipsorum, ante diuisionem illarum rerum, habebat in speciali usum eorum quia ante diuisionem eorum quilibet ipsorum comedebat et bibebat de hisque possidebat. Et ita usus talium, ante diuisionem, fuit separatus de facto a proprietate et dominio singularum in speciali, set qua ratione fuit separatus de facto ante diuisionem, eadem ratione fuit separabilis de possibili post diuisionem sicut ante.\textsuperscript{138}
\end{quote}

Francis’ conclusion here is characteristic of his *Improbatio*: it is not only a question of what happens in fact, but also one of possibility. Since use was separable before the division of goods, then by what reason it was separate at that time, by the same reason it is possibly separable after the division.

Paired with his belief that the ‘nature of things’ had not changed between then and now, the *de possibili* / *de facto* distinction was crucial for Francis, just as he had made extensive use of *de possibili* arguments (without a *de facto* counterpart) when dealing with the problem of future contingents.\textsuperscript{139} These two premises lead to the following explanation:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{137} See, e.g., his discussion of the Augustinian Hermits in *Improbatio* n. 346, 190: ‘Item, fratres ordinis sancti Augustini non debent habere in speciali proprietatem alicuius rei usu consumptibilis nec non consumptibilis.… Set fratres beati Augustini habent in speciali usum rerum usu consumptibilium … ergo dicti fratres habent in speciali usum rerum usu consumptibilium separatum a proprietate et dominio speciali.’
\textsuperscript{138} *Improbatio* n. 76, 81–82; and n. 77, 82, relates this idea to monastic practice. To argue otherwise (that use is absolutely inseparable from ownership and lordship), of course, would destroy the foundation of all *religiones* which have a vow of of abdicating personal ownership of temporal goods (n. 177, 119).
\textsuperscript{139} See, e.g., the discussion in Schabel 2007.
\end{quote}
ubi est eadem rerum natura, ibi usus uniformiter est separabilis uel inseparabilis de possibili a proprietate et dominio, licet non sit uniformiter separatus de facto; set natura rerum usu consumptibilium est eadem genere et specie substantialiter et accidentaliter, in speciali et in communi; et dominium commune talium rerum ita consumitur per usum earum, sicut consumititur dominium speciale et proprium, et sub usu iatarum rerum non magis saluatue dominium commune quam proprium.  

Francis built upon this point in two ways when he considered the special case of consumables, which we shall examine in the next chapter.  

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

It is not easy to follow Francis’ myriad of distinctions and terms when it comes to usus. Figure 5.2 represents an attempt to sketch how he understood the term. Part of the confusion seems to stem from the fact that he insisted that every type of usus can be broken down into two main components: the act itself and the abstract component that legitimates or brings about the action. Thus, the biggest division lies at the level of ‘actual’ versus ‘habitual’ use, which he also referred to as using naturaliter or moraliter.

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140. Improbatio n. 178, 120.
141. See p. 195, below.
However, because he insisted that that even things like usufruct or another use of right decompose into the actual right and the act, it seems that we must include them on the ‘using morally’ side as well. Every usus includes both the action and the foundation (principium) for that action.\textsuperscript{142}

The diagram exaggerates this to some extent, but Francis’ account of usus puts the ius utendi at centre stage.\textsuperscript{143} Some form of a ius utendi accompanies every licit act of using. There is the right of using temporaliter, which is the sort of right John had meant in his bulls. These are rights of using based on positive human law. He spoke at one point of it belonging to the ius civile or ius canonicum. The facultas iuris is related to this sort of right. If we can say that facultas utendi refers to the ability to use something, then the facultas iuris, which is ‘above’ the other faculties must be a legal ability to use something; it is, essentially, a ius utendi. We must locate the licentia iuris—a non-revocable licence that does not remain under the control of the one who initially granted it—under this branch as well. It is not clear how this would differ from a regular, as it were, right of using, which I have called a ius iuris utendi for lack of a better term. Perhaps Francis was willing to imagine that the licence of a superior for a monk to enter a different, stricter religious order counted as a licence, but fell below a full-blown right.

There is also the right of using spiritualiter, which is much more difficult to nail down. At the very least it is a ius equitatis: common to all and proper to none. There is the facultas nature, common to all and ‘lowest’ of the faculties. Presumably this faculty is the one that applies in extreme circumstances, such as imminent and manifest need, or where it is not a human positive law issue. Although Francis never made this point, his breakdown of usus clearly allows the possibility for a person to use a res nullius without acquiring any rights to that use since the acquisition of these sorts of rights depend upon the will.\textsuperscript{144} It would have been convenient if Francis had named a corresponding licentia naturae to go with this faculty, but he did not. I suppose this means that the facultas nature corresponds either to our natural ability to use in the sense of native or innate or to an ability to use based in ius naturale, which would then be related to the usus iuris naturalis; it possibly even meant both.

The crucial licence for the Franciscans was the licentia simplex. An owner could grant a simple licence of using to someone else, which would thus ‘allow’ that person to deploy

\textsuperscript{142} I have used the logical operator \( \lor \) (or) to stress this fact. For one may have the right of receiving the fruits while not actively performing the act of usufruct, or one may have this right and be acting; in either case, one may be said to have usufruct. It is not exclusive in the way \( \land \) (xor) is. The dashed lines represent plausible relationships that I have interpolated.

\textsuperscript{143} I find it doubtful that Francis really thought usufruct did not fall under the category of usus iuris, but he never actually made that claim, he only compared the two analogically. I have therefore deliberately drawn them as distinct branches of usus habitualis.

\textsuperscript{144} See the discussion starting on p. 117, above.
licitly his or her facultas utendi. In its narrow sense this is an ‘unnamed’ sort of licence, although in a looser sense we can call it a simplex licentia iuris. It is iuris because it falls under the spiritual right of using, and this is why Francis said a licence of using ‘includes’ a ius utendi. The faculty of using could even be common to a group. Francis did not explain how this worked, but maybe it could be explained in this way. If someone gave a simple licence to use a specific thing to a group, each member of the group qua a member would be able to employ, licitly, his faculty of using; conversely, non-members would not be able to use licitly that same thing.

5.4 WILLIAM OF OCKHAM

Ockham generally followed the standard Michaelist line that the pope’s argumentation relied on the ‘semantical ambiguity of the term “usus”’.145 Ockham agreed that usus could refer to both the act of using and a right of action, but these were only two of the four basic meanings usus had. Although Ockham conceded that that usus might be used in other ways, these were the four he named:146 (1) Use can be meant as distinguished from fruitio, where both are acts of the will whereby something is taken up into the faculty of the will. This is not a common meaning in legal discourse.147 (2) It might also refer to the act of using an eternal thing, which is the common meaning of the term.148 (3) In a third case it might refer to the custom of doing something (consuetudo aliquid faciendi), what we might mean by ‘usage’ today.149 (4) The last meaning Ockham mentioned was use as a ius speciale, what he sometimes referred to as a ius determinatum; this is a common meaning of usus in legal discourse.

Only the second and fourth meanings of usus played an important role in Ockham’s poverty theory. Of these two, use meaning the act of using is common across the sciences and is its significatio propria; a use as a ius determinatum is proper only to law and is thus a secondary meaning. That this was true was so well-known that Ockham claimed it

145. Lambertini 1994–97, 204.
146. The following is based on OND 2.80–99, 300.
147. The connection is not exact but a similar distinction runs through many of Augustine’s writings, most notably at De doctrina christiana 1.4.4–5.5 (Martin 1962, 8), De civitate Dei 11.25 (Dombart and Kalb 1955, 344–45), and De Trinitate 10.11.17 (Mountain 1968, 330). On the uti/frui distinction in Augustine, see especially O’Connor 1983, and more briefly Kent 2001, 213–17, Stock 1996, 195–96.148. Although Brett 1997, 58, has argued that this constituted a redefinition on Ockham’s part, he was actually following Michael’s twofold definition in App. mai., 255–57. We should also note that although this description of a ‘de facto’ use sounds remarkably similar to Ockham’s second main definition of use of fact (below, p. 174), John must mean (1) that this type of use is not use ‘properly speaking’, and (2) that this use is of the unjust variety which the friars are to avoid.
149. Part of my dislike for the translation of Gratian’s ‘Treatise of Laws’ (Thompson and Gordley 1993) is that they translated virtually every occurrence of usus by ‘usage’.
needed no explicit demonstration. Ockham’s strategy here, as we have seen elsewhere, was to point out that John had confused the definitional hierarchy of this term. That is, the pope had limited the range of possible meanings to those which applied in law, but these do not exhaust the range of valid meanings usus can have. If anything, Scripture should determine which meanings are acceptable or not. This twofold definition is important in another way as well, for it allowed Ockham to claim that usus facti did exist for consumables even though usus iuris might not.

Ockham treated the term usuarius in a similar way. Because the term usuarius is derived from usus, which in this context refers to a use or right or of fact, one can be a ‘user’ in two different ways. Accordingly, one may be a usuarius because he has use of right; and if he has only bare use (of right), he may be called a simplex usuarius. The other type of user is called such because he only has use of fact; and, in this case, a simple user would be one who has use of fact because he lacks (per carentiam) all legally actionable rights—whether in his own name or the name of his college—for the thing or the use of fact of the thing.

USUS IURIS

The term ‘use of right’ clearly suggests its juridical nature. By use of right people generally meant a ‘quoddam ius positivum determinatum, institutum ex ordinatione humana, quo quis habet licitam potestatem et auctoritatem uti rebus alienis, salva rerum substantia’. It was thus a key term for illustrating the limited nature of John XXII’s definition of usus. For example when the pope said that use, properly taken, cannot be had in consumables—the subject of our next chapter—Ockham’s response was to say that he must have meant use of right, which is a legal term; it is, after all, well known that Scripture and other sciences regularly speak about using all kinds of consumables. Use of right, according to Ockham, refers to either bare use of right or usufruct. Ockham

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150. OND 6.324–339, 363. Actus utendi is not a complicated term; in theology, moral philosophy, medicine, other common ways of speaking, and even in legal science, an ‘actus comedendi, bibendi, et huissumodi’ are called ‘actus utendi et usus’; see OND 6.343–345, 363.


152. In fact, under Roman law, a usuarius was a person who had the right of use over another person’s thing or slave; see Berger 1953, s.vv. ‘usuarius’ (752) and ‘usus’ (755). In other words, Ockham was (deliberately?) ignoring the legal heritage of the word, and treating it as a generic, everyday word.


154. OND 2.127–130, 301.

155. QVR 16.2–3, 442, and OND 16.54–62, 443–44, respectively.

156. OND 62.200–203, 568: ‘Quia omnis usus iuris est usus nudus, vel ususfructus. Sed ordo Fratrum Minorum non habet usum nudum iuris in rebus, nec ususfructum; quia omnis habens talem usum potest pro usu rei in iudicio ligare...’.
was clearly in command of the technical meaning of *ususfructus* and *usus nudus*.\(^{157}\) He gave the standard definition for usufruct, namely, the right to use another’s property as well as sell, grant, or rent his right to another. It was a thicker (*pinguius*) right than bare use, which is but a right of using in which the substance cannot be impaired and the right remains inalienable. The main point we must understand was that a use of right was a *ius quoddam* and never an act of using; *iuris* is meant to distinguish it from *usus facti*.\(^{158}\)

Incidentally, this distinction allows us to see how a use of right cannot be found in consumables. If use of right entails the preservation of the thing, consumables, which are consumed through use, cannot be so used.\(^{159}\) However, although use of right, taken strictly and most properly, cannot be established or had (*haberi*) in consumables, this does not mean that a right of using cannot be had.\(^{160}\) A right of using, after all, is merely the (legal) power to use a thing, it does not specify that the thing cannot be consumed (unless this right comes from a usufruct or bare use of right).

Perhaps the most questionable claim of Ockham’s about the nature of use of right has to do with ‘necessary use’: ‘usus necessarius non est usus iuris’. Ockham’s proof, as it were, was to point out that Franciscans and many others are sustained and fulfill their duties without any use of right. A use of right is simply not necessary for food, clothing, divine worship, or study; use of fact is, however.\(^{161}\) But this is not inconsistency on William’s part. The words ‘of right’ in this case have to do with civil law, not natural or divine law. Ockham, naturally, did agree that, in terms of natural law, the use of things like food are guaranteed by the law of nature. Naturally, civil law has no legitimate force if it tries to debar a right that is grounded in a higher law.

**IUS UTENDI**

Ockham described both a natural right of using and a positive right of using.\(^{162}\) Conceptually, these clearly correspond to Francis’ rights of using spiritually or temporally. A natural right of using is common to all men, for it is held from nature and on her authority

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\(^{157}\) This whole passage is distinctly reminiscent of Inst. 2, 5 pr.–2 (and 2, 4 pr.), which was commonly cited on all sides. Offler et al. 1956–97, 301 noted the echoes to Dig. 7.1.1, 7.1.12.2, 7.8.8, 7.8.12, but as these passages were neither cited by the others and are parallel to the citations from the *Institutiones*, I think we can doubt that Ockham had them in mind here.

\(^{158}\) *OND* 2.127–154, 301–02.

\(^{159}\) *OND* 6.400–403, 365).

\(^{160}\) *OND* 3.537–542, 325.

\(^{161}\) *OND* 58.178–186, 552.

\(^{162}\) *Impug.* § 26 (Knysh 2000, 253) also describes a right of using that ‘non est servitus sed mere ius partiale’ that can be found in consumables (priests of the Old Law had this sort of *ius utendi*). The idea is not repeated elsewhere, but it is not likely something a jurist would argue for.
rather than a ‘supervening enactment’ (aliqua constitutione superveniente). However, although everyone may have this right at every moment (omni tempore), no one has this for every moment (pro omni tempore). Someone who has no property, for example, cannot use another person’s things except in a moment of extreme necessity. This was not, of course, the right of using Nicholas referred to in Exiit, for Nicholas claimed that one could do without a right of using in temporalibus, but at the same time maintained that this did not preclude them from a means (via) for the sustenance of nature by the ius poli.

The situation is quite different with the positive right of using. This right is held by a human enactment or pact, and was the focus of his early chapters in the Opus nonaginta dierum. Ockham treated ius utendi as more or less synonymous with usus iuris. However, Ockham seems to reverse the relationship of the two terms compared to Michael:

licet ius utendi communiter et tamen proprie sumptum communius sit quam ususfrucuts et nudus usus, tamen stricte sumptum est idem quod nudus usus, et sic Nicholaus III in decretali Exiit videtur accipere ius utendi.

A right of using in its broader sense is commonly taken to be more general than usufruct or bare use, although in a stricter sense a right of using can mean bare use. The reason for Ockham’s reversal of Michael’s position has to do with the fact that in (true) bare use, neither the right of using nor the thing itself is alienable:

Quamvis ergo omnis usus iuris sit ius utendi, non tamen omne ius utendi est usus iuris, qui distinguitur a proprietate et dominio; sed omne ius utendi rebus alienis, salva rerum substantia, est usus.

In either a use of right or in lordship/ownership one will have a right of using, but a use of right is far from lordship; one always has usus, though, if he has a right of using.

The end result of Ockham’s claim makes no real difference to Michael’s breakdown of usus: all uses of right, whether usufruct or bare use, necessarily include a right of using. Ockham’s reversal of the terminology makes sense, but is ultimately cosmetic.

To have a right of using means that one has a ‘potestas licita utendi re extrinseca, qua quis sine culpa sua et absque causa rationabili privari non debet invitus; et si privatus

163. OND 61.35–44.559. It need hardly be said that this type of ius naturale cannot be renounced: OND 60.93–94.556. The terminology here will remind one of Peter Olivi’s distinction about de presenti and pro presenti necessity with respect to usus pauper in QPE 9 ad 6 (Burr 1992, 39–40), but that type of necessity is wholly different; see QPE 9 ad 2 (Burr 1992, 37–38), and Burr 1989, 68–70.
164. OND 60.89–100.556; cf. 6.151–154.358, and Exiit, 1113.
166. OND 2.181–184.302–03.
A right of using is primarily a licit power to use an external good of which the right-holder should not be deprived without fault of cause. Anyone unjustly deprived of their right, he continued, can sue the depriver in court.

The idea that one should not be deprived of his or her right(s) without cause was one that would become a cornerstone of his political thought in general. It is a noble sentiment, but Ockham originally only employed this idea instrumentally to show that he and his confreres did not have a right of using temporal goods. Ockham found this idea in some glosses to the Decretales and the Decretum; later on in his career he would provide further references. Significantly, these references are not found in the earlier Michaelist tracts, though a similar idea can be found in Michael’s Appellatio monacensis.

Ockham seems to have realized that not everyone would agree with the Michaelist claim that all rights (of using) entailed a right to legal action. Privileges, after all, ought to be considered rights of a sort, but with this crucial difference: they may be revoked at the will of the one granting the privilege—‘absque causa et sine culpa’. Ockham argued that the situation was not entirely the same. The reason for this has to do with the nature of the relationship of the granter of the privilege and the privilege itself. For just as a prince is not bound by his own laws, neither is one bound by a privilege he or she granted; others, however, are bound—morally—to respect the privilege. In other words, privileges are ‘rights’ in relationship to everyone but the granter. But they cannot

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167. OND 2.155–158, 302; 61.46–50, 559, refers to it as ‘quaedam licita potestas exercendi actum aliquem circa rem temporalem extrinsecam’.
168. The same obviously holds true for rights of lordship; see e.g., the example of Adam before the creation of Eve: OND 27.85–96, 488.
169. OND 61.53–69, 559–60.
170. Gl. ord. ad X 1.2.2, s.v. ‘culpa caret’; Gl. ord. ad X 4.13.11, s.v. ‘sine sua’; Gl. ord. ad D. 22 c. 6, s.v. ‘priusquam’. The subsequent references to Dig. 47.10.13.1 and 50.17.155.1 that Offler suggested, particularly the latter, are less convincing. See the discussion on p. 252, below.
171. See above, p. 82.
172. OND 61.71–75, 560: 155–157, 562. See also Gray 1986, 151–52. Ockham’s position was not very in tune with juridical thought, though there was no firm consensus on the precise nature of privileges. A privilege was often thought of as a concessio iuris guaranteeing a particular situation, and the canonists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries tended to see ‘dans le privilège une loi’; see Gaudemet 1986, 56 and 53, who was dealing with the ambiguous difference between a privilege and a ius singulare.
173. Dig. 1.3.31(30). Medieval jurists loved to discuss this claim; see especially Tierney 1963b, and Pennington 1993, 77–106.
174. OND 61.78–88, 560. See also AP 7.41–43, 1.253–54, citing X 4.5.4: ‘unusquisque in traditione seu collatione sive donatione rei suae potest legem, quam vult, imponere, dummodo nichil imponat, quod sit lege superiiori prohibitum’; and cf. AP 9.30–33, 1.258. Ockham subsequently related this idea to the mechanisms which govern donations to the Church, namely that the donor may impose whatever lex he or she so desires: OND 77.121–131, 626–27; cf. CB 6.4, 3.276.33–277.1; and OQ 1.15.18–23, 1.58.
be considered real positive law rights since they are subject to the arbitrary actions of the true right-holder.\textsuperscript{175} Ockham’s discussion leads one to believe, moreover, that it would be the responsibility of the right-holder rather than the enprivileged (as it were) to take legal action if a third-party interfered with the privilege.\textsuperscript{176}

**Licentia utendi**

The reason Ockham mentioned privileges was not because he wanted to argue that the Minorites had such quasi-rights in the things they used, but to point out that it is in fact possible for someone to be denied a certain action without cause. A fortiori, the same can be true of a *licentia utendi*, for a licence is, legally speaking, even weaker.\textsuperscript{177} Like a privilege, the latter sort of licences only exist *ad placitum concedentis*; where they differ, however, is that a licence confers no right. The purpose of a licence of using is to allow use, but with the possible inclusion of arbitrary conditions. That is, the duration of use is never fixed, but exists only as long as the granter of the licence wishes.\textsuperscript{178} But while the licence lasts, the licencee may employ the most general natural power of using.\textsuperscript{179} Ockham offered the standard example of poor guests invited to dinner: they have a licit power of using the food and drink placed before them, but only so long as the host wishes; and there is certainly no legal recourse if he changes his mind.\textsuperscript{180}

Ockham related this idea to the concept of a *gratia*—an idea novel to him.\textsuperscript{181} A grace confers a licit power of using, but the one granting such a grace can arbitrarily revoke this grace as he pleases without any danger of being called to court. Canonistic glosses are again the proof for Ockham’s position: a bishop’s *sumptus* is to be sought *ex gratia* rather than *ex iure*, and people elected to some position *de gratia* are not considered to

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\textsuperscript{175} Tabarroni 1999, 220–23, has stressed that Franciscan political thought was generally influenced by the idea that political arrangements could be enacted through promises. However, these were not as fragile as those that governed Franciscan poverty.

\textsuperscript{176} Cf. Kilcullen 2001b, 885 n. 10.

\textsuperscript{177} A similar account to the one presented can be found at Impug. § 18 (Knysh 2000, 250–51); but cf. the strange discription of the *licentia utendi* at Impug. § 4 (Knysh 2000, 243).

\textsuperscript{178} St Francis reflected this idea when he had all the brothers leave a hut because another man wished to stay there with his ass; see Thomas Celano, *Vita prima S. Francisci* 1.16.44 (AF, 10.34–35).

\textsuperscript{179} See below, p. 177.

\textsuperscript{180} OND 2.164–168, 302.

\textsuperscript{181} We should probably relate this to his theological writings. See, e.g., *Sent.* 4 q. 11 (OTh 7.213): ‘Ideo dico quod duplex est gratia: una est qualitas absoluta informans animam, alia est gratuita Dei voluntas. Primo modo loquendo de gratia, dico quod cadem est gratia gratum faciens et gratia virtutum et gratia sacramentalis cuiuscumque sacramenti.’ See the discussion in Baudry 1958, 105–6 and R. Wood 1999.
have obtained a *ius* or advantage. Simply put, there is a distinction to be drawn between *ius* and *gratia*.\(^{182}\)

The idea is, of course, that just as grace is supererogatory in that it is certainly a good thing to receive, but not something one can count on receiving,\(^ {183}\) so are the Franciscans supposed to be in an equally precarious situation: they are meant to hope for, not expect or demand, the kindness of strangers.\(^ {184}\) As he succinctly explained, the privation of grace ‘potest esse sine culpa’.\(^ {185}\)

Perhaps we should clarify that a licence *can* be a grace, for there are irrevocable licences—he mentioned a monk’s licence from a religious superior to enter a different order.\(^ {186}\) In fact, Ockham conceded that a some licences are *iura*; this is true when someone must not be deprived of such a licence without legitimate cause.\(^ {187}\) The example to which Ockham referred was Matthew 12.1, where Christ and his disciples went through the grain-fields on the Sabbath, picking and eating the heads of the grain.\(^ {188}\) But a licence of using was different in that it permitted the licence-holder to use the thing in question, but it did not imply any correlative duty on the part of others, particularly the owner(s), to refrain from arbitrarily revoking the licence at some point.\(^ {189}\)

One interesting result of this arrangement is that any licence which can be revoked by the granter by means of the *ius fori* should not be thought to be a part of the *ius fori*.\(^ {190}\) In turn, such licences cannot be said to be actionable, which also explains why they cannot be considered rights.\(^ {191}\) This will be important to Ockham’s account of Minorite poverty, for it allows for the friars to have various licences which exist ‘outside of’ the sphere of civil law.\(^ {192}\) In a sense it is rather a step ‘below’ in that the arrangement is

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182. *OND* 2.160–174, 302, citing *Gl. ord. ad C.* 10 q. 3 c. 7, s.v. ‘sumptus’, and *Gl. ord. ad X* 1.5.4, s.v. ‘de gratia’.
183. I owe Peter King thanks for helping me understand the significance of this point.
185. *Sent.* 4 q. 11 (OTh 7.195).
186. *OND* 61.89–94, 560. In fact, Ockham might well have added that there are also ‘intermediate’ licences, which are revocable with cause, e.g., the *licentia ubique docendi*. Cf. *Exiit*, 1119, about the *licentia praedicandi*: ‘quam quidem licentiam praefati ministri revocare et suspenderre valeant et arctare, sicut et quando id eis videbitur expedire’. Gray 1986, 151–52, has a very useful discussion of licences and privileges.
187. As Miethke 1969, 491 n. 221, has suggested, we should relate this idea to Francis’ concept of a *licentia iuris*; see above, p. 161.
188. See the discussion at *OND* 3.388–416, 321–322.
189. Tierney 2006, 370–74, recently analyzed this conception of a revocable licence in terms of a Hohfeldian conception of right, which corroborates the account given here: ‘A license is merely a permission to do an act which without such permission would amount to a trespass’ (italics Hohfeld’s). For Hohfeld in the context of canonistic thought, see the excellent account in Reid 1991, 60–72.
192. See, e.g., *OND* 60.101–118, 556.
meant to affect only the two individuals or groups (other than perhaps the others’ duty to respect the existence of the licence).

**USUS FACTI**

The terms ‘use of fact’ and ‘simple use of fact’ were common by the time of the *Opus nonaginta dierum*. Nicholas had already divided Bonaventure’s notion of *simplex usus* into *ius utendi* and *simplex facti usus*; Annabel Brett has recently argued that a novelty of Ockham’s treatise is that his definition of *usus facti* as only the act of using constituted a redefinition on Ockham’s part. Such a claim misrepresents Ockham’s own position and, as we have already seen, his debt to his Michaelist confreres. Use of fact can mean two different, though related, things: (1) an act of using, such as eating or drinking; or, (2) it can be taken for a licit power of doing (*eliciendi*) such an act. Of the two types of use of fact, the act of using is the more general meaning; this is, Ockham wrote, the only sense John was willing to accept.

Nicholas, according to the *Opus nonaginta dierum*, took use of fact more generally (*magis communiter*) than John, for he used the term in both these ways, while John did...
not. Apparently when Clement said that use ought to be common to all in Dilectissimis, he was talking about a licit power of using, not the act of using, nor any of the uses of right. Nicholas followed his lead in Exit, though at times he also meant the act of using by use of fact. If one is inclined to like the Michaelist poverty theory, Ockham’s reading of Exit is likely to persuade, but it is worth noting that he might be playing a little too loose here. Nicholas does talk about potestas in Exit, but on both occasions it is a ‘libera potestas revocandi’ which is said to reside with the donor of alms to the order. The pope, however, supposedly used usus facti in a narrower sense. Early on in the Opus nonaginta dierum, Ockham suggested that the pope only took use of fact to mean the act of using, never as a licit power.

The adjective ‘simplex’ does not add anything significant to this definition, but including it suggests either (1) that this kind of act does not require some right to be connected or adjoined to it, or (2) that the act is without any right of using. In the first sense, then, a user clearly does have an act of using, though this act does not necessarily require of itself (de se) a right of using from the ius fori. According to the second way, the phrase simple use of fact simply means that the act of using does not have, de facto, any connected right of using; it is, essentially, a way of saying ‘a bare act of using’, much like ‘bare use of right’ is called a use of right which is not usufruct. In short, an act of using need not be anything more complicated than an act of using. It may (often) be the case that other relationships (e.g., lordship) obtain, but an act of using does not depend on these other relationships. Or, in the case of (2), the act in question does not have (in reality) an adjoined right of using.

The point Ockham really wanted to make about simple use of fact is that it is present in every act of using, regardless of context:

Omnis enim actus exterior utendi re temporali, de quo nunc est sermo, est indifferentes

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200. OND 6.264–271, 361: ‘... quo modo accipit usum beatus Clemens, prout recitatur Dilectissimis, cum dicit: Communis enim usus omnium, quae sunt in hoc mundo, omnibus hominibus esse debuit, ubi non accipitur usus pro actu utendi nec pro usu, qui est usus iuris modus, nec pro usufructu, sed accipitur pro licta potestate utendi, et sic accipit usum facti Nicholaus III. Unde simplicem usum facti vocat licitam potestatem utendi, cui non est necessario annexum ius, quo usum valeat in iudicio vendicare; nonnunquam tamen usum facti vocat actum utendi.’ Cf. OND 32:304–342, 507–08.
201. Exit, 1115–16.
202. OND 71.111–134, 596–97. The other Michaelists never quite made this point, but it is an obvious extension of ideas implicit in their texts; see, e.g., App. Mon., 839, and Improbatio n. 579, 283. For a discussion of Ockham’s understanding of predication, see Freddoso 1980, 8–14; for an overview of Ockham’s logical programme in the SL, see King 2005.
ad actum licitum et illicitum: et ita omnis talis est simplex usus facti, hoc est, est usus, qui potest esse sine omni iure, immo potest esse contra ius et illicitus.²⁰³

The text continues, in fact, to repeat the claim that simplex is added in order to make it clear that, in the case of the Franciscans, no right is necessarily connected to their use of fact.²⁰⁴ Ockham did not specify ‘positive’ right here, but the point is made enough throughout the text that we can be fairly certain this is not a case of confused self-contradiction.²⁰⁵ Ultimately, Ockham seems to have believed that Nicolas added the term ‘simple use of fact’ to deal with the question of ‘use of necessary sustenance’. This is surely a reasonable, though controversial, concatenation of (1) the claim that the friars only have simple use of fact with (2) the claim that mortal life can do without proprietas, possessio, ususfructus, and ius utendi, but no professio which excludes the ‘usus necessarie sustentationis’ can exist in any way.²⁰⁶

Use of fact, denoting as it does merely the act of using or the power to perform such an act, can quite easily stand on its own. We have already seen that Ockham believed the narrow sense of use of fact (sumptus stricte), the act of using, did not need any basis in law. Thus, one might ask what its connection with lordship is. Dominium is founded of course by either divine, natural, or positive law. We have seen how Ockham was more or less uninterested in the first two categories when it came to the institution

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²⁰³ OND 58.117–120, 551; cf. 37.128–138, 517–18, and 56.59–63, 547. It may well be that part of the reason some scholars have been disappointed by Ockham’s theory of evangelical poverty has to do with the word ‘licit’. Licit, in this context, merely means ‘permitted by (some) law’. A licit act can be very different from a ‘good’ act, for whether an act should be considered good or bad should, in the first place, be decided with reference to the individual’s will (cf. King 1999, 229–32). In Connex. 2.200–210 (OTH 8.338), e.g., Ockham argued that ‘aliquis actus est intrinseece bonus moraliter, aliquis intrinseece malus et vitiosus, aliquis neuter sive indifferentes. Exemplum primi: velle orare propter honorem Dei et qua praecedent est a Deo secundum rectam rationem etc. Exemplum secundi: velle orare propter vanam gloriam et qua contra praecedent Dei et contra rectam rationem. Exemplum tertii: velle simpliciter orare sine aliqua circumstantia dictata a ratione, quia nec propter bonum finem nec propter malum, quia propter nullum finem; et talis actus, sive interior sive exterior, solum dicitur bonus denominatione extrinseca et nullo modo intrinseece, nec vitiosus’ (emphasis added).

That is, even if, strictly speaking, only acts of the will are ‘intrinseece laudabilis et vituperabilis’ (Quodl. 3.14.67–68 [OTH 7.254]), it is possible that an act can be meritorious (or not) through consideration of external circumstances (Connex. 2.212–29 [OTH 8.338–39]); but note that such acts (virtuous by extrinsic denomination) are in fact morally neutral or indifferent acts, and are virtuous only in so far as they are performed in conformity with necessarily virtuous acts (cf. R. Wood 1997, 198). Freppert 1988, 142, has noted that this is similar to the line taken by Scotus, but the pedigree stretches further back than that: Bonaventure made a similar claim; see Ap.paup. 1.7–8, 8.237b–38a.

²⁰⁴ OND 58.120–129, 551.

²⁰⁵ Cf. OND 35.62–65, 513, and 56.37–39, 547, where Ockham claimed—in an almost identical phrase—that Michael never understood simple use of fact as anything but use (of fact) with no necessarily attached right by which someone could litigate (for the use of the thing) in court.

²⁰⁶ OND 58.29–43, 549. Of course, although every use of necessary sustenance is a case of use of fact, this does not mean every use of fact is a case of use of necessary sustenance: OND 58.112–113, 551; the reference is to Exit, 1113.
of *dominium* (outside the unique situation of extreme necessity), for God’s lordship falls outside the scope of the poverty controversy, and the common lordship which exists by the law of nature is a special situation, which calls for its own discussion. The real issue, in Ockham’s opinion, was that use of fact did not depend on any lordship based in civil law:

\[ \ldots \text{tertium notabile, scilicet, usus facti, sicut actus comedendi et bibendi, potest a dominio in speciali separari. Quartum notabile, quod elicitur ex dictis istius impugnati, est quod dominium, de quo loquitur iste impugnatus in hoc casu, est dominium mundanum et civile, quod est potestas vel habens annexam potestatem libere vendendi, donandi, et sicut sibi placuerit disponendi res, quaurum habetur dominium.}^{207} \]

This is not to say that use of fact always excludes right and ownership, for many rich people live off only their own goods, merely that the separation is possible, especially through the abdication of all right (such as the Franciscans do).^{208}

This brings us to a further significant point in the debate: licit use. Even if use of fact *qua* an act of using can be considered in the abstract, this does not mean the act is really distinct from ethical and legal concerns. That is, these acts can still be considered licit or illicit, just or unjust, good or bad. A thief, for example, has illicit use of fact when he eats someone else’s food; such an act would also be unjust and morally wrong; nor, finally, would he gain legally actionable lordship over the food.^{209} For use of fact to be licit, Ockham claimed, only two conditions generally (*communiter*) need to hold: (1) ‘quod talis usus facti non sit volenti uti inhibitus’; and (2) ‘quod habeat licentiam utendi ab illo, qui potest licentiam talem concedere’. In other words, one who is not prohibited from wearing (say) a certain hat only needs permission to wear it from the owner (*dominus*), not some sort of concession of individual or common lordship.^{210} A licit power of using is required for use of fact to be licit. But since such a power was granted by God, and cannot be renounced, this is never a hard condition to fulfill.^{211}

It is extremely important to note, however, that this ‘licit’ power is *not* the same as the ‘natural right of using’, despite the claims of others.^{212} A licence is always granted by someone, while this most general power was granted by God; the latter is always present,

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208. *OND* 58.87–111, 550–51. The last sentence of this passage admits that *in una significatione* all simple use of fact does exclude *ius et proprietatem*; presumably, this is because we are talking about simple use of fact *qua* an act of using.
211. At *OND* 4.192–217, 333–34. Ockham explained that humans have a God-given ‘licita potestas utendi communissima’, which can make use of fact licit without lordship (provided the intention to acquire lordship is lacking); this power is irrenounceable.
212. See above, p. 169, for the natural right of using. Morrall 1949, 345–47, has made a claim of this sort.
but it can only be used, can only be *licita*, in two basic situations. The first is the in a time of extreme need, where *ius naturale* ensures that we can licitly act to preserve our life; but this is hardly the situation of day-to-day living, even for one as poor as a Franciscan. This is why a licence is needed: a *licentia utendi*, while it is granted, means that one can use the thing licitly. The power of using in this case is also *licita*.

