

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM: ORDINATIO 1 d. 2 q. 4*

With regard to the identity and distinctness of God from the creature, it should be asked whether there is something common and univocal to God and the creature, something that is essentially predicable of each. But since that question, and many things that are and ought to be said in the following questions, depend on familiarity with the nature of the univocal and the universal, then for the clarification of what is and ought to be said [in the following questions] I shall first of all raise some questions about the nature of the universal and the univocal.

In line with this, I *first* ask whether that which is immediately and proximately denominated by a universal and univocal intention is some genuine thing outside the soul, intrinsic and essential to those [things] to which it is common and univocal, yet really distinct from them.

[The Principal Arguments]

That it is the case:

[First Positive Argument]: It is a genuine thing, essential and intrinsic to those [things] to which it is common. For, according to the Commentator in his remarks on *Met.* 5 com. 7 ([Iuntina 8 fol. 52va]):

Those two men, universal and particular (namely to which music is accidental), are essentially one.

But that which is essentially one with some real being outside the soul is a genuine thing and essential to such a thing. Hence the universal *man* is a genuine thing outside the soul and essential to those [things] to which it is common.

[Second Positive Argument]: It seems that the universal is a really distinct thing, since it is impossible for the same thing to be corruptible and incorruptible; but universals are incorruptible and those [things] to which they are common are corruptible; hence they are not the same thing as singulars.

For the opposite: The Commentator, in his remarks on *Met.* 12 com. 22 ([Iuntina 8 fol. 144va]):

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‘One’ and ‘being’ exist in virtue of universal things, which do not have being outside the soul.

Hence, according to the Commentator, universals do not have being outside the soul. But nothing that does not have being outside the soul is really the same as a being outside the soul. Therefore, *etc.*

[Walter Burleigh’s View]

Regarding the question: One view is that any given univocal universal is a certain thing really existing outside the soul in any singular whatever and pertaining to the essence of any singular, really distinct from any singular and from any other universal, such that the universal **man** is one genuine thing really existing outside the soul in any given man, and it is really distinguished from any given man and from the universal **animal** and from the universal **substance**—and so for all genera and species, whether they are subalternate or not subalternate. And thus, according to that view, there are as many universals that are predicable *in quid* and *per se primo modo* of any singular that is *per se* in the genus as there are really distinct things in it, any given one of which is really distinguished from any other and from that singular, and all those things, in themselves in no way multiplied howsoever much singulars be multiplied, are in any given individual belonging to the same species.

[Thirteen Arguments for Burleigh’s View]

This view is argued for in many ways. First of all, by reasons—

[First Argument]

Definition is primarily of substance and secondarily of accident, according to the Philosopher (*Met.* 7.4 [1030^b4–14]). But definition is not primarily of the singular substance, according to [the Philosopher] (*Met.* 7.15 [1039^b20–1040^a10]). Hence there is a substance other than singular [substance], which is primarily definable. But that [substance that is primarily definable] is not separated from sensibles, since such [a separated substance] is not definable, according to the Philosopher himself in the same passage. Hence it pertains to the essence of the singular.

[First Confirmation]: This [first argument] is confirmed [as follows]. Something in the genus Substance is definable, according to everyone. But the individual is not definable, since, if it were, I ask: what would be put into its definition? Nothing but substance, according to the Philosopher (*Met.* 7.4 [1030^b4–7]). Therefore, some substance would be put into its definition—but not singular substance, since then either (*i*) the very singu-

lar substance itself is definable, which is impossible, since the same thing does not define itself, or *(ii)* another [singular substance is put into the definition, which is impossible], since no singular substance is truly predicable of another singular substance. Hence it is necessary that some *universal* substance be put into its definition. And, consequently, what was to be proved is established.

[Second Confirmation]: The [first argument] is also confirmed [as follows]. Substance is defined by a definition strictly speaking, which is given through genus and differentia. Next, I ask: is the genus [given in the definition] either *(i)* a thing, or *(ii)* a concept (*intentio*)? [With regard to *(i)*]: if [the genus] is a thing, then it is not a singular thing, since no singular is a genus. Hence it is a universal thing, and it pertains to the essence of the species that has been defined—for otherwise that species would have been defined through an additional element, since [it would have been defined] through something that would be outside of its essence; hence, besides the singular thing, there is some other (universal) thing pertaining to the essence of the singular thing itself. [With regard to *(ii)*]: if, however, the genus and the differentia [given in the definition of the species] were certain concepts (*intentiones*), then against this: substance is defined only through substances, according to the Philosopher (*Met.* 7.4 [1030^b4–14]). Hence the genus and the differentia are substances. Likewise, then substance would have been defined by an additional element, since [it would have been defined] through intentions, which do not pertain to the essence of the thing.

[Third Confirmation]: Thirdly, the [first argument] is confirmed [as follows]. The definition is truly predicated primarily of what has been defined. But [the definition] is not predicated primarily of some individual, since then it would have been predicated of nothing other than [that] individual. Nor is [the definition] predicated primarily of something extrinsic to the individual itself, since nothing of this kind truly exists, [for example], a rational animal. Hence [the definition] is predicated *per se* of something that is not any individual, and nevertheless it is intrinsic to any given individual. But there is nothing of this kind except a thing that is universal, really distinct from the individual and intrinsic to it.

[Second Argument]

Secondly, it is argued for as follows. Real science is about genuine things outside the soul, since real science is distinguished from rational science in this regard. But no science is primarily about singular things. Hence there are some things outside the soul besides singular things.

[Proof of the Minor]: The minor premiss, [namely “no science is primarily about singular things”], is clear according to the Philosopher

(*Post. an.* 1.4–5 [73^b26–74^a13] and *Met.* 7.15 [1039^b20–1040^a10]).

[Third Argument]

This word ‘man’ primarily signifies some thing outside the soul, since every univocal word has primarily one significate. For [the univocal word] is distinguished in this regard from the equivocal word, which signifies many [significates] equally primarily. But it does not primarily signify some intention, since then it would be a name of a second-level intention. Likewise, then this [proposition]:

A second-level intention is a man
would be true without any [further] distinction, since a word always has the feature that it supposits for its significate on the basis of the institution [of the word]. But it is clear that [“A second-level concept is a man”] is either simply false or should be distinguished. Hence this word ‘man’ does not primarily signify an intention. Hence it signifies some thing outside the soul, and it does not primarily signify a singular thing, since it does not signify [any] one [singular thing] before another. Hence it signifies some thing other than the singular, and not [some thing] that is extrinsic to the singular. Hence [the word ‘man’ signifies a universal thing].

[Fourth Argument]

The intellect can understand man while not understanding some singular man. But in understanding man, it understands a genuine thing. Hence there is some genuine thing that is understood at that point, distinct from any given singular man.

[Fifth Argument]

The primary adequate object of a real potency is a genuine thing. But the primary adequate object of any given potency (whether sensitive or intellectual) is not some singular thing, since then nothing would have been apprehended by that potency except (*i*) that singular thing, or (*ii*) under the *ratio* of that singular [thing]—each of which is obviously false. Hence some thing other than a singular thing is the primary adequate object of a real potency.

[Proof of the Major]: The major premiss, [namely “the primary adequate object of a real potency is a genuine thing”], is clear—especially with regard to sensitive potency, since nothing is apprehensible by a sensitive potency except a genuine thing. Hence nothing is its object, neither adequate nor non-adequate, except a genuine thing.