In some ways, this was a dangerous position to adopt. For example, one problem is that this ‘*licita potestas utendi communissima*’ sounds like an euphemism for some kind of lordship (for what is such a power but some justified form of control over the object in question?), which would mean a licit act of using is not separable from all lordship. Ockham, however, insisted that there were two reasons why a power to use cannot be simply equated with lordship. In the first case, Ockham argued that although Adam and Eve had been given a power to use all temporals in one way, this need not be called lordship because they had also been given a non-coercive (*coactive*) power of using angels—which clearly did not involve having some sort of lordship over them. That is, our first parents had merely the power to use certain determinate things.213 Similarly, not every power of using can be considered (a type of lordship), for animals have a power of eating, but we do not say that they have lordship over what they eat.214

A cynic might well wonder at this point whether William saw any connection between an animal’s so-called power of eating and humankind’s natural power of using, though certainly the response would be on the basis of the fact that in the latter case the action is (usually) informed by reason.215 But, whatever the precise difference, the fact remains that the early community of believers managed to make do with use without lordship. As we have seen already, Christ was supposed to have avoided lordship and ownership in so far as he was a mortal and wayfaring man. He only had things *quantum ad use*, a licit power of using, a habit (or some kind of stewardship or management) of using.216

**PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS**

As adumbrated by Ockham, *usus* underwent some significant changes. Even a cursory comparison of Figure 5.3 with those for Michael (Fig. 5.1) and Francis (Fig. 5.2) show some noteworthy differences. I have come to the conclusion, however, that these schematizations exaggerate these differences to some extent. (And let us not forget that any scholastic

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213. See above, p. 129.
215. This distinction will become important in § 6.4 (p. 203 ff.), where questions of just use are raised. For now, it is important to note only that this distinction is what allows use to differentiate morally good and bad acts from indifferent ones; cf. *OND* 41.65–72, 524.
worth his salt could usually draw enough distinctions to reconcile the most surprising of things.) Thus, after summarizing Ockham’s general account of *usus*, we should consider in what respect Michael’s, Francis’, and Ockham’s tracts presented a united front against the pope’s definitions of *usus*.

The diagram shows first of all how Ockham further emphasized how narrow a definition of *usus* was at stake between the Michaelists and the papacy. It had nothing to do with *usus* as distinct from *fruitio*, which seems to be more of a philosophical meaning presumably deriving ultimately from Augustine. *Usus* might also be a synonym for *consuetudo* according to an early *capitulum* of the *Decretum*. These are all acceptable meanings of *usus*, just as the term might refer simply to the act of using, which, in fact, is the most common meaning of all.

The heart of the debate centred upon *usus* as the act of using and *usus* as a legal right. In the second sense it was what he called alternately a *ius speciale* or *ius determinatum*, which was merely a *ius utendi*. He was using language reminiscent of Michael’s *ius proprium* or *ius personale*, but Ockham reversed the previous relationship of *ius utendi* and *usus iuris* when he explained that every use of right was a right of using but not every right of using was a use of right. The reason for this reversal seems to be twofold. In the first place it makes sense for the crucial distinction between natural and positive rights of using (which roughly correspond to Francis’ spiritual and temporal rights of using): a use of right is thus implicitly limited to a positive use of right. Secondly, other property relations, such as *proprietas* and *dominium* also give their holder a right to use,
but these rights to use are far different than a more limited use of right, which may be either usufruct or *usus nudus*.

If one has lordship, ownership, usufruct, or bare use, one’s use is licit provided one does not violate the conditions of the lesser rights (such as the obligation to preserve the substance). However, this does not imply that an act of using without a related positive right must be illicit. It can be, as we shall see in the next chapter, but there are also licit acts of using. There are two possible ways this might occur. One might be able to engage, as it were, one’s natural right of using. This can only occur, however, when there are no positive law barriers to the use, which could occur if one came across some unowned item, say a nice walking stick out in the wilderness, or if one must make use of something in order to stay alive. I am continually reminded of the situation of Jean Valjean in *Les Misérables*, who was compelled to steal a loaf of bread to feed his starving family. Neither the Michaelists nor medieval canonists would deny him this right in principle, though as Brian Tierney noted some time ago, there was very likely a disconnect between the theory of extreme necessity and its actual application.

Of course, a Franciscan did not spend much time in danger of starvation, or in areas where there was a great number of unowned things. Thus, the primary means by which their power to use of things deserves to be called licit is when they are granted, *ex gratia*, a licence of using. A licence allows one to employ their most general, and now licit, power of using without granting them any legal rights to defend their use in court because the granting of the licence of using depends on the potentially fickle whim of the donor. It is therefore to be considered entirely different from a positive right of using, for it is protected by *ius naturale*, not *ius positivum*.

But if the details of the picture are different for Michael, Francis, and Ockham, the conclusions from each are essentially the same. In the Michaelist world there are five different ways an act of using can be licit: (1) the rare case of dire necessity allows a natural right of using to trump any potentially conflicting property rights; (2) owners may use their goods; (3) or give a use of right to another; (4) or give a licence of using to another; and, finally, (5) one may always licitly use an unowned thing. The key to all of this for Ockham is our God-given *communissima licita potestas utendi*, which, he claimed, is always present. This most general power of using is never explicitly identified with

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217. In Fig. 5.3 I use *simplex usus facti* to refer to the *nudus actus utendi* as described on p. 175 above.

218. Tierney 1959, 38–39. As Tierney also noted, however, we should keep in mind the great concern exhibited to the poor by means of personal and institutional alms-giving. The Franciscan order itself witnesses to this, for their commitment to evangelical poverty encouraged many to desire to donate to their cause. It is no small irony that the Franciscans were quite clearly victims of their own success. Wolf 2003, in an interesting and contentious study, read the ‘success’ of St Francis in this way.
our natural right of using, but it is hard to see what difference there can be between the two. Both are always present, but both always yield to existing property rights, except for the natural right in the case of extreme necessity. Since they seem to be the same in application, I am inclined to think they are two sides of the same coin and leave it at that. There are, after all, two other problems which we must yet consider: that of consumables and that of the corporate poverty of the Franciscan order.
CONSUMABLES, or fungibles, pose something of a special challenge in questions of ownership and property rights because of their impermanent nature. One might have no trouble accepting that John could give William a right to use (or maybe merely a licence to use) his favourite *calamus* for a specified amount of time, but have trouble understanding how John could give William a right, or worse a licence, to use a *sextarius* of irreplaceable oriental ink as well. This was as true for John XXII in the fourteenth century as it was for the author of a recent textbook on medieval economic thought. They both reasoned along the same lines. It is because the substance of a consumable, or a *res usu consumptibilis*, is destroyed through use that ownership is inseparable from its use.\(^1\)

At the risk of becoming too repetitive, let us review John’s position once more. For John there were three related problems. The first was that because use, as he understood it, demanded the preservation of the thing’s substance, consumables could not even be used, which was clearly meant to cut short the whole idea that Franciscans (merely) had a use of fact in all things. The second problem was that, even if for the sake of the argument we pretended that the definitional problem of *usus* were a semantic quibble, because all property rights are extinguished with the consumption of the fungible, only the holder of the property rights can licitly consume it. The second problem leads directly to the third: licit use must be, in the final analysis, just use. And just use requires at minimum a right of using for non-consumables, and lordship or ownership in the case of consumables.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Schlageter 1989, 195.

\(^2\) D. Wood 2002, 226, defined a fungible as ‘an object that is consumed in use, with the result that its use cannot be separated from its ownership’. Note that I use the terms consumable and fungible interchangeably.
Although Bonagratia’s last official entries in the poverty controversy were written before *Quia quorundam* and *Quia vir*, the *loci* of John’s stance on consumables, Bonagratia was aware of the objection that use and lordship might be thought to be inseparable in the case of consumables. He argued that the idea was absurd because it would mean that Christ and the apostles would have been ‘proprietarii in singulari’ and have had ‘in singulari dominia, proprietatem et possessiones pecuniarum’, for money, too, is a consumable. Bonagratia was thinking of the *lex* in Dig. 7.5.7, which said that in cases of usufruct for consumables, or things ‘quae usu continentur’, the *proprietas* itself ought to be transferred to the legatee. Thus, Bonagratia noted, this objection seemed to imply that he who renounces the ownership and lordship of consumables seems to renounce use of them as well. Yet instead of explaining *why* this wasn’t the case, he simply referred to *Exiit* and its account of the five *consideranda* for temporal goods. It was self-evident, he felt, that a slave, *filiusfamilias*, or religious would only have simple use of fact without ever having lordship, ownership, or right. It is likely that Bonagratia simply assumed the absurdity of this position, for, given the way he phrased John’s question on evangelical poverty, the question was only one of common proprietary lordship, and this objection led to the conclusion that Christ and the apostles would be individual property-holders, an idea Bonagratia might have felt was so unorthodox as to be beneath consideration. Durand of St-Pourçain’s own contribution to the consistory debate shows that this was not so unreasonable an assumption on Bonagratia’s part.

The importance of *usus* understandably became much more important in Bonagratia’s appeal against *Ad conditorem*. According to Bonagratia, one of three main points to emerge from *Exiit* is that the Friars Minor have only a simple use of fact, separate from all ownership and lordship. This includes consumables, for the lordship and

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4. Bonagratia, *De paup.*, 501–02. Similarly, neither monks nor religious could have usufruct: *De paup.*, 502–03.
5. This is surely the implication of his point in *App.ACC*, 94, that things given to religious automatically pass into the lordship of the Church: ‘Ex quibus manifeste patet quod proprietas et dominium omnium rerum quae propter Deum dantur, offeruntur seu conceduntur in speciali vel in communi Fratribus Minoribus, qui ex eorum professione et regula a se in speciali et ab ipsorum collegio in communi proprietatem omnium rerum abdicarunt et in communitate sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae remanserunt, in dominium communitatis sanctae Romanae et universalis Ecclesiae transferetur.’
6. See his *De paup.*, 187 (ed. in Miethke 1993), where he agreed that ‘omnis religiosus abdicat a se proprietatem quorumcumque bonorum temporalium’. This is not a full endorsement of Bonagratia’s assumption of course, but it is a Dominican’s step in that direction.
ownership held by the Church remains right up to the point of consumption (usque ad ... consumptionem). 8

Bonagratia was something of anoptimist: apparently everything the friars used was necessary for the preservation of their life or their ministry. This is not the same necessity as extreme necessity, but necessity in the sense that the proper performance of their duties requires that they use these things. 9 ‘Necessities’ clearly includes consumables like food and drink, as two leges of the Digest note. 10

The way Bonagratia proved usus to be separate from lordship and ownership owes everything to his theory of ius. We have already seen Bonagratia argue that there were no distinct dominia under natural and divine law, and that the meum / tuum distinction derived from ius humanum. 11 That is, because all things that look to the use (spectant ad usum) of humankind are common to everyone ‘de iure naturali et divino’: there is no lordship or ownership (necessarily) adjoined. 12 Bonagratia paired the ubiquitous Quo elongati and Dilectissimis with a snippet of Ambrose’s De officiis, which held that nature ensured a common possessio of the Earth for all to argue in effect that since there was use of necessities under natural law, which existed at the origin of rational creatures, and thus before the advent of human dominium, there must have been a use of things de iure naturali et divino without an adjoined ‘mine’ and ‘yours’. 13

Historically we have also seen cases where the dominium resides with God while priests have the use. According to Leviticus 27.30, for example, all tithes are the Lord’s; yet Numbers 18.23–24 says of the Levites that they possessed nothing but the tithes which the Lord gave for their use. ‘In “usus”’, Bonagratia noted, ‘non in proprietatem et dominium’. 14

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8. Bonagratia, App.ACC, 100.
9. Cf. the advice of Bonaventure, a strenuous proponent of the need for educated friars, in Regula novitiorum 16.3 (BOO 8.490b): ‘Unde nihil habeas nec per te nec per interpositam personam, et attende semper, ut nihil habeas in cella nisi necessaria, et hoc dico etiam de minimis rebus, ne forte negligendo modica paulatim cadas ad maiora.’ The growth of the order from simplices et illitterati to doctores clarissimos et peritissimos is, famously, what made Bonaventure especially love the life of St Francis; see Epistola de tribus quaestionibus 13 (BOO 8.336ab). The authenticity of this letter is a matter of debate. Brady 1975, 96, accepted it as genuine, whereas Distelbrink 1975, 45, remained open to the idea that it was not, even though it is admittedly Bonaventuran in tone and spirit.
10. Bonagratia, App.ACC, 100–01, citing Dig. 34.1.6 and 34.1.23.
11. See above, p. 78.
12. Bonagratia, App.ACC, 102: ‘Ex iure etiam naturali et divino constat in omnibus rebus, sive sint de illis quae non consumuntur usu sive sint de his quae consumuntur usu, usus rerum ipsarum non habet dominium sive proprietatem rerum adnexum sive adnexam, quia de iure naturali et divino omnia quae spectant ad usum hominum sic sunt communia omnibus hominibus, in Inst. 2.1.1.’ Cf. his De paup., 503.
In the sphere of positive law, de iure civil et canonico, Bonagratia could name three situations where lordship and use were separable. Slaves, filiifamilias, and monks all use consumable things where they do not have ad momentum any dominium, proprietias, or ius, only simple use of fact.15 Starting with the slave, Bonagratia noted that a slave does not have lordship of a peculium under Roman law, but that ownership and possessio (in its legal sense) resides with the dominus.16 Consumables may be the object of a peculium. Thus, even if food is entrusted (cibaria legantur) to a slave, the bequest is understood to be the lord’s.17 The same leges and outcome more or less apply for a filiusfamilias.18 That monks use things without dominium is shown through canon law. According to Cum monasterium (X 3.35.6), a decratal the Michaelists all cited and John ignored, monastic rules insist upon an abdication of all ownership in such a way that not even the pope can allow a dispensation.19 Thus, even a monk’s clothing is not considered his own, as one reads in a gloss to Non dicatis (C. 12 q. 1 c. 11). Interestingly, this gloss makes its case by reference to the situation of a slave’s peculium.20 Another gloss notes that neither monks nor religious are able to have usufruct, let alone lordship.21 The conclusion was clear: the lordship of the things a monk or a religious who can have proprium in communi always belongs to the monastery or community, while the simple use of fact belongs to the monk or religious. In other words, use is separable from ownership and lordship.22 In

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15. Bonagratia, De paup., 502; App.ACC, 104, only mentions lordship and ownership. Bertrand de la Tour briefly mentioned these three examples in a similar proof; see Tocco 1910, 72–73, and cf. Vital du Four’s remarks Christ could having clothing after the fashion of a slave: Tocco 1910, 80.


17. Bonagratia, App.ACC, 105; ‘Ipse enim servus, qui in alterius potestate est, nihil proprium habere potest, in Inst. 3.28.1 [see n. 30 in Appendix C]. Unde nec vestimenti sibi a domino suo traditi, nec alterius rei peculiaris habet dominium nec possessionem, Dig. 15.1.25, sed proprietas et possessio semper residet penes dominum, Dig. 41.2.1.5; et Dig. 41.2.24. Et si cibaria servis legentur, procul dubio domini est, non servorum legatum, ut dicitur Dig. 35.1.42, in fine.’ Cf. his De paup., 502.

18. Bonagratia, App.ACC, 105, citing Dig. 41.2.4, 41.2.1.5, 50.17.93, and 35.1.42; cf. De paup., 502.

19. Hostiensis summarized the point quite simply; Summa aurea ad X 3.35 n. 1. Qualiter monachi (fol. 1144): ‘Qualiter monachi uiuere debeat. Continenter et sine proprio, contra quod etiam summus Pontifex dispensare non potest.’ In the same passage, Hostiensis noted that monks are not even to have peculium, unless from a licence of the abbot ratione administrationis; he referred back to X 3.35.2, § Qui vero.

20. Gl. ord. ad C. 12 q. 1 c. 11, s.v. ‘possidere’: ‘Sed nunquid uestis est sua quam habet? Vel nunquid dicitur possidere res temporales uel uestem? Non videtur: qua uestis qua semper utitur servus, de peculio domini est. Dig. 15.1.25. Sed servus non possidet ea quae sunt in peculio: ut Dig. 41.2.1.24. Item qui ab alio possidetur, ipse nihil possidet: ut Dig. 48.5.22(21).’ It is worth noting that this gloss goes on to argue that monks cannot sue or be sued in their own name (except in specific cases).

21. See Gl. ord. ad C. 19 q. 3 c. 9, s.v. ‘non extantibus’.

22. Bonagratia, App.ACC, 105; cf. his De paup., 502–03.
the next chapter we shall see how an order may only have a use of fact while the lordship and ownership resides with someone else.

6.2 Michael of Cesena

Unlike Bonagratia, Michael of Cesena had the dubious advantage of reading through other bulls besides *Ad conditorem*, not to mention that he published his first two appeals almost four years after *Quia quorundam*. He had a lot to chew on, and this perhaps accounts for the somewhat disorganized nature of the *Appellatio maior*.\(^{23}\) However, although some of the problems of consumable were touched upon in *Ad conditorem* already, important refinements and additions were made in both *Quia quorundam* and *Quia vir*. Consequently, whether partial to the Michaelist cause or not, readers will likely find Michael’s own position more satisfying than the groundwork laid down by Bonagratia.

*(ab-)*using consumables

Michael of Cesena had a venerable tradition to draw on when it came to dealing with the problem of how the use of consumables could be separate from property rights.\(^{24}\) But John’s point that one did not properly “use” consumables, only consumed or ab-used them, was in a sense new.

That is, the terminology was new; but the essential problem was an old one, and Michael found fault with the novel terminology, which he referred to at one point as a *profana vocis novitas*.\(^{25}\) No one denied, of course, that the use of consumables resulted in a thing’s consumption. *Abusus* and *abuti*, however, are not good terms to use in this context. It was a point that the Michaelists would repeat again and again. The prefix *ab* did not merely intensify the meaning of *usus* as John had claimed,\(^{26}\) *usus* and *abusus* were in fact opposites in the same way that the words *habitus* and *privatio* were opposites. This was what Augustine was getting at in his book *De doctrina christiana* when he termed illicit use *abusus vel abusio*.\(^{27}\) Michael drew the expected conclusion: ‘ergo per

\(^{23}\) It is, for instance, almost impossible to keep track of which errors and heresies, or sub-errors and sub-heresies, stem from *CIN*. And he had already anticipated all the problems of *QQM* by the time he got to them. The *App.mon.*, in contrast, is a model of clarity.

\(^{24}\) In addition to the list of usual suspects provided in the poverty controversy surveys, one should also consult the texts in Tocco 1910, 51–173. Admittedly, most of the responses are less than inspiring compared with the Michaelist texts.

\(^{25}\) *App.mai.*, 259.

\(^{26}\) See above, p. 42.

\(^{27}\) See above, p. 156.
oppositum, usus est licitus usus’. When making the same point in his earlier appeal, Michael gave the example of someone who uses food ‘propter Deum’; such a person uses the food in line with the nature of the food as it is set out in 1 Timothy 4.1–3, which explains that God created food ‘ad percipiendum cum gratiarum actione fidelibus’. The point for Michael was that one who uses food in this way ‘vescitur cum gratiarum actione’: he most certainly does not ‘abuse’ it. This sort of language may be the proximate source for Ockham’s discussion of a licence being a grace, although it is equally clear that Ockham reformulated the language into a more useful format.

*Abusus* could only refer to the mis-use of a thing, to use something against or not in line with (*contra; non secundum*) nature. It was merely a *corruptio usus*. Michael was not willing to accept the idea that we can use ‘ab-use’ to mean consumption, mainly because the term simply had too negative a connotation: ‘abusus regulariter in malam partem accipitur sive sonat’. It simply would not do to have ‘Abutere modico vino’ in 1 Timothy 5.23, for example, or to say that Christ and the apostles went about ‘ab-using’ consumables in their daily life.

Perhaps the most interesting point of Michael’s response for this topic was when he considered what followed from the possibility that there might be two different kinds of ab-use, one where it means illicit use, and a another where it means ‘usus improprius, non tamen illicitus sed licitus’. This second improper but licit use, however, which we sometimes call ab-use, only applies to (*solum attenditur circa*) words and modes of speaking. We may speak improperly, but we are abusing the language. Ab-use *qua* illicit use, however, applies to things. And it is thus the second meaning that must be understood when talking about food and drink and the like. And of course when Clement V said in *Exivi* that the brothers had a moderate use of necessities, and that people necessarily need a simple use of fact, he clearly meant consumables and that the brothers’ use of them was licit.

**The vanishing dominium of consumables**

Arguing over whether one should use *usus* or *abusus* when talking about consumables may seem like a pedant’s pastime, but it was closely connected to a much more serious problem, namely, the problem that through a consumable’s (ab-)use the lordship of the consumable

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30. And, as such, wherever use could not occur, neither could ab-use: *App.mai.*, 259; cf. *App.min.*, 436.
32. *App.mai.*, 259–60. Ockham, it may be noted, never bothered with forestalling this objection.
is also consumed. To John that seemed incontrovertible proof that any legitimate *usuarius* must have some sort of property right to the consumable. John had argued that licit use of a consumable meant that one had to have a *ius abutendi*, or simply *abusus* in Roman law, which is perhaps best translated as a ‘right of disposal’.\(^{34}\) As this was a feature of lordship, the pope’s argument concluded that one had to have ownership of a consumable in order to use it. Closely connected to this was the apparent problem that the owner’s lordship would seem to be forever severed from the temporal utility that comes from the use of the consumable; that is, consumption of a consumable by the non-owner would seem to violate the Roman law principle that one cannot have a perpetual usufruct.

Although Michael touched on this topic in his earlier writings, because the pope’s most detailed argument on this topic only emerged in *Quia vir*, the *Appellatio monacensis* contains the most systematic response. Of the seven reasons why John’s conclusion and the means by which he got to the conclusion that the use of consumables cannot be separated from lordship and ownership, several bear directly on the problem that the lordship vanishes along with the consumable. The first reason is straightforward. Through ‘consumptive use’, regardless of whether it is just or not, any sort of *dominium iuris* or *ius utendi* to the substance is also consumed. Thus, if a just use of consumables cannot be separated from lordship and ownership because both the substance and the property rights are consumed through that use, the argument would seem to lead to the conclusion that an unjust use of consumables could not be separated from lordship and ownership as well. In either case, the lordship and ownership are consumed.\(^{35}\) In other words, when thieves consume things they have stolen, on John’s argument they would become the owners of the stolen goods they consume.

The fourth argument attacks the problem from a consideration of the differences between individual and common ownership. Clearly, both types of lordship are consumed when a consumable is used. Thus if the use is inseparable because the lordship is consumed,

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\(^{34}\) See above, 42.

\(^{35}\) *App.mon.*, 821: ‘Primo, quoniam constat quod per usum consumptivum iniustum rerum usu consumptibilium ita consumitur quaecunque proprietas et quodcumque dominium iuris ac etiam ius utendi ipsarum sicut per usum iustum et licitum, quia post usum consumptivum iniustum earum non plus remanet proprietias et dominium quodcumque iuris, nec etiam ius utendi ipsarum, quam post usum iustum. Si ergo usus talium rerum non potest a proprietate et dominio separari eo quod per actum utendi et cum ipso actu et in ipso actu earum substantia consumitur ac proprietas et dominium, ... et per actum utendi ita consumitur quaecunque proprietas et dominium iuris ac etiam ius utendi ipsarum sicut per actum iustum utendi, sequitur necessario, secundum suum medium eroneum, quod usus iniustus talium rerum non possit separari a proprietate et dominio iuris, nec etiam a iure utendi ipsarum, cum quodlibet eorum ita consumatur per usum consumptivum iniustum sicut per usum iustum. Et ita usus iniustus erit necessario iustus, quia usus indivisus et inseparabilis a quolibet dominio et iure utendi, nulla alia circumstantia vitius, est usus in se iustus’ (emphasis added). The force of the argument clearly depends upon the ‘eo quod’.
it would seem that the use of consumables is also inseparable from common lordship. So it would seem that all religious, who vow to live without anything of their own, are actually *proprietarii* and have *dominium proprietatis* both individually and in common, since they ‘habeant usum talium, et usus talium, secundum utrumque eius medium, sit inseparabilis a quolibet proprietatis dominio, tam proprio quam communi’—which would make a mockery of a religious’ vow to live *sine proprio*.

The fifth reason built upon the fourth. If the pope’s thesis about the inseparability for consumables of use and lordship were true, then it would seem one had to be granting the lordship with the use. After all, a superior’s *potestas ordinandi et dispondendi* regarding an inferior’s use and mode of using can no more be preserved than can the actual lordship. Therefore, the ‘usus inferiorum in quacumque religione non est separabilis a libera potestate ordinandi et disponendi de usu et modo utendi’. This in turn would mean that the inferior who used the thing would have this free power and would thenceforth not subject to the decisions and decrees of their superiors—which would destroy all *religio* as far as the chain of obedience is concerned.

The sixth and seven reasons are variations on the same theme, the former about a king’s lordship over his subjects’ things, while the latter considers the problem with respect to God’s lordship. In both cases the lordship is only mediate and only indirectly consumed. Not withstanding the profound difference between human and divine lordship, the point is the same: mediate lordship, regardless of type, is certainly separable if not always separate from the consumptive use. Otherwise, in the case of secular lords, the subjects would not have to recognize them as their superiors and lords, but would freely and absolutely hold and possess these consumables—‘quod est contra omnem ordinem principatus politici’. In other words, Michael saw that the pope’s arguments led to the untenable idea that the established political order has no stake in the affairs of its citizens. The Minister-General instead saw himself arguing along quite different lines. We might reasonably expect that the emperor, Michael’s protector, would be pleased to hear that a *princeps’ mediate lordship is far from useless*. At the very least, the advantage and utility of the subjects redounds to the advantage of their lords.

As for divine lordship, the *dominium Dei actuale* is consumed when a consumable is used much like human lordship—though there remains a virtual and possible lordship of God insofar as he could repair the consumed thing in number. The example cited in this

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36. *App.mon.*, 823–24. As this was precisely John’s view, there is a good case to be made that arguments of this tenor were meant less to convince John than they were meant to convince the wider world, especially those in religious orders.


connection was that of sacrifices and oblations. They are consumed through our use, but God has ‘dominium generale et speciale’.\textsuperscript{40}

There was also a related problem. According to John, the act of using itself cannot be had. The nature of consumables makes the example even more poignant because it is not clear when the lordship actually ceases to be. John’s solution was simple: lordship is consumed through the use, that is to say through the \textit{actus perfectus};\textsuperscript{41} but, for consumables, the lordship itself is transferred along with the use (for non-consumables, at least the right of using is passed). This was a suspicious argument for the Michaelists. They found the pope’s idea of a ‘completed’ act too fuzzy, and outright denied that lordship has to transfer with the use.

That simple use could not be ‘had’ was considered John’s fourth error in the \textit{Appellatio minor}.\textsuperscript{42} The shorter appeal, which was clearly aimed at a larger audience than the more detailed \textit{Appellatio maior}, focused on showing that the pope was in effect arguing that Christ never did things like eat, drink, preach, or wash his disciples’ feet. For, according to John’s division of an action, this would have to have happened either \textit{ante actum}, \textit{post actum}, or \textit{in ipso actu}. The first alternative fails, Michael argued, because at this point acts of eating, drinking, and the like only exist in potency.\textsuperscript{43} After the act also fails, because the act does not do (\textit{exercere}) anything then. And as for during the act, Michael argued that John’s subdivision of the present into so small a moment that it can only be intellectually understood, not experienced, is in fact but a summary of a position Aristotle refuted in his \textit{Physics}.\textsuperscript{44}

Moreover, it would seem that the pope’s argument also proved that use could never be conjoined to lordship for the same reason it could not be separate. After all, if use cannot be had because it does not perceptually exist, it is not clear how it could be joined with something or not.\textsuperscript{45} The \textit{Appellatio monacensis} built on this argument in some detail. The basic premise was one Francis also favoured, namely that lordship was lordship regardless of whether it was lordship over a consumable or not:\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{quote}
Sed natura rerum usu consumptibilium est eadem genere et specie in speciali et in communi, quia differentia subiectorum utentium non variat genere nec specie naturam rerum utibilium, et per usum rerum usu consumptibilium ita consumitur dominium
\end{quote}

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\textsuperscript{40} & \textit{App.mon.}, 825–27. \\
\textsuperscript{41} & See above, p. 43. \\
\textsuperscript{42} & Michael quoted from \textit{ACC\textsuperscript{2}} 168–187 (Tarrant \textsuperscript{1983}, 243–45). \\
\textsuperscript{43} & \textit{App.mai.}, 267, adduces proof from \textit{X} 3.48.5(!), and 4.2.13. \\
\textsuperscript{44} & \textit{App.min.}, 439. The similarities between John’s opinion and the one Aristotle refutes are indeed striking; see Aristotle, \textit{Physics} 4.10 217b30–218a9 (Bossier and Brams \textsuperscript{1990}, 170). \\
\textsuperscript{45} & \textit{App.min.}, 439–40; \textit{App.mai.}, 268. \\
\textsuperscript{46} & \textit{App.mon.}, 829.
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
commune sicut consumitur dominium proprium, quia post usum earum non plus
remanet dominium commune quam dominium proprium et e converso.\textsuperscript{47}

If someone can use something separate from common lordship, which is the situation of
most religious, there is no reason why that person could not use something separate from
individual lordship. That is, because use was separable from common lordship, it was ‘de
se et de natura sua . . . separabilis simpliciter et absolute’.\textsuperscript{48}

Although Michael never subjected the pope’s argument to an investigation of the
semantics of \textit{perfectus} to the same degree that Ockham would, it is clear that he thought
the pope’s concern about the problem of locating an act of using in time to be a little
absurd. As for figuring out at what point a lord ceases to have lordship of a consumable
good, Michael put it this way: not all so-called consumables deteriorate immediately at
the first instance of being used; this is even true to some extent for a crust of bread.
Therefore, ‘sicut non est inconveniens quod dominus habeat dominium servi comedentis,
ita non est inconveniens quod habeat dominium cibi vel panis exsistentis in ore servi’.\textsuperscript{49}

In the longer appeal he added that this was because the slave was actually unable to
obtain ownership, lordship, or (legal) \textit{possessio} insofar as he was under the authority
\textit{(potestas)} of another.\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{MUST LICIT USE BE JUST?}

In the last chapter we saw that the Michaelists thought a licence of using was enough
to ensure that any subsequent use would be licit so long as the licence was still in force.
The pope, on the other hand, argued that this licence had to be a sort of \textit{ius} because
otherwise that use would not be just, and \textit{ipso facto} illicit. No Franciscan doubted that
a friar’s use was to be licit and just, of course, but the Michaelists were convinced that
John simply had a wrong-headed conception of what the prerequisites were.

Surprisingly, Michael seems to have been unable to come up with a worthwhile solution
to this problem. Before the pope had formulated the strong version of his position in
\textit{Quia quorundam}, Michael had only to deal with the case of \textit{Ad conditorem}, which had
simply argued that just use needed at least a right of using. Michael saw three problems
with this simplified position. At their root, they all conflicted with some aspect of what
Nicholas had intended in \textit{Exiiit}. He first quoted from where Nicholas had said that, of the
five \textit{consideranda} for temporal things, simple use of fact was necessary and no religious

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{App.mon.}, 833–34.
\textsuperscript{48} \textit{App.mon.}, 834.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{App.min.}, 440.
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{App.mai.}, 269.
profession could exclude from itself ‘usum necessariae sustentationis’. Nicholas thus clearly thought simple use of fact could be licitly had without property rights, for one cannot licitly lack things like *proprietas*, *possessio*, *ususfructus*, or *ius utendi*, and be content with only simple use of fact if the simple use of fact were an unjust act. On a related point, Michael argued that since *Exiit* sanctioned the Franciscan poverty theory, and since this theory vowed to follow Christ in this type of poverty, it must be licit and just to have simple use of fact without any right of using provided one has a licence to use:

\[
\text{quia aliud est habere ius utendi et aliud est habere licentiam utendi, et ideo quamvis usus absque omni iure et licentia esset illicitus, usus tamen absque iure utendi, cum licentia tamen utendi, non est illicitus.}
\]

This last was clearly an argument that would only convince one who needed no convincing.

For the third point, he quoted again the decretal. *Exiit* explicitly spoke of a ‘usus non iuris sed facti tantummodo nomen habens; quod facti est tantum, in utendo praebet utentibus nihil iuris’. From there, Michael pointed out that the Church cannot err, and went on to examine more closely the nature of *ius utendi*, the types of *ius*, and the nature of *licentiae*, all in a bid to maintain that simple use of fact without a right of using is not to be thought of as (necessarily) unjust. But as these are all topics we have already investigated, there is no need to retrace our steps now.

### 6.3 Francis of Marchia

Francis located a lot of his argumentation against the pope in his various discussions about consumables, for the implication was that any argument that could prove the separability of use and lordship or rights of use would also, a fortiori, be valid for non-consumables.