[Sixth Argument]

The primary subject of a real attribute (*passio*) is a genuine thing. But no singular thing is the primary subject of any given attribute, for

then that attribute would be appropriate to nothing but that of which that singular thing is said, according to the art of the Philosopher (*Post. an.* 1.4 [85^a13–86^b38]). And, consequently, [the attribute] would not be appropriate to any other singular thing of the same *ratio*, which is obviously false. Hence a real attribute is primarily appropriate to a thing other than the singular thing.

[Proof of the Major]: The major premiss, [namely “the primary subject of a real attribute is a genuine thing”], is clear, since the subject is not more imperfect than its attribute. Hence if the attribute were real the subject will be real.

[First Confirmation]: The [sixth argument] is confirmed by the Philosopher, *De an.* 2.7 [418^b7–9]: transparency is present in air and in water neither only through the *ratio* water, nor only by means of the *ratio* air, but by means of the *ratio* of a common nature. Hence that nature is in each. Hence there is some common nature in each, differing from the other.

[Second Confirmation]: The [sixth argument] is confirmed, secondly, by *De gen. et corr.* 1.4 [319^b22–24]: when water comes to be out of air, numerically the same transparency remains. And [it does not remain] by means of the *ratio* of the matter, since then it would always remain, as matter always remains; nor yet by means of the *ratio* of a singular form, since no [form] of this sort is the same [throughout the change]. Hence [it remains] by means of the *ratio* of a common form. Hence there is some common form differing from any given singular form.

[Seventh Argument]

A natural agent, in acting, tends to a genuine thing. And [a natural agent] does not tend to a singular thing, since by that *ratio* it would tend to one [singular thing] and to another, for it is equally related to any other singular thing of the same *ratio* as [it is related] to that one, and consequently it would tend to an infinite [number], and so would be frustrated in its tendency since it can never produce an infinite [number]. Hence [a natural agent] tends to some thing that is distinct from singulars.

[Eighth Argument]

A generalissimum is either (*i*) a genuine thing, or (*ii*) only a concept of the mind. [With regard to (*i*): if it were a genuine thing, then it is certain that no singular thing is a generalissimum. For no singular thing of this sort is predicated of everything contained under the generalissimum, of which [contained things], nevertheless, the generalissimum itself is truly predicated. Hence [the generalissimum] is another thing. [With regard to (*ii*): if it were a concept of the mind, then, since concepts can be many, it

would follow that there could be many generalissima of substance.

[Ninth Argument]

According to Porphyry ([*Isag.* 7]):

The species is what is collective of many into one nature.

Hence ‘species’ expresses one nature beyond those many [things] that have been collected. Similarly ([*Isag.* 7]):

Many men are one man by participation in the species.

But they are not one singular man. Hence there is some universal beyond particulars.

[Tenth Argument]

According to the Philosopher (*Cat.* 2 [1^a20–21]):

Of these [things] that exist, some are said of a subject and are not in a subject.

And [things] of this sort are not accidents, since, according to [Aristotle] ([*Cat.* 2 1^a24–1^b3]), accidents are in a subject. Therefore, since they exist, they are substances. But they are not singular substances, since, according to [Aristotle] ([*Cat.* 2 1^b3–4]), they “are neither in a subject nor said of a subject.” Hence [they are universals].

[Eleventh Argument]

Cat. 5 [2^a10–17]:

Some substances are primary, and other [substances] are secondary.

Primary substances are singular substances. Hence besides singular substance there is another substance, which is secondary [substance], namely the genus or the species.

[Confirmation]: This is confirmed [as follows]. In the same passage, Aristotle says that, of secondary substances, the species is more substance than the genus ([*Cat.* 5 2^b8–9]). Hence genera and species are substances. And they are not singular substances, for then they would be primary substances. Hence [they are universals].

[Twelfth Argument]

De int. 7 [17^a38–39]:

Of things, some are universals, others particulars.

But one [element] of a division is not the other [element of the division]. Hence universal things are not particular things, nor conversely. Hence they differ.

[Thirteenth Argument]

Top. 1.7 [103^a7–8]:

‘Same’ is said in three ways: the same in genus, the same in species, the same in number.

From this [passage] it is argued [as follows]. Here there is a threefold real identity. But specific identity is not primarily appropriate to the individual, and neither is generic identity. Hence [they are primarily appropriate] to some other things.

[Six Arguments Against Burleigh’s View]

That view is simply false and absurd; hence I argue against it.

[First Argument]

There is no thing that is numerically one, neither varied nor multiplied, in many suppositis or sensible singulars, nor even in any given created individuals [taken] together simultaneously. But such a thing, if it were posited, would be numerically one. Hence it would not be in many singulars and pertain to their essence.

[Proof of the Major]: The major premiss, [namely “there is no thing that is numerically one, neither varied nor multiplied, in many suppositis or sensible singulars, nor even in any given created individuals taken together simultaneously”], is obvious. For this is proper to the divine essence alone, [namely] that it is in many really distinct suppositis without any division and multiplication.

[Proof of the Minor]: I prove the minor premiss, [namely] that such a thing is numerically one, as follows. Whenever there are two really distinct things that are equally simple, of which neither includes a greater plurality of things intrinsic to it than the other, [then] either (i) each of those things is numerically one, or (ii) neither [of those things is numerically one]. For there is no greater reason that one of them be numerically one than the other. |# Or, if one of them includes a greater plurality [intrinsic to it] than the other, so that they are not equally simple, if the one that includes the greater plurality and is less simple is numerically one, [then] the one that includes the lesser plurality intrinsic to it and is more simple will be numerically one #|. But a universal and a singular thing, according to you [who hold this view], are two really distinct and equally simple things, |# or the universal thing is more simple #|. Nor does the universal thing include a greater plurality of things intrinsic to it than the singular thing. Hence if the singular thing is numerically one, the universal thing will be numerically one.

[Proof of the First Part of the Minor]: The first part of the minor premiss of the syllogism, |# namely that the universal and the singular

thing are two really distinct things, #| is granted by the view.

[Proof of the Second Part of the Minor]: The second part, |# namely that the universal thing does not include a greater plurality of things [intrinsic to it] than the singular thing, #| I prove as follows. If the universal thing includes a greater plurality of things intrinsic to it, then it includes either (i) a greater plurality of universal things, or (ii) [a greater plurality] of singular things. [With regard to (i)]: [it does not include a greater plurality] of universal things, since I take one of those universal things |# that is included [in it], and I ask: #| either it includes a greater plurality than the singular thing, or not. If it does, I ask [the same question] about one of those [things] included [in it] as before. And so it will be established that some universal thing does not include a greater plurality of things than the singular thing, or there will be an infinite regress. [With regard to (ii)]: if it does not, then that universal thing that does not include a greater plurality of things will be just as numerically one as the singular thing, and, consequently, by the same argument, any other universal thing will be numerically one. Nor can it include a greater plurality of singular things, since then it would only be distinguished from singular things as the whole [is distinguished] from a part—which is impossible even according to those [philosophers who hold this view], since according to them the singular essentially includes the universal itself and something more, and, consequently, the singular is the whole and the universal the part, according to them. Similarly, what is to be proved follows from this, since if any given part were numerically one, the whole will be numerically one.

[Confirmation of the First Argument]: The [first argument against Burleigh's view] is confirmed [as follows]. According to those [philosophers who hold this view], anything included in the universal is included in anything contained *per se* under that universal. Hence anything included essentially in man is included essentially in Socrates, since anything pertaining to the essence of man pertains to the essence of Socrates. Hence the universal never includes a greater plurality of |# universal or singular #| things than the singular, and, consequently, [the universal] is equally as simple [as the singular]. And, consequently, [the universal] is numerically one if the singular be numerically one.

[Objections and Replies to the First Argument Against Burleigh's View]

[First Objection]: If it were stated that [the universal] includes many things, yet it does not [include them] insofar as they are intrinsic to it—

[Reply to the First Objection]: Against [this first objection, I reply as follows]. An inclusion or containment of this sort does not exclude numerical

unity. For, indeed, God and matter and any given cause contain many really distinct things in this way, and yet any such thing, [namely God or matter or any cause], is numerically one.

[Second Objection]: If it were stated that the universal thing is really able to be shared by many and is really in many, but it is not in this way a singular, and hence although it does not intrinsically include a greater plurality of things nevertheless it is not numerically one like the singular—

[Reply to the Second Objection]: Against this [second objection], I ask: how is [the universal] able to be shared by many and how is it in many? Either *(i)* through an identity with many, and through its real multiplication beyond the multiplication of those things in which it is; or *(ii)* [the universal], in itself neither multiplied nor varied, is shared by many and is in these [things] from which it always remains really distinct. [Let us consider each case in turn.]

[With regard to *(i)* in the reply to the second objection to the first argument against Burleigh's view]: if *(i)* [were said to be the case], [namely that the universal is able to be shared by many and is in many through an identity with many, and through its real multiplication beyond the multiplication of those things in which it is], then [there are the following objections].

- (a)* [The universal] is not distinct from singulars but expresses singular things themselves, if it is shared by them through identity.
- (b)* Likewise, there is a contradiction in terms here [in the claim] that [the universal] would be shared by them through an identity, since this is the same as saying that the very things themselves are shared by themselves.
- (c)* Likewise, if they are multiplied beyond the multiplication of individuals, then there really would be as many universals as singulars, and so none of them would be universal.
- (d)* Also, the [philosophers who hold this view] assert the opposite of this in saying that [the universal] is simply another thing, not varied in itself, yet really existing in many.

[With regard to *(ii)* in the reply to the second objection to the first argument against Burleigh's view]: if *(ii)* were said [to be the case], [≠ namely that [the universal], in itself neither varied nor multiplied, is shared by many and remains really distinct from them, ≠] such shareability or existence in many does not exclude numerical unity, [for the following four reasons].

- (a)* Because matter, which is numerically one, is in really diverse [things] successively. Nor is [matter] more numerically one for existing in diverse [things] successively than if it were to have existed in the same [things] simultaneously without [any] variation of it.

- (b) Because if the same form were simultaneously to have perfected many matters, [that form] would have been no less numerically one.
- (c) Because, according to the fiction of the Commentator [*In De an.* 3 com. 5 (Crawford 387–413).], even though the possible intellect is in many men, it is nonetheless numerically one, since it is really distinguished from any of them. Nor is [the possible intellect] multiplied in itself, even though the men to whom [the possible intellect] is united are multiplied. Hence, in the same way, although that common man, which is assumed to be really distinct, is in many singular men, from any one of which it is really distinguished, nevertheless if it were not multiplied in itself but only the singular men in which it is were multiplied, it will simply be numerically one.
- (d) Because the divine essence, although it is shared by the distinct supposits also through identity, still, since it is not multiplied in itself but only the supposits by which it is shared are multiplied, it is numerically one. Hence so much the more if that common man were shared by many such that it is in many [men], from any one of which it is really distinguished, if it nevertheless were not multiplied in itself, but only the singular men in whom it is were multiplied, it will simply be numerically one.

[Confirmation of the Reply to the Second Objection]: That argument is confirmed [as follows]. Any thing making a number along with another thing, such that it would be true to say that they are ‘many things,’ will either be numerically one thing or numerically many things. For it is impossible to have two things or three things unless there were many [things], any given [one] of which would be numerically one. But according to you [who hold this view], a singular thing and a universal thing are many things and several [things]. Hence a universal thing is either numerically one thing or numerically many things. And whichever [alternative] be granted, what was to be proved is established.

[Third Objection]: If it were stated that the major premiss [of the first argument against Burleigh’s view], [namely “there is no thing that is numerically one—neither varied nor multiplied—in many supposits or sensible singulars, nor even in any given created individuals taken together simultaneously”], is not true in every case, since the numerically one (like number [in general]) is not found in all things but only in continuous [things]—

[Reply to the Third Objection]: Against [this third objection, I reply as follows]. That response concedes what was to be proved, since then it can truly and strictly be stated in its own way that the universal thing is numerically one—just as the divine essence is numerically one, and just as

the possible intellect that is dreamed up by the Commentator is numerically one, and just as any given angel is numerically one, and [just as] the intellective soul (according to the truth of the matter) is numerically one. And so, consequently, since every thing that is numerically one is genuinely a singular thing, the universal thing will genuinely be a singular thing.

[Confirmation of the Reply to the Third Objection]: The entire preceding argument is confirmed as follows. Every thing making a number along with another really distinct thing is numerically one thing or numerically many things. But a universal thing of this sort, if it were posited, genuinely makes a number along with a singular thing. Hence [the universal] is [either] (i) numerically one thing, or (ii) numerically many things. But [the universal] is not numerically many things, since then it would be many singulars. For according to those [philosophers who hold this view] (and in truth) every thing that is numerically one is singular, and so numerically many things are many singulars. But no universal thing is many singulars, according to those who [philosophers who hold this view], since according to them it is really distinguished from all singulars. Hence [the universal] is numerically one.

[Proof of the Major of the Confirmation of the Reply to the Third Objection]: The major [premiss] of that argument, [namely “every thing making a number along with another really distinct thing is numerically one thing or numerically many things”], is clear, since all things making a number are numbered, and consequently any of them is one in number.

[Proof of the Minor of the Confirmation of the Reply to the Third Objection]: The minor premiss, [namely “a universal thing genuinely makes a number along with a singular thing”], is also clear. For, according to those [philosophers who hold this view], the singular thing and the universal thing are many really distinct things, just as Socrates and the universal that ‘man’ signifies are many things. And they are not infinitely [many]. Hence they are finitely [many]. Hence they are two, or three, or four, or [many] in some definite number. And it is certain that they can only be said to be two (it is clear inductively). Hence [Socrates and the universal man] are only two things. Hence they will genuinely be this pair, just as this man and this angel make a pair. Hence each of those things (indicating here that universal thing and that singular thing) genuinely is numerically one, just as this man, as much as that angel, is numerically one.

|# [Confirmation of the Proof of the Minor of the Confirmation of the Reply to the Third Objection]: Again, this is confirmed [as follows]. Two universals, namely the universal **man** and the universal **angel**, are two things that are really distinct of themselves or by some [things] intrinsic to them.

And they are not more than two. Hence each of them is genuinely one and not many. And, in consequence, each of them is numerically one.