(AB)USING CONSUMABLES

Francis, like the other Michaelists, was not at all convinced of the need for or accuracy of this new terminology of *abusus*. John, we know, had argued that of the five *consideranda*

Nicholas described in *Exiit*, the only one that applied to consumables was ownership. Francis' main problem with the pope's position was again its implicit assumption that legal definitions suffice for a general understanding of the question, which also explained why the pope had the strange idea that use of fact could not be 'had'.

We shall return to this problem in the next section; first let us start with the terminology. Francis began by pointing out that the use John claimed to have been discussing was one 'divided against' the other four *consideranda* of *Exiit*, but the pope's civil law definition of use as a right of using with the substance preserved precluded this possibility. John was thinking in terms of civil law and Nicholas was not, Francis claimed, for while Nicholas divided simple use of fact against ownership, possession (which Francis consistently omits in his discussion), usufruct, and right of using, the laws do not take *usus* and *uti* as divided against usufruct and a right of using, for they fall under the very definition of use.

The pope's claim that use and using are an imprecise way of speaking about consumption and consuming is equally confused. If, as John claimed, Scripture always meant consumption and consuming when it said use and using, then the two are synonymous, and if the one is found in consumables, the other must be as well. In fact, the connection between either of these sets of terms to ab-use and ab-using is far more tenuous. Francis was adamant that sacred Scripture never took use or consumption for ab-use. The pope's terminology was, in short, profane and unsuitable, neither in concordance with sacred Scripture nor with the fathers when they spoke about consumables, nor even with common usage, which both Aristotle and Augustine endorse as commonsense.

More to the point, civil law opposes *abusus* to a use of right insofar as the latter requires the preservation of the substance, but it does not universally oppose *abusus* to *usus*, particularly not to 'usu actuali facti', for the laws do not deny this use for consumables. Human laws do not deny consumables a use of fact composed of both the act of using and a natural right of using; however, since John’s use of right demands the preservation of the substance, it clearly cannot apply to consumables. Passages in the *Institutes* in fact suppose an act of using and an actual use of fact.

56. *Improbatio* n. 567, 277.
59. *Improbatio* n. 605, 291: ‘quia si consumptio est usus et consumi uti, et in talibus proprie reperitur consumptio et consumi, ego in eis proprie reperitur usus et uti’.
60. *Improbatio* n. 606, 291. Elsewhere he would claim that the terms are opposites: n. 615, 294–95.
62. *Improbatio* n. 632, 300–01; Francis cited Inst. 2.5.5 as evidence.
63. *Improbatio* n. 653, 306.
64. *Improbatio* nn. 655–656, 307, citing Inst. 2.5.pr.–1, 2.5.4. See Appendix 25 on p. 281 below for a
In a much longer-winded fashion, Francis argued that John’s reasons for championing ab-use as the proper term for consumables fell flat, but we should notice some of the friar’s disingenuousness here. Even if we accept that a legal definition of use—whether it can pertain to consumables or not—is too narrow for a generic definition, it does not follow that abusus is not a more accurate term for the use of consumables. John was in fact being entirely consistent when he argued that use could not apply to res usu consumptibiles (since it demanded that the item not be consumed or used up), nor that use was a good way of describing what one did with consumables. The real point, and this was not lost on Francis, was that because a consumable was consumed through (ab-)use, a right of using was not enough to ensure just or licit use of a thing; because the dominium of a thing vanished along with the thing, one had to have a right to consume the lordship as well. This is the subject of our next section.

**THE VANISHING DOMINium OF CONSUMABLES**

Francis’ solution to the problem of the vanishing dominium was to examine the nature of lordship as a consumable is (being) consumed. John had argued that the lordship of a consumable was consumed along with the thing. Francis agreed to this, of course, but used this point to demonstrate the separability of use and lordship. Francis made his point in a number of ways.

One approach was to attack the pope’s position from a logical perspective. Beginning with the axiom that a universal conclusion does not follow from a particular middle term (ex medio particulari) in any science except accidentally, he noted next (as we have already seen) that John’s definition of use, which required the substance to be preserved, was not a universal definition. At best the pope’s argument can only conclude that that use, under this specific definition, cannot be found in consumables.\(^6\)

Francis also gave a number of examples that he believed clearly proved the separability of use and lordship. The first example Francis adduced was what happened to God’s lordship when a thing is consumed (which was, admittedly, not a question that John felt was relevant to the question at hand). When a thing is consumed, Francis explained, both human lordship and, indirectly, God’s actual divine lordship is consumed. As it is clear that our use is separate from divine lordship, it follows that use is separable from lordship in this case at least.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) discussion of Francis’ confused reference. We should also note that Francis failed to mention Azo in this connection, unlike Michael and William.

\(^6\) *Improbatio* n. 26, 60.

\(^6\) *Improbatio* nn. 10–11, 50–51.
The other two examples were more mundane. He explained first that John’s own position, incoherent as it was, conceded the very conclusion that he was arguing against. One example was that of an individual using something that was communally owned. With respect to the consumption of a thing, it does not matter whether the thing is *proprium* or *commune*, ‘quia post usum non plus remanet substantia propria quam communis’. If John were right then, it would follow that use would be inseparable from both individual and communal ownership and lordship, for neither would be preserved after a consumable had been used. Thus, among the first multitude of believers, everyone would have had individual and communal onwership and lordship of the things they used, contrary to what we read in Acts 4.32. Francis employed his *de possibili* argument here as well. If, he wrote, the members of the early Christian community each had personal use for some time separate from individual ownership and lordship—as the passage in Acts suggests—’eadem ratione potuit [sc. quilibet credencium] habere de possibili usum talium separatum a proprietate et dominio communi’. After all, ownership is consumed regardless of whether it is individual or communal. The similarity to Michael’s argument needs no elaboration.

The other example Francis offered was that of unjust use. We shall come to his arguments on this topic in a moment, but for now the point was simply that if unjust use entailed use without ownership or rights of use, this alone would be enough to demonstrate their inherent separability: through unjust use ‘consumatur omnis proprietas et dominium ipsarum siue iuris siue facti’. Otherwise, he explained, all things would, *de iure*, belong to the thieves and bandits.

Clearly, neither side would defend a claim of this sort. But the problem remains as to how one can consume things that are not his own, as does the uncertainty of how and how long the owner maintains lordship over an item that someone else is consuming. John, we know, believed that consumables are consumed ‘per usum utendi perfectum’, which is why they are so called.

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67. *Improbatio* n. 23, 57.
68. *Improbatio* n. 24, 58; cf. nn. 102–103, 92. As he noted, this was not a conclusion that John had explicitly come to.
69. *Improbatio* n. 137, 105; cf. n. 65, 77; and n. 338, 185.
70. *Improbatio* n. 25, 59. To drive home the foolishness of John’s position, he added: ‘Ynmo ex hoc sequitur quod usus injustus sit inseparabilis a iure utendi quocunque ipsarum, quia per usum inium istum ipsarum consumitur quodcunque ius utendi earum sicut per usum iustum, cum post usum inium non remaneat aliqaud ius utendi earum. Et ita usus inius justus usus justus, cum usus a iure utendi indiusus sit usus iustus: quod est erroneous et insanum.’ In passing, we might wonder what Francis meant by a *proprietas* or *dominium facti*, since he clearly thought all legitimate lordship was a legal title to a thing; but it is a small slip, I think, and not one we should be overly concerned with: after all, no matter what it is, it is indisputable that it would be consumed by a consumptive act.
71. *Improbatio* n. 791, 352; see above, p. 43.
It was for this reason that John denied that use of fact could be ‘had’. It too, like *dominium*, suffered from a tendency to vanish under scrutiny. Francis did not take kindly to the pope’s attempt to becloud (*obnubilare*) the eyes of men.\(^7^2\) As usual, John’s arguments ran the risk of overturning the truth of Scripture. The very key to his argument, that ‘esse rem perfectam significat’,\(^7^3\) only proved—were it true—that one cannot give or concede use to anyone else,\(^7^4\) and that no one could ever come to do anything corporally.\(^7^5\)

These conclusions derived from two related considerations: first the nature of non-permanent, successive things, and the basic relationship between *esse* and *fieri*. Consumables naturally do not belong in the category of permanent things, but that does not preclude them from being had successively in the way time is had.\(^7^6\) The concrete example Francis offered were taken from Scripture. The existence (*esse*) of a thing, John suggested, indicated the completed act.\(^7^7\) A claim of this sort would make a mockery of the two men’s response to Jesus that today is the third day (Luc. 24.21), or that it was the winter at the time of the Feast of the Dedication (Io. 10.22), or that it was night when Judas left after Jesus predicted his betrayal (Io. 13.30).\(^7^8\) In all these cases, the existence of those temporal moments did not depend on their being *perfecta*. The same, Francis felt, could thus be true about moments relating to use of fact.

One might object that the way we might have an apple while we consume it does not, after all, seem similar to the way we experience—‘have’—time. The analogy with time was not Francis’ fault, however: John had raised the issue first.\(^7^9\) The pope had argued that use of fact did not ever exist in reality (*in rerum natura*), not before, during, or after the act. This implied, Francis noted, that there would never be, *formaliter*, a user. The analogy this time is to a quality: just as a white thing is not formally white except by whiteness, so a user is not formally a user except by use. Thus, what John was in fact arguing was that ‘nullus unquam utatur actu aliqua re quacunque in rerum natura’.\(^8^0\)

The other consideration the pope’s claim about *esse* brings out is the relationship between *esse* and *fieri*, for just as the *esse* of a permanent thing consists in permanent being, so the *esse rei successiue* consists in successive becoming (*in fieri successiue*). In

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\(^7^2\) *Improbatio* n. 787, 350.

\(^7^3\) *Improbatio* n. 771, 345; part of a (highly inaccurate) quotation from ACC\(^2\) 168–185, 243–45.

\(^7^4\) *Improbatio* n. 783, 349.

\(^7^5\) *Improbatio* n. 781. 348. A similar argument was made in the *App.min.*, 439.

\(^7^6\) "non est de genere permanencium".

\(^7^7\) Above, p. 43. Note, however, that John never used the exact phrase ‘esse rem perfectam significat’ that Francis ascribed to him.

\(^7^8\) *Improbatio* n. 778, 247.

\(^7^9\) Above, p. 43.

\(^8^0\) *Improbatio* nn. 775–776, 346.
other words, John was wrong: ‘ergo esse rei successiue signifcat ipsum in fieri successiuo
sicut habet esse in fieri successiuo et non in esse perfecto’.\footnote{Improbatio n. 779, 347–48.}

The fact that the existence of a successive thing exists in successive becoming means
that the pope’s position, were it true, would lead to all kinds of preposterous problems.
For example, since a successive thing exists through becoming, if it is impossible for the
successive to exist in reality, then it is impossible that it could come about. (Francis
suggested John’s ‘quod impossible est esse, impossibile est haberi’ is the equivalent of
‘quod impossibile est esse, impossibile est fieri’.) But this would mean that Christ, the
apostles, and other faithful Catholics never did anything that Scripture says they did—for
what was impossible to do was never done.\footnote{Improbatio n. 781, 348.}

The conclusion we are left with is that a successive thing, like use of fact, can be
held successively. And if it can be held successively, then surely the use of consumables
is separable from lordship as long as the ‘res nondum est consumpta’.\footnote{Improbatio n. 792, 352.}
Put another way, John’s claim fell apart no matter how one looked at it. There were two ways
of thinking about what happened when consumables were used: either ownership and
lordship remained continuously while a consumable was being used or not. If not, and
lordship ceased ‘ante finem usus’, and (as John had said) the right of using was not
separate from ownership and lordship, then the right of using does not remain continuously
under use, but ceases before the end of use. Consequently, it follows that use is separate
from ownership and a right of using for the time at which neither the ownership nor the
right of using remains. And thus the Michaelist position is proved: there can be just use
without ownership and without a right of using.\footnote{Improbatio n. 793, 352–53.}

The other alternative is no better. The pope would have to face two problems if
ownership endured until the end of the act of use. The first problem was that this
position amounted to admitting that use, properly so-called, is found in consumables. For
the reason it was denied was that use does not presuppose the saving of the substance
any more than ownership and lordship: use was only denied of such things because the
lordship and ownership were consumed through ‘use’. A thing is properly someone’s
with respect to lordship as long as the ownership and lordship are preserved under
use; therefore, use is properly found in a thing as long as someone has lordship of it.\footnote{Improbatio n. 795, 353.}
Moreover, if ownership endured as long as the act of using did, use must be separate
from ownership and lordship insofar as a use under which ownership and lordship is

\footnote{Improbatio n. 779, 347–48.}
\footnote{Improbatio n. 781, 348.}
\footnote{Improbatio n. 792, 352.}
\footnote{Improbatio n. 793, 352–53.}
\footnote{Improbatio n. 795, 353.}
continuously preserved is continuously separable from ownership and lordship. Therefore, if ownership and lordship endures as long as use does, but no longer, it follows that use is separable while it endures—though ownership is not separable after ‘usus perfectus’.\textsuperscript{86}

**MUST LICIT USE BE JUST?**

In many ways, the crux of John’s case against the Michaelist position lay in his argument about the prerequisites for licit and just use. For use to be licit, as we have seen, it must be just; and just use entailed at least a right of using, or, in the case of consumables, at least a claim of ownership. This meant, of course, that any so-called *licentia utendi*, if it meant anything, meant no less than a right of using.

Francis’ twofold *licentia* and their relationship to *ius* allowed Francis to agree that licit use must be just without equating the licence and the right. As he explained, a use for which neither a ‘ius utendi temporale nec spirituale’ corresponds cannot be just, but a spiritual right of using suffices for an act to be just.\textsuperscript{87} Thus, on Francis’ reading of X 5.40.12, when Isidore wrote ‘Quod iuste fit, iure fit’, we should understand ‘iure spirituali, et non iure temporali’, the latter being the one Michael denied and John affirmed in their exchanges with one another.

As for the pope’s other point on this issue, that there are no indifferent acts insofar as they are always just or unjust, Francis had little to say:

\begin{quote}
Quod vero dicit [John], quod ‘inter iustum et iniustum non [Michael] est dare actum humanum indifferentem’,\textsuperscript{88} est falsum de actu humano iusto ex iure utendi temporali, et iniusto ex opposito iuris utendi temporalis, quia [Michael] est dare actum humanum denudatum omni iure utendi temporali et contrario sibi opposito.\textsuperscript{89}
\end{quote}

This was no more than a simple denial of the pope’s position based on his earlier distinction regarding the twofold nature of *ius utendi*. As we shall see, Ockham had a much more cogent response on this point.

\textsuperscript{86} Improbatio n. 796, 353.

\textsuperscript{87} Improbatio n. 746, 336: at n. 745, 335. Francis made a case based on the situation of a monk using a thing for which he has no personal right to use: ‘si religiosus quicunque potest habere usum iustum ex iure utendi sue communitatis absque omni iure utendi proprio, multo magis perfectus seruus Dei potest habere usum iustum ex iure extrinseco et separato Dei, absque omni iure intrinseco et coniuncto proprio sui, quia perfectus seruus Dei magis est in voluntate Dei quam sit religiousus in manu sue religionis et Deus etiam assistit presencior suo seruo quam religio suo subdito. Si ergo religiousus potest uti rebus sue religionis iure religionis et non suo, eadem ratione uerus seruus Dei poterit uti rebus Dei iure Dei et non suo.’

\textsuperscript{88} See p. 46, above.

\textsuperscript{89} Improbatio n. 766, 343.
In his systematic way, Ockham described the Michaelist understanding of *res usu consumptibles* near the beginning of the *Opus nonaginta dierum*. Consumables, he wrote,

sunt illae, quae ipso usu, id est actu utendi, vel penitus consumuntur quantum ad utentem vel ut communiter deteriorantur et tandem consumuntur; huiusmodi sunt cibus et potus, medicinae, unguenta, pecuniae, vestimenta et similia.\(^90\)

Because John had argued that, strictly speaking, consumables cannot be used (*uti*), but only ‘used up’ or *ab*-used (*abuti*),\(^91\) Ockham first had to show that it makes sense to talk about using consumables. Ockham recognized two types of consumption: ‘uno modo pro consumpto esse; alio modo pro motu seu alteratione praecedente consumptum esse’.\(^92\) The first type is thus nothing more than the usual meaning of consumption; the second type, Kilcullen and Scott aptly described as ‘consumption in progress’.\(^93\)

The other issue that Ockham had to answer was John’s claim that, *secundum leges*, use cannot be ‘had’ in consumables because one cannot enjoy the fruits of a consumable without also destroying the substance of the thing. One of the reasons for Ockham’s careful distinction between the various types of law now becomes clear: use of fact, as only the act of using, does not pertain to civil law. In fact, the legal sense of use is but one sense. According to other senses of use, it is perfectly normal to say that someone uses consumables. Therefore, just because it may be inappropriate to say, e.g., ‘I used an apple’ (instead of ‘I consumed an apple’) in legalese, it does not mean Scripture speaks incorrectly when it says ‘vino modico utere’ (1 Tim. 5.23). Thus, in a non-legal sense consumables are used; and in fact there are three ways ‘aliquot consumi per aliquem actum’ may be understood.\(^94\) In the first way, a *res absoluta* ceases to be through some act, such as food and drink being digested. Like so-called absolute things, which are either substances or qualities according to Ockham (and not quantities), relations might also be consumed in the sense of cease to be.\(^95\)

\(^90\). *OND* 2.236–241, 304. Note that Ockham begins by noting that consumables are not always immediately consumed, which allows him to set-up the standard Michaelist position on consumables a little more easily.

\(^91\). For all references to John’s theory of consumables here, see above, p. 41.

\(^92\). *OND* 43.78–80, 530.

\(^93\). Kilcullen and Scott 2001, 374.

\(^94\). The following discussion is based on *OND* 41.77–90, 524.

\(^95\). *SL* 1.49 (OPh 1.154): ‘Est autem ista opinio quod praeter res absolutas, scilicet substantias et qualitates nulla res est imaginabilis, nec in actu nec in potentia.’ Ockham argues against quantity
Thus, the second way something is consumed is when an absolute thing ceases to have a ‘respectum vel appellationem aliquam respectivam’. The example Ockham gave was that of spending money. Money is ‘consumed’ when it is spent, but the coins themselves do not cease to be, only the relation the spender had with the money. The third way does not exist separately from the first and second ways, but something may also be consumed through an act in the sense that latainliquis respectus vel appellatio respectiva ceases to inhere in someone or be verified of something. Thus, say, God’s lordship of something can be said to be consumed because he ceases to be the lord of that thing upon its consumption; but, naturally, we do not say that God ceases to exist through that act.

With this distinction in hand, Ockham then showed how John’s _ultima evasio_, namely that the act of consuming is not and cannot be _in rerum natura_. This claim ultimately rests upon a contradiction in John’s argument. The pope maintained that _usus_ and _uti_ cannot properly claim a place in consumables, but _consumptio_ and the _actus consumendi_ does have a place. According to Ockham, however, consumption and the act of consumption are merely types of use or using;\footnote{In fact, John XXII also made this point in; see _QVR_, 576.} therefore, since consumption certainly does exist in consumables (on John’s terms), use must as well.

**THE VANISHING DOMINION OF CONSUMABLES**

As we have seen, Ockham believed that one had to meet at least two basic conditions for use to be just: that the use in question is not prohibited to the would-be user (e.g., no vow prohibiting the use), and that he or she has been granted a license of using from a legitimate authority (e.g., the owner). Anything in excess of these two criteria, such as possessing legitimate rights to the use, or lordship, naturally ensures the justness of the use—provided, of course, that the use is not directed to an unjust end. In the case of consumables, however, one significant problem seemed to be that because the thing is eventually consumed, the granter of the licence had to lose his lordship at some point, which would mean he would eventually also lose his ability to grant such a license. The pope was not convinced, for instance, that the use of a consumable could ever remain in the power of (_penes_) of one person while the lordship remains in the power of another.\footnote{Earlier Ockham only tried to show (_contra_ John) that lordship and use is separable in some cases; now he is arguing for a more specific, and stronger, claim; cf. _OND_ 73.77–82, 601.}

\footnote{being a _res absoluta_ in _SL_ 1.48 (OPh 1.152–53). On absolute and relative substances, see briefly Adams 1987, 145–46; the topic is discussed _passim_ in Spade 1999a, and relations are discussed in Maurer 1999, 47–51.} Ockham responded to this with a list of examples where this is not true: a servant may
use his lord’s money or wear clothes which belong to his lord, or one might choose to employ (\textit{conducens}) his money for display (\textit{ad pompam}).

To the pope’s argument that things are consumed by the completed act, Ockham responded that there are three ways of understanding \textit{perfectus}. According to the first sense, an act is \textit{perfectus} when ‘nichil deficit actui, quod requiritur ad esse vel bene esse actus, sicut homo dicitur perfectus, quando nichil deficit homini, quod requiritur ad esse vel bene esse hominis’ The second and third ways have quite a different sense. An act is \textit{perfectus} either because it is finished or completed; or, an act is called \textit{perfectus} when the goal of the act has been attained, much like the building of a house is called \textit{perfecta} when the house is finished (\textit{facta}). The second and third way, then, do not allow us to speak about the separability lordship or ownership in any meaningful way, for the act is over and questions of lordship are moot because the item in question has been consumed. Besides, since the act is over at this point, it cannot be either separate from or joined to lordship. Instead, Ockham claimed, Michael had only intended to claim that the act of using, \textit{while it lasts}, can be separated from ownership and lordship. In other words, Ockham believed that the act of consuming, when considering claims of (non-)lordship, could only ever be \textit{perfectus} in the first sense.

The pope’s related claim, that the act does not exist in reality while it is being done, led Ockham to explain the \textit{impugnatores} position on successiua. As Ockham understood the pope, his claim amounted to the notion that successives cannot exist in reality. For his rebuttal, Ockham expanded greatly on the scriptural passages cited by Francis. The tenor of these passages is that successive phenomena such as night, winter, time, movement, voices, words, sounds and so forth do exist. Furthermore, anything that can be given also clearly exists in reality. As the pope admitted that an act of using can be given, it follows that such acts can and do exist. Like his confreres, Ockham took the pope’s conclusion that an act of using does not really exist and argued backwards from it to a \textit{reductio ad absurdum}. The idea is simple. Ockham suggests these three

\begin{itemize}
\item 98. \textit{OND} 32.196–202, 504.
\item 99. See above, p. 43.
\item 100. \textit{OND} 73.22–31, 600.
\item 101. \textit{OND} 73.46–51, 600.
\item 102. \textit{OND} 73.35–37, 600.
\item 103. See above p. 196. Note that throughout the ensuing discussion the phrase ‘really exists’ translates ‘in rerum natura est’.
\item 104. \textit{OND} 67.47–93, 583–84.
\item 105. See above, p. 37; cf. \textit{QVR} 30, 495.
\item 106. We should note in passing that Ockham passes up a clear opportunity to relate the \textit{OND} to his philosophical writings. This is indeed a great opportunity to connect this problem to, e.g., his commentaries on Aristotle’s \textit{Physics}; yet his writings show much more affinity with Francis’ than to these commentaries. See Goddu 1999, 162–64, for his academic views.
\end{itemize}
propositions are equivalent: (1) ‘Utens est in rerum natura’; (2) ‘Album est in rerum natura’; and (3) ‘Musicum est in rerum natura’. The third proposition can only be true if both music—the form denoted as belonging to the subject—and its subject really exist. The same, then, is true for the first. There must be both an individual and an act of using. Thus, if, as John claimed, there is no such thing as an act of using, then there cannot be an *utens.*\(^{107}\) The solution is to admit that acts of using do exist. The pope unwillingly admitted this anyway when he said that acts of using exist *in potentia* before they are enacted. According to Ockham, anything which exists in potency can, at some point, exist *in actu* even though it does not so exist while in potency.\(^{108}\)

Ockham also noted the absurdities which followed upon John’s claim that use, as an *actus utendi perfectus*, cannot be separated from lordship or ownership:

Item, contra praedicta [the impugnatores] aguunt sic: Aut, [1] per actum utendi non perfectum\(^{109}\) vel principium actus (per quem vel per quod nequaquam res consumitur) necessario acquiritur dominium rei seu proprietas, si antea minime habeabatur; aut [2] non necessario acquiritur, etiam licet prius habitum non fuisset. Si detur primum, ergo, sicut actus perfectus non potest esse a dominio separatus in re usu consumptibili, ita etiam actus alius, qui non est perfectus (secundum istum [John XXII]) non potest in re usu consumptibili a proprietate seu dominio separari; et per consequens absque rei consumptione non potest in rebus usu consumptilibus actus utendi a proprietate seu dominio separari. Si detur secundum, habetur propositum appellantis, quod scilicet aliquis potest uti re usu consumptibili absque dominio seu proprietate.\(^{110}\)

According to Ockham, either lordship or ownership of a (consumable) thing is necessarily acquired through an incomplete act of using or through the beginning of such an act, or it is not. In the case of the former, and on John’s terms, the act of using cannot be separate from lordship whether complete or not—which cannot be true since usufruct is an example of use without lordship. The Michaelists, of course, maintained the much more reasonable position that lordship is not *necessarily* acquired through such imperfect acts of using.

Ultimately, Ockham believed that lordship can remain with the lord as long as the act of consuming takes place—i.e., a long time for clothing, but very little time for food.\(^{111}\)

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107. *OND* 67.117–129, 585. The terms *utens*, *album*, and *musicum* are, according to *SL* 1.10 (OPh 1.35–38), *nomina connotativa*, that is, words which signify one thing primarily and another secondarily (e.g., *aliquid informatum albedine*). The point of the *OND* passage is that connotative terms imply and require two different things, a substance and the (appropriate) accidental quality. Cf. *Improbatio* nn. 775–778, 346–47, discussed on p. 196, above. Ockham seems to have developed Francis’ arguments.


109. That is, *perfectus* in the second or third senses.


111. *OND* 41.137–146, 526.
MUST LICIT USE BE JUST?

The pope denied the idea that a licence of using was distinct from a right of using. But even if there were such a distinction, he argued that the holder of anything less than a right of using could not say any resulting use was 'just'.

Ockham’s answer to the challenge was unique. His decision to bring Aquinas to bear on this issue suggests that he recognized the Aquinian undertones to the pope’s argument. Ockham’s debt to Aquinas was perhaps deeper than he explicitly noted. The term justice could be used in three basic ways.

Justice₁: accipitur pro quadem virtute particulari distincta ab aliis tribus virtutibus cardinalibus, habente materiam specialem distinctam a materia cuiuslibet alterius virtutis cardinalis, secundum quam homo iustè operatur ad alterum;

Justice₂: accipitur ... pro quadem virtute generali, quae vocatur iustitia legalis, quae omnes actus virtutum ordinat ad bonum commune;

Justice₃: accipitur ... pro debita ordinatione actus ad rationem vel aliam operationem, et ita secundum quosdam vocatur iustitia metaphorice sump-pta.

Acts, therefore, may be said to be just or not according to the same scheme. Acts of courage or generosity, for example, may be considered many things, but they are not just in the sense of justice₁. Similarly, acts may be called just according to justice₂ when it is elicited or commanded by legal justice. Clearly, acts can only be just in this sense when laws have been established about the action in question. (Driving a car on the right-hand side of the road cannot be just or unjust if no law has been made about which side of the

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112. See above, p. 46.
113. As many people have noted, Ockham probably took pleasure in being able to use Aquinas against the pope who canonized him; see, e.g., Shogimen 1998, 528–29; Tierney 1997a, 129 n. 83.
114. What follows is based upon OND 60.120–129, 557. See Miethke 1969, 478–79.
115. Cf. STh 2a2ae.58.8 (‘uturn iustitia particularis habeat materiam specialem’) ad 2 (9.16): ‘Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes cardinales dupliciter accipiuntur. Uno modo, secundum quod sunt speciales virtutes habentes determinatas materias. Alio modo, secundum quod significant quosdam generales modos virtutis’; STh 2a2ae.58.2 co. (9.10): ‘cum nomen iustitiae aequalitatem importet, ex sua ratione iustitia habet quod sit ad alterum: nihil enim est sibi aequale, sed alteri.... Iustitia ergo proprie dicta requirit diversitatem suppositorum: et ideo non est nisi unius hominis ad alium.’
116. Cf. STh 2a2ae.58.7 co. (9.15): ‘iustitia legalis non est essentialiter omnis virtus, sed oportet praeter iustitiam legalem, quae ordinat hominem immediate ad bonum commune, esse alias virtutes quae immediate ordinant hominem circa particularia bona.’
117. See STh 2a2ae.58.2 co. (9.10), where reference is made to the (Latin version of the) Ethica Nicomachea 5.15.1138b6 ff. (Gauthier 1973, 476–77; or the ‘B’ recension: Gauthier 1972, 251). Aquinas is quoted at OND 60.130–142, 557. The point is that it is ‘metaphorical’ because the action need not be done ad alterum.
road one is to drive on.) For an act to be just in the third, metaphorical, sense, it need only be good and consonant with right reason.\textsuperscript{118}

The purpose of this distinction is to disentangle licit use and John’s definition of just use. Hence Ockham concluded that although many licit acts may not be just in the first or second senses of justice, everyone who posits that every human act is morally good or bad would say that every licit act could be just according to justice.\textsuperscript{3}

Ockham, then, effectively forestalled the pope’s objection by pointing out that positive law and morality are not coextensive.\textsuperscript{119} The pope had argued that one needed a right of using—or, for consumables, a right of ab-using—in order for use to be just. Ockham, of course, found this idea preposterous because positive law had no essential connection to morality. Positive law either came about through agreements (pactiones) between people, or through a ruler’s decree (ordinatio). The justness of an action was often determined by reference to right reason, which is intimately tied to questions of morality.\textsuperscript{120} Actions may thus be ‘just’ and at the same time legally ‘indifferent’ as far as positive law is concerned.

Such is the case with the licentia utendi. Naturally, licences can fall under the purview of positive law, but not all need to. As Ockham saw it, a licence had by the grace of someone else could operate outside of the jurisdiction of positive law, provided, of course, that they do not violate existing laws. On the analogy that a prince is ‘freed’ from his own laws, the granter of a licence is likewise not bound by the conditions he sets. Licences are therefore revocable at the whim of the granter. But a licence of using does not grant a right of using; nor are the terms equivalent. The difference is simple: a right of using offers recourse to legal action, while a licence does not.

All a licence offers is the opportunity to make use of our ‘most general power of using’.\textsuperscript{121} This power is present whenever we make use of something, and it is the accompanying circumstances which allow us to describe it in different ways. When we make use of something as its owner or as the usufructuary, then this licit power of using is accompanied by a right of using. If our use is impeded, the reason we have recourse to the courts is not because the power of using is something protected by law, but because

\textsuperscript{118} OND 60.143–160. 557. Cf. Quodl. 3.15.89–94 (OTh 7.261): ‘Dico igitur quod deformitas [here a ‘carentia rectitudinis quae debet inesse actui’] non est carentia iustitiae vel rectitudinis debita inesse actu, sed est carentia rectitudinis debita inesse ipsi voluntati; quod nihil aliud est dicere nisi quod voluntas obligatur aliquem actum elicere secundum praeceptum divinum quem non elicet. Et ideo rectitudo actus non est aliud quam ipse actus qui debuit elicere secundum rectam rationem.’

\textsuperscript{119} This point has been made before: Morrall 1949, 348, and Leff 1975, 620. In fact, in a perhaps not very lawyer-minded way, Ockham felt the opposite was true; cf. Kölmel 1953, 85: ‘Das positive Gesetz ist nicht in sich frei von Rechtlichkeit (Moralität)’.

\textsuperscript{120} That is, acts in themselves are morally neutral, and it is the agent’s intentions which are good or bad: Quodl. 1.20 (OTh 9.99–106); cf. King 1999, 229, and McGrade 1974, 186.

\textsuperscript{121} OND 4.192–217, 333–34.
our claim as owner or usufructuary is. When we make illicit use of something (like a thief does), we are not convicted as such because we have employed this power of using, but because, by doing so, we have infringed upon the rights and claims of others. When we are granted only a licence of using and all the limitations this entails, when we use our innate power of using, if our use is impeded there is precious little we can do about it (other than complain). In other words, Ockham was arguing that (1) because positive law necessarily had to exist within natural law in so far as the former can never legitimately contradict the latter’s positive or negative commands, and (2) because there are actions whose justness or liceity depends only on natural law, not all actions need rely on the ordinances or pacts of positive law. A licence of using, then, which is ‘permitted’ under natural law, could be licit and just outside of the concerns of positive law. Our power of using, however, is always present—even if it is only licit while the one granting a licence of using says it is.

In this sense, an act of using may be morally good and consonant with right reason, and therefore just in the third sense, even if positive law were to insist that use and lordship of a thing can not remain forever separate (i.e., the act of using a consumable without lordship would not be just in the second sense). One may question how well Ockham answered John’s argument, and no doubt the pope would hardly be satisfied, but this solution was certainly far more workable than modern commentators usually believe.\footnote{122. Brett 1997, 50–68, is a recent negative assessment.}
CHAPTER SEVEN
CORPORATE POVERTY

Patet quod ecclesia, populus, ac multitudo, ac ratione consimili ordo, fratrum scilicet Minorum, potest habere actum realem, et quod non sit persona imaginaria et repraesentata, sed est verae personae, quamvis non sit una persona sola.

William of Ockham

Poverty was, without a doubt, the most conspicuous feature of the Franciscan modus vivendi. The friars themselves were divided on the issue of personal poverty. Yet it was not personal poverty that really distinguished the Franciscans from the other mendicant orders. It was rather their corporate poverty that set them apart. John XXII denied that this was the case, that it could even be the case. We have already discussed his claim that an Order could not have use of fact, only a use of right. He thought his point was obvious: since an Order is merely a persona representata et imaginaria, only ‘things of right’ can belong to an order, not ‘things of fact’. This study of Ockham’s theory of property rights would be incomplete, then, if we did not consider this relatively unstudied aspect of the Michaelist theory of property rights.