[General Confirmation of the Reply to the Third Objection]: All the aforementioned [arguments] are confirmed [as follows]. I ask for the significante of the phrase ‘numerically one’. And it is necessary to say that [‘numerically one’] either (*i*) signifies that which is one and not many, and then what was to be proved is established, since then any given universal thing is one and not many; or (*ii*) signifies that which is one and not many and not in many, and then the understanding, no matter how much it be one and not many, nevertheless if it were in many would not be numerically one; and, likewise, the divine essence, since it is in many, would not be numerically one; and in the same way, if this form were in many composites through divine power, it would not be numerically one,—all of which are false. Alternatively, it is necessary to say that [‘numerically one’] signifies that which is one continuous [object] and not many continuous [objects], and then an angel would not be numerically one, nor the divine essence, nor any intellectual soul, nor any simple thing—which are absurd claims. And so, on the basis of all the aforementioned points, it is clearly obvious that if there were such a universal thing, it will genuinely be numerically one, just as an angel or a soul or any non-continuous thing [is numerically one]. #|

[Second Argument]

Secondly, I argue as follows: Every thing prior to some other thing that is really distinct from it can exist without it. But according to you [who hold this view], that [universal thing] is prior and is really distinct. Hence it can exist without the singular thing.

I argue in another way as follows. When some thing that is really distinct from other things can exist without any given one [of them] taken separately (and this by nature), and it does not essentially depend on any of them, then it can exist without each of them taken together (and this by means of divine power). But according to those [philosophers who hold this view], that universal thing that is signified by ‘man’ can really exist without any given singular man. Hence that universal thing could exist without any singular thing by means of divine power.

(The [alternative] argument, and that proposition on which it is based, will be clarified in [Ord. 1 d. 9 q. 3]).

[Confirmation]: That [second] argument is confirmed [as follows]. The individual adds something beyond the nature, according to those [philosophers who hold this view]. And this makes something *per se* one along with that universal thing—since if it did not, then it would be something

that would be neither substance nor accident. Hence it does not seem to involve a contradiction that what is added be conserved by God without any universal nature advening, which seems absurd.

[Third Argument]

Thirdly, as follows: An individual belonging to some species can be newly created, no matter how many other individuals belonging to the same species previously created or produced remain. But creation is simply from nothing, such that nothing essential and intrinsic to the thing precedes it in real being. Hence no thing that is not varied, existing previously in any given individual, pertains to the essence of that newly created individual. For, if there were, then something essential would have preceded that thing, and consequently it would not have been created. Hence there is no universal thing that pertains to the essence of those individuals, since if there were, that [thing] would have existed before every individual after the first one produced, and consequently all [individuals] produced after the first one has been produced would not be created, since they would not be from nothing.

[Fourth Argument]

Besides, any singular thing can be annihilated without the annihilation or destruction of another singular thing on which it does not depend in any way. Hence this man can be annihilated by God even though no other man is annihilated or destroyed. But in a case of annihilation, nothing intrinsic to the thing remains, neither in itself nor in anything in real being. Hence there is not any such thing that is common to each [of the two things], since then that [common thing] would have been annihilated. Consequently, no other man would remain according to his own entire essence. And thus any given man would at least be corrupted, since when any given part is annihilated the whole is destroyed.

[Objection to the Third and Fourth Arguments]: If someone were to raise the quibble against these arguments that something is created or annihilated when anything in it that is numerically one in it is created or annihilated, yet it is not necessary that the nature that is common to it and to others should at that point be created or annihilated—

[Reply]: On the contrary: Creation is simply from nothing, such that nothing that is intrinsic or essential to the thing precedes [the creation]. Likewise, nothing [which is intrinsic or essential to the thing] remains in the case of annihilation. Hence if something that is essential to a creatable and annihilable thing were to precede [it] or remain [after it], [the thing] will neither be created nor annihilated.

[First Confirmation of the Reply]: This [reply] is confirmed [as follows].

That universal thing is as essential to the individual as any given particular thing [is essential to it]. For, according to those [philosophers who hold this view], Socrates is just as essentially a man as he has this matter and this form. Hence, just as Socrates can be annihilated or created only if this matter as well as this form be created or annihilated, so too Socrates will only be able to be created or annihilated if this thing which is essential to him [either] beforehand be [simply] nothing or afterwards be simply nothing.

[Second Confirmation of the Reply]: Likewise, that common nature is more essential and intrinsic to the individual than any given matter or potency of matter for material form. But if a material form were produced in prime matter and with regard to the potency of matter, [the individual] is not created—or, if the matter or the potency of matter were to remain, [the individual] would not be annihilated, according to those [philosophers who hold this view]. Hence so much the more, if this [universal] thing that is intrinsic to the individual were to precede [it] or follow [it], is [the individual] not created or not annihilated.

[Third Confirmation of the Reply]: Likewise, I could with the same ease say that the thing will be able to be created if that which has been added to the nature beforehand were not a pure nothing, while nevertheless the nature itself beforehand were a pure nothing, since each is essential to it.

[Fifth Argument]

Fifthly, I argue as follows: Either that universal or common **man** pertains to the essence of Socrates, or it does not. If it does not, then it is certain, according to those [philosophers who hold this view], that Socrates does not pertain to the essence of that common man, since then that common man would not remain without Socrates, which they deny. Hence [Socrates and that common man] are two [things], neither of which pertains to the essence of the other. Then I ask: do [Socrates and that common man] produce something that is one *per se*? And if they do, then Socrates is not an individual, but rather will be a part of something that is one *per se*. Likewise, then [Socrates] would no more essentially be man than matter is the form with which it makes [something] that is one *per se*. [On the other hand], if [Socrates and that common man] do not make [something] that is one *per se*, and one is not an accident of the other, then each will be a subsistent *per se*. And thus a Platonic Idea will exist, and it will be a subsistent that is one *per se*, yet coexisting with many. And many other absurdities follow—which nobody of sound mind would accept—if that universal thing does not pertain to the essence of Socrates, nor along with some [added factor] produces [something] that is one *per se*.

[Objection]: If it were stated that the universal thing pertains to the essence of Socrates, and it is not the whole essence of Socrates (since then it would not be a thing other than Socrates), and so it is an essential part of Socrates—

[Reply]: Many absurdities follow from this [objection]:

[First Absurd Consequence]: Socrates would then no more be a singular thing than a universal [thing], since the whole is no more denominated from one of its essential parts than from another—just as the composite is no more said to be the form than the matter, nor conversely, although the form is the more principal part.

[Second Absurd Consequence]: A singular thing would then genuinely be the matter of the universal thing and the universal thing would be the form, or conversely. For either that added singular thing and the universal are either (*i*) of the same ratio, or (*ii*) they are of different [*rationes*]. [With regard to (*i*): they are not of the same [ratio], for then one would be no more universal than the other. [With regard to (*ii*): if they are of different [*rationes*], then all those [things] that are of differing *rationes*, if they make [something] that is *per se* one, are related as form and matter. Hence the universal and the singular thing are related as form and matter.

[Objection]: If it were asserted that this is true only when each of those things is singular—

[Reply]: This [objection] does not work. For I could say with the same ease that when each of the things is singular it is not necessary that they are related such that one is matter and the other form.