7.1 The Origins of Franciscan Corporate Poverty

The origins of Franciscan corporate poverty can be found in both the Regula bullata and the Testamentum of St Francis. In the first case the brothers are ordered to appropriate ‘nec domum nec locum nec aliquam rem’, while in the Testamentum, St Francis came down even more strongly against corporate ownership: ‘Caveant sibi fratres, ut ecclesias,

1. IPP 27.285–288, 335–36. An earlier and somewhat longer version of this chapter is due to appear in Scott and Kosso forthcoming under the title ‘Innocent IV, John XXII, and the Michaelists on Corporate Poverty’. I wish to thank the editors and Brepols for allowing me to re-use parts of this paper here.

2. See above, p. 40. Throughout this chapter I use ‘Order’ to keep in view the fact that we are dealing with the Franciscan Order as a corporate entity.

habitacula paupercula et omnia, quae pro ipsis construuntur, penitus non recipiant, nisi essent, sicut decet sanctam paupertatem, quam in regula promisimus, semper ibi hospitantes sicut advenae et peregrini [cf. 1 Pt. 2.11].

St Francis’ message was not lost on subsequent generations of Franciscan authors. Although Gregory IX declared that the Testamentum was not binding only a few years later, he did so while affirming the order’s corporate poverty. Fifteen years later, in 1245, Innocent IV said much the same thing. In this way, though perhaps not in so straightforward a manner, the doctrine of Franciscan corporate poverty found papal approbation.

In many ways it was corporate poverty that many people found most problematic. The problem was none too subtle: if the friars did not own the things they used, who did? Innocent IV aimed to settle questions like these. Gregory had explained that the lordship of the places and houses belongs to those ‘ad quos noscitur pertinere’, and that the friars were unable to sell, exchange, or otherwise alienate movable goods without the permission of the Cardinal in charge of the order (ordinis gubernator), or one of the leaders of the order. Though he has often been criticized for missing the point when it comes to Franciscan poverty, on this point at least, Innocent’s ‘fuller clarification’ seems common-sense enough. As he explained, the friars must not exchange these goods, because the ius, proprietas, et dominium belong directly to the Church except where the

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5. See, e.g., Hugh of Digne’s Expositio 6 (Flood 1979, 145.13–145.15): ‘Quae sententia [RegB 6.1] iuxta responsum apostolicum omnem a fratribus in communi et speciali proprietatem excludit, ita quod proprium nec omnes in communi nec singuli debent in speciali habere.’ As Flood noted, there are distinct echoes of both Quo elongati and Ordinem vestrum in this passage.
6. The similarities are striking, especially because of the ways Innocent modified the other parts of the bull. The following is adapted from Pásztor 1986, 111:

**Quo elongati**

Dicimus itaque, quod nec in communi nec in speciali debent proprietatem habere, sed utensilium et librorum et eorum mobilium, que licet habere, ordo usum habeat .... (Grundmann 1961, 22)

**Ordinem vestrum**

Dicimus insuper, quod ... nec in communi, neque in speciali debent proprietatem habere; sed locorum, et domorum, ac utensilium, et librorum, et eorum mobilium, quae licet habere, Ordo habeat usum. (BF 1.401a, no. 114)

The attentive reader will note Innocent’s addition of ‘places and houses’ in the list of things the brothers ‘have the use of’, which would appear to be somewhat in opposition to the RegB. On the comparison of Ordinem vestrum to RegB and Quo elongati, one should consult above all Pásztor 1986, 104–12. See Elizondo 1962 for an exhaustive discussion of both Quo elongati and Ordinem vestrum.

7. See, e.g., the anecdote of Thomas of Celano, 2 Celano 2.28.58 (AF 10.166), where St Francis (c. 1219–21) refused to allow the brothers use a house in Bologna until the Bishop of Ostia publicly claimed that the house was his; mentioned by Little 1978, 164. There is some irony in the fact that it was at Bologna where one of the earliest distinctions between dominium and usus was made.


donors wish to retain lordship and ownership. This was a development of Gregory’s position, for while Gregory was willing to assume by ‘to whom it is known to pertain’, everyone would understand the same thing, Innocent felt the need to say explicitly who the owner was for any good the Franciscans used: either the donor who wanted to keep ownership and lordship, or the Church itself—not, that is, the Franciscans.

It is tempting to speculate about the reasons for Innocent’s addition, both here and in the other aspects of Ordinem vestrum that were not as well received by the Order. But in the case of accepting the ‘right and ownership’, the answer is probably simple enough: ‘In this way [Innocent] put an end to a nagging question with which critics of the Order had easily disturbed the brothers. Who owned the bucket with which the brother carried out the kitchen swill? The pope did.’

The rationale and effect of Innocent’s move is easy to understand, but it could also be described in a more technical sense: the pope was, in fact, forestalling the possible objection that one became the owner merely by using an unowned thing, a res nullius in Roman law.

The basic problem was that a thing was generally considered abandoned if the former owner had no intention to retain ownership of the thing in question. Although physical possession of a thing available for acquisition was only one of the two necessary criteria for establishing ownership—the other being an intention to acquire ownership—it was

10. BF 1.401b, no. 114: ‘cum tam immobiliam, quam mobilium huiusmodi ius, proprietas, et dominium (illis solis exceptis, in quibus expresse donatores, seu translatores sibi proprietatem, et dominium reservasse constiterit) nullo medio ad Ecclesiam ipsam spectent; cui domus, et loca praedicta cum Ecclesiis, ceterisque suis pertinentiis (quae omnia in ius, et proprietatem Beati Petri suscipimus) omnino tam in spiritualibus, quam temporalibus immediate subesse noscuntur.’

11. Moorman 1968, 120. Cf. Lambert 1998, 106–07: Quo elongati ‘had set it down that the friars were obliged by their Rule to make a total renunciation, as an order, of all forms of dominion or property rights. [Ordinem vestrum] had put forward a theoretical system, a legal fiction indeed, which would enable the order to observe this total renunciation.’

12. See, e.g., the Diffinitiones narbonensis, n. 13 (Delorme 1910, 503): ‘Declaratio domini Innocentii maneat suspensa, sicut fuit in capitulo Methensi [1254]; et inhibemus districte, ne aliquis utatur ea in hiis, in quibus declarationi domini Gregorii [sc. Quo elongati] contradicit’ However, we never get the sense that the papal retentio dominii was one of these points. Subsequent papal declarations repeated the claim—e.g., Clement IV, Cum dilecti (25 July 1265), BF 3.24b, n. 26; Gregory X, Voluntariae (5 November 1274), BF 3.222b, n. 58; Martin IV Exultantes (18 January 1283), BF 3.501b, n. 40—and the Michaelists, at least, were keen to cite them; see App.mon., 846–47, and OND 71.159–177, 597–98.


14. Cf. Inst. 2.1.47: ‘si rem pro derelicto a domino habitam occupaverit quis, statim eum dominum effici. Pro derelicto autem habeur, quod dominus ea mente abiercit, ut id rerum suarum esse nollet, ideoque statim dominus esse desinit.’ A gloss to this passage (s.v., ideoque statim) notes: ‘Licet quidam putauerint non desinere, nisi ab alio possessa fuerit, ut in Dig. 41.7.2’ (Caprioli et al. 2004, 91). Inst. 2.1.48 stresses the importance of the intention to abandon: in the case of things thrown overboard during a storm, since the owner’s intention was to escape the storm, not abandon ownership of them, these goods were not res nullius.

15. See above, p. 99.
the prior consideration. Now, however, even if it were argued that a friar wanted to claim ownership of the slop bucket, he had no legal claim to it. Innocent’s *retentio dominii* thus served as a clear legal buffer against one avenue of attack against the theory of Franciscan poverty.

We should assume that Innocent IV knew what he was doing, for he was no mean jurist. Indeed, Innocent is well known for his role in the development of medieval corporation theory.\(^{16}\) It is an interesting coincidence that in the very same year that he reserved ‘ius, proprietas, et dominium’ of the things the order had the use of,\(^ {17}\) he also denied the possibility of excommunicating a corporation since corporations ‘nomina sunt iuris et non personarum’ and therefore could not commit an offense or ‘delict’ (*delinquat*).\(^ {18}\) It is highly likely that when John XXII claimed that an order was, *in iure*, nothing more than a *persona ficta et repraesentata*, he at least thought he was arguing along lines Innocent would have approved of. Thus, it seems appropriate to frame the Michaelist response to John’s position in the context of Innocent’s theory of corporations.

### 7.2 Innocent IV & Corporation Theory

A preliminary remark is in order regarding the so-called fiction theory. Fascinating as they are, we shall not get mired in the old-fashioned debates between the ‘realist’ and ‘fiction’ theory of corporations.\(^ {19}\) However, as there is much truth to the claim that Innocent was a proponent of a fiction theory, if not *the* Fiction Theory,\(^ {20}\) I shall continue to employ this terminology.

The fiction theory, in the medieval sense, is described as such because the corporation—the *universitas* to use the most generic term—as such is merely a fiction of the law.\(^ {21}\) The source for the claim that Innocent was an adherent of this view comes from a comment on

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16. Innocent’s views on property rights are also worth looking at; see Tierney 1996, 28 and 1997a, 143–44, for some general observations.
17. Above, n. 10.
20. Rodriguez 1962, 312 (his emphasis); my understanding of Innocent’s position owes much to this incisive article. One should also consult Ullmann 1948; for general surveys, see Pennington 1988, 444–49, and J. P. Canning 1988.
21. On medieval corporative terminology in general, see Michaud-Quantin 1970; in the commentary tradition to Aristotle’s *Politics*, the preferred term was *civitas* or *communitas*, but this is a more specialized usage deriving ultimately from the early Moerbeke translation. See Quillet 1971, 188–89.
7. Corporate Poverty §. Innocent IV & Corporation Theory

a decretal that is not actually a part of the Liber extra. For our purposes the content of the decretal is more important than its status in the official version of Gregory’s Decretales, viz, a decision regarding the lawsuit between two monasteries over a question of corporate poverty. One issue involved the swearing of oaths. Could an abbot or prior swear an oath ‘nomine suo et in animas conventuum eorumdem’? Innocent first stressed that the one swearing the oath had to follow the will of the majority. He then went on to write that it makes sense for the animae conventuum to swear through one person if they wish ‘cum collegium in causa uniuersitatis fingatur una persona’. Innocent also made a similar point with specific reference to a universitas religiosorum. Religious corporations can also swear through someone else; this is, in fact, the normal way of doing things: a procurator introduces the lawsuit and another person (principalis persona) swears and responds in the case. These passages illustrate well at least part of John XXII’s claim: certainly an Order is, according to Innocent, a ‘represented’ person insofar as it is something that can be represented by one person. But to determine whether he thought it was also an ‘imaginary’ person requires further attention.

In Innocent’s view, though it may be thought of as one person in certain circumstances, a corporation is not really a person. It cannot, as we have seen, be excommunicated. He went on to explain that excommunicating a corporation would entail condemning the innocent along with the guilty, which is hardly an equitable thing to do.

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It seems, then, that while a corporation can be represented legally, even as a person in certain capacities, he also believed, with Accursius, that ‘uniuersitas nihil aliud est nisi singuli homines qui [ibi] sunt’. Or, to use Innocent’s words, ‘quia capitulum, quod est nomen...’

22. In Innocent’s commentary, there are two extra decretals added to X 2.20 (De testibus et attestotionibus). For the details of this confusion, see Rodriguez 1962, 309–10.
23. Innocent IV, Comm. ad X 2.20.57, n.4 (fol. 270va).
24. Innocent IV, Comm. ad X 2.20.57, n.5 (fol. 270vb): ‘hodie licitum est omnibus collegiis per alium iurare, et hoc ideo, quia cum collegium in causa uniuersitatis fingatur una persona, dignum est, quod per unum iurent, licet per se iurare possint, si velit. Cod. 2.58(59)2.5: Et etiam propter facilitatem ponendi, et respondendi, alias autem quilibet per se in animam suam iurare debet.’
25. Innocent IV, Comm. ad X 2.1.14 (fol. 194vb): ‘In uniyersitate autem religiosorum, non est dubium, quod per alium iurare potest. Infra, X 2.7.1. Ipse respondebit secundum quod maiori parti placuerit; nec mirum si per alium, quam qui iurare possit, et respondet cum hoc generaliter obtineat, quod procurator litem contestaret, et tamen principalis persona iuraret, et respondet.’
26. Cf. App. mon., 750, where Michael described Peter as swearing on behalf of the other apostles: ‘... ut habitet Matthaei 19.21, Marci 10.28 et Lucae 18.28, Petrus, in persona apostolorum, ostendens se et apostolos perfecte adimplesses consilium perfectionis evangelicae datum illi iuveni cui Christus dixerat [Mt. 19.21]: Si vis esse perfectus, vade et vende omnia quae habes et da pauperibus etc., respondit [Mt. 19.27]: Ecce, nos reliquimus omnia et securi sumus te etc.’ See also App. mon., 773.
27. See above, n. 18, and Miethke 1969, 503–04.
intellectualem, et res incorporalis, nihil facere potest, nisi per membra sua’. The same seems to be true in legal cases: people, not corporations are liable in court. According to Innocent, ‘uniuersitas non potest accusari, nec puniri, sed delinquentes tantum; ciuiliter autem conueniri et pecuniariter puniri possunt ex delicto rectorum, ut in contrariis, et supra X 5.3.19.’

What, then, should we say of Innocent’s views about the nature of a corporation? It is certainly true that Innocent was more interested in discussing corporations in relation to the practical problems of ecclesiastical administration than in elaborating an abstract theory of their metaphysical status, yet this is not to deny that the rudiments of such a theory might lie scattered throughout his writings. As it turns out, Innocent described two types of corporate entities. In a comment on the phrase ‘unum corpus’ in a decretal about the establishment of a college, Innocent described two types of colleges. There are collegia personalia, which are comprised of professions, business associations, and religious orders; these are voluntary rather than necessary corporations. Necessary and natural colleges are those that form by reason of origin or residence, such as colleges of a city, town, or church. But, Innocent clarified, this is not a distinction held in iure, it is only said by analogy to real and personal servitudes. This analogy is suggestive, but ultimately of little use. Servitudes in Roman law were classified as iura in re aliena, rights over another’s property, which were vested in the beneficiary as a right attached to the immovable property. Personal servitudes, unlike praedial servitudes, could not be alienated to another, and tended to be extinguished upon the death of the beneficiary. Usufruct, (bare) use, and habitation were all classified as personal servitudes in Roman law. In the Institutes, as we have seen, usus nudus is said to be established and extinguished in the same way

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30. Innocent IV, Comm. ad X 5.39.64, n.3 (fol. 56rb). This is part of a longer section that begins by noting that when a chapter is compelled to do something, we understand that to mean that the members of the chapter are compelled. On the nomen intellectuale, see Michaud-Quantin 1970, 43.
31. Innocent IV, Comm. ad X 5.3.30 n.1 (fol. 500va–b). Rodriguez’ (1962, 304) has potest for possunt, which justifies his claim that a corporation ‘can be cited as a defendant in a civil suit in tort’. Both what follows and Innocent’s reference to X 5.3.19 seem to suggest possunt is the better reading, but without further work on the textual tradition, we cannot be certain how much ‘personality’ Innocent was prepared to give to corporations on this point.
32. See Tierney 1998, 94–97, for some apposite cautionary remarks on this question.
34. On servitudes, see above, p. 53.
35. We should assume that Innocent was referring to praedial servitudes when he wrote of ‘real’ servitudes. A praedial servitude—servitutes rerum, iura praediorum—tended to be for the economic exploitation of some immovable property.
usufruct is; there is, however ‘less right’ in use than usufruct; one who has the use of a house, for example, is considered to only have a use of right, which is non-transferable.\textsuperscript{36}

A proper understanding of servitudes, then, surely helps us understand what John meant about the Order’s use being a use of right, and that this was tantamount to a right of using,\textsuperscript{37} but it does not really help us understand why a \textit{collegium religionum} is \textit{personale}. Presumably the point is that a religious college—an \textit{ordo}—is ‘personal’ in that it inheres in the people who comprise it, rather than the ‘real’ colleges (cities, towns, churches), which would seem to inhere in the place itself. But this only brings us back to Azo’s point that a corporation is simply made up of those who are there.

We can get closer to our goal, however, if we consider what Innocent had to say about the agents of a corporation, particularly of these \textit{collegia personalia}. These groups of people naturally had common goals and interests, and it was important for the decretalists to explain how these interests could be represented.\textsuperscript{38} One example Innocent dealt with was that of a cleric representing his prebend. Innocent thought it was only natural for a cleric to be able to sue on behalf of his prebend because, according to the \textit{Digest}, a beneficiary of a usufruct is a person who can sue. Moreover, a prebend itself can have its own \textit{iura} and \textit{possessiones}, just as a bishopric, abbey, hospital, house, dignity, or administration can.\textsuperscript{39} Naturally, a prebend requires some sort of agent for it to act, but it is equally clear that ‘a certain personality is predicated’ of it as well.\textsuperscript{40} In another comment to the same decretal, Innocent made the comparison between a \textit{prebendarius} and a \textit{usufructuarius} even more explicit.\textsuperscript{41}

In summary, then, a religious college or corporation, a \textit{collegium personale}, exists in analogy to a personal servitude, and the agent of this college is analogous to one who holds a personal servitude (usufruct in this case). Servitudes are, moreover, rights of a sort, ‘lesser real rights’ according to one classification.\textsuperscript{42} There is thus a temptation to think

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Inst. 2.5 pr.–2: ‘Isdem istis modis, quibus usus fructus constituitur, etiam modus usus constitui solet isdemque illis modis finitur, quibus et usus fructus desinit. Minus autem scilicet iuris in usu est quam in usu fructu . . . Item is, qui aedium usum habet, hactenus iuris habere intellegitur, ut ipse tantum habitet, nec hoc ius ad alium transferre potest.’ Cf. Dig. 7.8.1 and 7.8.8.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Above, p. 36.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} See the discussion in Rodriguez 1962, 305–15.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} Innocent IV, \textit{Comm.} ad X 2.19.3, n.1 (fol. 248ra–b). ‘Nota clericos pro prae bendis suis posse agere et comenirsi, nam ususfructuarii sunt qui agere possunt. Dig. 10.1.4.9. Sed dices quoniam \textit{quamodo} aget nomine prae bendae cum prae benda nihil habeat uel possideat? Respondeo, imo haec prae benda potest habere iura sua et possessiones, sicut episcopatus, abbatia, hospitale, uel quaecunque alia dominus \textit{domus} uel dignitas, uel administratio.’ The text is corrupt here. I read \textit{quomodo} for \textit{quoniam} and \textit{domus} for \textit{dominus}. Rodriguez 1962, 306, who used the Venice edition of 1570 has \textit{quodmodo} (a typo?) and \textit{domus}.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Rodriguez 1962, 306.
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Innocent IV, \textit{Comm.} ad X 2.19.3, n.3 (fol. 248rb): ‘Et satis dicimus posse dari inter prae bendarios ad similitudinem ususfructuariun.’
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Miller 1998, 65.
\end{itemize}
that Innocent thought of a corporation, at least in the case of a \textit{collegium personale}, as an entity that simply signifies a group of men brought and bound together by a common cause, and which is in a sense the summation of the rights and possessions that are vested in the individuals of the group,\textsuperscript{43} even if they are distinct from the rights and possessions of any one individual of the group.\textsuperscript{44} However, this group can be treated of as a person for the express purpose of thinking about the shared rights and interests that are vested in the group. It is a legal ‘person’, and it can be represented, but it is not ‘real’. If this was what John meant by ‘imaginary’, then Innocent probably would have agreed with him.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsc{Ordinem uestrum reconsidered}

The preceding analysis also sheds some light on some of the elements of \textit{Ordinem vestrum} that the Franciscans were not so keen on, namely Innocent’s pronouncements regarding the Order’s ‘agent’ (\textit{nuncius}), his official and \textit{de facto} relationship with the Order, and his general powers.\textsuperscript{46} As we have seen, Innocent saw no theoretical difficulties in having

\begin{quote}
\textit{Quo elongati} \\
\ldots si rem sibi necessariam velint fratres emere \\
\ldots possunt. \\
\ldots qui taliter presentatus a fratribus non est eorum nuntius, licet presentetur ab ipsis, sed illius potius, cuius \textit{mandato} solutionem facit. \\
Idem tamen nuntius solvere statim debet, ita quod de pecunia nihil remaneat penes eum.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{Ordinem vestrum} \\
\ldots possunt tamen, si rem sibi necessariam, \textit{aut utilem} velint emere. \\
\ldots taliter praesentatus a Fratribus non est eorum nuncius, licet praesentetur ab ipsis, sed illius potius, cuius \textit{auctoritate} solutionem facit.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{43} In Baldus’ \textit{Margarita} for Innocent’s commentary, we read regarding the pope’s commentary to X 5.39.52(53) (n. 18 above), he explained that a \textit{universitas} ‘non est aliud quam homines qui in eo sunt, scilicet cum addito iuris intellectu, et addita significa[...]

\textsuperscript{44} Berman 1983, 216, 220.

\textsuperscript{45} It is important to note that Innocent devoted far more space here to the question of swearing \textit{de veritate dicenda} and accurately and honestly representing the group than to the few lines about thinking of the college as one person.

\textsuperscript{46} Pásztor 1986, 110–11, has highlighted the differences in a very straightforward fashion. I follow her schematization here:
someone act on behalf of a corporation. Clearly, as both Quo elongati and Ordinem vestrum demonstrate, this was what the agent was meant to do. In each case, the agent may actually have been presented by the brothers, but he is not, de iure (we must assume), an agent of the brothers. The real difference here between the bulls (aside from the fact that Innocent allowed these agents to procure ‘useful’ things in addition to the needs of the Order) is that whereas before the agent could deposit the alms sicut dominus with a spiritual friend, Innocent said the agent could hold onto the alms himself sicut dominus, or hand them over to a ‘spiritual friend’ that the Order could nominate if they wished. Additionally, while Quo elongati implies that the spiritual friend determined the expediency of using the alms for their needs, Ordinem vestrum claims the brothers themselves determined what was expedient (or even just useful); they could even decide to have him transfer the alms to another person or location.

In light of what Innocent said in his Commentary about corporations, I think we must read Innocent to have been thinking of rights. It harmonizes well with what we have seen regarding his corporation ‘theory’. The agent acts on behalf of a college to represent faithfully the wishes of the college. In this case the agent is to secure what the college—the members of the college—deem necessary or useful. His subsequent bull, Quanto studiosis (1247), makes this all the more obvious. This bull reiterated the claim of papal ownership, but it also, noting that the Order had to have frequent recourse to the Apostolic See because of this arrangement, allowed the brothers to establish and remove men, as often as it seems advantageous, who have ‘the power to seek, sell, exchange, alienate, manage, spend, buy, and convert’ things for the friars’ use (in usum). There were additional clauses about need and expediency, but, overall, one is reminded of Innocent’s point that a ‘universitas etiam proprie dicitur constituere procuratorem in re propria universitatis. Cod. 2.58(59).2.5. Item actorem constituit uniuersitas in rebus non suis. Dig. 3.4.6.3. Item actorem constituit uniuersitas in rebus non suis. Dig. 3.4.6.3.48

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47. Quanto studiosis (BF 1.487–88, no. 235): ‘Cum enim . . . oporteat vos propter hoc semper ad Sedem Apostolicam, ad quam rerum ipsarum spectat proprietias, habere recursum: Nos quieti dicti Ordinis, et necessitatibus vestris paterna volentes sollicitudine providere, praeuentium vobis auctoritate concedimus; ut singulius vestrum liceat in Provinciis eis commissis per se, vel per alios Fratres suos, quibus id duxerint committre dum [sic — read: committendum], constituere aliquos viros idoneos Deum timentes, qui pro locorum indigentia singulorum res huiusmodi tam concessas, quam etiam conferendas auctoritate Nostra libere petere, vendere, commutare, alienare, tractare, expendere, vel permutare, ac in usum Fratrum convertere valetundum dispositionem vestram pro necessitatibus, vel commodis Fratrum Ordinis memorati, sicut vobis pro loco, et tempore videbitur expedire; liceat quoque vobis eodem viros sic constitutos a vobis amovere, aliosque ad praemissa exequenda sine difficulitate qualibet subrogare, quotes videritis opportunum.’ Not without reason does a marginal gloss to this passage read: ‘Auctoritas instituendi Syndicos cum ampla facultate’!

48. Innocent IV, Comm. ad X 2.7.5 (fol. 211rb).
As far as I can tell, Innocent did not comment on *ius* or *usus* in a way that would be of interest to the polemicists involved in the poverty controversy (or the historians who study them). His commentary to X 5.40.12 (‘Ius dictum est a iure possidendo’) is blank. However, this much seems clear. When it suited the discussion, Innocent was certainly not opposed to thinking about a corporation as a ‘person’ who could be represented before the law, even if we must always remember that a corporation is not something separate or above the people who comprise it. Yet if a college is to be considered on the analogy of a servitude, it seems that what the agent of the college represents is to be thought of in terms of right(s).

### 7.3 Bonagratia of Bergamo

Now that Innocent’s position is sufficiently clear, we may turn to the Michaelist account of the relationship a ‘use of right’ must have with an ‘Order’. It is not immediately apparent whether Francis and William, perhaps even Michael, realized it, but they were faced with a far greater quandary than they let on in their writings. The problem was that Bonagratia had already said what John would later say in *Quia quorundam* regarding a *usus iuris* in his *Tractatus de Christi et apostolorum paupertate*.

The chronology is important in this case. Written some months before the first version of *Ad conditorem* was published, the treatise was meant to answer the question of whether it was heretical to say that Christ and the apostles had nothing individually or in common. As he saw it, the question could be asking three very different things. ‘Habere aliquid’ might mean: (1) to obtain something by right of lordship (or quasi-lordship), or ownership, and in this case a thing may properly be said to be an individual’s or a college’s; (2) it could also be taken in a broad sense, such as someone who holds a thing *de facto* or ‘ad usum simplicem facti’, where there is no claim to the right of lordship or ownership; or (3) someone is said to have a thing because he has administration of it. Bonagratia ended up rejecting the last two modes as candidates for the question, but the reason he gave for rejecting them is crucial for his corporation theory. It could not be about these last two modes, he reasoned,

\[\text{quia etsi detinere res de facto seu uti rebus simplicis facti usu, aut amministrare res aut dispensare, vel per modum custodie seu depositi tenere, possit competere pluribus ut singularibus, non tamen potest competere collegio sive universitati. Nam quamvis}\]

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49. X 5.40.12: ‘Ius dictum est a iure possidendo. Hoc enim iure possidetur, quod iuste, hoc iuste, quod bene; quod autem male possidetur, alienum est. Male autem possidet, qui vel suis male utitur, vel aliena praesumit.’ See also above, p. 46 n. 160.

50. See above, p. 140.
in hiis que iuris sunt, seu que spectant ad ius hereditatis, collegium et universitas
viciem persone obtineant, Dig. 46.1.22(!) et 46.1.73(!), Dig. 45.3.1.pr., in hiis que facti
sunt, seu in quibus factum persone requiritur, sive ubi sine certa persona quid fieri
non potest, non obtinet collegium viciem persone Dig. 41.1.34.51

In his desire to show that the pope’s question had to be about ‘having something’ in the
sense of property rights, Bonagratia insisted that corporations could only hold the place
of a person in matters of ius.

In the remainder of the tract, Bonagratia spoke about the ‘collegium apostolorum’
in connection with having things in the first sense of habere res.52 Therefore, although
Bonagratia said further on in the treatise that Christ’s precept against possessing gold,
silver, or money was to be understood distributive et etiam collective, such that both
individual apostles and the whole college of apostles were forbidden to possess gold, silver,
or money,53 and although he said that a slave, a filiusfamilias, or a religious has only
simple use of fact,54 it would seem that Bonagratia held, along with the pope, that an
Order, though maybe not merely ‘imaginary’, could only ‘have’ a use of right. It is
somewhat surprising that John did not mention that Bonagratia seems to have held the
same opinion that he defended in Quia quorundam.

Bonagratia did not leave it at that, however. First he located use of fact within the
sphere of ius naturale. He even twisted a famous passage of Roman law to suggest that
nature taught all animals this use.55 A use of fact of this sort is thus irrenounceable.
Bonagratia took the standard view that since everyone is obliged to preserve his or her
own life, everyone is also unable to renounce the things without which they could not
live.56

The second step was to redefine the corporation that owned the goods the apostles
used so that it included all of the faithful. Buried in a mass of legal references, Bonagratia
answered the vexing question of ownership:

Si vero dicatur: Cuius ergo erat dominium rerum, quibus utebantur apostoli? ... Et
res ecclesie non dicuntur alicuius singularis hominum vel hominis vel collegii, set quasi
res ecclesie non dicuntur alicuius singularis hominum vel hominis vel collegii, set quasi

53. Bonagratia, De paup., 495: ‘Et ideo preceptum datum apostolis de non possidendo autum nec
argentum neque pecunias, intelligi debet prout stare potest pro suis suppositis distributive et etiam
collective, interdicendo non solum cui libet singulari, set toti collegio apostolorum possessionem
huliusmodi.’
55. Bonagratia, De paup., 503: ‘Preterea usus facti rerum necessariarum ad substentationem nature est
de iure naturali, eo quod ab exordio rationalis creature incepit D. 5 d.a.c. 5; D. 35 c. 7, et eo quod
ubique et apud omnes instictu nature, non ex constitutione aliqua habetur, ut in D. 1 c. 7, et eo
natura hunc usum omnia animalia docuit, Inst. 1.2.pr., Dig. 1.1.1.3.’
56. Bonagratia, De paup., 503.
communes universitatis omnium fidelium que est corpus Christi: C. 12 q. 1 c. 26 et c. 28; Et nota per Innocentium, X 2.12.4. Sic et dominium sive proprietas rerum, quibus utebantur apostoli, erat universitatis omnium fidelium sive bonorum. Nam iure divino omnia sunt bonorum C. 23 q. 7 c. 1.

In this way, Bonagratia was able to provide an account of what we might call the ‘natural use’ of the apostles while relocating the ownership of these goods within the larger community. Unfortunately, the analogy was not as fitting for the Franciscan situation. The difference between the two groups was that phrase ‘Ordo habeat usum’: no one granted the college of apostles a use, whether of fact or of right, the way thirteenth-century popes did the Franciscans. Bonagratia’s Tractatus thus hinted at the problem of corporate poverty, and began to answer it, but it did not have an answer to the dilemma John XXII would pose in Quia quorundam and Quia vir.

7.4 Michael of Cesena

The significance of John’s criticism of the idea of corporate poverty was not realized right away. In his Pisan appeals, however, Michael responded to John’s adoption of Bonagratia’s argument. In the Appellatio minor Michael gave a simplified version of what Bonagratia had said. The bull Cum inter declared two basic claims heretical: to say that Christ and the apostles did not have some things individually or in common; and to say that they did not have any right of using, selling, donating, or acquiring the things Scripture says they had. This is the subject of the sixth error described in the Appellatio minor, which, as Michael saw it, had to do with the problem of the apostolic college. Michael naturally understood the ius in question to be one based in positive law (and thus litigible). With a reference to the ubiquitous Dilectissimis Michael concluded that the passage in Acts 4.32–35 (or 2.44–45) did not refer simply to the community or college of apostles. Echoing what Bonagratia had already written, he concluded that Acts had to refer to the general and universal community of believers because if these so-called common goods were appropriated to the apostle’s specific college, then these goods could not be common to the whole multitude of believers, ‘for what is of a part is not of the whole’.

58. In the Appellatio Michaelis in Avenione, e.g., there is no discussion of corporate poverty beyond the general claim that the Franciscans’ vow to have nothing tam in speciali quam in communi had the approval of both Exit et Exivi—not to mention John’s own approval of these two bulls; see G&F, 186–87.
59. App.min., 443–44.
60. App.min., 445: ‘Si enim apostoli, qui in dicta multitudine credentium, sicut nobilior portio ipsius multitudinis comprehendebantur, habuissent aliqua ipsorum speciali collegio appropriata, constat
In the *Appellatio maior*, the problem of corporate poverty was dealt with at greater length. *Ad conditorem*, *Cum inter*, and *Quia quorundam*, in fact, all get the corporate poverty of the apostles and Franciscans wrong. The novelty Michael introduced in the longer appeal was to compare the need for any *religio* to ensure that no private person have or possess anything of his own to the need for ‘the whole *religio* of the Friars Minor’ to have nothing of its own. This religion, Michael continued, ‘quantum ad abdicationem proprietatis omnium rerum, quam in communi fecit censetur sicut una persona sive vice personae unius fungitur, Dig. 46.1.22.’ Here Michael referred to a key passage of the *Digest*, which stated that entities like municipalities and fellowships perform the function of a person. In the *Appellatio monacensis*, he repeated the comparison between monk / monastery and college / general society, but in language similar to Francis. That is, the *proportio* of a single individual to a college is the same as the *proportio* of a single specific college to a general community. There is more. Just as a single person is not perfect *personaliter* unless all individual temporal property is renounced, so similarly, or *proportionaliter*, a specific college cannot be perfect *collegialiter* unless it renounces all common temporal ownership and lordship.

From there it was easy to draw the connection to the situation of a a monk and monastery and the Franciscan Order and the whole Church. Just as something given, granted, or offered to a monk passes into the lordship of the whole college (whatever

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61. *App.mai.*, 272–73: ‘attendendum est quod quemadmodum essentiale est statui religionis cuiuslibet perfectae quod nulla persona privata aliquid proprium habeat sive possideat, ut in praellegato X 3.35.6, sic et religioni toti Fratrum Minorum essentiale est quod proprium non habeat’. We might note in passing that Michael would probably not have found Innocent’s comments to this part of the decretal particularly palatable. According to his Innocent IV, *Comm. ad X* 3.35.6 (fol. 432vb–33rb), regarding the ‘abdicatio proprietas ... annexa regulae monachali’, the ‘Papa potest dispensare cum monacho, quod habeat proprium vel coniugem, cum posit ordinem et naturam, quam det ordinii, et substantiam tollere’. The pope, however, needs to do so *ex causa*. Innocent proves that this has to be the case with an amusing hypothetical situation: Imagine that all of Christianity were in danger unless a monk became king (say because no one else knew how to govern the realm); surely in that case, he reasoned, the pope can dispense with the vow of personal poverty.


64. See below, p. 223.

65. *App.mon.*, 751: ‘Item, quae est proportio unius personae singularis ad unum collegium speciale eadem est proportio per omnia unius collegii specialis ad unam communatum generalum. Sed persona aliqua singularis non potest esse perfecta personaliter nisi renuntiet in speciali proprietati omnium reum temporalium, ut patet de primis credentibus Actuum 4 et de religiosis absque proprio vivere profiteantibus. Ergo similiter, seu proportionaliter, collegium quodcumque speciale non potest esse perfectum collegialiter nisi renuntiet in communi proprieatibus et domino omnium reum temporalium.’

66. As long, that is, that we remember the Franciscan double mode of renunciation is more extreme and therefore superior to the monastic model: *App.mon.*, 752.
the intention of the donor), and into the management of the abbot (even if the donor is thinking nothing about the college), so what is given to the college, or congregation, of the Friars Minor passes into the lordship of the Roman Church and management of the pope. The similarity of this last statement to Bonagratia’s tract needs no elaboration.

So far Michael was attempting to show the corporate non-lordship of his Order. Part of his argument depended upon his adaptation of St Bonaventure’s account of the fourfold communitas of temporal goods, which flow from a fourfold ius. At the risk of some tedium, we must consider these four communitates once more. The first type of communitas was that which existed (only) in a time of necessity, and therefore can be omitted here. The second type of communitas, which is based on divine law, was the source for both the ‘primitiva communitas credentium’ and those who followed the apostolic life in the Church, and it was to this type of community that the verses of Acts 4 and Dilectissimis referred.

The third communitas, based as it is on humanly instituted law, describes the general civil order. But it can also describe corporations within civil society. Corporations of this sort, however, have nothing to do with evangelical society; in fact, those interested in evangelical perfection are obliged to renounce this sort of community. The reason for this is that, as it is often noted in Roman law, when a community—fellowship might be a better term in this context—is dissolved, the goods and monies of the community are divided amongst its members. In other words, he said, ‘tali respectu “quod est collegii, dicitur esse singulorum’.

Michael’s view was similar to the juristic view described above, namely that a corporation is nothing other than the men who are there: ‘Ideo cuilibet de tali communitate sive collegio dicitur competere proprium ius personale in rebus communibus illius collegii.’

The fourth type of communitas describes ecclesiastical society. Unlike Bonaventure, who used this fourth type to develop an explanation for why other mendicant orders or bishops—who have no personal, only ‘collegial’ ownership—may still be considered

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68. Or indeed with the Franciscan tradition in general. Cf. Hugh of Digne, Expositio 6 (Flood 1979, 146.29–147.12), and Bonaventure, Epistola de tribus quaestionibus ad magistrum innominatum 7 (BOO 8.333a).

69. See Appendix A.


71. App. mai., 339, quoting Gl. ord. ad Dig. 47.22.1, s.v. ‘Competit’; he also cited Dig. 47.22.1.2 and 47.22.3 pr.

perfect, Michael focused on when this type of communitas arose, which, he said, happened after the Roman principes took up the Christian faith and richly endowed the Church. The crucial difference between this community and the second one is that the ecclesiastical community is the one to which ‘datur actio et exceptio in iudicio’ for the goods held by the community, which means it has quasi proprietas and dominium utile. The rationale here was that the type of control a church (or agent of the church) could exercise over these goods fell in between that found in the second and third types. This was not a new idea: many canonists maintained, for instance, that a prelate could not alienate the goods of his church without the consent of the canons. Michael in fact quoted Innocent IV and Hostiensis on this very point. The two canonists noted that it was Christ who had (full) lordship and possession of the things of the Church; they belong to the bishops, prelates, or chapters only as it concerns governance and administration.

Michael utilized all these ideas in his argument against the Franciscan Order having a use of right. Michael’s response took several prongs. The first was (of course) an appeal to Exiit, which explained that the brothers could not acquire anything for themselves individually or for their Order even in common, and that the Roman Church received the ownership and lordship of the goods of which it was licit for the Order and brothers to have the use. Whether or not one finds this response convincing, it clearly does not answer the problem posed by John: it could simply be argued that Nicholas spoke ambiguously here, for an Order simply cannot have a use of fact—and ‘licet habere’ could easily be taken to mean something more than using a thing without any right whatsoever.

When Michael responded to the issue of an Order having usus, he made two different arguments. One was to equate the Order of the brothers with the professio fratrum. Thus, when Exiit said that the profession of the brothers abdicated the ‘proprietatem usus et
rei cuiuscumque dominium’, it should be obvious that a use that is of right (according to
the sense in Inst. 2.2.2) does not belong (convenit) to the Order or profession.\textsuperscript{79}

Michael also addressed the supposedly imaginary nature of corporations. He wrote:

Praeterea, adquirere aliquid alteri est iuris et in iure consistit, et tamen textus [*Exiit]*
dicit quod frater nihil possunt adquirere Ordini etiam in communi. Ergo liquet quod
ea quae sunt facti, scilicet usus facti, congruit Ordini praedicto Fratrum Minorum, et
ea quae sunt iuris non possunt sibi congruere. Et est ratio, quia Ordo, qui fungitur vice
personae sicut haereditas, municipium et societas et curia, Dig. 46.1.22(!), abdicavit a
se ea quae sunt iuris et retinuit solummodo ea quae tantummodo sunt facti.\textsuperscript{80}

A little further on he repeated this point with further, if questionable, references to
Roman law.\textsuperscript{81} But he added that,

imperite dictum est quod Ordo sit imaginaria persona. Nam illud de iure dicitur imagi-
nariorum quod similatur esse, et non est, Dig. 18.1.55. Et notatur Dig. 50.17.16. Et quod
imaginarium est, iuris vinculum non obtinet, Dig. 44.7.54, sicut nec chimeraa. . . . Ideo
quod imaginarium est, usum iuris habere non potest, quia iuris vinculum non obtinet.
Ordo autem, sicut et collegium unum et populus unus et civitas una, interpretatione
et statuto iuris in veritate repraesentat personam et fungitur vice personae. Unde nisi
Ordo Fratrum Minorum abdicasset a se, ea quae sunt iuris sibi competenter.\textsuperscript{82}

In the eyes of the law, the Order is a person; and what this means is that this ‘person’
can renounce a use of right, just like a real person could do. On the other side, Michael
also maintained, similar to Innocent, that an Order is little more than the people who
comprise it. The phrase ‘brothers in common’ is equivalent to ‘the Order’; thus ‘quod
fratribus in communi relictum est, Ordini intelligitur esse relictum’.\textsuperscript{83} St Francis also
clearly thought that this had to be true as well, for he was content with only forbidding
the brothers to appropriate house, place, or anything. That is, he knew that *fratres*, in
the plural, could indicate a college or community and then he forbade them to appropriate
a place or domicile, the very sort of thing a community worries about first.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{79} *App.mai.*, 378; for *Exiit*, see 2.1113. Inst. 2.2.2 deals with *res incorporales*, the sort of things ‘quae
in iure consistunt’. Azo’s glosses to this section consistently equate the *ius* of something to the thing
itself; e.g., in the gloss to *ius hereditatis*, he wrote: ‘Idest hereditarium ius, quoad est hereditas: et

\textsuperscript{80} *App.mai.*, 377. On the reference to the *Digest*, see n. 63 above.

\textsuperscript{81} Inst. 3.17.1 (but cf. 3.17.3), and Dig. 41.1.34, which, as the editors note, ‘Non videtur esse ad rem’.

\textsuperscript{82} *App.mai.*, 378–79.

\textsuperscript{83} *App.mai.*, 372, citing Dig. 34.5.2(!) et 34.5.20(21). The same point is made at *App.mai.*, 378.

\textsuperscript{84} *App.mon.*, 676–78.
As for proof that a corporation might act ‘of fact’, Michael quoted from Dig. 41.2.2: ‘Sed hoc iure utimur, ut et possidere et usucapere municeps\textsuperscript{85} possint idque eis per servum et per liberam personam adquiratur.’ According to Michael, by using both possessere and usucapere, it was clear that both what is of fact and what is of law belong to a corporation, which performs the function of a person.\textsuperscript{86} Michael therefore defended Franciscan poverty by an appeal to the fiction theory. Where he differed from John was that he rejected the notion that an Order was an imaginary person. As a legal person it could act; in this case it could renounce a right of use.

Michael’s appeals were published in the fall of 1328. He was the reprobate who provoked \textit{Quia vir reprobus}, John’s final pronouncement just over a year later. In this longish bull (just under one-third the length of the \textit{Appellatio maior}), the pope re-clarified his opinion regarding evangelical poverty for the last time. With respect to the problem of an Order having anything other that a use of right, John had little to add. Part of the emphasis this time around was in connecting the problem of an Order’s supposed use of right with the idea that an act of using was something exclusive to an individual agent (and inherently incommunicable).\textsuperscript{87} The other relevant passage in \textit{Quia vir} made sure that everyone understood that the use of right that belongs to an Order is not an individual (\textit{proprium}) right, but one common to the whole Order.\textsuperscript{88} I suspect that this renewed emphasis on the right being common to the whole Order was partly responsible for the slant of Francis of Marchia’s and William of Ockham’s responses to the problem.

Strangely, the \textit{Appellatio monacensis} does not take up this issue again in the light of John’s more forceful comments in \textit{Quia vir}. Some arguments are repeated, as we have seen, but there are no new developments regarding the problem that the personality of an order is but a legal fiction. At one point Michael spent some time showing that John was wrongly arguing for communal ownership among the apostles and early believers through a misunderstanding of the distinct sub-community of the apostles,\textsuperscript{89} but the argument

\textsuperscript{85} A municeps was a citizen of a municipium, or free town, in antiquity. Michael seems to be designating the corporate nature inherent in the plural municipes, for which he had some grounds: cf. e.g., \textit{Summa Paucapaleae} ad C. 17 q. 4 c. 10 (Schulte 1890, 91): ‘Municipes sunt in eodem municipio nati ab officio dicti eo, quo publicis officis mancipati sunt;’ repeated almost \textit{verbatim} by Rufinus, \textit{Summa Decretorum} ad C. 17 q. 4 c. 10 (Singer 1902, 375). See further, Michaud-Quantin 1970, 119–21.

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{App.mai.}, 379: ‘In qua lege exemplum patet de utroque, scilicet de eo quod est facti ut possidere, et de eo quod est iuris, ut usu capere, quod haec universitati, quae vice fungitur personae, conveniunt.’

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{QVR}, 559: ‘Item, quia usus facti sic est utentis quod non potest dici alius nec communicabilis sibi. Patet enim quod actus comedendi sic erat sibi proprius quod non poterat dici alius esse communis, quare et communio praedicta non potest intelligi quod simplicem facti usum. Rursus, quia usus facti communitati non convenit, cum talis usus personam veram requirat et exigat, quam non gerit communitas, sed potius imaginariam seu etiam repraesentatem.’

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{QVR}, 581.

\textsuperscript{89} See \textit{App.mon.}, 740–46.
there relied upon rather than developed the existing corporation theory of the earlier appeals.

7.5 Francis of Marchia

When Francis came to deal with this issue, he clearly relied upon Michael of Cesena’s early appeals of 1328. However, he modified Michael’s response somewhat and, in this case, this alteration led to the omission of a key element of the *Appellatio maior.*\(^9^0\)

As he had done elsewhere, Francis began with a consideration of some of the possible meanings of the term under consideration. In one sense of the word, a *communitas* might well be imaginary and represented. This was true for a *communitas logica,* for this type of community is a ‘communitas rationis abstracta a suis particularibus’. But this was surely not what John and the Michaelists were arguing over, which was a collective community—a ‘communitas rei uera et non rationis tantum’. The example Francis provided is that of ten men pulling a ship together. It is clear, he explained,

*in tractu de facto nauis a decem hominibus simul, qui tractus facti nauis per se est communitatis seu multitudinis x. hominum ipsum trahencium et non alicuius persone singularis, quia nullus unus, per se solus, posset eam trahere de facto, et ita x. homines trahunt ipsum nauem simul ut unus motor seu tractor sufficiens et totalis.*\(^9^1\)

Thus, if use of fact required a ‘true person’, it should be understood that this use of fact requires a true person or a community made up of true people. After all, there are many human acts where one ‘true’ person does not suffice, and a plurality is required instead. In the example of the actual (*de facto*) dragging of the ship, that actual dragging had to be attributed to the group, not any one individual. Finally, in Francis’ opinion, it is absurd to say that use of fact requires a true person any more than a right of using does.\(^9^2\) It was an argument that Ockham would expand upon.

This is not, however, to deny the reality of a corporation. Francis agreed with Michael that, ‘communitas specialis se habet ad communitatem generalem sicut se habet una persona singularis ad unam communitatem speciellem’.\(^9^3\) Francis employed this idea as an example of how it was possible for the college of the apostles to renounce corporate

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90. We must not forget though that Francis did deal with ‘corporate’ issues as it related to whether the college of apostles held any *dominium.* I have not repeated this here, but much of what is said there (above, p. 124 f.) applies here as well.

91. *Improbatio* n. 161, 114. This is discussed briefly in Miethke 1969, 505.

92. *Improbatio* n. 156, 112.

93. *Improbatio* n. 743, 335.
ownership, even going so far as to argue that the ‘community of apostles . . . held the place of one specific person’ as it concerns the abdication of ownership, or right.

Francis thus answered the pope’s objection, but only by recasting the question. He did not discuss the question of whether an *ordo* may be considered a juridical ‘person’, which was, after all, the focus of John’s claim. This is even more apparent where he responded to the pope’s point that the use of right that belongs to an Order had to be a *ius commune*. To be fair, one of Francis’ primary goals in the *Improbatio* was to prove that whenever John said ‘use of right’ or ‘right of using’, he had to mean a right that was *litigiosum et contenciosum*, which included a *ius agendi*, or a right to take action in court. Thus, he reasoned, John had to mean, in some way, an exclusive (*proprium*) right of using, for no one can start a legal suit on behalf of a right of using that is only common and in no way exclusive except where someone wishes to appropriate for himself the common right (*ius commune*). This is a far cry from the position defended by Innocent.

In summary, then, while Francis insisted that a corporation was a ‘real’ thing in contrast to a ‘logical’ entity, it was only as real as the people who comprised it. This is not what John was saying, who was concerned only with a corporation as a legal entity; nor does it seem to match up properly with Innocent’s understanding, which, though he would agree with Francis on this point, also viewed a corporation as the locus of a set of rights, which inhered in it—even if that meant inhering, ultimately, in the members. The difference between the two positions had a lot to do with what ‘direction’ one viewed the corporation from. Francis was concerned with the agency of the individuals looking ‘out’ through the corporation: no single Franciscan would want to take up any ‘collegial’ right, even to act on behalf of the college. John, on the other hand, was thinking from the perspective of one granting a thing, ‘use’ in this case, to the college; he was looking ‘in’, through the corporation, to the people who comprised it. Thus, the use, conceded as a right of use, was conceded to the Order—that is, in common to the people who comprised it.

7.6 William of Ockham

Although corporations or corporative thinking, as it were, would eventually play a very important role in Ockham’s *opera politica*, the poverty controversy provided the first forum

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94. See *Improbatio* nn. 50–52, 1164, 70–72, 473–74.
95. *Improbatio* n. 283, 163.
96. *Improbatio* n. 733, 332.
97. *Improbatio* n. 730, 331–32: ‘Ex quo etiam sequitur quod ipse intellexit de iure agendi proprio alico modo, particulariter uel collegialiter, quia pro iure utendi tantum communi et nullo modo proprio, nullus mouet causam aliquam in iudicio, nisi in casu cum quis ius commune uult sibi appropriare’.
to develop his thoughts on their nature. Yet this aspect of his defense of Franciscan poverty remains mostly unstudied.

Let us start, however, with his Epistola ad Fratres Minores, written shortly after the appearance of the Opus nonaginta dierum, for it lays the issues out clearly and succinctly. According to the letter, errors abound in John’s various bulls; of the many found in Quia quorundam, Ockham saw fit to mention seven. Three of them relate to our topic: that the Order is an ‘imaginary and represented person’; that things of fact cannot belong to an Order; and that things of right can belong to an Order. These three errors, he wrote, ‘ita sunt ridiculosa, ut nequaquam improbatione sed derisu indigeant’. Ockham would return to this point in other works as well, but it was usually little more than a summary of the three errors. Only the Opus nonaginta dierum and the Contra Benedictum present a detailed refutation of the pope’s position.

When he discussed these three errors in the context of the poverty controversy, he included a fourth, related, error: that the Franciscan Order had a right of use to the things it used. Ockham made it clear that he understood the Roman law meaning lurking in the term. As he said, every use of right is a usus nudus, or a usufruct. The Order, of course, does not have this kind of use, for Clement had forbidden the Order to litigate in Exivi, and a use of right was a use that one could defend in court. Thus, one could be sure the Order did not have a use of this sort.

Ockham dealt with the other errors in turn. He also doubted in the strongest of terms that a ‘communitas gerit personam imaginariam seu repraesentatam’. Like Francis, he argued this made no sense, not to mention contradict other dicta of the pope.

Quia illud, quod potest habere actum realem, non est persona imaginaria et repraesentata. Sed ecclesia est quaedam communitas, quae multos potest actus reales exercere; habet enim ecclesia iurisdictionem magnam, per quam potest iudicare inter litigantes, pro qua indigent.

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98. Lagarde 1963, 43-44, provided a brief account of Ockham’s use of corporate terminology, but it is in dire need of revision. He wrote, for instance that Ockham used the word universitas ‘assez rarement’, but the term is used quite frequently in the Dialogus. It is usually employed in the sense of universitas fidelium or mortalium (e.g., 3.1 Dial. 2.1, 2.2, 2.26, 2.30; 3.2 Dial. 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 1.8, 1.11, 1.19, 1.31; 3.2 Dial. 2.5, 2.6, 3.6), at least once as a universitas viventium (3.2 Dial. 1.7), as well as in the sense of ‘corporation’ or ‘community’: e.g., 3.2 Dial. 3.10, 3.17. A particularly interesting application of his corporative thinking occurs at 3.2 Dial. 1.29. In this case, I have relied on the forthcoming critical edition (Kilcullen et al. 1995-).

99. Epist. 9.29-10.3; at OQ 8.7.49-55, 206, it is suggested that ‘ad minus sunt circiter nonaginta’ errors in his bulls.

100. OND 6.413-414, 365. Cf. Miethke 1969, 507-08, who, in the following pages, attempted to relate this position to Ockham’s philosophical views.

101. CB 1.8, 189.26-191.39; CE 3.56-74, 30-31; CI 24, 102.27-103.12; IPP 27.257-294, 335-36; and OQ 8.7.112-125, 208.

102. See p. 168, above.

103. OND 62.200-201, 568.
res ecclesiae defensare et multa alia facere, quae personae imaginariae et repraesentatae convenire non possunt.\textsuperscript{104}

Similarly, John had also insisted that the Order of Friars Minor has a right of using in the things they used, which would be impossible if the Order were an imaginary and represented person. Therefore, he concluded, the pope did not really think that the Order (or any other community) was really imaginary.\textsuperscript{105}

Ockham addressed the issue of representation in his account of who owned the goods that the apostles used. There were three possibilities. In all cases the goods were common to the general community of believers, but in the second case, which clearly owes much to Francis’ position, Ockham suggest that there may be a common sort of lordship by which someone could litigate in the name of the whole community. In this case, the apostles would not have more than simple use of fact, either individually or in respect of their specific college—though not because they lacked a right common to their college and to the others.\textsuperscript{106}

The apostles, William argued, had use of fact of consumables separate from both individual lordship and a ‘common’ lordship proper to the college of apostles, for the consumables were common to the entire community of believers.\textsuperscript{107} The upshot of this point is that Ockham was forced to admit that it was possible that the apostles did not have use of fact separate from every human-based \textit{(humanitus inventum)} lordship.\textsuperscript{108} But the argument is enough for Ockham’s modified Michaelist position, which drew three conclusions from the fact that the apostles held neither individual lordship nor some sort of exclusive common apostolic lordship: First, that the apostles had use of fact of consumables separate from (individual and common) ‘full and free’ or ‘civil and worldly’ lordship; second, that they had this use separate from all individual lordship (of any type); and, third, that this use was separate from any lordship common to the college of apostles.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{104} OND 6.424–429, 365.
\textsuperscript{105} OND 6.433–438, 366.
\textsuperscript{106} OND 106.84–90, 772: ‘Alii dicunt quod illa bona erant communia Apostolis et aliiis quoad aliquale dominium, quo quis nomine totius communitiatis poterat habere potestatem pro eis in iudicio litigandi. Et tunc Apostoli habebant simplicem facti usum in huiusmodi rebus propter carentiam omnis iuris in eis, quod esset proprium cuiusque Apostolo vel toti collegio Apostolorum, non propter carentiam omnis iuris communis eorum collegio speciali et alii.’ A few lines further on, Ockham made an allusion that made it clear he was thinking in terms of the fourth type of \textit{communitas} outlined by Michael and Bonaventure, which is discussed in Appendix A.
\textsuperscript{107} OND 6.86–123, 357–58. The point of this argument was to solidify the claim that consumables were common to (all) the first believers with respect to a power of relieving their needs.
\textsuperscript{108} It was an open question in Ockham’s opinion whether what was common to the whole community of believers could be called some unique type of lordship; see the discussion on p. 134 above.
Ockham belaboured this point because what was theoretically possible for the *collegium apostolorum* distinct from the rest of the early Church can also be true for the Franciscans as a distinct group within the Church. Thus we read, for instance, that

 nec est intentio appellantis nec ipsorum [i.e., *impugnatores*] in suis traditionibus indagare, an Apostoli habuerint in temporalibus aliquod ius utendi, immo etiam dominium aliquaet proprietatem communitatem collegio suo speciali et toti residuo communitatis fidellium vel illorum, qui bona communia ecclesiae dispensanda receperunt; sed intentio eorum est quod Apostoli in rebus temporalibus non habuerunt dominium vel proprietatem nec aliquod ius utendi, etiam communiter accepto iure utendi pro iure, quod actionem dat civilem, proprium collegio Apostolorum.

Ockham therefore conceded that it was possible that the apostles *and* the whole community might have had a right in the consumables. But that was not an issue the Michaelists cared to answer. They were only concerned with the corporate rights of the apostles *qua* a corporation, and in that case they did not have any property rights in common. Ockham was not entirely sure that the apostles individually or as a group shared this *ius commune*. It was possible that they did, but it might actually have been only some part of the community of all the faithful that did. Individually, of course, the apostles had only the God-given licit power of using consumables, regardless of who owned them.

Ockham also used Francis’ argument regarding the pulling of a ship. Some acts, it is true, require a unique individual, but others clearly require the collective efforts of several people. A community, in short, is not one true person, but several true people; and an Order is not a ‘unica vera persona’, but is true people, just as a people is not one man, but is many men. A people is many men gathered *in unum*, just like a community of the faithful is many faithful people professing one faith. A community ‘non est aliquid fantasticum nec imaginarium, sed est verae personae, sicut populus non est unus homo, sed est plures homines.’ Therefore, as Miethke noted, when Nicholas III said that the Order had this use, this simply meant that the friars had this use, for the brothers are the Order.

111. *OND* 6.485–495, 367. Although Ockham never said which alternative he favoured—for either claim was sufficient for his stated purpose—it is likely he preferred the latter inasmuch as he added that it would mean that the apostles *qua* a corporation only had a licit power of using the things bought with the common pool of money.
112. See above, p. 177.
114. *OND* 62.281–283, 570: ‘Verum est quod ordo non est unica vera persona, sed est verae personae: sicut populus non est unus homo, sed est plures homines.’ Cf. Ockham’s comments about the lordship of a solitary monk in a monastery on p. 128 above.
This argument was, in short, similar to—but more pointed than—Michael’s claim in the Appellatio maior; it was, in fact, even closer in spirit both to the gloss ‘Non debetur’ and to comments Ockham had made in his academic writings.\textsuperscript{117}

Elsewhere Ockham made an argument reminiscent of Francis’ description of a logica communitas. If, he said, the Franciscan Order were only an imaginary and represented person, the same must be said of the Church. He thought that the absurdity of this position was clear,

Quod enim est tantum repraesentatum et imaginariurn est fantasticum, et non est in re extra animam. Sed ecclesia non est quid fantasticum non existens extra animam... Quia aut ecclesia est extra animam, aut in anima tantum aut aliquid compositum ex ente in anima et ente extra animam. Si est in anima tantum, vel aliquid compositum ex ente in anima et ente extra animam, ergo nullum reale nec iurisdictionem realem potest habere: quae dicere de ecclesia est impium et blasphemum. Si autem ecclesia est extra animam, vel ergo est una res, vel plures; et sive sit una sive plures, non est persona repraesentata et imaginaria; quia nec una res est persona imaginaria, nec plures res sunt una persona repraesentata et imaginaria.\textsuperscript{118}

As to whether things of fact can belong to an Order, if this were impossible, then one would have to conclude that they could not befit any community or college: neither the Church, nor a general council, nor the congregation of the faithful, nor a people, nor a crowd, nor a folk, nor a city, kingdom, nor any sort of corporation or community. Yet many examples from Scripture and canon law bear out the opposite.\textsuperscript{119}

The third error was that although things of fact could not, apparently, belong to an Order, things of right could. According to Ockham,

Quia omne ius ad actum aliquem ordinatur; cui ergo illud, quod facti est, convenire non potest, nec illud, quod iuris est, eidem poterit convenire. Item, nulli, quod est solum imaginarium, potest ius aliquod convenire. Sed ordo secundum istum est solummodo quid imaginarium; ergo ei non potest ius convenire.\textsuperscript{120}

In Contra Benedictum he expanded slightly on his argument.

Dicere autem, sicut iste dicit, quod persona imaginaria et repraesentata potest habere illa quae iuris sunt, et non actum realem, est tam fantastice dictum, ut in fantasticis assueti hoc nequaquam capere possint, cum communiter fantastici teneat quod illa, quae in anima sola imaginatione exsistunt, iura realia habere non possunt.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{117} See n. 83 and n. 29 above. Miethke 1969, 511–13, noted the connection to Ockham’s Sentence commentary and the Summula philosophiae naturalis. 
\textsuperscript{118} OND 62.211–220, 568; cf. 62.283–287, 570. 
\textsuperscript{119} OND 62.227–256, 568–69; cf. 6.415–420, 365, CB 1.8, 190.17–24, provides an even longer list of scriptural references. 
\textsuperscript{120} OND 62.259–263, 569; cf. 62.287–289, 570. See Miethke 1969, 510. 
\textsuperscript{121} CB 1.8, 190.29–34.
John’s argument also fails, he explained, because if a real action is incompatible with something by its very nature, the same must be true for the right of exercising that real action. Although he has switched from pairing *usus facti* / *usus iuris* to *actus realis* / *ius exercendi actum realem*, so far the argument is pretty much the same. The crucial addition is that corporations—like an Order—can have *iura et actus reales*; he goes on to list several ‘real’ acts, such as the act of judging, correcting, dispensing the sacraments, or managing ecclesiastical things. An Order is, after all, *verae personae et reales* in the same way that the Church, or congregation of the faithful is true and real persons, for what is true persons is the mystical body of Christ.\(^\text{122}\)

Ockham wrote the *Contra Benedictum* some five or six years after the *Opus nonaginta dierum* in 1337/38,\(^\text{123}\) which may explain why he was suddenly willing to stress the fact that an Order can—the verb *posse* is important here—have rights. It fits well with his general argument, to be sure, but this was very close to the point John had been making, namely, that an Order had to have rights since that is all an Order can have. It is therefore somewhat surprising that Ockham would choose to stress this point, regardless of the context in which he wrote it.

By way of conclusion, we should say that, of all the opinions we have considered on the nature of corporations, those expressed in the *Appellatio maior* seem to make the most sense in light of Innocent’s own views. Innocent’s opinion seems ambiguous though. If one were to judge solely by his *Commentary*, one would be hard-pressed to find a reason for why he would agree to Michael’s account of how a corporation may be granted anything other than rights—rights, which, in the end, devolved to the actual members of the corporation in common. The increased powers he granted to the nominated agents of the Order in *Quanto studiosis* would seem to bear this out as well. And although we have seen how Innocent did not discuss *usus* per se, his familiarity with Roman law makes it seem likely that he would understand a grant of *usus* to an Order to be one *of right*, not *of fact*.\(^\text{124}\)

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\(^\text{122}\). *CB* 1.8, 191.4–14: ‘Ordo igitur potest habere iura et actus reales: quemadmodum ecclesia tam universalis quam particularis potest habere et habet non solum iura sed etiam multos actus reales, scilicet actum iudicandi, corrigendi, sacramenta ecclesiastica dispensandi et de rebus ecclesiasticis disponendi, ac innumeris alios.... Nec ordo est persona imaginaria et repraesentata, sed est verae personae et reales, licet non sit una persona: quemadmodum ecclesia sive congregatio fidelium, licet non sit unica persona, est plures verae personae et reales, quia est corpus Christi misticum, quod est verae personae....’

\(^\text{123}\). Baudry 1950, 189.

\(^\text{124}\). One of many other issues where further study may prove fruitful would be to examine more closely Innocent’s writings regarding the need for a corporation to receive legitimate sanction (*tacitum vel expressum*) from a superior, particularly as a cornerstone of defenses of Franciscan poverty is that their Order and their brand of poverty possesses (repeated) papal approval. On Innocent’s views, see *Comm.* ad X 1.29(31).3 and 5.21.14, n.2 (fol. 148ra, 526rb). See also the comments in Melloni 1986, 189–90.
Concerning the ‘represented’ nature of an Order, Innocent, John, Bonagratia, and Michael seem to be in agreement to a certain extent; Francis and Ockham missed the point. But I suspect that they were more concerned with the philosophical tradition of repraesentatio and especially John’s use of the term ‘imaginary’, which John perhaps had little justification to employ. The Michaelists were usually keen to jump upon any chance to impugn John’s arguments, and they clearly saw an opportunity here. From their arguments, we should assume that Francis, and Ockham following him at first, chose to interpret the pope to mean that an Order was only a represented and imaginary person. And in both cases they gave arguments to show that this could not be true. An Order was like the Church, made up of real people. But as we have seen, no one denied this.\(^{125}\)

As J. P. Canning has shown, for Baldus (d. 1400) a ‘populus is at the same time both an abstract entity and real men’, that they are two aspects of the same thing, but he ‘never maintains that the populus as a conceptualization performs these legislative and governmental functions’\(^{126}\) Mutatis mutandis, the same, I think, could be said of Innocent or the Michaelists.\(^{127}\)

It would also seem that Michael’s response was the most successful rebuttal of John’s position in terms of answering what the pope was actually saying in an imprecise way. Michael utilized the distinction between the types of law—divine, natural, and positive—in a way that his confreres did not: he made explicit that the Order, considered as such, renounced positive law-based rights. Ockham was one step closer to this position in the Contra Benedictum, where he wrote that, despite what ‘that fantasist, John, dreams up’, ‘the Order of the Friars Minor is true people, who have and can have real rights and acts’.\(^{128}\) What he forgot to mention, though, was that though it can have these kind of rights, it does not need to have them. As Michael said, had not the Order renounced these rights, it would have them.

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\(^{125}\) It thus may be true that Ockham’s ‘logical individualism’ (McGrade 1980, 163; cf. Shogimen 2007, 170, 191, and 216), suited this position, or his ‘nominalist philosophical conclusions’ (Morrall 1961, 485), but I doubt we need to chalk it up to being more than a standard view, or common-sense. Moreover, it is clear that Ockham did lend a sense of personality to the ‘Church’—no less, that is, than Innocent did.

\(^{126}\) J. P. Canning 1980, 14 (emphasis Canning’s).

\(^{127}\) Cf. Tierney 1986a, 7.

\(^{128}\) CB 1.8, 3.191.36–39, citing C. 24 q. 1 c. 20.
**Chapter Eight**

**Conclusion**

Allegatio sit debilis iudicanda, si papa decretales pro se ... adduxerit, tamen illa allegatio fortis est censenda, quae in decretalibus contra papam evidentius est fundata. ... Propter quod in sequentibus contra quosdam posteriores vocatos pontifices canones antiquorum patrum saepius allegabo....

William of Ockham

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We are now in a position to make some conclusions and generalizations about Ockham’s theory of property rights as it was expressed in the *Opus nonaginta dierum*. I would like to do two things in this final chapter: summarize the essential similarities and differences of the Michaelist position on the nature of Franciscan poverty, and, secondly, consider briefly the extent to which he ‘went beyond’ the Michaelist framework when it came to his use of canon and civil law.

**8.1 Summary of the Michaelist Position**

The first task is easy enough. As Roberto Lambertini noted some time ago, despite the ‘notorious dullness’ of the lengthy Michaelist texts, a careful reading of these texts shows that within the framework of broad agreement, there was still room to work out individual positions. The Michaelists to a man adhered to what Kenneth Pennington recently described as the ‘hierarchy of laws’, although the *ius gentium* played a rather unimportant role in their descriptions of the interaction between various types of *iura* and *leges*. Taken broadly, the Michaelists seem fairly close to what the Decretists wrote in their commentaries to Gratian’s *Tractatus de legibus*, although there is no direct quoting from even the more influential of them. The Michaelists cared most about the division between human and suprahuman law. Ockham also developed further the hazy distinction

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3. Pennington 2008b, 574.
between positive and non-positive types of law, which relied on his reading of both *Exiit* and the relevant passages of the *Decretum* (more on this shortly). It further seems to be generally true that the Michaelists employed *lex* and *ius* when they were trying to mark a distinction between positive and non-positive law; however, it cannot be said that they exclusively meant that *lex* was always positive law, while *ius* was not. Ockham’s use of *ius fori* and *ius poli*, for example, flies in the face of this distinction. Perhaps it is best to say that the distinction is more apparent in Bonagratia’s and Michael’s texts than in Francis’ and Ockham’s.