[Third Absurd Consequence]: Third, it follows that any given accident would be genuinely and really composed out of diverse things that are really distinct, namely out of the universal nature of this kind and out of something added to it. And in every case it would follow that there would be as many really distinct things in any given singular as there are universals univocally predicable of the same [singular]. |# Again, Socrates would then be of a different *ratio* from Plato, since those [factors] added to the universals would be of diverse *rationes*. #|

[Sixth Argument]

Sixthly, I argue as follows: Every thing outside the soul in the genus Substance is receptive of contraries. Hence if there were some universal **substance**, it will genuinely be receptive of contraries. But no universal is receptive of contraries. Therefore, no such universal is a real thing in the genus Substance.

[Proof of the Antecedent]: The antecedent, [namely “every thing outside the soul in the genus Substance is receptive of contraries”], is clear

from the Philosopher saying that this is strictly proper to substance (*Cat.* 5 [4^b17–18]).

[Proof of the Second Part of the Minor]: Moreover, I prove that no such [universal] is receptive of contraries, for then, just as individual contraries can be in diverse individuals in the same specialissima, so too those common contraries would be in the same universal together—which is impossible.

[Proof of the Consequence in the Proof of the Second Part of the Minor]: The consequence—[namely “Just as individual contraries can be in diverse individuals in the same specialissima, so too those common contraries would be in the same universal together”]—is clear. For those individual contraries cannot exist unless their common universals were to exist. Hence it is necessary that those common contraries be in something that is primarily receptive [of them]. But [those common contraries] do not exist primarily in some singular, nor in some singulars. Hence they exist primarily in some universal or in some universals. But it is not necessary that they be together in some universals, since it is possible that those singulars in which they exist be singular accidents belonging to the same specialissima. For example, this intellective soul has knowledge with regard to some conclusion, and another intellective soul is in error regarding the same conclusion. Then knowledge in general, which precisely regards this conclusion, and error in general, which is contrary to [knowledge in general], do not exist subjectively in diverse universals in respect of these intellective souls. Hence they will exist subjectively in the same universal. Consequently, some contraries exist together in the same subject primarily.

[First Confirmation]: The [sixth argument] is confirmed [as follows]. According to those [philosophers who hold this view], contrareity is found primarily among universals, and so too incompatibility and opposition. Hence contrary universals will not in any way be able to exist in the same subject primarily, |# which would nevertheless follow if the aforementioned view were true #|.

[Second Confirmation]: Likewise, it would follow that the universal thing would be primarily and *per se* changeable, since that which primarily and *per se* receives some thing subjectively is genuinely changed. But according to the view [under discussion], it is necessary to hold that the universal nature receives primarily and *per se* a universal accident, which is its primary subject. Hence it is primarily changed. The consequent is false, since—according to everyone—acts, operations, and changes are primarily characteristic of singulars, and not of universals.

[Third Confirmation]: |# Likewise, then the same thing would be si-

multaneously in diverse places #|. ¹

[Fourth Confirmation]: Likewise, there would follow a certain absurdity in theology, [namely] that something intrinsic and essential to Christ would be damned and miserable, by the misery that belongs to fault as well as by the misery that belongs to punishment. For that nature that is common to Christ and to other men is informed both by blessedness in common and misery in common, [misery] belonging to fault as well as [misery] belonging to punishment.

(Many other absurdities follow upon that view [under discussion], [absurdities] that—as with those given above, for all their irrationality and absurdity—would not be adduced against [the view] but for the reason that it was the view of many [philosophers], and still perhaps is held by many [philosophers].)

[First Confirmation of the Fourth Confirmation]: The [fourth confirmation] is confirmed [as follows]. When in some [whole] there are two really distinct [things] that are informed by contraries, that whole is no more denominated by one of those contraries than by the rest. Hence if the universal **human nature**, belonging to the essence of Christ, is informed by the misery belonging to fault as well as [by the misery] belonging to punishment—and it is certain that something that pertains to the essence of Christ is informed by blessedness—then Christ will no more be formally denominated ‘blessed’ than ‘miserable’, which is absurd.

[Second Confirmation of the Fourth Confirmation]: The [fourth confirmation] is confirmed [as follows]. Anything essential in Christ is united with the divine Word. But nothing united with the divine Word is damned or miserable. Hence there is no such universal nature that is receptive of contraries, *e. g.* [receptive] of blessedness and misery, in Christ.

[Objection to the Sixth Argument]: If you [who hold this view] were to say that it is not the Philosopher’s intent that every substance is receptive of contraries, but rather that only primary substance [is receptive of contraries]—

[Reply]: On the contrary, just as there are universals of substances,

¹ This later addition by Ockham seems to be wrongly placed. It is omitted entirely in A, and it is a marginal comment in F. The critical edition, following the lead of the other manuscripts, inserts it at the very top of 121, right before the proposition beginning “Many absurdities. . .” But the paragraph following this begins “That last [point] is confirmed. . .” (*confirmatur istud ultimum*), which can only refer to the theological absurdity, and not to the later addition or to the general remark about many absurdities. Therefore, I have inserted the later addition before the theological absurdity.

so too are there universals of accidents. Hence whiteness or blackness in common exist in some subject primarily, or in some [subjects primarily]. But they do not exist primarily in singulars. Hence they exist primarily in universals. Therefore, etc.

The assumption is clear, since just as a singular accident is [related] to a singular subject, so too a common accident is [related] to a common subject. Hence just as a singular accident is in a singular subject, so too a common [accident] is in a common [subject]. Consequently, if a singular were receptive of contraries, the specialissima will be receptive of contraries.

[Ockham's Response to the Initial Question]

Therefore, I respond to the question in another way: that no thing that is really distinct from singular things and intrinsic to them is universal or common to them, since such a thing would only have had to be postulated [either] (*i*) for preserving the essential predication of one [thing] of another, or (*ii*) for preserving the knowledge of things, and (*iii*) [for preserving] the definitions of things—which are the reasons Aristotle suggests for Plato's view [*Met.* 12.4 1078^b27–34].

[Rejection of (*i*):] Now (*i*) does not work, since by the very fact that [the universal] is held to be intrinsic to the thing and really distinct from the singular thing, it must be a part of the thing. But a part cannot be predicated essentially of the thing [as a whole], just as neither matter nor form is predicated essentially of the composite. Hence if [something] is predicated essentially of a thing, it must not supposit for itself, but rather for a singular thing. But supposition of this kind can be preserved by holding that something that is not the whole thing, nor part of the thing, be predicated. Hence, for preserving predication of this sort, it is not necessary to hold that what is predicated is another thing and yet intrinsic to the thing.

For example, that the predication:

Man is an animal

or [the predication]:

Socrates is an animal

be essential *per se primo modo* and *in quid*, can be preserved by holding that what is predicated is neither really the subject nor part of the subject—just as well as [it can be preserved] by holding that what is predicated be an essential part of the subject. For if it were held that what is predicated be an essential part of the subject, I ask: what is denoted by the proposition? Either (*a*) [it is denoted] that the subject essentially be the very thing that is predicated—and this is impossible, since the whole is never essentially

nor really its part. Or, (*b*) it is denoted that that which is genuinely a man is something that is genuinely an animal, that is to say, that that for which ‘man’ supposit is the same as that for which ‘animal’ supposit, howsoever much the predicate that supposit not be that for which it supposit in that proposition. But all of this can equally well be preserved by holding that the predicate not be the subject, nor part of it, as [it can] by holding that it be part of it. For it is equally possible that something extrinsic to another supposit for it as that a part of it supposit for it. Hence, for preserving that predication, it is not necessary to postulate something predicable and common pertaining to something to be intrinsic to it.

[Confirmation of the Rejection of (*i*): The [rejection of (*i*)] is confirmed [as follows]. In that proposition:

Man is an animal

either (*a*) the terms supposit for themselves, or (*b*) they do not. [With regard to (*a*): if it is the case [that the terms supposit for themselves], then this proposition would be false, since those terms are distinct, nor is the one the other. [With regard to (*b*): if the [terms] do not supposit for themselves, then, both according to the view recited previously and in truth, [they supposit] for things other than themselves. And it can be appropriate for something extrinsic to supposit for something other than itself, just as much as [for something] intrinsic. Hence [it is not necessary to postulate something predicable and common pertaining to something to be intrinsic to it].

[Rejection of (*ii*): Nor is it necessary to postulate [something predicable and common pertaining to something to be intrinsic to it] due to (*ii*), for the same [reason]. It is sufficient for having real knowledge to have propositions that are *per se primo modo* and *secundo modo*. And these [propositions] can be had without another thing of this sort—as will be established in answering some arguments, and as has been proved in the previous argument. Hence [it is not necessary to postulate something predicable and common pertaining to something to be intrinsic to it].

[Rejection of (*iii*): Nor is it necessary to posit such a [universal] thing due to (*iii*), for the same [reason], as will be clear shortly.

[Five Persuasive Arguments]

This point can be argued for persuasively by means of some logical arguments [as follows].

[First Persuasive Argument]

First, that which is universally denied of some genus is not a thing *per se* contained under that genus. For example, if this [proposition]:

No animal is *A*

were true, *A* will not be *per se* contained under [the genus] animal. But any given universal is universally denied of a genus of this kind, *e. g.* of the generalissimum Substance. For this [proposition]:

No substance is *A*

is simply true—let *A* be the universal signified by ‘animal’|# or that supposits for that universal #|—and so too for any other [genus]. Hence no universal is some thing really contained under the genus Substance.

[Proof of the Major]: The major premiss is clear, since a genus is truly predicated of everything contained *per se* under that genus.

[Proof of the Minor]: The minor premiss is clear [as follows]. I take the thing that is brought in by ‘animal’ (according to you [who hold this view]), and let it be *A*. Then this [proposition]:

No substance is *A*

is true. For no incorporeal substance is *A*, [and] likewise no corporeal substance is *A*. The last [claim] is clear, since no inanimate body is *A*, and likewise no animate body is *A*. The last [claim] is true, since no animate insensible body is *A*, and likewise no animate sensible body is *A*. The last [claim] is true, since no man is *A*, no ass is *A*, and so on for all species contained under [the genus] animate sensible body, and hence no sensible body is *A*. This argument—[*i. e.* the proof of the minor premiss]—holds through that rule [given by] the Philosopher (*Top.* 2.4 [111^a33–34]):

Whatever any given species belonging to some genus is denied of, that genus is denied of the same.

Hence if this [proposition]:

No substance is *A*

were true, *A* is not *per se* a thing that is contained under that generalissimum.

[Second Persuasive Argument]

Besides, there is an acceptable consequence from what is lower *per se* to what is higher,|# namely when the higher and the lower supposit for the things contained [under themselves], although [the consequence] does not follow when they supposit for themselves. #| Therefore, [the consequence]:

Man is a species; hence animal is a species

follows. And so I ask: how does ‘animal’ supposit [in the consequent]? Either (*a*) [the term ‘animal’ supposits] personally, and then this [consequent] is false, even according to those [philosophers who hold this view], since no animal is a species. Or, (*b*) [the term ‘animal’ supposits] simply, and then [the consequent] is false, since then ‘animal’ supposits for a common thing (according to those [philosophers who hold this view]) as for itself, and that

common thing is not a specialissima but a genus.

[Third Persuasive Argument]

Besides, the [consequence]:

Every animal is corruptible *per se* and generable *per se*; hence this thing (indicating the universal thing brought in by ‘man’) is *per se* corruptible. follows. And [the consequence follows] in the same way for all of the most specific universals contained under animal. [But] the consequent is false. Therefore, the antecedent [must be false]. And, consequently, [the proposition]:

Every animal is *per se* corruptible would be false. Yet nobody denies this [proposition]. For this [proposition]:

Every body is mobile would have to be denied for the same reason. And, consequently, [this proposition]:

Every man is *per se* risible [would have to be denied], and every proposition in which an attribute (*passio*) is predicated of its subject with the mark of perseity would in every case be false—which is absurd.

[Proof of the First Consequence]: The first consequence—[namely “Every animal is corruptible *per se* and generable *per se*; hence this thing (indicating the universal thing brought in by ‘man’) is *per se* corruptible”]—is clear. For there is an acceptable consequence from what is higher, as distributed, to anything *per se* lower, |# which is a thing contained under it #|.

[Objection]: If it were objected that what is higher is not distributed over all *per se* lower [items], but only over singulars and not over universals—

[Reply]: Against this, [I say] that anything higher is distributed over those [elements] to which it is more immediately related. Hence, since according to you [who hold this view] those universals are more immediate to what is higher [than are the singulars], [the higher term] will be primarily distributed over them.

[Fourth Persuasive Argument]

Besides, the genus is univocally predicated of the universal thing and the singular thing—since if not, [the genus] is predicated of them equivocally, which the [philosophers who hold this view] deny. Hence [the genus] is equally distributed over one thing and over others. For there is no reason to say that it is distributed over one thing *per se* contained under [it] and not over others; indeed, I might with the same ease say that it is distributed precisely over universal things as much as [it is distributed] over

those [items] that are immediately contained under the genus, and not over singulars. Likewise, for whatever reason one universal is not distributed over such contained [items], neither is another. Hence a being (*ens*) is not distributed over other universals but only over singulars. Consequently, this [proposition]:

Some being is universal
would be literally false—which is denied [by those philosophers who hold this view].

[Fifth Persuasive Argument]

If this [proposition]:

The specialissima is a substance

were true, ‘substance’ supposits either (*a*) simply, or (*b*) personally. [With regard to (*a*): if [‘substance’ supposits] simply, then this [proposition] will be false, since then the specialissima would be a generalissimum. [With regard to (*b*): if [‘substance’ supposits] personally, [the proposition] will still be false, since then it supposits for its supposits and for singulars, and consequently the specialissima would be something singular.

Hence I say that there is no such thing that is universal and intrinsic to those [things] to which it is common.

[Replies to the Arguments for Burleigh’s View]

[Reply to the First Argument]

When it is accepted [by the argument] that “definition is primarily of substance,” I say that for definition to be of something ‘primarily’ can be understood in two ways, [as follows].

(A) That [the definition] be of that of which the definition is primarily and adequately predicated, such that what is defined and the definition convert.

According to (A), definition is not primarily of substance, since a definition of this sort is primarily and adequately predicated of no substance. Rather, according to (A), definition is primarily of some one term that is convertible with the definition, although the term is not really the definition. (What that term is will be stated later, [in *Ord.* 1 d. 2 q. 8]).