There are two keys to Michaelist thinking about *ius*. The first picks up on the standard ideas about the immutability of *ius naturale*. As we have seen, everyone affirmed its general immutability, just as everyone confirmed that this immutability could be altered in part given the correct set of circumstances. The Michaelists tended to argue this idea on the basis of the common-sense maxim that necessity is subject to no law. Although it was not a Franciscan invention to claim that in times of extreme need, people had a *ius* to take what they needed for their survival, it was something that they were fond of repeating. From here it was a short walk to the idea that *ius naturale* was irrenounceable, which itself implied that other *iura* were not. This became the basis for the idea that Franciscans and their order could operate ‘extra juridically’, that is, outside the bounds of positive law yet still within the sphere of natural law. As McGrade once put it, they sought a ‘disengagement from the legal order’, that is, from the humanly legislated legal order.

The other key feature of *ius* for the Michaelists was that the holder of a *ius* could always legitimately and automatically take action in court if his *ius* was infringed. This point was one of the insuperable rifts between John and the Michaelists. Yet it is interesting that the pope’s denial that a *ius utendi* automatically entailed a *ius agendi* means that he was actually not that far from the Michaelists’ point that their rightless use through licences of using was significant because it was legally indefensible. This, to me, seems like one of the best ways for reconciling—should one want to—the pope’s basic position on Franciscan poverty with some of the aims of the Michaelists, or indeed with Nicholas III’s *Exiit*.

There are some differences to be noted among the major Michaelist tracts on the nature of *ius*. For Michael, the key point about *ius* was how it was responsible for founding the different *communitates temporalium*, which neither Francis nor William were

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4. So much so that Lee 2009, 29–30, completely misunderstood Ockham on this point, which he also treated as if it were the sum of Ockham’s position.
5. McGrade 1974, 16.
6. I exclude Bonagratia’s shorter ones, mostly because they are too short for any detailed analysis.
much interested in. Francis’ main points about *ius* was that the pope’s exclusive focus on positive law *ius* was too narrow to be of any real use, and in fact misrepresented the nature of the problem entirely. Ockham’s real novelty was the reliance on the Augustinian distinction between *ius fori* and *ius poli*, which he grafted onto the standard conception of the hierarchy of laws; he recognized that it was important to distinguish between positive and non-positive (or moral) law. And, as will become apparent in the next section, he also made independent use of canon law to draw this distinction. The advantage of Ockham’s position is that it is a useful basis for explaining all kinds of lordship or lordship-like relationships. Thus Franciscan use, which is rightless, is a power-relationship between the rightless friar and the rights-holding owner, who, in theory, sets all terms of the friar’s use. This is similar to other types of proprietary relationships, although in other cases the grantee of, say, a usufruct or right of using has certain legally protected rights. The model also works, *mutatis mutandis*, for a king’s or emperor’s *dominium* over the goods of his subjects, or even God’s over creation. It must be noted, however, that the other Michaelists held, either explicitly or tacitly, a similar view; yet Ockham put forward the ideas in a more comprehensive fashion, and which clearly serve as the basis for his more mature views on *dominium* in both proprietary and political lordship senses.\(^7\)

*Dominium*, according to the Michaelists, belonged mostly under the rubric of *ius*, especially insofar as it was used in the context of evangelical poverty. The main point the Michaelists were concerned to make was that human lordship, the only one that was ever really at issue, was not part of the prelapsarian condition of man, and was not entirely necessary now. (The *dominium* found in the state of innocence was of a different, non-coercive sort; it had nothing to do with proprietary lordship.) After the fall, ownership became a ‘free possibility’, but as useful as private ownership might be for human society, it was ‘never allowed to interfere with the fundamental right of living’\(^8\). Thanks to the example of Christ and the apostles, we know that it is possible for some to live without any lordship over temporal things, and that it is most meritorious to do so by a vow, which also means that—as long as a religious’ intentions remain true to his vow (admittedly not as easy as the Michaelists made it sound)—such a person is ‘intentionally’ incapable of acquiring property rights. And as people who have renounced authority over their own wills, effectively making them *iuris alienis*, they are legally incapable of acquiring the same rights under positive civil law.

The Michaelists also insisted that the kind of proprietary lordship exercised by churchmen in their official capacity was not the same as the type of lordship people

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exercised as regular citizens. Ecclesiastical lordship was restricted in its scope, and clerics should be thought of as stewards and administrators of this property, not full-fledged proprietors, for they manifestly cannot, as Ockham would say, dispose of a *res ecclesiae* by selling, giving, bequeathing, donating or alienating it at their own pleasure; nor do they have the ability to sue for it in court and treat it in any way not prohibited by natural law.

The Michaelists showed perhaps the most variation when it came to *usus*. They were all agreed that *usus*, even in the context of property rights, did not only mean ‘legal’ use, or that the description of *usus* in the *Institutes* (2.4) and *Digest* (7.1) was the only relevant meaning of the term. To have *usus* does not necessarily mean one has a right to use.

So far the Michaelists were in harmony with each other, but they made their point in different ways. Michael attacked the pope’s account of *usus*, which he recognized as a gloss of Azo’s, by pointing out that even Azo admitted that there could be a ‘de facto’ use. That is, *usus* might refer to the legal right or the physical action. He then described these rights of using as being either divine, natural, or civil, which clearly correspond to the various types of *ius*. For Michael, the question of Franciscan poverty was concerned with a *usus iuris civilis*, which perhaps explains why Michael never really articulated a theory of natural rights. Michael’s arguments on this topic were made with copious references to both canon and civil law.

An important part of the Michaelist response to John was their theory of licences. Friars had licences, not rights, to use things, and the easiest way to tell them apart was that this sort of licence gave no one a *ius agendi*, while a *ius utendi* certainly did. For Michael, human beings also have a *licentia utendi* the things they need for survival in times of extreme necessity. Both Francis and William provided a somewhat different account of what mechanisms come into play in times of necessity, though the net result remained the same: one may take the steps needed in order to survive past that moment of extreme need.

Michael’s explanation of how one could use things outside of extreme necessity without possessing any rights to use them relied on the idea that human beings have in the first place a simple ability (*facultas*) to use things. However, for the use to be considered licit, it must be permitted in some way. Some things belong to the ecclesiastical community in general, which are common by divine law, but this does not typically include the basic items of daily life, such as food or clothing (or books). To use these things, one needs a

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10. *OND* 2.389–397, 308, describing *dominium*. It is the second characteristic that is most important. They can of course take action in court, just not in their own name.
licence if not real property rights. This is what temporal owners give the friars: a positive law-based licence to use, which we know is not a right because the licence-holder has no way to defend his licence in court against the one who granted it.

Francis of Marchia broke down usus in a unique way. The two features of his account that stand out the most are that every type of usus consists of the physical act along with some abstract ‘principium’ of that act. Thus usus facti consists of both the act and the faculty of using, just as usufruct consists of both the right to receive the fruits and the act of receiving those fruits.

The other noteworthy feature concerns the ius utendi: according to Francis, there is a temporal and a spiritual ius utendi. A temporal right of using covers those situations that occur within the sphere of positive law, where the actors have positive rights to property, such as usufruct or the ius utendi referred to by the pope. The spiritual right of using is not really a ‘right’ at all, but it is what makes our innate facultas utendi licit and just, either through our facultas naturae, or, more commonly, through the receipt of a revocable and legally indefensible licentia simplex from someone who holds legitimate rights over the thing that will be used or consumed. Francis maintained that every legitimate act of using, however construed, involves some form of a ius utendi; the pope’s ius utendi is only part of the picture.

Ockham’s account of usus shows a number of similarities to and echoes of the other Michaelist texts, but he assimilated Michael’s ‘legal’ arguments to Francis’ more philosophical ones, as well as provided a greater degree of precision to the views of both. Like Francis, he made a big deal of the pope’s merely juridical interpretation of the meaning of usus.

Ockham is also easier to follow than Francis is with his ius utendi spiritualiter, even if the point they wanted to make was the same. On the contentious issue of how a use ‘of fact’ might be licit or ‘just’ without the actor having any rights to do so, Ockham’s position was that one needed either a natural right of using, which manifested only in particular situations such as extreme need, or a licence of using, which was a non-ius that could be granted by the owner. One conspicuous feature of Ockham’s account of licences was the point that the person who gives the licence also sets its terms. It seems like simple enough a point, but it is noteworthy because Ockham would later apply this principle to other aspects of his political thought.\footnote{See p. 148 n. 47 above, for references. Gray 1986, 148, argued that Ockham may well have been influenced by English law in his treatment of licences, in that such law recognized ‘some act of using in which the beneficiary is unprotected’. Perhaps, but he is clearly more deeply indebted to the Michaelist tradition.}
It is hard to imagine why the Michaelist stance on licences does not make sense. Why *must* we say that the grantee of a licence has either gained a right to use or he uses the thing unjustly? If the owner and the grantee agree that the grantee has only a permission to use something without ever gaining any rights over it, then so be it. Franciscans are supposed to live by means of these licences, except that they also vow to live in this way, committing themselves to live in the precarious situation of those whose way of life and material comforts are decided entirely at the whim of another.\(^\text{12}\)

Incidentally, it should be clear by now that neither Ockham nor the other Michaelists thought that Franciscan life depended mostly on the so-called natural rights, even those normally associated with extreme necessity. These two modes, either by licence or natural right, were two of the five general cases where an act of using may be considered licit. The other three ways one may have licit use of an object are: a person may use an unowned thing by employing our generic power of using (without acquiring *dominium* if one wishes); an owner can use things he or she owns; and one who has some kind of use of right may also use the thing over which he or she holds the right.

We also looked at two problems commonly associated with Franciscan poverty, namely the use of consumables by non-owners and the nature of corporate poverty. With respect to consumables, Bonagratia laid the basic legal foundation for the argument that consumables admit a separation of use and lordship. Under Roman law, everyone who was *iuris alieni*—slaves and *filiifamilias* being the two most pointed examples—are unable to exercise proprietary lordship, yet they are able to use things at their master’s pleasure. One finds a similar argument regarding members of religious orders in canon law.

The other Michaelists extended their criticism of the pope’s position, but none offered a more cogent legal argument than Bonagratia, though Michael made virtually identical claims regarding the separability of use and lordship in consumables. Michael also attended to some of the pope’s later objections, such as whether one can, properly speaking, ‘use’ a consumable. Part of this answer led to the point that we must imagine that the separation of lordship and use must be thought to (be able to) exist as long as the consumable itself exists. Both he and Francis based some of their arguments on the fact that even God’s mediate lordship exists just that long as well, entirely separate from the use of the consumable in question.\(^\text{13}\) The Michaelists also ridiculed the pope’s argument that the act of using cannot be ‘had’ as specious reasoning.

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\(^{12}\) Such was the theory, anyway. A balanced analysis would have to admit that the pope had a point when he wrote that he has seen how Franciscan lack of lordship had done more harm than good. The claim was perhaps a bit hyperbolic, but one does get a sense that no amount of papal legislation regarding Franciscan poverty would ever stop the friars from both worrying and boasting about their poverty. Cf. Lambert 1972, 137–38.

\(^{13}\) Cf. *OND* 41.84–93, 524.
Regarding the problem John posed in *Quia vir* about actions needing to be just, unjust, or neither, and that Franciscan use must be just, it seems that only Ockham gave a useful reply. Michael hardly addressed the problem, seemingly content with the idea that *Exiit* confirmed the Franciscan way of life as modelled on the life of Christ and the apostles, which clearly entails that the use of the things ‘licit to have’ must be just without any property rights. The licence, he insisted, guaranteed that use would not be illicit. Francis’ solution was hardly much better. As Francis saw it, we should not say that no ‘indifferent’ act can be posited between just and unjust acts. An act may be just due to \((ex)\) a temporal right of using and unjust due to ‘the opposite’ of such a right. Michael, Francis explained, was positing an act denuded of both these *iura*,\(^{14}\) which is, presumably, what Ockham once called the bare use of fact.

Francis’ position seems to amount to little more than an awkwardly phrased assertion that there are, with respect to rights of using, indifferent acts. Ockham agreed, but gave a much more comprehensible account of how this works. To do this, he built on the idea that not all actions need to be or can be studied in the light of positive law. Many are, of course, but when we are dealing with issues of morality, we should not think about an action being ‘just’ only on the basis of legal justice. Actions may be just in a more metaphorical sense, but they remain just nonetheless. When one is speaking about the just use a friar is to exercise, it is of justice in this sense that we should speak. This is particularly true since the friars do not acquire legal rights when they are granted licences of using, only the permission to employ that most general power of using that was granted in common to humankind.

Finally, there is the issue of corporate poverty. Bonagratia’s main contributions to this topic seems to be, first, that a corporation only ‘obtinet ... vicem personam’ in matters of *ius*, and not where the ‘factum persone’ is required. This is, presumably, what John meant when he claimed that the Order could not have a use of fact only one of right because it was merely a ‘represented person’. If so, then his rhetorical flourish, namely that the Order should only be considered a ‘representata et imaginaria’ person opened the door to a great deal of ridicule, and not all of it fair.

Bonagratia located the corporate ownership of the early community of believers in the entire community of believers: the things of the Church were ‘quasi communes universitatis omnium fidelium’, as was their lordship and ownership. We have here an allusion to Bonaventure’s second of the *quadruplex temporalium communitas*: the second is the *communitas* that exists by the *ius* of fraternal charity, whereby all things belong to the just.\(^{15}\) Contemporary Franciscans may be said to live in much the same way.

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\(^{14}\) See above, p. 198.

\(^{15}\) See Appendix A below.
Michael made the reference to Bonaventure’s ‘communities’ explicit. He also focused on the idea that corporations perform the function of a (legal) person, and that we can therefore compare the situation of a monk in a monastery to the Franciscan Order in society at large. Thus, while both Franciscans and Dominicans are perfect personaliter due to their renunciation of the third Bonaventuran community, Franciscans are also perfect collegialiter for having renounced the fourth community. According to Michael, corporations can have both things of fact and things of right; in the case of the Franciscans, they would have had a usus iuris, had they not renounced it.

Michael took the pope to task for using ‘imaginaria’: it was unskilfully said, he claimed, which is perhaps a sign that Michael recognized that John did not mean that corporations were truly imaginary, only that they only had legal personality. Francis and William either misunderstood the pope, or simply chose to do so on this point. Francis was clearly concerned to show how it is possible for a group of people to have an action that a single individual could not. The example of ten men pulling one ship provides a good image for us to hold on to, but it might not seem to be ad rem in the case of a solitary friar eating a crust of bread.

Francis seemed to believe that a corporation of people was only as real as the people who comprised it, but Ockham said it clearly: ‘Fratres sunt ordo et ordo est Fratres’.

If this was a position consistent with his logical individualism, it was no less consistent with the views of contemporary jurists. And we must surely imagine that the pope thought that if a corporation was anything, it was something made up of people. Regarding the problem of usus facti versus usus iuris, Ockham also agreed with Francis and Michael that groups of people can have real acts. The key to corporate lordship for all the Michaelists was the fact that we must consider the apostles, the college of apostles, as a distinct body within the Church. This apostolic college lacked rights exclusive to it, and the same was therefore true of the Franciscan Order of Ockham’s day.

The one omission in Ockham’s account, although it is clearly implied when you collect all his arguments about corporate poverty, is that in his emphasis to show that corporations can have rights, he forgot to insist that they do not need to have them.

8.2 Legal Catenae in the Opus nonaginta dierum

Ockham’s misunderstanding of the pope’s views on juristic personality, wilful or not, provides a nice segue to the question of how Ockham utilized the legal sources in the course of the Opus nonaginta dierum. Ockham’s knowledge and use of the law has piqued

the interest of Tierney in passing, but it is an exceedingly difficult question to answer; consequently I have tried only to provide the rudiments of an answer here rather than a comprehensive one.

Ockham’s citations of canon and civil law fall into two general categories. They either appear in a cluster, or catena, or an individual reference will appear in relative isolation. Many of these catenae are due to Offler’s vigilant eye rather than a direct quotation or citation of the sources in question. Many references, moreover, can be found in the other Michaelist texts, which may indeed be the source for Ockham’s references. The presence or absence of legal references in the Michaelist corpus is an interesting issue. Roberto Lambertini recently argued that the Improbatio had to antedate the Appellatio monacensis because when the two make similar arguments Michael’s text is more fully fleshed out with references to canon and Roman law. After all, why would Francis strip out these useful and impressive-looking catenae? I do not find this as convincing an argument: a long list of references to, say, canon law would be mostly meaningless to someone who does not know the content of the capitula to which they refer. As Francis never formally studied law, unless he had access to the texts, it would seem advisable to omit such references in his own text.

Yet I agree with Lambertini’s sentiment that the study of what was cited and how it was cited can be revealing. In my admittedly selective analysis, I opted to examine some of the more interesting catenae, either because they occur at significant points in the Opus nonaginta dierum, or because they seemed to deserve closer analysis. As Tierney noted, given Ockham’s views on the relative merits of canonists and theologians, ‘it is a pleasing irony that’ in certain cases ‘a little canonistic learning is needed to understand what Ockham, the theologian, was trying to convey to his readers’.

For this section I have employed a specialized system of notation that must be mentioned. References set in italics indicate that they are unique to Ockham, while a ‘(cf.)’ indicates a suggestion made by Offler; if they are combined—viz, (cf.)—it means that it is a suggestion made by Offler that was not cited in the other texts. Also, in the following lists (only) I have written references to the Ordinary Gloss in a more economical manner.

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17. Tierney 1954, 45–46, noted the verbal similarity between a passage of the Brevisloquium (2.21.14–35, 155–56) and Guido’s Rosarium ad D. 12 c. 2; cf. Tierney 1977b, 73. Gagnér 1974 also argued for that juristic sources must be considered in relation to Ockham’s views, and this idea is at least implicit in Kriechbaum 1996.
18. Lambertini 2001, 295. Not that this was his only argument.
19. See p. 241 n. 29, below, for an example of Ockham omitting a reference to the Digest for perhaps this very reason. Something similar can be seen in the quotation/paraphrase of App.mai. 255–56 at Impug. § 8 (Knysh 2000, 246); see p. 242 and n. 38, below.
than the standard style. Finally, the catenae listed below are numbered in the sequence in which they occur in the *Opus nonaginta dierum*, \(^{21}\) but since I have not discussed each one, the numbers grow at an erratic pace.

**Catena 1** The first significant cluster of references in the *Opus nonaginta dierum* comes early in the text, which deals with both the issue of how official appeals work and that Michael did so appeal. As Offler noted, much of this came from the letter *Quoniam omnis humana sententia*, \(^{22}\) although the relationship is slightly more extensive than Offler thought.\(^{23}\)

1. Dig. 49.7.1 (cf.)  
2. C. 2 q. 6 c. 31 (cf.)  
3. C. 2 q. 6 c. 9  
4. D. 40 c. 6  
5. gl. D. 40 c. 6 (a fide devius) (cf.)  
6. gl. D. 19 c. 9 (concilio)  
7. D. 19 c. 9  
8. X 5.7-13

There is not much to detain us here other than to note that Offler’s suggestions are justified by their explicit appearance in this letter. This is clearly an example of William mixing direct quotation and (accurate) paraphrase. There is, however, an addition and source that is anterior to both. The *Allegationes religiosorum uirorum* quotes the gloss *Concilium* directly and then suggests the reader look at the text and gloss of D. 40 c. 6, before pointing out any Catholic is superior to a heretical pope as it is proved in C. 24 q. 1 d.p.c. 4 and in the text and gloss of C. 24 q. 1 c. 1, which Ockham cited in his next cluster.\(^{24}\)

**Catena 2** For this second cluster,\(^{25}\) Offler suggested the *Allegationes religiosorum uirorum* as a source.\(^{26}\)

1. gl. C. 24 q. 1 c. 1 (in heresim)  
2. Dig. 4.8.4 (cf.)  
3. Dig. 36.1.13.4 (cf.)  
4. X 1.6.20 (cf.)  
5. X 5.7-13

This cluster shows us mainly that Offler’s knowledge of Roman law exceeded Ockham’s. Ockham quoted a portion of the gloss to *in heresim*, which dismisses the ‘rule’ that an

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\(^{21}\) My criteria for deciding what constitute a catena were subjectively decided upon: at least three references in close proximity to one another, where the subject matter to which they refer remains approximately the same. However, noticeably longer lists may be included even if the subject matter evolves more rapidly. To include more than this would have greatly increased the size of this section.

\(^{22}\) Ed. in G&F, 938–60.

\(^{23}\) *OND* 1.34–78; cf. G&F, 940–43. This was a response by ‘Nicholas the Minorite’ to an earlier tract of Guiral Ot, who had been elected as Michael of Cesena’s successor on 10 June 1329.

\(^{24}\) *Alleg.*, 545–46. Ockham was is listed as one of authors of this text.

\(^{25}\) *OND* 1.92–95, 295.

\(^{26}\) G&F, 547–48, in particular.

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**Legend:**

(cf.) = not cited directly; *italics* = unique to *OND*; (cf.)= not cited directly, unique to *OND*
equal cannot loose or bind an equal because a heretical pope is less than any Catholic. Michael quoted this section twice, both times a little more extensively than Ockham did, including the related gloss Quod autem (ad C. 24 q. 1 d.a.c. 1), which refers us to X 5.7.13. More interesting, however, is the part of the first gloss, which refers one to X 1.6.20 for the idea that equals have no power over equals. Neither Michael nor Ockham referred to it even though it falls in the middle of the passage they quoted. Perhaps this is to be explained by the fact that it was missing in the versions of the gloss they consulted or because the idea was so familiar to readers of Quo elongati that they felt no need to provide references for ‘that rule’. Gregory IX used this notion to declare that St Francis’ Testament was not an officially binding document. Bonaventure also made

27. App.mon., 854–55. The concluding section to this text (851–65) deals with the conclusion that John had pertinaciously fallen into a great number of heresies; the question thus became ‘What to do now?’ This gloss thus helped solve the problem because the pope no longer had any authoritative position in Christian society.

28. X 1.6.20: ‘quum non habeat imperium par in parem’. This reference was used explicitly on this point in the 3 opp., 508; however, it was not used in conjunction with these other references.

29. Compare the differences between the quotations:

In haeresim:

Hic est casus in quo papa papam potest ligare: in quo papa in canonem latae sententiae incidit. Nec huic obviat regula illa, quia par parem solvere uel ligare non potest. X 1.6.20. Quia si papa haereticus est: in eo quod haereticus est, est minor quotilibet catholico. C. 12 q. 1 c. 9. Quia lex factum ipsum damnat sive notat etiam absque sententia, Dig. 23.2.43.13.

App.mai., 407–08:

Hic est casus in quo papa canonem latae sententiae incidit. Nec obviat illa regula ‘par parem solvere vel ligare non potest’, qui si papa est haereticus, minor est quotilibet catholico; quia lex factum ipsum damnat sive notat etiam absque sententia, Dig. 23.2.43.13.

App.mon., 854–55:

Hic est casus in quo papa papam ligare potest et in quo papa canonem latae sententiae incidit. Nec obviat illa regula, quia ‘par parem solvere vel ligare non potest’, quia si papa est haereticus, minor est quotilibet catholico, C. 12 q. 1 c. 9. Quia lex factum notat etiam sine sententia, Dig. 23.2.43.13.

OND 1.92–95, 295:

Hic est casus—quando scilicet aliquis in haeresim labitur—in quo papa in canonem latae sententiae incidit. Nec obviat illa regula, ‘quia par parem solvere vel ligare non potest’, quia si papa est haereticus, minor est quotilibet catholico.

Even ignoring Ockham’s aside, it is clear that Ockham shortened his quotation of the gloss, and, significantly, ignored the reference to the Digest.

30. Although the context is admittedly different, in the Dialogus the magister makes a similiar point, but the authority given was Aristotle; see 3.1 Dial. 2.2 (circa prsentium): ‘Sed iustum est ut aliquis sibi simillimus et equalibus principetur, quod Aristoteles, 3O Politicorum, c. 15O [sc. 3.16 1287a12–17], testari videtur cum dicit: “Similibus enim natura idem iustum necessarium et eadem dignitatem secundum naturam esse, quare siquidem inequea equales alimentum habere vel vestimentum nocivum corporibus, sic habent et que circa honores, similibet et inequale equales: propter quod quidem nichil magis principari quam subici iustum”. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod iustum est ut aliquis sibi simillimus et equalibus principetur.’

31. Quo elongati 12–38 (Grundmann 1961, 20–21; cf. 4 n. 1, where Grundmann incorrectly refers to Dig. 36.1.12.4).
use of this maxim, and he did refer to X 1.6.20. All these factors surely helped ensure that this idea would stick out in Ockham’s mind well enough that he would remember it when he came to documenting the way appeals from the pope, particularly a heretical pope, worked.

The allusions to Roman law are also easily explained: The gloss In parem refers to them in the order found in Offler’s apparatus, along with several others that offered exceptions this supposed regula.

**Catena 5** As we have seen, Ockham and his confreres insisted that the definition of usus as a ius utendi was a definition in iure. This is indeed a gloss of Azo’s, but there is no solid indication that Ockham knew it first-hand the way the Michael, Bonagratia, or John did.

1. *gl.* Dig. 7.8.1 (nudus usus) (cf.)
2. Dig. 7.8.8 (cf.)
3. Dig. 7.8.12 (cf.)
4. Inst. 2.5.1 (cf.)
5. Dig. 7.1.1 (cf.)
6. Dig. 7.1.12.2 (cf.)
7. Inst. 2.4 pr. (cf.)
8. Inst. 2.5.1 (cf.)
9. *D.* 1 d.p.c. 5

Following the allusion to Azo, Ockham argued that he who has a bare use of a farm also has the right to stay on the farm if he so wishes. A cursory look at the references to Dig. 7.8 shows that they are too far off-topic for Ockham to have had them in mind. Inst. 2.5.1 is concise and to the point, and clearly Ockham’s (ultimate) source. The *Appellatio maior* reads, quoting from Azo’s *Summa institutionum*:

Et dominus Azzo in *Summa institutionum*, *De usu et habitatione* [2.5]: ‘Unde et is cui usus domnus relictus est, habet ius habitandi cum familia sua in ipsa domo, Dig. 7.8.2. Et is cui usus fundi relictus est, habet ius morandi in fundo et fructus quosdam percipiendi ex eo, Dig. 7.8.10; et in Inst. 2.5.1. . . .’

It is a little more interesting for the remaining four references to Roman law, which Offler suggested for Ockham’s claim that usufruct is a ‘fuller’ right (pinguius ius) than bare use, though they both belong to the category of usus iuris. It is thicker because the

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**LEGEND:**
(cf.) = not cited directly; *italics* = unique to OND; (cf.) = not cited directly, unique to OND
usufructuary is able to sell, loan, and grant his entire *ius* to someone else. Dig. 7.1.1 and Inst. 2.4 pr. both explain that usufruct is a right of using another’s goods with the substance preserved. Michael gave this very definition, although he incorrectly referred his readers to the text and gloss of Dig. 7.8.1, which merely explains that bare use, which is ‘*sine fructu*’, is established in the same way usufruct is; it was the gloss that he was quoting from. The idea that usufruct is a more expansive right than bare use is implicit in Dig. 7.1.1, which includes the important point that the usufructuary can use the thing himself or ‘*alii fruendam concedere vel locare vel vendere*’. A similar point is made in Inst. 2.5.1, which begins, moreover, by saying: ‘Minus iuris est in usu quam in usu fructu’. This is clear because the holder of bare use can use the things over which he holds use, but he cannot ‘*vendere aut locare aut gratis concedere*’ the way a usufructuary can. Michael quoted this passage from the *Institutes* twice, as did Francis in a rather confused way, which suggests that he knew of the idea only second-hand. It seems fair to assume that Ockham merely followed Michael on this point, and added the commonsense point that ‘*“nudus” additur ad differentiam ususfructus*’.

The situation seems to be a little different with the allusion to D. 1 d.p.c. 5, and perhaps its *capitulum*. The casual reference to *consuetudo* as either written or unwritten law, but principally unwritten law corresponds well to Gratian’s conclusion. The fact that Ockham alluded to this passage in two other places while the other Michaelists never did clearly suggests that Ockham had some direct acquaintance with this portion of the *Decretum*.

**Catena 6 & 23** These two groups of references are linked by the distinction between the *ius fori* and *ius poli*, which is mentioned in *Exit*, but is also found in C. 17 q. 4 c. 43 and in the ‘Casus’ to C. 17 q. 4 d.p.c. 42.

1. C. 12 q. 2 c. 67
2. C. 16 q. 4 c. 2
3. C. 12 q. 2 c. 75
4. C. 3 q. 1 c. 1
5. C. 3 q. 2 c. 4
6. VI 5.12.3 (*Exit*)
7. C. 17 q. 4 c. 43

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39. App.mai., 255; App.mon., 829. This error is perhaps due to his quotation of Azo’s *Summa institutionum* to Inst. 2.5. See the discussion on p. 283 n. 38.
40. It is also in Gl. ord. ad Inst. 2.4 pr., s.v. ‘Frundi’.
41. App.mai., 256; App.mon., 832–33. For Francis, see nn. 25, 27, and 28 on p. 281.
42. See OND 2.338–376, 366–07, and 65.34–89, 573–75.

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**Legend:**

(cf.) = not cited directly; *italics* = unique to OND; (cf.)= not cited directly, unique to OND
These are found in crucial chapters in Ockham’s theory of property. The second chapter lays out many of Ockham’s definitions that he returned to again and again; and the sixty-fifth chapter is where Ockham responded to the pope’s argument that since all licit use must, ipso facto, be just use, and therefore include a right of using. John cited X 5.40.12 and C. 14 q. 4 c. 11 in his favour; Ockham fired back with a series of references. Brian Tierney has already pointed out that a look at the Ordinary Gloss is revealing at this point, but I think more can be said.

Let us start with Tierney’s suggestions, however. The idea is that Ockham probably reformulated what he found in X 5.40.12 (Ius dictum) and its glosses when he wrote that the impugnatores maintain that ius is sometimes taken for ‘ius fori’ and sometimes taken for ‘ius poli’, which is a distinction taken from Augustine’s De vita clericorum and placed in C. 17 q. 4 c. 43 (Quicumque uult). Ockham then quoted from it and noted that the same idea could be found in the preceding pars Gratiani. There is no question that Ockham looked up Ius dictum: he quoted from it a little later on, and, as Tierney noted, used language that seems closely related to the Ordinary Gloss.

The glosses to Quicumque uult also deserved some attention. Ockham famously linked the ius poli of Exiit to aequitas naturalis; but this is not an example of Ockham’s voluntarism as much as it is a sign that he read the gloss Non iure poli. There should be no surprise that he linked these concepts to natural law when we note that he also cited D. 1 c. 7, since that caputum links ius naturale to natural equity.

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43. He cited canon law exclusively over the course of the chapter: C. 17 q. 4 d.a.c. 43; D. 6 d.p.c. 3; D. 8 c. 2; D. 1 c. 2; D. 4 c. 3; Gl. ord. ad C. 17 q. 4 c. 43, s.v. ‘non iure poli’ (cf.); Exiit (VI 5.12.3); C. 23 q. 7 c. 1; D. 47 c. 8; D. 1 c. 7; X 5.40.12; C. 14 q. 4 c. 11.

44. See Tierney 1997a, 39–57.

45. OND 65.34–39, 573: ‘Circa primum dicunt quod hoc nomen “ius” aliquando accipitur pro iure fori, aliquando pro iure poli. Ista distinctio colligitur ex verbis Augustini de vita Clericorum, quae ponuntur C. 17 q. 4 c. 43: qui ait: In potestate habebat episcopus non reddere, sed iure fori, non iure poli; et ex eisdem causa et quaestione, § Sed notandum (d.p.c. 42), habetur eadem distinctio.’ The following lines are quoted and discussed above, p. 89.

46. OND 65.36–45 and 277–279, 579. See Tierney 1997a, 126 n. 74; cf. Gl. ord. ad X 5.40.12, s.v. ‘Casus’. The glosses Hoc enim iure and Male autem direct the reader to John’s C. 14 q. 4 c. 11.

47. Gl. ord. ad C. 17 q. 4 c. 43, s.v. ‘non iure poli’: ‘id est quodam naturali equitate’.

48. See above, 74 n. 144 for the passage in question; cf. Tierney 1997a, 128, who, accidentally no doubt, wrote D. 1 c. 8.

49. The idea is also found in Gl. ord. ad D. 5 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘cepit’, on which, see below, p. 249.
In some ways the other causae are more interesting. Ockham quoted from several distinct capitula, which no one else bothered to use, in quick succession, and there is no real link to be found among them through the Glossa ordinaria, with a few inconsequential exceptions.\footnote{Gl. \textit{ord.} ad C. 3 q. 1 c. 1, s.v. ‘nullum crimen’, refers to C. 3 q. 2 c. 4. Likewise, \textit{Gl. ord.} ad D. 8 c. 2, s.v. ‘Peregrini’, cites D. 41 c. 1, which Ockham quotes from earlier on (\textit{OND} \textsection 112–115, 314), but in an entirely different context. Less relevant: \textit{Gl. ord.} ad C. 16 q. 4 c. 2, s.v. ‘possessuum’, points to C. 8 q. 4 c. 1, C. 2 q. 6 c. 2, and C. 16 q. 3 c. 6 (for which see also the glosses \textit{Inconcussam} and \textit{Arbitris}); the gloss \textit{Dominio} points to a slightly ambiguous ‘ff. de uerbo sig. Interdum’, which I take to refer to Dig. \textsection 16.78, since it is the only \textit{Interdum} that deals with proprietary ‘definitions’. In all cases, only Michael refers to these references, and none occur in connection with the context in which Ockham was using C. 3 q. 1 c. 1. A similar argument could be made about the gloss \textit{Iudicent} to D. 4 c. 3; in this case the references are seen scattered throughout the \textit{Alleg.}.
\textsection 5 rather than \textsection 6 of Dig. \textsection 13.6.3, which is presumably due to his reliance on \textit{ORD} \textsection 3.329–333, 319; cf. 3.629–630, 327.}

Another significant feature of these references is that the unique capitula of the early distinctions stand apart from the other references not only in the sense that others never employed them, but also that Ockham quoted them directly and that the Glossa Ordinaria to the other capitula of these clusters does not point to them. This seems to be further evidence that Ockham had access to and read for himself these early distinctions.

Catena 7 This passage occurs in the middle of a long discussion of what Chrysostom meant in D. 88 c. 11 about loaning money.\footnote{For discussion see Lamberti’s excellent article (1994–97).}

At this particular point Ockham was explaining that one who loaned money could not demand back more than the value of the money, but that one who loaned money \textit{ad pompam} can, according to the laws, get back more than just the value of the money (\textit{secundum leges potest aliquid recipere ultra pecuniam}). This is due to the fact that someone who does not gratuitously hand over money \textit{ad pompam} still retains lordship of the money.\footnote{\textit{OND} \textsection 3.329–333, 319; cf. 3.629–630, 327.}

The larger context was that use and lordship were considered separable in certain cases, even according to the \textit{ius commune}. As Offler noted, Michael made a similar point in the \textit{Appellatio monacensis}, where he clinched his argument thus: ‘sicut probatur per id quod legitur et notatur X [\textsection 19]. \textit{De usuris}, [c. 8] \textit{Conquestus}, in glossa Bernardi et per Hostiensem, in \textit{Summa de usuris}, versu et ff. [\textsection 13] \textit{Commodati}, l. [3]. [8] paenultima et lege sequenti’.\footnote{App. \textit{mon.}, 832.} Offler’s references are to the point, better in fact than Michael, who suggested \textsection 5 rather than \textsection 6 of Dig. \textsection 13.6.3, which is presumably due to his reliance on

\begin{enumerate}
\item Dig. 13.6.3.6 (cf.)
\item Dig. 13.6.4 (cf.)
\item \textit{gl.} X 5.19.8 (de feudo) (cf.)
\item Hostiensis, \textit{Summa aurea} ad X 5.19 (cf.)
\end{enumerate}
Hostiensis’ Summa. Ockham’s case is even more straightforward. At OND 3.330 he left the allusion implicit, as he did at 14.111 and 109.257–259. However, at 32.186–193 Ockham wrote that it was a gloss to X 5.19.8 (i.e., s.v. ‘de feudo’) that showed that one lent money ad pompam only had a right to use the money, not ownership of it. He did not specify the gloss, much as Michael had not, and one gets the impression that his knowledge of the sources for this claim was fairly limited. That is, he might have written ‘secundum leges’ (3.330) and ‘secundum iura’ (109.258), but Michael again seems the proximate source. In fact, when John cited Dig. 13.6.3.6 as part of his proof that neither usufruct nor a right of using can be established or had in consumables, Ockham did not take the opportunity to turn the Digest passage against him as we might expect. However, it is conceivable that Ockham knew of Bernard’s gloss first-hand.

Catena 8 & 17 The eighth and seventeenth clusters are identical except only the latter includes the direct quotation from the Decretum; however, this capitulum is found some lines above the first cluster. Both are related to a discussion of Chrysostom; the first of these is still part of the lengthy discussion raised in the seventh catena.

1. Dig. 4.4.16.4 (cf.) 2. gl. Cod. 4.44.2 (humanum est) (cf.) 3. gl. X 3.17.3 (deceptione) (cf.) 4. gl. X 5.19.6 (comparant) (cf.) 5. C. 14 q. 3 c. 1(!)

Here the issue is how it is that both parties of a contract are allowed to deceive each other (licet contrahentibus se ad invicem decipere). The first four references are related through their glosses. Humanum est points to the paragraph in the Digest, and a gloss to that paragraph points us to the corresponding lex in the Code. The gloss Deceptione is misleading, however, for it is the subsequent gloss, Si uenditor, that seems to combine parts of the glosses Humanum est and Naturaliter licere:

Si uenditor: Si uero dolus non dat causam contractui, nec incidit in contractum, sed deceptus sum ultra dimidiam iusti pretii in uenditione: obtinent quod hic dicitur, et infra X 3.17.6 et Cod. 4.44.2. Si autem sum decepturn minus dimidia iusti pretii, non

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54. See Hostiensis, Summa aurea ad X 5.19 n. 7 (col. 1622): ‘Decimo, quando pecunia commodatur ad pompam, ff. commoda(ti). l. 3. §. pe. & l. seq.’ [i.e., Dig. 13.6.3.5 and 13.6.4]. I am not entirely sure what ‘versu 10’ means, but the Summa aurea ad X 5.19 n. 7 lists twelve (by my count) cases where the general prohibition against usury fails.

55. For the second case, Offer listed Dig. 13.6.3.6 and STh 2a2ae.78.1 ad 6 as a possibility. For Aquinas’ connection here to this part of the Digest, see Aubert 1955, 73.

56. See OND 39.1–32, 518–19; G&F, 575. Yet this passage of Roman law was not one-sided; see, e.g., Gl. ord. ad Dig. 13.6.3.6, s.v. ‘Consumitur’: ‘unde pani impropie dicitur commodari’.

57. OND 3.365–368, 320, and 48.82–90, 521; for the first reference to C. 14 q. 3 c. 1, see OND 3.269–270, 318.

58. Gl. ord. ad Dig. 4.4.16.4, s.v. ‘Naturaliter licere’.

**LEGEND:**

(cf.) = not cited directly; *italics* = unique to OND; (cf.)= not cited directly, unique to OND
A simpler solution, however, would be to do away with all these complications and look only to the gloss *Comparant*. As Ockham said, he will avoid talking about how all these laws should be understood for the sake of brevity. The very words I quoted above can be found in this gloss, along with references to these other passages to the *Digest*, *Code*, and *Decretals* (not, though, to their glosses). We are thus left with the conclusion that much like a gloss to X 5.19.8, Ockham perhaps had the opportunity to read a gloss to X 5.19.6 as well.

The quotation from the *Decretum* cannot be explained by any obvious cross-references, and since the other Michaelists did not cite it, it seems to be further evidence that Ockham did some research of his own when writing the *Opus nonaginta dierum*. It is a little mysterious, too, that the second time he cited the *capitulum*, he claimed it was from the second question of the fourteenth *Causa*, rather than the third, though mistakes of this sort are easy to make. Regardless, there is no doubt that he knew the *capitulum*’s contents well enough to cite it, and the same must be true of the gloss as well, for it is there that the insistence that *dominium* is transferred in a *mutuum* when dealing with consumables, that is, what consist of weight, number, and measure.

**Catena 9** The discussion here has to do with the ubiquitous idea that necessity has no law.

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59. The gloss gives a misleading reference: ‘ff. de mino. in causae. §. in pretio’. However, this paragraph of the *Digest* begins: ‘Idem Pomponius ait in pretio’.

60. The text reads here: ‘supra tit. j. l. & eleganter. in princ.’


62. For what it is worth, I did not find it quoted in Hostiensis’ *Summa aurea* to X 5.19 either.

63. The quotation at *OND* 40.87–88, 521, in fact, is a direct quotation of the gloss *Plusquam* to C. 14 q. 3 c. 1.

64. *OND* 3.416, 322.
Offler noted that the idea can be found in these capitula, but also pointed out that the idea might be taken directly from Bonagratia, who cited the three capitula from the Decretals.\textsuperscript{65} In fact, both Michael and Bonagratia cited them in this order: X 3.46.2, X 1.4.4, and X 5.41.4, where both also gave the wrong incipit for the first reference (‘Sicut’ instead of ‘Consilium nostrum’).\textsuperscript{66} Ockham provided no references; presumably his source was Michael and Bonagratia, but that he felt the idea needed no authoritative support to be considered valid. In fact, Ockham had made a similar point in his academic works. In a question on whether the will can have a virtuous act with respect to an object about which it has made an erroneous judgement, Ockham uses the example of an indigent person who is erroneously considered not to be needy. What is important to us is that it is taken as axiomatic that right reason would dictate that such a person should be helped in extreme necessity: the idea was one ‘evidens ex notitia terminorum’.\textsuperscript{67} As Roumy has shown, it was hardly a novel position to take.\textsuperscript{68} There is no reason, then, to assume that Ockham had any knowledge of where in canon law this idea might be found this early on, unless he was looking at Michael or Bonagratia’s references to the Decretals.\textsuperscript{69}

**Catena 10**  Here Ockham was explaining the nature of a *res nullius*.\textsuperscript{70}

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\textsuperscript{65} De paup., 505.

\textsuperscript{66} App.mai., 336; see above, p. 83. The explanation for this mix-up might lie in Gl. ord. ad X 5.41.4, s.v. ‘Necessitas’: ‘Hoc ideo dicit, quia necessitas legi non subiacet: supra de obser. iei. c. ij. in fine (X 3.46.2) et supra de consue. quanto (X 1.4.4) et D. 1 de cons. sicut (D. 1 de cons. c. 11) et D. 3 peruenit (D. 3 de cons. c. 12). .’

\textsuperscript{67} Ockham, *Quaestiones variae* 8.1.58–64 (OTh 8.411): ‘Exemplum: aliquis indiget extrema necessitate. Sit ita. Et per consequens recta ratio, si inesset alicui potenti, dictaret quod tali est subveniendum tamquam indigenti extrema necessitate. Sed ratio errans errore invincibili potest indicare quod talis non est sic indigens, et per consequens potest indicare quod tali tamquam sic indigenti non est sic subveniendum.’ And *Quaestiones variae* 8.2.309–311 (OTh 8.423): ‘ponatur aliquis habens iustum rationem universalem rectam ‘omni indigenti extrema necessitate est benefaciendum ne pereat’ quae est evidens ex notitia terminorum.’ These examples were noted by Miethke 1969, 489 and n. 215, but the references should be updated to the critical edition of Ockham’s works.

\textsuperscript{68} Roumy 2006.

\textsuperscript{69} *AP* 8.47–52, 256, however, cites X 5.41.4 and D. 5 de cons. c. 26; Gl. ord. ad X 5.41.4, s.v. ‘Necessitas’ connects the two, along with the other capitula of the Decretals mentioned here in this cluster. (Gl. ord. ad X 3.46.2, s.v. ‘Necessitas’ points forward to X 5.41.4.) See also 3.1 *Dial.* 2.20 (circa finem), where he both demonstrates knowledge of the gloss to this capitulum and cites some of the same catena that Michael and Bonagratia used on this point. See also App.mai., 265, 359, and 397. Read Shogimen 1997, 168 and n. 26, in light of the claims made here.

\textsuperscript{70} OND 4.209–217, 303.

\textsuperscript{legend:}

(cf.) = not cited directly; *italics* = unique to OND; (cf.)= not cited directly, unique to OND
1. Inst. 2.1.47 (cf.)
2. Dig. 41.7.1 (cf.)
3. Dig. 45.3.36 (cf.)
4. Inst. 2.1.12 (cf.)
5. Dig. 41.1.3 pr. (cf.)
6. VI 5.12.3 (Exit) (cf.)
7. D. 5 d.a.c. 1 (cf.)
8. D. 6 d.p.c. 3 (cf.)

The linkages between the Roman law ones are clear. Apart from Dig. 45.3.36, which is surely the least relevant lex in this context, the others fall into place thus. A gloss to Inst. 2.1.47 (s.v. ‘desinit’) refers the careful reader to Dig. 47.7.1. On the other hand, Inst. 2.1.12 and Dig. 41.1.3 pr. form an obvious pair. Inst. 2.1.12–17 is largely based on Dig. 41.1.1 pr.–41.1.5, at times the text is even identical, which is a point mentioned in Mommsen’s apparatus.71

The second half of this chain occurs a few lines later; at this point, Ockham was explaining that it is not licit for anyone to renounce a potestas utendi, which may indeed be exercised over res nullius without acquiring dominium over the thing in question. Offer suggested that, in this context, the Appellatio maior referred to these passages of the Decretum, where he explains that we are necessarily obliged to conserve our life and that a use of things necessary for sustaining human life falls under a precept of natural and divine lex. Michael listed cited several capitula in defence of this claim.72

Bonagratia also used these references, but his purpose was slightly different. This time they supported the belief that the use of all things was common to all of humankind by natural and divine ius; division into ‘mine’ and ‘yours’ is a consequence of human ius.73 In the De paupertate, both these topics coincide. A use of fact for the sake of conserving one’s life comes from natural ius, not some (human) legislation (constitutio); since iura naturalia remain immutable, this is an irrenounceable feature of human existence. Possessions and property rights (proprietates) come from human ius, however, and are renounceable, as the example of Esau demonstrates (Gen. 25.33).74

The implication for Ockham is clear. In all cases here, he would not need to rely on any first hand knowledge of the legal corpora, but could make these claims based only on his knowledge of the basic Michaelist position. The references to Roman law seem particularly unlikely. However, Ockham did quote from D. 6 d.p.c. 3 in another, important, context,75 and so, given their close connection to each other, it is not surprising

71. The glosses are not, but Gl. ord. ad Dig. 41.1.3.2, s.v. ‘desinit’ refers back to Inst. 2.1.12.
73. App.ACC, 102–103, citing Inst. 2.1.1, D. 5 d.a.c. 1, Quo iure, Dilectissimis, D. 5 d.a.c. 1, D. 35 c. 8.
74. Bonagratia, De paup., 503, citing D. 5 d.a.c. 1, D. 35 c. 8(!), D. 1 c. 7, Inst. 1.2 pr., Dig. 1.1.1.3, D. 5 d.a.c. 1, D. 6 d.p.c. 3, Inst. 1.2.11 (actually quoted before D. 5 d.a.c. 1, but only mentioned here), Quo iure, Inst. 2.2 (per totum), C. 7 q. 1 c. 8, and Dig. 21.1.14.9.
75. See above, p. 244.

LEGEND:
(cf.) = not cited directly; italics = unique to OND; (cf.)= not cited directly, unique to OND
that Offler suggested D. 5 d.a.c. 1 in this context, nor even is it impossible that Ockham did not have it in mind.\textsuperscript{76}

\textbf{Catena 12} As Table C.1 should make clear, we do not need to go too far afield to explain any of the references to C. 12 q. 1; the \textit{quaestio} itself—‘utrum liceat clericis proprium habere’—is telling.

1. C. 12 q. 1 c. 8
2. C. 12 q. 1 c. 9
3. C. 12 q. 1 c. 2 (\textit{Dilectissimis})
4. C. 12 q. 1 c. 8

Here Ockham was explaining that those who live a common life live are sustained from common properties; he followed this with references to the monastic rules of Augustine and Benedict.\textsuperscript{77} Michael did precisely the same thing in the \textit{Appellatio monacensis}.\textsuperscript{78} However, there are two good reasons for thinking that Ockham looked at this part of the \textit{Decretum} himself. First, he knew that c. 9 came from ‘Pope Urban’,\textsuperscript{79} a point that is never made in the other references to this \textit{capitulum}. Second, Ockham referred often to this section of the \textit{Decretum}, and so he is likely to have wanted to read this portion if he had the chance.

This second reason may also explain the unique reference to C. 12 q. 1 c. 21, which is paired with C. 1 q. 1 c. 21.\textsuperscript{80} Ockham was in the middle of an explanation of the difference between ‘thicker’ and ‘thinner’ (\textit{pinguius}; \textit{minus pingue}) forms of \textit{dominium}. The difference is due to the fact that sometimes the \textit{dominium} in question does not allow one to sell, give away, or bequeath something, though generally in civil and canon law \textit{dominium} indicates the power to do these three things. At this point Ockham quoted from these two \textit{capitula}. Michael quoted exactly the same portion of C. 1 q. 1 c. 21 in a related context, namely that monks do not have this power, but his string of references do not include any Ockham cited.\textsuperscript{81} There is a partial exception. Ockham did at one point explain that \textit{dominium} as it was understood in civil law meant a power of alienating, selling, giving away, bequeathing, or using a thing as one pleases. Along the way he mangled a reference to Cod. 4.35.21, which Michael had employed on a few other occasions.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{76} The two are paired in Bonagratia, \textit{De paup.}, 503, and \textit{App.mai.}, 232. In neither case are they quoted.
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{OND} 9.532–578, 394–95.
\textsuperscript{78} \textit{App.mon.}, 675; cf. 834–35.
\textsuperscript{79} It is in fact one of the so-called Pseudo-Isidorean decretals.
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{OND} 2.416–421, 308.
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{App.mon.}, 815–16, citing Cod. 4.35.21, C. 1 q. 1 c. 21, Cod. 4.38.14, Inst. 2.1.40.
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{App.mai.}, 277; \textit{App.mon.}, 810 and 827; \textit{OND} 4.648–651, 344–45. The first and last of Michael’s references to Cod. 4.35.21 could be the source for Ockham’s quasi-quotation. Note also that Offler claimed two references for the \textit{Appellatio maior}, which I cannot verify because I have not consulted the edition he used.

\textbf{Legend:}

\textit{(cf.)} = not cited directly; \textit{italics} = unique to \textit{OND}; \textit{(cf.)} = not cited directly, unique to \textit{OND}
Catenae 13 & 14. These are two related passages, and they should be looked at in conjunction with catena 9, where the passage from the Decretals is discussed. In the first the claim is that in times of extreme need one may take, even sell something that belongs to another in order to preserve one’s own life. The second passage employs the idea that necessity has no law. The obvious common thread is Exiit, but there are reasons for agreeing with Offler’s wider list.

1. X 5.41.4 (cf.)
2. VI 5.12.3 (Exiit) (cf.)
3. gl. D. 1 c. 7 (communis omnium)
4. gl. D. 47 c. 8 (commune) (cf.)

Bypassing Exiit, it is a well-known canonistic idea that things are to be shared in times of necessity. Two different glosses to D. 1 c. 7, Ius naturale, make this point (s.vv. ‘ius naturale’; ‘communis omnium’), and the same is true for D. 47 c. 8, Sicut hii, where the gloss Commune is also worth mentioning. Michael quoted the relevant part of the second capitulum while Bonagratia cited both of these capitula, though in each case without the gloss. Ockham quoted from the second of these, more extensively than did Michael or Bonagratia, although there is overlap. The gloss Commune reiterates the idea that things are to be shared in moments of necessity, and gives several references to the capitula of C. 12 q. 2, which were popular among the Michaelists. It is not unreasonable to think that Ockham had direct knowledge of the glosses to D. 47 c. 8, but the source may also be Bonagratia or Michael, whose citations overlap to a very significant degree when discussing the duty to share in times of necessity.

It is a different story for Ius naturale. In this case even though (only) Bonagratia’s De paupertate cited this capitulum, Ockham was clearly familiar with its contents. He referred to it on three different occasions, once even quoting the gloss that explains things should be shared in times of necessity. On the other occasions he quoted from different parts of different glosses. There is no question that Ockham had access to this part of the Decretum and read it for himself.

84. App. mai., 336; Bonagratia, De paup., 503 and 504. For Bonagratia the context was not quite as similar as it was for Ockham and Michael.
85. OND 65.129–131 and 141–147, 576.
86. See also OND 77.343–344, 632, and Gl. ord. ad D. 47 c. 8, s.v. ‘Aliena’.
88. OND 27.147–148, 488; see p. 75, above, for a quotation.
89. See OND 65.201–202, 578; 65.255, 579; 91.27–32, 666.
Catena 14 was suggested for Ockham’s reiterated point that necessity is subject to no law. These texts are germane, but again we do not need to go further than Ockham’s fellow Michaelists, or Exiit, for this idea. In addition to what was said above in catena 9, we should note that Michael once cited D. 1 de cons. c. 11 to point out that necessity can make licit what is normally not licit.90

Catena 20 This group of references is very revealing. At this point Ockham was defending the sanctity of individual rights: no one is to be deprived of his or her ius without cause or fault—which is not the case with mere licences.91 The only passages which Ockham directly quoted are the two early distinctions of the Decretum, yet, on the whole, this passage is an important one.

1. D. 1 c. 2
2. gl. X 1.2.2 (culpa caret)
3. gl. X 4.13.11 (sine sua)
4. gl. D. 22 c. 6 (priusquam)
5. Dig. 47.10.13.1 (cf.)
6. Dig. 50.17.155.1 (cf.)
7. D. 3 c. 3
8. Dig. 1.3.31 (cf.)
9. X 3.31.18 (cf.)

As we have seen, this distinction lay at the heart of the Michaelist defense of their version of Franciscan poverty. As such we should expect to see some overlap in the sources Ockham cited. But there is none, except for Dig. 1.3.31, the famous passage where the emperor is declared to be legibus solutus, which Ockham certainly alludes to, but does not actually quote; it is cited twice in the Allegaciones religiosorum uirorum, which may be Ockham’s source.92 We can also safely dismiss the other Roman law passages. They were suggested because Ockham claimed that prosecuting one’s ius causes injury to no person: ‘nec alicui facit iniuriam, qui ius suum prosequitur’. Dig. 47.10.13.1 is a possibility,93 but the similarities are not close enough to be convincing.

The most interesting part are the three glosses. Ockham, and only Ockham, referred to them to make his point. The glosses to the two capitula from the Decretals are very similar in content; neither point to the other, but both do point to D. 22 c. 6, which may have inspired Ockham to take a look for himself. Regardless, although he did not actually quote from them, he knew that the Glossa ordinaria defended the sanctity of individual rights in the same way he did.

90. App.mon., 790, citing X 5.41.4, D. 1 de cons. c. 11, D. 5 de cons. c. 26, C. 25 q. 1 d.p.c. 16.
93. ‘Is, qui iure publico utitur, non videtur iniuriae faciendae causa hoc facere: iuris enim executio non habet iniuriam.’

LEGEND: (cf.) = not cited directly; italics = unique to OND; (cf.)= not cited directly, unique to OND
Catena 21  At this point in the *Opus nonaginta dierum*, Ockham was defending the idea that things of fact (*quae facti sunt*) can truly belong (*conuenire*) to corporations.\(^94\)

1. C. 12 q. 2 c. 49 4. D. 15 c. 2
2. C. 25 q. 1 c. 1 5. X 4.1.1
3. D. 15 c. 3 6. X 1.1.2

Ockham argued by means of a *reductio ad absurdum*: if things of fact cannot belong to an Order, then the same would be true of all other corporate bodies, from colleges to general councils and the congregation of the faithful, to cities and kingdoms even. He then cited scriptural examples of groups doing factual things, such as praying (Lc. 1.10) or waiting for someone (Lc. 1.21). He then quoted from the *Decretum*, noting that a church ought neither lose its own things nor rapaciously take possession of other peoples’ things (C. 12 q. 2 c. 49). The universal Church has approved constitutions of synods, as the remaining *capitula* references attest. All of these are examples of corporate bodies ‘factually’ performing an action.

Although Michael cited D. 15 c. 2 frequently, he did not use it in the same way Ockham did except incidentally: that is, he often used it to point out that the Church ‘does’ things, but the was not that it does things, but what it does.\(^95\) Much the same should be said for earlier uses of D. 15 c. 3.\(^96\) Ockham might have first learnt the importance of these passages, which affirm the validity of the first four ecumenical councils, but he derived a different lesson from them than did the other Michaelists.

Overall, this group of references were unique to Ockham, and I cannot trace a connection through the *Gloss*. Perhaps another source can explain these references, but this seems further evidence that Ockham studied some canon law for himself.

Catena 25  These references occur in the seventy-first chapter where Ockham explains what the word *simplex* and its cognates usually mean.\(^97\) It is one of the few places in the *Opus nonaginta dierum* where Ockham tells us how philosophers think about such things, particularly in natural philosophy and logic.

1. C. 6 q. 1 c. 13 6. X 5.7.12
2. X 3.19.8 7. D. 36 d.a.c. 1
3. X 1.3.20 8. *gl.* D. 39 c. 1 (simplex est) (cf.)
4. D. 2 de cons. c. 3 9. X 4.6.4
5. X 1.7.2 10. X 5.39.29

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\(^94\) *OND* 62.225–256, 568–69.

\(^95\) See *App.mai.*, 248–49, 367–68, 400, 408, 409; *App.mon.*, 627 and 861; and *App.min.*, 450, which Ockham quoted at *OND* 122.8–32, 831–32. See also 3 opp., 491–92.

\(^96\) See *App.mai.*, 232; *App.mon.*, 853; 3 opp., 492, 497, and 511; and *Alleg.*, 536.

\(^97\) *OND* 71.40–85, 594–95.

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**Legend:**

(cf.) = not cited directly; *italics* = unique to *OND*; (cf.)= not cited directly, unique to *OND*
Unlike in philosophy, in theology, law, and everyday speech (in vulgari locutione), simplicitas is usually meant in a sense opposite to deceitfulness (dolositati), as suggested by Scripture and C. 6 q. 1 c. 13, or taken for stupidity and ignorance, or indiscretion or inexperience, in which case the laws tells us that the simple ought to be spared (X 3.19.8; X 1.3.20; D. 2 de cons. c. 3; X 1.7.2; X 5.7.12; D. 36 d.a.c. 1; Gl. ord. ad D. 39 c. 1, s.v. ‘simplex est’). Simplicity may also be opposed to ‘solemn’, as in a simple, not solemn vow (X 3.19.8). Using everyday speech one may also call a priest ‘simple’, which merely means that the priest lacks greater dignity than (mere) priesthood, much like a simple soldier is but a soldier and a simple monk is but a monk; Ockham then suggested we compare what is said in X 5.39.29.

What stands out most in this section is how many of the capitula Ockham quoted from are unique to him. In fact, when Ockham wrote: ‘et sic dicunt iura quod parcendum est simplicitati, ut habetur X 3.19.8’, it is the gloss Simplicitati that we must look at:

Simplicitati: Cui parcendum est: supra X 1.3.20 et Nov. 74.9; Dig. 2.5.2; Dig. 2.13.1.5; et Dig. 2.1.7.4; D. 86 c. 24 et X 1.7.2. . . .

In other words, Ockham ignored the many references to Roman law and then went on to quote from the two passages of the Decretals referred to by this gloss.98

Cum ex iniuncto (X 5.7.12) can perhaps be explained in a more roundabout way. As we have seen, Ockham quoted from the Allegationes religiosorum uirorum in the opening chapter of the Opus nonaginta dierum, which included X 5.7.13, and alluded to it again in the same chapter. He also closed his work with two references to X 5.7.13, which is not surprising since the capitulum belongs to the title De haereticis. Since this title was a fairly popular one among the Michaelists, it is reasonable to suppose that Ockham would have made use of it if were to hand.99 More tenuously, one gloss quite near to the portion of Cum ex iniuncto that Ockham quoted cross-references D. 38 c. 12, which is part of section of the Decretum that is meant to show that clerics should have practical, experiential knowledge (DD. 36–40).100 As the table of canon law references shows, this was also a section of the Decretum that Ockham seems to have taken a personal interest in. In any event, these two capitula from the Decretum are linked through the gloss, and

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98. Cf. Gl. ord. ad X 1.7.2, s.v. ‘Ex simplicitate’: ‘Simplicitati enim parcendum est: D. 86 c. 24 et X 3.19.8, ubi plures concordantiae sunt ad hoc.’

99. Gl. ord. ad X 5.7.13, s.v. ‘Apostolicae’ refers to X 5.39.29, which may explain its appearance at the end of this catena.

100. Gl. ord. ad X 5.7.12, s.v. ‘Exquirunt’: ‘scilicet subditi a scholasticis: D. 38 c. 12. Bernardus.’ Cf. Gl. ord. ad X 5.7.12, s.v. ‘Simplicitatem’. For the summary grouping of the mentioned distinctions, see the Casus to D. 36.

**Legend:**

(cf.) = not cited directly; *italics* = unique to OND; (cf.)= not cited directly, unique to OND
explain why Ockham said that *simplicitas* might refer to inexperience,\footnote{Gl. ord. ad D. 36 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘Simplicitatis’.} or be opposed to deceitfulness or mean stupidity.\footnote{Gl. ord. ad D. 39 c. 1, s.v. ‘Simplex est’}

**Catena 28** Chapter ninety-one again demonstrates Ockham’s use of the early distinctions of the *Decretum*. At this point in *Quia vir*, the pope was explaining that the Michaelists misunderstood *Quo iure*, which, he argued, merely indicated that the *ius agendi* in court was a formula introduced by civil law.\footnote{The following is based on OND \textit{91}–\textit{128}, 665–68.}

\begin{enumerate}
\item gl. D. 1 c. 7 (Ius naturale)
\item D. 1 c. 9
\item D. 1 c. 10
\item D. 8 c. 1 (*Quo iure*)
\end{enumerate}

In his reply Ockham referred several times to *Quo iure*, but only after he deployed these three *capitula* of the first distinction. Unlike his confreres Ockham quoted the gloss *Ius naturale* to show that *ius civile* could be taken in a number of different ways: either as what is neither natural law nor the law or nations; as what is not canon law; as the law of the twelve tables; or in contrast to the *ius praetorium*.\footnote{Quoted above, p. 75 n. 151.} The point for Ockham was that in the way the Michaelists understood civil law—namely, ‘pro iure humano’—John’s point about *Quo iure* made no sense. There are, after all Old Testament examples that make a mockery of the pope’s claims.\footnote{Ockham cited 1 Reg. 30.24–25 and Gen. 47.26.} Secondly, Ockham used D. 1 c. 9, which describes what belongs to the *ius gentium* and why it is so called, to show that *dominia* of things are acquired by human law ‘extra iudicium’. He then quoted from D. 1 c. 10, which treats of *ius militare*, to show that by this (human) *ius* other property relations—‘praedae diviso et portio principis’—have been introduced.\footnote{Ockham also mentioned that *praescriptiones* and *usucapiones* were introduced through civil laws, which are dealt with briefly at D. 1 c. 12 (and s.v. ‘usucapionibus’).}

From there Ockham moved on to a detailed analysis of *Quo iure*, but since it was a popular choice among the controversialists, there is no need to doubt Ockham’s familiarity with its contents.\footnote{For what it is worth, its glosses *Nam iure divino* and *Possidere* both refer to C. 23 q. 7 c. 1. It is also interesting that when Ockham quoted this part of *QVR* at the *Brev.* 3.1.66–73, 163, and responded to it in the following chapter, he avoided this argument entirely.}

Clearly much more could be said about Ockham’s use of legal sources in the *Opus nonaginta dierum*. I have only surveyed a small selection of the references cited in Offler’s critical edition of the text; to do more, however, would require a much longer, and much different, study. Yet I think it should be clear that Ockham not only relied more heavily

\begin{small}
\textbf{Legend:}
\begin{itemize}
\item (cf.) = not cited directly; \textit{italics} = unique to \textit{OND}; (cf.) = not cited directly, unique to \textit{OND}
\end{itemize}
\end{small}
on canon law sources than Roman law ones,\textsuperscript{108} he also studied the texts of the \textit{Corpus iuris canonici} for himself, which does not seem to be the case at all for the \textit{Corpus iuris civilis}.\textsuperscript{109}

Ockham may have done this deliberately, for he did something similar in the \textit{Breviloquium}. As he saw it, we should judge it suspect if the pope tries to prove his authority only by means of canon law, without also defending his position with Scripture; the same would be true, he added, if the emperor tried to do the same thing through Roman law alone.\textsuperscript{110} On the other hand, citing canon law against a pope’s claims to supreme \textit{plenitudo potestatis}, or Roman law against similar claims of the emperor, is quite convincing. It is for this reason, he said, that he would adduce the canons of the Fathers very frequently (\textit{saepius}).\textsuperscript{111}

It is an intriguing suggestion, but it does not map so neatly onto the circumstances surrounding the poverty controversy, for while we might agree that it seems easier to find pro-papal authority ideas in canon law than in Roman law, there is no reason to think that canon law is biased towards a single pope’s views on property rights. In fact, the inclusion of both \textit{Exiit} and \textit{Exivi} in the \textit{Liber sextus} and the \textit{Clementinae} might seem to support the opposite position. However, Ockham wrote the \textit{Opus nonaginta dierum} several years after the Michaelist break with the pope. And although his massive text is framed as a (neutral) contribution to the Franciscan poverty controversy, for all intents and purposes

\begin{verbatim}
\textsuperscript{108} We should note in passing that there are even more ‘anomalous’ references in the \textit{OND} than we have considered so far. The following list comprises the references to canon law that occur in relative isolation within the \textit{OND} and are unattested in the other Michaelist texts; Ockham quoted from many of these directly:

2. D. 23 c. 6 7. C. 12 q. 2 c. 16 12. C. 35 q. 9 c. 8 17. X 3.50.1
4. D. 37 c. 10 9. C. 19 q. 3 c. 7 14. X 2.2.10 19. VI 5.12 reg. 72 (cf.)
5. D. 88 c. 6 (cf.) 10. C. 24 q. 3 c. 30 15. X 2.2.11

\textsuperscript{109} Contrast the equivalent list of Roman law references in the \textit{OND}:

1. Inst. 1.2.2 (cf.) 4. Dig. 6.1.49 (cf.) 6. Cod. 3.32.2 (cf.)
2. Inst. 3.14.2 (cf.) 5. Dig. 50.17.155.1 (cf.) 7. Cod. 8.33(34).3 (cf.)
3. Dig. 1.3.12 (cf.)

What should be obvious is that, unlike many of the \textit{capitula} of canon law, Ockham never actually quoted from or referred to any of these passages explicitly.

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Brev.} 1.8.7–12, 106: ‘Si enim papa potestatem suam, quam ex iure divino asserit se habere, solummodo per decreta et decretales probare voluerit, respondebitur sibi quod haec probatio in praedictum partis tamquam familiaris, nisi scripturis possit muniri divinis, est habenda susperta, et idem dicit poterit imperatori et alteri cuiusque, si solummodo per imperiales leges se contra papam in huiusmodi temptaverit defensare…’

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Brev.} 1.9.4–19, 107–8; quoted in part in the epigraph to this chapter.
\end{verbatim}
this controversy ended with the publication of *Quia vir* three years earlier. Michael’s *Appellatio monacensis* and Francis’ *Improbatio* were not attempts to ‘debate’ with the pope about the merits of their respective positions on evangelical poverty, but attempts to prove to the world that the pope was an unrepentant and pertinacious heretic for his attempts to destroy Franciscan poverty, which had the support of the unerring Church (along with a host of related problems). As Ockham wrote in the wake of these two texts, it is entirely reasonable to assume that when he hoped that ‘the truth itself should shine forth more clearly’, part of this truth was that the *impugnatus* claimed a great number of gravely erroneous and heretical things.