That a definition is of something ‘primarily’ can be understood in another way, namely:

(B) There is something whose parts are primarily expressed by such a definition.

And this [second way in which a definition is of something ‘primarily’] can be understood in two ways, since, like any superlative, ‘primarily’ can

be taken [either]:

(B₁) positively

or

(B₂) negatively

[With regard to (B₁): if [‘primarily’ is taken positively], I still say that definition is of nothing primarily, since nothing is primarily definable. For there is nothing whose parts should be expressed, except the singular, and the parts of one singular are not expressed through a definition before [the parts of] another [singular are expressed by the same definition]. [With regard to (B₂): [if ‘primarily’ is taken negatively], I say that definition is primarily of substance, since the parts of substance are primarily expressed through the definition.

When it is stated [in the first argument for Burleigh’s view] that “definition is not primarily of the singular substance,” I say that this is true according to (A), since the definition is primarily and adequately predicated of no singular substance.

Nevertheless, according to (B₂), I say that definition is primarily of the singular substance, since the parts of [the singular substance] are primarily expressed by a definition, and such a definition is not truly predicated of some other supposit *per se*.

An example [of (A)]: *rational animal* is a definition. This definition is primarily of the term ‘man,’ since it is primarily and adequately predicated of that term. For it is predicated of nothing but what the term ‘man’ is predicated of. The definition, if it should supposit personally, is truly predicated of everything of which the term ‘man,’ when [‘man’] has personal supposition, is predicated. Hence the definition and what is defined convert, since for some [terms] to be convertible is for whatever the one is predicated of so too the other is [predicated of], and conversely—if they were to supposit personally, [that is], because, in the case of convertible [terms], it is always necessary that something be predicated of the one [of the pair] suppositing otherwise than personally that is not predicated of the other, and conversely. For example, ‘man’ and ‘risible’ convert, and yet risible is an attribute of man and man is not an attribute of man. According to (A), then, this definition *rational animal* is primarily of the term ‘man,’ whose parts, nevertheless, are not expressed through the definition.

According to (B₁), this definition is primarily of nothing, because only the parts of Socrates and Plato are expressed through the definition. For just as nothing is a rational animal except Socrates and Plato (and so on for the other singular [men]), so too are the parts of nothing else expressed by the definition, and yet the parts of Socrates are not expressed before

[the parts] of Plato [are expressed], nor conversely. Hence the parts of none [of the men] are primarily expressed, namely such that the parts of one are expressed before the parts of any other.

According to (B₂), the parts of Socrates are primarily expressed by the definition, and likewise the parts of Plato [are primarily expressed by the definition], since the parts of nothing else are expressed as primary. And so, understanding ‘what is defined as primary’ in this way, I say that Socrates is what is defined as primary, and likewise Plato [is what is defined as primary], and so on for any given man. For this definition is truly predicated of anything that is such. Nor is [the definition] truly predicated of anything else that supposits for itself, but [it is predicated] only of those [terms] that supposit for singular men. Accordingly, if ‘man’ in the proposition:

Man is a rational animal

were to have supposited for something other than a singular man, that [proposition] would have been simply false. And thus nothing is imaginable as a rational animal except this man or that [man], and so on for the rest. Consequently, for the same reason, the real parts of nothing else are expressed through that definition save the parts of this man and that one, and so on for the other singular [men].

[Three Objections to the Reply to the First Argument]

[First Objection]: The definition and what is defined are the same thing. But the term ‘man’ is not the same thing as that definition. Hence that term is not defined primarily.

[Second Objection]: Besides, the parts of no singular are expressed primarily through the definition, since the definition is the principle of perfectly knowing that of which the parts are primarily expressed through the definition. But the parts of no singular are perfectly known through the definition, since the [parts] of one [are known] no more than [the parts] of another, and thus either [the parts] of none or [the parts] of any given [singular are perfectly known through the definition]. But it is certain that it is not [the parts] of any given [singular]. Hence [the parts] of none [are perfectly known through the definition].

[Third Objection]: The Philosopher says that definition is primarily of substance ([*Met.* 7.4 1030^b4–14]), and he says that singular substance is not defined (*Met.* 7.15 1039^b20–1040^a10). But [the Philosopher] does not equivocate. Hence another substance, which is not singular, is defined.

[Replies to the Three Objections]

[Reply to the First Objection]: With regard to the first of these [objections], I say that the definition and what is defined are never the same

thing. For just as they are not the same term, so too they are not the same thing. Still, this point notwithstanding, [the definition and what is defined] supposit for the same thing and precisely for the same thing; nor is some thing signified primarily and principally by one that is not signified by the other; nor is anything extrinsic connoted by either of them. And the authorities understand it in this way, should they say that the definition and what is defined are one thing, namely because they have one significate. The authorities—and also some modern [thinkers]—fully express this intention, although some of them do not point it out, when they frequently say that the definition and what is defined bring in the same thing and that they signify the same thing. Consequently, they are not the same thing, just as neither are two signs or “bringers-in” one significate or what is brought in.

[Reply to the Second Objection]: With regard to the second [objection], I say that the definition is not always the principle of perfectly knowing anything of which it is the definition. For sometimes—as will be established later [in *Ord.* 1 d. 3 q. 5 (478.8–479.7)]—that of which there is a definition can be perfectly known without any definition. But it is quite true that when a definition is had, the parts of something of which [the definition] is the definition can be known to be in that of which it is the definition. For example, once diverse men are known, and are known in their diverse circumstances, eventually this definition *rational animal* is acquired, namely by knowing that every man is a rational animal. When this definition is had by someone, if some man of whom he previously had no notion were presented to him, [then] in virtue of the notion of the aforementioned such definition he knows that that man, whom he did not know in himself except confusedly (since he does not apprehend any given part of him distinctly), has really distinct parts, namely a body and an intellective soul. And he would not know this unless he were to have and know that the stated definition is a definition that is common to all men. Thus the definition in this way leads to a notion—which is somehow distinct—of a singular thing, that [the definition] is of ‘primarily’, according to (B2) above, but only when there co-exists [with the definition] a confused notion of the singular thing. Still, that singular thing is not strictly known distinctly through that definition, but loosely, namely since [the things] predicable of it, which signify distinct parts of the singular thing, are known. But how [they are known] will be stated later.

[Reply to the Third Objection]: With regard to the third [objection], I say that it is not unacceptable for the Philosopher to equivocate in different passages, especially when in one passage he fully expresses that he is equivocating.

Alternatively, as regards the Philosopher's and the Commentator's intent in the different passages in *Met.* 7 ([which are cited in the first argument for Burleigh's view]), it can be said that they would frequently take 'substance' for a name or a term signifying substance. And then I say that definition is primarily of substance, *i. e.* [the definition] is primarily and adequately predicated of a common name or [common] term that precisely brings in a singular substance. And according to (A), as stated, definition is not primarily of the singular substance.

[Replies to the Confirmations of the First Argument]

[Reply to the First Confirmation]: I say that no thing in the genus Substance is definable according to (A), but rather [only] according to (B2). [Furthermore], I say that not any given substance ought to be put into its definition, but rather terms precisely signifying substances ought to be put [into its definition]. And that is the way predicables are called 'substantial,' namely [because] they are predicables that bring in substances alone. The Commentator calls predicables 'substantial' in this fashion in *Met.* 7 com. 11 [Iuntina 8 fol. 76rb], where he says that only

Three predicables are substantial, namely genus, differentia, and definition.