By way of conclusion, let us look once more at the beginning and the end of the *Opus nonaginta dierum*. What can be said of Ockham’s execution of his professed intentions? The bare bones of his claim to provide the whole text of *Quia vir* along with the objections and responses of the *impugnatores* was never really in question. Ockham’s prologue makes no direct claim of impersonality, though that seems to be the implication. In the conclusion, however, he is a mere ‘reciter’ of the many opinions of others; his wish was to inspire some hard thinking on the part of the *impugnatus*, and to get him to express his opinion. Ockham then disavowed authorship in the ‘strong sense’; he would express his own opinions in—God willing—an ‘excellent’ future work. Yet it should be clear by now that Ockham was much more of an author than he claimed. There is no doubt that he recycled ideas other Michaelists had already conceived, but he also sharpened them in many cases, and ignored or downplayed others as according to the method of proposing objections and solutions to John’s arguments. The use of Aquinas in the *Opus nonaginta dierum* is one clear novelty. I believe that his final position on how *usus* could be related to different kinds of rights was also noticeably different in the finer details.

The same is true of his use of legal sources, at least as far as this cursory examination can discern. Ockham was no jurist, and his ability to cite legal precedents to support his

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112. Many Franciscans, in fact, sided with the pope (Lambertini 2005, 153), or at least have little interest in the Michaelist cause (Moorman 1968, 324–25).
113. See above, p. 13.
argument certainly does not equal that of Bonagratia, who could string together truly enviable lists of *capitula* and *leges*, as we see in both the texts written in his own name and those published under Michael’s. Yet Ockham did not merely shorten the *catenae* found in other Michaelist texts. He undertook to read up on canon law for himself, and he cut out Roman law references that he could have easily put to use. I suggested that this was deliberate on his part, but it is conceivable that he did not have easy access to Roman law collections when he was writing, and so left out references he saw in other texts in order to avoid being called out for shoddy workmanship. Or perhaps he had not had the time to do work *in originalibus* for both canon and Roman law and had to focus his energies in one direction. It is hard to be certain about the ‘why’, but there can be no doubt that his work as a whole displays a strong preference for canon law over its Roman counterpart.

One final issue: Does the *Opus nonaginta dierum* deserve the label ‘legalistic’? If we mean this in the sense of being overly reliant on legal definitions and strict adherence to the written rules of the law, then I would deny it that label. There is no question that Ockham relied heavily on definitions in the opening chapters of the *Opus nonaginta dierum*, but the poverty controversy itself relied heavily on definitions throughout its history. It is not much of a stretch to characterize the whole controversy, from the 1250s on at the very least, as a demonstration of that maxim, ‘omnis definitio in iure periculosæ est’. In its final stage, after the segregation of the so-called spirituals from the mainstream community and the doctrinal (as it were) suppression of the spirituals’ version of Franciscan poverty, the problem of Franciscan poverty turned on the precise meaning of three or four difficult, and often related, terms: *ius*, *dominium*, *proprietas*, and *usus*. To defend either the view that *ius* and *usus* had to be connected in at least some cases or the view that they were not necessarily connected at all one had to provide useful, working definitions of these terms.

John XXII, not unjustly, relied heavily on a limited definition of *usus* to prove his case, but did not analyse the other terms very carefully. The Michaelists wrote at far greater length, and parsed these terms more carefully. A case could be made that Ockham did so more carefully than the rest, though he had the advantage of writing last. When Ockham had the chance, much like Francis before him, he would note that a certain term could be used in many different ways depending on which context was in play. Few of these were ‘legal’ definitions; in fact, the goal of the Michaelists was often to demonstrate that to insist on only one meaning of a word was a mistake. There were different sorts of *iura*, for example, and Ockham did not claim that Franciscans had none of them, only that

117. I owe Professor Goering thanks for constantly reminding me of this point.
the holder of *usus* did not necessarily have ‘a (legal) use’: *ius* (*positivum*), *dominium*, and *proprietas* meant one had recourse to the courts, *usus* not necessarily so. The whole point of the *Opus nonaginta dierum* was to provide the ‘discretus lector’ the means by which, on these tricky issues, ‘inter vera . . . et falsa conetur subtiliter iudicare’.$^{118}$

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$^{118}$ *OND* 124.476–477, 858.
One of the striking features of Michael of Cesena’s *Appellatio maior* is his adoption of Bonaventure’s discussion of what he called the *quadruplex temporalium communitas*. Michael greatly expanded on Bonaventure’s use of this idea: what took less than two columns of text in the modern edition of Bonaventure’s *Apologia pauperum* occupies over five pages of the *Appellatio maior*. Below I give the text in parallel, using italics to indicate substantive differences; afterwards I note a few points of particular interest.

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**Apologia pauperum** 10.13–16

Prima namque communitas est, quae manat ex iure necessitatis naturae, qua fit, ut omnis res ad naturae sustentationem idonea, quantumcumque sit alicui personae appropriata, illius fiat, qui ea indiget necessitatis extrema. Et huic communitati remuniare non est possibile, pro eo quod manat ex iure naturaliter inserto homini, quia Dei est imago et creatura dignissima, propter quam sunt omnia mundana.

Secunda communitas est, quae manat ex iure caritatis fraternae, qua fit, ut omnia sint iustorum, et communione quadam caritatis quae sunt proprria singulorum fiant universorum communia, secundum illud Apostoli: *Omnia vestra sunt* [1 Cor. 3:22]. De qua Augustinus super Ioannem homilia sexta, loquens contra haereticos Donatistas: ‘Veniant’, inquit, ‘ad catholicam Ecclesiam et nobiscum habeant non solum terram, sed eum qui fecit caelum et terram’. *Et huic communitati re-

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**Appellatio maior**

Prima namque communitas est quae emanat a iure necessitatis naturae, *qua* iure fit ut omni re temporali ad naturae sustentationem idonea, quantumcumque sit alicui personae appropriata, *ille* qui ea indiget necessitatis extrema licite uti possit ad naturae sustentationem, etiam absque voluntate vel licentia eius cui appropriata erat, quinimmo potest eam licite auferre et violenter ab illo cui est appropriata.... Et huic communitati sive iuri non est possibile renuntiare pro eo quod manat a iure naturaliter inserto homini, *qui* Dei est imago et creatura dignissima, propter quam sunt omnia mundana *creata*.

Secunda communitas est quae manat ex iure divino, *quo* fit ut omnia sint iustorum communione quadam fraternae caritatis, ut quae prius erant propra, fiant universorum communia, secundum illud Apostoli [1 Cor. 3:22]. De qua communitate Augustinus super Ioannem, homilia 6, loquens contra haereticos Donatistas, *et ponitur C. 23 q. 7 c. 3 dicit*: ‘Veniant’, inquit, ‘ad catholicam Ecclesiam et nobiscum habeant non solum terram, sed etiam eum qui fecit caelum et terram’.... *Et secundum*

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2. Bonaventure’s text has *quia*, but it seems to me that *qui* would be the better reading.
nuntiare est omnino illicitum, quia manat ex iure divinitatis infuso, per quod est unitas in columba, id est in universali Ecclesia, a qua quidem unitate ac communione nullus potest discedere, servata divina lege, quae tota completur in caritate.

Tertia est communitas, quae manat ex iure civilitatis mundanae, qua fit, ut unius imperii, regni, vel civitatis una fiat respublica, vel unius societatis, ut mercatorum vel pugnatorum, commune fiat lucrum vel damnum, vel unius indivisae familiae una sit communis hereditas. Et huic communitate renuntiare est de perfectionis evangelicae necessitate, quia talis communitas personalem includit proprietatem, quae manat ex iure humanitatis instituto, cui etiam annexa sunt quae occasionaliter inducunt difficultatem ad bonum et pronitatem ad malum, ac per hoc perfectioni evangelicae adversantur. Et ideo animae sanctae huiusmodi suadetur dimissio, ut in Psalmo dicitur: 'Audi, filia, et vide et inclinatur competere proprium ius personale in rebus aurem tuam et obliviscere populum tuum et domum patris tui' [44.11].

Quarta communitas est, quae manat ex iure dotationis ecclesiae, qua fit, ut omnia bona, quae conferentur ecclesiae, Domino dedicentur ad communem sustentationem ministrorum suorum et pauperum. Et haec communitas est in omnibus ecclesiis collegiatis habentibus possessiones. Et huic communitate renuntiare non est perfectioni necessarium, quia teneri potest salva perfectione, sicut apparit in praelatis et Religiosis perfectis et sanctis; quia talis communitas ex iure manat divinitus ordinato, 'ut de altari vivat qui altari deservit' [1 Cor. 9.13], et illis sint omnia communia, hoc ipsis divinis fuerunt apostolis omnia tempora tempora divinitus infuso, per quod est unitas in columba, lia communia, non quantum ad proprietatem sive dominium iuris civilis et mundani, quae reliquarunt, dicentes: 'Ecce, nos reliquimus omnia' [Mt. 19.27], sed solum quantum ad usum. Ex quo iure etiam emanavit in Ecclesia primitiva communitas credentium et apostolicam vitam sequentium, de qua dicitur Actuum 4.32....

Tertia communitas est quae emanat ex iure civilitatis mundanae, quo fit ut unius regni vel civitatis sive castri vel villae vel unius societatis sive collegii aut universitatis hominum aliquorum una fiat communitas et respublica vel unius indivisae familiae una communis haereditas. Et talis communitas includit etiam personalem proprietatem in rebus communibus, emanantem ex iure humanitatis instituto, nam quamvis res communitas civilis et mundanae absolute non censeantur esse singulorum, sed sint actu universitatis, quoad proprietatem et dominium, Dig. 1.8.6.1; et Dig. 2.4.10.4.... Ideo cuilibet de tali communitate sive collegio dictur competere proprium ius personale in rebus communibus illius collegii. Et talis communitas quae personalem includit proprietatem manantem ex iure humanitatis instituto, nullo modo stat cum perfectione evangelica de qua dixit Christus [Mt. 19.21] .... Immo, tali communitate renuntiare est de necessitate volenti perfectionem evangelicam adipisci.

Quarta communitas est ecclesiastica, quae emanavit ex iure ecclesiastico ratione dotationis Ecclesiae introducto, scilicet postquam fuit Ecclesias dota ta a princibus christianis. Et haec communitas includit quasi proprietatem, non personalem sed collegialen, non civilem et mundanam sed ecclesiasticam.... Ez hoc iure ecclesiastico bona Ecclesiae divisa sunt per ecclesias diversorum locorum auctoritate summorum pontificum, et ecclesiae limitate et episcopis et alius praelatis in ecclesia concessa est administratio. Et haec communitas est etiam in omnibus ecclesiis collegiatis et regularibus ha-
quibus est ‘cor unum et anima una’ [Act. 4.32], unus pater spiritualis et una norma vivendi. Huic tamen communitati renuntiare non est perfectioni contrarium, quin potius facit ad perfectionis evangelicae cumulum, pro eo videlicet, quod talis communitas, quamquam manet ex iure divino, manat etiam ex humano, et quia non solum est spiritualis, verum etiam temporalis, et quia, licet in ea excludatur personalis proprietas, includitur tamen proprietas collegialis, cuius etiam quaelibet persona de collegio particeps esse dignoscitur non solum quantum ad usum, verum etiam quantum ad dominium, dum unusquisque ipso iure actionem habet ad res ecclesiae suae recuperandas et exceptionem ad defendendas; quod vere declarat, dominii rerum ipsarum agentem vel excipientem aliqualiter esse participem. bentibus domos et praedias rustica et urbana et possessiones ac alia bona in communi sive ad sufficientiam vitae, ut habent monasteria abundantia, sive habeant aliqua sed non ad sufficientiam, unde et mendicare compellantur, ut Prædicatores. Et quia pro ipsis domibus, prædiis, possessionibus et bonis quae in communi habent, ipsi communitati datur actio et exceptio in iudicio, dicuntur in bonis ipsius communitatis esse, Dig. 41.1.52. Ideo taliis communitatis dicitur habere quasi proprietatem et dominium utile.... Nec ad perfectionem evangelicam servandam necesse est renuntiare huiusmodi communitati, potest tamen renuntiare tali communitati volens ad perfectionis evangelicae cel-situidinem pervenire, quia talis communitas emanat etiam ex iure humano (et) ecclesiastico. Unde etiam talis communitas est temporalis, quia licet in ea excludatur personalis proprietas, includitur tamen in ea quasi quaedam collegialis proprietas cuius quilibet de collegio quodammodo particeps esse dignoscitur, dum unusquisque clericus ecclesiae collegiatae habet actionem ad res ecclesiae suae recuperandas et exceptionem ad defendendas.

Bonaventure employed this quadruple distinction to show how it was that the Church could ‘truly’ possess temporal goods equally by divine and human law (ius). As Lambertini noted, these communitates are distinguished by two basic features: what ius they are based on, and whether they can be renounced. According to Bonaventure, it is by means of the communitas that derives from the ius necessitatis naturae that previously appropriated things comes to belong to the one who needs it. This was of course a standard view, as was the idea that one could not avoid this type of joint possession, even if it only had practical importance in extreme circumstances.

The second community is the one by which all things can be said to belong to the just, for by the fellowship of charity, what belongs to one person comes to belong to the entire group. Since this type of joint possession derives from a divinely infused ius, it too is irrenouncible.

The third community corresponds to civil society. This sort of community must be renounced for the sake of evangelical perfection because it includes personal ownership, which is based on positive human law, and which occasionally makes it harder to do good than ill.

4. Lambertini 1990, 94; see generally his discussion on 94–97.
The fourth community describes the ecclesiastical society. It is by this community, which derives *ex iure dotationis ecclesiae*, that everything conferred upon the Church is dedicated to God for the sake of sustaining his ministers and his faithful poor. This community exists in all churches which have possessions of their own. The perfect do not need to renounce this community since it is based on divinely instituted *ius*; but they can renounce it if they wish. It is, after all, both a spiritual and temporal community: spiritual because it excludes personal ownership, but temporal because it allows collegial ownership. Members of this community thus have both *usus* and *dominium*, which means that they can take action in court to defend or recoup the things of the Church. At the same time, however, the Church cannot be said to have true *dominium*.6

Bonaventure did not make great use of this fourfold division; for him it was more of an *ad hoc* device that allowed him to specify better the difference between the first and second *communitates* on the one hand and the third and fourth on the other.7 Michael made a far more extensive use of this concept, both explicitly and implicitly, and I think evidence of its influence can be detected in the writings of Francis and William as well even though they never employed these terms directly.8

The most obvious difference between the two texts is the switch from *qua* to *quo* in each case (except the fourth, but the effect is the same). Michael chose to emphasize the role *ius* played in determining these *communitates*. Now it is the *ius* that directly produces the result.

The first *communitas* is pretty much the same as it is in Bonaventure. The biggest difference lies in the fact that Michael avoided Bonaventure’s wording where it is said that in the case of extreme need things come to belong to (*illius fiat*) who needs them. Michael instead put the same point into the language of the Michaelist position. Now the person in need can merely licitly use the things he needs even without the owner’s licence to do so; he may do so violently even if it is necessary. This is not theft, Michael assured us; and it is what Nicholas was describing by his use of *ius poli*.9

For the second *communitas* Michael also laid stress on *usus* over property rights.10 Bonaventure chose to avoid both terms, presumably because the ‘fellowship of charity’ has nothing to do with property rights. Michael connected this fellowship with the primitive

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5. Lambertini 1990, 96, has stressed that Bonaventure thought the right (*diritto*) of recouping or defending goods is a true sign of *dominium* over a thing.
Church (though I doubt that Bonaventure would have had a problem with this) by linking it to *Dilectissimis*.

Michael kept to the idea that the third *communitas* described the civil order. The *ius civilitatis mundanae* was the means by which one community or *respublica* come to be of a kingdom, city, fellowship, or, he added, college. The key feature remained that such associations had personal ownership, and Michael added a series of references to the *Digest* to highlight the nature of corporate ownership.¹¹

The fourth community underwent the most profound change. Michael dropped the references to Acts 4.32 and instead focused on how this *communitas* differed from the primitive Church. At that early date the apostles and their followers did not acquire any estates or possessions in Judea, only their *pretia*, which was for fostering the needy. It was only after the Church came to the Roman princes that the Church was endowed. Michael quoted from C. 12 q. 1 c. 16 to prove his point.¹² By *ius ecclesiasticum* the goods of the Church are divided among the various churches, and these churches can defend their property in court, although they do not have more than restricted ownership (*quasi proprietatem et dominium utile*). It is not full civil ownership or lordship because, unlike that which exists in the third *communitas*, if this *communitas* is dissolved the goods are not divided among its members like a non-ecclesiastical corporation, but reverts to the Church—the *congregatio fidelium*. The Friars Minor renounced this fourth *communitas* along with all personal and collegial ownership, remaining content with the second *communitas* alone.¹³ This is why the Franciscan abdication is more perfect than that of the other mendicant orders: it includes an abdication of collegial ownership. Both are perfect, but one is more perfect.

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¹¹ *App.mai.*, 339.
¹² *App.mai.*, 340; the quotation was not noted by G&F.
¹³ *App.mai.*, 342 (and the first *communitas*).
APPENDIX B

A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE MICHAELIST TRACTS ON EVANGELICAL POVERTY

The texts in the below table are all closely interrelated because of how they quote one another. Using these cues, it is easy to build a table that allows us to see at a glance how the different texts responded to the same substantial problems. I include it here in the hopes that it proves useful to others.

A word about the organization is in order. With the exception of Michael’s two longer appeals, the text that is responsible for the organization of all the others is the Appellatio minor. The Appellatio maior is naturally laid out along the same lines as its shorter counterpart; both deal chronologically and mostly ex ordine with the errors found in Ad conditorem, Cum inter, and Quia quorundam. However, the errors listed in the below table often included several (sub-)errors of their own. The Appellatio monacensis follows its own logic, which was to extract only the principales errores from John’s bulls. Yet as Lambertini noted, these errors are organized along the following lines: the first two errors are Christological in nature, the next eight deal with the apostles, while the eleventh addresses the issue of property in the primitive community of believers, and the twelfth confronts the problem of consumables. Francis and Ockham were systematic in a different way: If the man who called himself Pope John XXII wanted to refute Michael bit-by-bit, then they would do the same, only at greater length. It seems reasonable to assume that William saw the benefits of Francis’ paragraph-by-paragraph response (and that of the Tres oppositiones), but we should not forget that this was not an unheard of procedure to adopt.

Michael’s appeals are easily divisible according to the major errors he lists; Ockham’s text is divided according to his one hundred and twenty-four sequential quotations of Quia vir; Francis’ text quotes Quia vir in forty-six blocks, but his editor has usefully numbered the paragraphs, which makes it easier to pinpoint parts of his argument. The

1. Cross-references to these bulls are provided in the notes.
2. Lambertini 2001, 282. Even within these errors there is a tendency to analyze the error in terms of what Scripture says, then the Fathers, then the determinations of the Church. See Accrocca 1994–97, 174–79, for a summary account of the twelve errors (written prior to the appearance of G&F).
3. As the table makes clear, Francis did not entirely follow this method, but for reasons that remain unexplained. Some seemingly ‘out of place’ paragraph numbers are due to repetition on the part of either John or Michael, but not all can be explained that way. It is possible that Francis had intended a more thematic approach but simply gave that up as the far more difficult option.
numbers in the table below refer to these divisions. The version of *Quia vir* found in Gál and Flood was left undivided, so I refer to it by the page numbers of that edition. One final caveat: the thematic method of the *Appellatio monacensis* means that its structure cannot so easily be compared to the *Improbatio* or the *Opus nonaginta dierum*. Therefore, the structural relationship among these three texts is less tidy than the following table may make it seem.

Table B.1: Structural Analysis of Michaelist Tracts on Evangelical Poverty

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4. *QVR* § 2 quotes *App.min.*, 431–32. Note that references to a §-number refer to Ockham’s division of the text.
6. § 11 quotes *App.min.*, 432.
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15. § 44: quotes App.min., 435.
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concluding remarks 124

30. § 78: quotes App.min., 587.
33. § 82: quotes App.min., 443.
34. The second error of CIN cannot be located within the structure of the other tracts, but I include it here because these errors are related to the sixth error of the App.min.
41. § 118: cf. App.min., 443.
43. § 120: quotes App.min., 449.
44. Michael also found heresies in the apparatus of Jesselin de Cassagnes that related to this error.
The two tables given here should be mostly self-explanatory. They simply indicate how frequently a given *lex* or *capitulum* has been cited, or possibly alluded to, in the named texts. Offler, for one, seems to have edited Ockham’s political writings with one eye constantly roving over Ockham’s own sizeable oeuvre, while the second continually scanned both the *Corpus iuris civilis* and the *Corpus iuris canonici*, not to mention their respective glosses, and with yet a third eye on the corpus of Michaelist texts. Often enough his suggestions are compelling; however, the table of Roman law citations seems to illustrate my claim that Ockham did not delve deeply into the Roman law sources while composing the *Opus nonaginta dierum*.

The conventions adopted here are simple. An asterisk (‘*’) marks that a direct reference to or quotation of the *Glossa ordinaria* was made at least once. Thus a ‘3*’ means a certain reference was made three times, and that one or more of those times it was to a gloss. An allusion or conjectured reference to a legal text is marked as such, either to the text itself (‘cf.’) or to a gloss (‘(‘*’)’). In order to make Ockham’s ‘unique’ references stand in sharp relief, I have highlighted them by means of a gray bar across that row.

Table C.1: Table of Canon Law References

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**Legend:** cf. = not directly cited  * = reference to gloss  (‘*’) = cf. the gloss

(Continued on next page)

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1. Offler suggested D. 1 cc. 3–5 *OND* 2.146–149, 302, but as *OND* 3.206–207, 316, and 106.398–400, 780, show, Ockham was probably only really thinking of D. 1 d.p.c. 5 (and perhaps this *capitulum*). The *Gloss* is not inapposite, so I mention it as well.
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**Legend:**
- cf. = not directly cited
- * = reference to gloss
- (*) = cf. the gloss

(Continued on next page)

2. One reference (G&F, 329) was unidentified, perhaps because Michael wrote ‘Si ad Scripturam’ rather than ‘Si ad Scripturas’.
### C. Comparison of Legal References

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**Legend:**  
- cf. = not directly cited  
- * = reference to gloss  
- (*) = cf. the gloss

(Continued on next page)

3. Wrongly listed as c. 7 in Oliger 1929, 503 n. 3.

4. Michael’s point (App.min., 435) was that Augustine and D. 41 generally support the notion that food is used (the first four capitula derive from Augustine).
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LEGEND:  
- cf. = not directly cited 
- * = reference to gloss  
- (1*) = cf. the gloss

(Continued on next page)

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6. It is very unlikely Ockham was citing this even allusively; see the discussion on p. 247.

7. Cited on G&F, 941. As Offler noted (OPol 1.294), this section of the Opus nonaginta dierum is dependent on this letter of ‘Nicholas the Minorite’, sometimes known as Quoniam omnem humana sententia.
### C. Comparison of Legal References

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**Legend:** cf. = not directly cited  * = reference to gloss  (*/ ) = cf. the gloss

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8. Cited twice in two different glosses to C. 24 q. 1 d.a.c. 1 (s.vv. ‘Quod autem’; ‘Qui uero’), though in the second case, Michael’s text reads 3 q. 7. See, for both, App.mon., 854.

9. At **OND** 77.412–413, 633–34, Ockham writes: ‘et x, q. ii, c. Si oeconomus’, which is § 11 of the second capitulum, but then goes on to quote from what our modern edition calls capitulum 3. The portion that Ockham quoted comes originally from Cod. 1.2.14.9; as the Correctores Romani noted, some of the older mss. counted this palea as part of capitulum 2 and gave the remainder of the Code passage as well (Friedberg 1879–81, 1.619, in notationes correctorum). Apparently he had access to one of the mss. since his quotation includes this later portion as well. Offler listed the reference as C. 10 q. 2 c. 3 on OPol 2.634.
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LEGEND: cf. = not directly cited * = reference to gloss (* = cf. the gloss

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10. Offler found the reference strange and noted (OPol 2.617) that the Lyons edition (1495) emended it to c. 16
11. Corrected by Offler from ‘xvi, q. 1, c. Auctoritate’.
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**Legend:** cf. = not directly cited  * = reference to gloss  (*) = cf. the gloss

(Continued on next page)

13. Michael quoted (G&F, 860) a gloss to C. 2 q. 7 c. 8, which reads in part ‘q. ultima Sane’, which must be an incomplete reference back to G&F, 858.

14. This is cited, along with C. 8 q. 4 c. 1, as part of Gl. ord. ad D. 19 c. 9, s.v. ‘Abegerunt’.
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Legend: cf. = not directly cited * = reference to gloss (*) = cf. the gloss

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15. Also cited in 3 opp., 489, in a similar group as that found at OND 124.74–118, 848–49.
16. Offler marked this as a confer, but Ockham cited it explicitly: OND 62.243, 569.
### Reference Texts

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**Legend:** cf. = not directly cited  * = reference to gloss  (* ) = cf. the gloss

(Continued on next page)

17. Mariani 1993, 218 n. 141, suggested Francis might be alluding to Gregory the Great via this passage, but it is more likely to have come from his knowledge of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*.
18. It is unlikely Ockham was citing this even allusively; see the discussion on p. 247.
19. See the discussion on p. 240.
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**Legend:**  
`cf. =` not directly cited  
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**Legend:**
- **cf.** = not directly cited
- **=** = reference to gloss
- **(*)** = cf. the gloss

(Continued on next page)

20. Corrected from X 3.24.19 on G&F, 854; it is part of Gl. ord. ad C. 24 q. 1 d.a.c. 1, s.v. ‘Quod autem’.
21. It is unlikely Ockham was citing this even allusively; see the discussion on 247.
### C. Comparison of Legal References

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23. It is unlikely Ockham was citing this even allusively; see the discussion on p. 247.
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LEGEND: cf. = not directly cited * = reference to gloss (*) = cf. the gloss
(Continued on next page)

²⁴. See OND 3.202, 316, for the unlikely allusion to this passage.
²⁵. Francis was confused, and it is contagious. He quoted from this passage, but refers to it as ‘in
Instituta, capita De usu et habitacione’ (Inst. 2.5). Mariani confusedly has ‘Inst. II, 3–4 [or 34]. 4.
pag. 13’ in the apparatus fontium (pp. 300, 306, 313, 332), which is nonsensical. Moreover, to locate
Francis’ quotations in Inst. 2.4 rather than to the gloss to Dig. 7.8.1 (s.v. ‘nudus usus’) is to ignore
the fundamental difference Francis saw between usus and ususfructus!
²⁶. Two of these references have been corrected from Inst. 2.4.1.2 in Oliger 1929. 509.
²⁷. Not Inst. II. 4–5, 4–1, though Inst. 2.4–4–2.5.1 is close; see Mariani 1993. 306–07.
²⁸. Not Inst. 2.5–5; see Mariani 1993. 301.
²⁹. Offler noted one passage (40.37–38) which speaks of having a ‘usum fundi vel domus’, a possible
echo of Inst. 2.5.1–2.
³⁰. G&F, 105 reads: ‘... in I. 3, 28 Per quas personas nobis adquiritur, Item, nobis. Unde...’. The
item refers to the lex, but the second nobis cannot refer to anything in Inst. 3.28; my guess is that it
is an accidental reduplication from the rubric.
### C. Comparison of Legal References

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| Dig. 1.3.31 | 2 | **cf.** |
| Dig. 1.8.1 pr. | | | 131 | 132 |
| Dig. 1.8.6.1 | 1 |
| **Dig. 1.10.1.1** | | | (*) |
| Dig. 1.18.3 | 1 |
| Dig. 1.21.1 | 1 |
| Dig. 1.38.4 | | 1 |
| Dig. 2.1.6 | 1 |
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| Dig. 3.3.1 | | 1 |
| Dig. 3.4.1 | 1 |
| Dig. 3.4.2 | 2 |
| Dig. 3.4.3 | 1 |
| Dig. 3.4.7.1 | 1 |
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| Dig. 3.45.20 (21) | 1 |
| Dig. 4.4.16.4 | **cf.** |
| Dig. 4.4.45 | 1 |
| Dig. 4.8.4 | | **cf.** |
| Dig. 6.1.49 | | **cf.** |
| Dig. 6.1.62 | | 1 |
| Dig. 7.1.1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | **cf.** |
| Dig. 7.1.3.3 | | | 133 |
| Dig. 7.1.4 | 1 |
| Dig. 7.1.7.1 | 1 |
| **Dig. 7.1.12.2** | | **cf.** |
| Dig. 7.1.32 | | |
| Dig. 7.1.56 | | **cf.** | **cf.** |
| Dig. 7.5-34 | 2* | 1* | 1* |
| Dig. 7.5-1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 135 | 136 | 1 |

**Legend:** cf. = not directly cited * = reference to gloss (**) = cf. the gloss

(Continued on next page)

31. Corrected from Dig. 1.8.1 on G&F, 842.
32. Not Dig. 8, 1, pag. 39; see Mariani 1993, 215.
33. A parallel passage to Inst. 2.5 pr., which he cites in the next paragraph.
34. Although all editions of QVR are agreed that John cited Dig. 7.5, Francis and Ockham responded to him.
35. John made reference to a gloss to the rubric of Dig. 7.5; Francis and Ockham responded to him.
36. Not Dig. 8, 1, 1, pag. 127; see Mariani 1993, 281.
### C. Comparison of Legal References

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**Legend:** cf. = not directly cited * = reference to gloss (*) = cf. the gloss

(Continued on next page)

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37. Not Dig. 8, 1, 2, pag. 127; see Mariani 1993, 281.

38. At App.mai., 255, and App.mon., 829, Michael claimed that the definition, ‘usus est ius utendi rebus alienis, salva rerum substantia’, derives from the text and gloss of Dig. 7.8.1, but it is only found in the Gloss (s.v. ‘etiam nudus usus’).

39. Olicher 1929, 510 n. 4, is right to remark: ‘In hoc titulo nihil inveni ad rem faciens.’

40. The text reads (Olicher 1929, 510): ‘ff. si certum petatur, l. sicut’, which as Olicher rightly noted seems to be a reference to Cod. 4.2 except for the fact that the word sicut is nowhere to be found. A gloss to the just quoted Dig. 7.5.7 (s.v. ‘Qualitatis’) might provide a clue, however; it reads: ‘ut i sì cer. pet. l. cum quid’. Although this is surely a confused reference itself, considering both the gloss and Bonagratia’s citation, two possibilities present themselves: Dig. 7.6.5.6, i.e., Si usus fructus petetur vel ad alium pertinere negetur, l. uti frui, § Sicut; and Dig. 12.1.3, i.e., De rebus creditis sicertum petetur et de condictione, l. Cum quid. As both references fit the context (quasi ususfructus), but only the second was cited elsewhere (App.mon., 831), I opt for the second option.

41. Ockham quotes John’s one reference to this passage, and four times refers to money being used ‘ad pompam’ (3.339, 14.111, 32.186–193, 109.257–259). Offer suggested this passage, but 3.330 and 32.186–193 make it more likely that Ockham was following Gl. ord. ad X 5.19.8, s.v. ‘de feudo’. The same is true for Dig. 13.6.4, which Offer suggested for 3.330.
C. Comparison of Legal References

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**Legend:** cf. = not directly cited * = reference to gloss (*) = cf. the gloss

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42. Unidentified on G&F, 855, but cf. G&F, 408: they are both part of the quotation of *Gl. ord.* ad C. 24 q. 1 c. 1, s.v. ‘in heresim’.
43. Wrongly noted (G&F, 294), due mostly to Michael’s incorrect reference, as Dig. 21.1.21; the reference should in fact be to Dig. 28.1.21 pr.
44. The reference (G&F, 375) is to an impossible ‘ff. *De testimoniiis, l. Haeredes, 1’*, but because, like the note above, Michael was arguing here against the idea that the pope established novelties, the reference he probably had in mind was ff. *De testamentis, l. Haeredes, 1* (Dig. 28.1.21.1).
45. G&F, 316 reads ‘... et domini appellatione continetur potissime qui proprietatem habet, ff. *Ad Silienianum,* (?) l. 1, circa principium’, which is an almost verbatim quotation of this *lex*.
46. Only Bonagratia’s texts refer directly to this passage; the *OND*, quoting the *QVR*, make no direct reference, but Offer was quick to catch it; the passage was not noted by Mariani.
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**Legend:** cf. = not directly cited  * = reference to gloss  (*) = cf. the gloss

(*Continued on next page*)

47. Oliger 1929, 502 incorrectly suggested Dig. 41.1.1.5.
48. Due to his error in the note above, Oliger (1929, 502), could not identify this reference.
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**Legend:**
- `cf.` = not directly cited
- `*` = reference to gloss
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51. Unidentified on G&F, 672.
52. Reading ‘l. [Is] qui actionem’.
53. One reference (G&F, 400) is wrongly listed as Cod. 1.4.
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**Legend:** cf. = not directly cited  * = reference to gloss  (*)& = cf. the gloss

(Continued on next page)

54. Bonagratia gave a faulty reference (Oliger 1929, 510 n. 2), which is impossible to decipher: ‘ff. si certum petatur, l. sicur’. The title refers to Cod. 4.2, but there is no lex beginning with sicur. It may be a faulty cross-reference from a gloss: Bonagratia makes the reference as the middle link of a catena that includes Dig. 46.3.55 and Dig. 50.17.15.

55. The text (G&F, 315) reads ‘et per totum’.
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56. Corrected from Cod. 10.42(43).2 on G&F, 357.
57. Corrected from Cod. 10.42(43).6 on G&F, 357.
58. G&F, 357, reads: ‘et C. [10. 49 (48)] De quibus munecibus vel praestantis nemini se liceat excusare, l. 1. || 2.’; since the first *lex* only contains one subsection, it seems best to read ‘*lex* 1 (et) 2’.
59. Listed as ‘Auth. seu Novellae cap. 2, tit. 1’ in Oliger 1929, 324.
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