That is: whatever is predicable of substance and only brings in substance is either genus or differentia or definition. Nevertheless, these [predicables]—namely genus, differentia, and definition—are not substances, but are only signs bringing in substances. They are put into the definition, and not the substances brought in by the genus and differentia, because nothing is brought in by the genus animal except only something singular, and yet nothing of the sort is put into the definition.

[Reply to the Second Confirmation]: The same point [holds]. The genus and differentia, which are put into the definition of the species, are not substances but precisely bring in substances, connoting no accident. Nevertheless, they do not pertain to the essence of the species. But it does not follow due to this [fact] that such a definition be through something additional, since a definition is not called 'through something additional' because something is put into that definition that does not pertain to the essence of what is defined, but rather because something is put [into that definition] that brings in and signifies something beyond the essence of what is defined. For instance, the definition 'whiteness is a discernible color of sight' is [a definition] through something additional, since the term 'sight' put here is beyond the whole essence of whiteness and brings in something beyond the whole essence of whiteness. And when it is said [in the second confirmation of the first argument for Burleigh's view] that "substance is only defined

through substances, according to the Philosopher (*Met.* 7.4 [1030^b4–14])”—I say that this [remark] should be understood as follows: that substance is only defined through predicables bringing in precisely substances and not some accident.

[Reply to the Third Confirmation]: I state that the definition is predicated of what is defined according to (A), not for itself, but for what is defined according to (B₂). For in the proposition:

Every man is a rational animal

the subject is what is defined according to (A), and it does not supposit for itself but for singulars, which is what is defined according to (B₂).

[Reply to the Second Argument]

I state that real science is not always about things insofar as it is about those [items] that are immediately known, but rather about other [items] that only supposit for things.

To understand this point—and because many things have previously been and ought to be said for the sake of any [readers] who are untrained in logic—it should be known that any given science, whether it be real or rational, is only about propositions insofar as it is about those [items] that are known, since propositions alone are known.

Furthermore, according to Boethius (*In De int.* [REF]), the proposition has a three-fold being: in the mind, in speech, and in writing. That is to say, some propositions are only concepts and understood, some are spoken, and some are written. Thus, if there were some other signs instituted to signify in the same way as utterances and inscriptions [signify], a proposition would exist in those [new signs], just as there are in these [utterances and inscriptions]. Hence just as the spoken proposition is truly composed out of spoken words, and the written proposition is composed out of written words, so too the proposition that is only conceived is composed out of concepts or understandings (|# or by means of concepts or understandings #|) that belong to the soul. Hence just as every spoken word can be a part of a proposition in speech, so too every understanding can be part of a proposition in the mind—|# according to one view, or [every] concept according to another view #|.

Moreover, just as a spoken word that is part of a spoken proposition can have multiple supposition—namely material and personal and simple [supposition], as is clear in these spoken propositions that are heard by the bodily ears:

(1) Man is a monosyllabic word

in which that word [‘man’] is taken materially, since that word (in that proposition is true) there stands for and supposits for itself; likewise, [in the

proposition]:

(2) A man is running

[the word ‘man’] there stands for [something] personally, because it supposits for men themselves, not for the word [‘man’], since that word is not able to run; furthermore, in that [proposition]:

(3) Man is a species

that word [‘man’] supposits simply for something common—so too a consimilar part of a proposition in the mind [can have multiple supposition]. Putting aside every spoken word, since [the mental proposition] does not belong to any language at all—just as Augustine says in *The Trinity* 15.10.19 that there is some word that does not belong to any language—that part, I say, of such a [mental] proposition can have simple supposition, and then it supposits for something common; or it can have personal supposition, and then it stands for and supposits for the very things that are signified, if it signifies [significaret/significant] things; or it can have material supposition, and then it stands for and supposits for itself.

Due to this fact, I reply to the [second] argument [for Burleigh’s view] that just as the spoken proposition:

Every man is risible

is truly known—for just as it is true so too is it truly known, since every truth can be known; moreover, none but a madman can deny that some spoken propositions are true and some false; who would say that he never heard (by bodily ears) any lie? yet nothing can be heard by the bodily ears except a spoken word, just as nothing can be seen by the bodily eyes except color or light; hence some propositions precisely composed out of spoken words are true, *e. g.* these [propositions]:

Every man is an animal

Every man is risible

Every species is predicated *in quid* of many [things] differing in number

The genus is predicated of many [things] differing in species

and so on for the other [propositions] that can be known—so too the proposition in the mind, which does not belong to any language, is truly known.

Now it is the case that the science of some spoken propositions of this sort is real and [the science] of other [spoken propositions] is rational, and nevertheless the [things] that are known and all their parts are truly spoken words. Still, the parts of some [spoken propositions] supposit and stand not for themselves (namely [for] words), but for real external things (*e. g.* for subjects). Hence science of those [spoken] propositions is called ‘real.’ Furthermore, other parts of other [spoken] propositions stand for the mental concepts themselves; hence science of them can be called ‘rational’

or 'logical.' And the science of these spoken propositions:

Man is a monosyllabic word

and

Animal is a trisyllabic word

can be called 'grammatical.' Still, all such [spoken] propositions and all their parts are spoken words. And they are only said to pertain to different sciences because the parts of different propositions supposit for different [subjects], [namely] because some supposit for things, others for mental concepts, and others for the spoken words themselves.

Hence it is in the same way, proportionately, for propositions in the mind, which truly can be known by us in this life: all the terms of those propositions are only concepts and they are not the external substances themselves. Nevertheless, the terms of some propositions stand and supposit personally, namely for the external things themselves—for example, in such [propositions] as:

Everything mobile is partly in the terminus *a quo* [and partly in the terminus *ad quem*].

Every man is risible.

Every triangle has three [angles equal to two right angles].

and so on for the other [cases]. Hence the science of such propositions is said to be real. However, the terms of other propositions supposit simply, namely for the concepts themselves—for example, in these [propositions]:

Every demonstration is based on primary and true [premisses].

Man is a species.

and so on for the other [cases]. Hence the science of such [propositions] is said to be rational. Hence it is not relevant to real science whether the terms of the proposition that is known are things outside the soul or are only in the soul, so long as they stand and supposit for those external things. Thus for real science it is not necessary to postulate some such universal things that are really distinct from singular things.

Due to this fact, I say to the logical form of the [second] argument that 'science is about things' can be understood in three ways [as follows]:

(*i*) ['Science is about things'] because the thing itself is known.

There is no science of substantial things according to (*i*), especially because nothing but the complex is known. However, the complex is not outside the soul, except perhaps in speech or in a consimilar sign.

(*ii*) ['Science is about things'] because real things are parts of that which is known.

It is not necessary for real science to be about external things according to (*ii*).

(*iii*) [‘Science is about things’] because real things are those [items] for which what is known supposit.

Real science is about things according to (*iii*). But [real science] is not about universal things, since no supposition for them takes place. For in the mental proposition:

Every body is composed out of a singular matter and [a singular] form no supposition for some universal body takes place, since no such body (even if it were to exist) is composed out of a singular matter and a singular form. But science is about singular things according to (*iii*), since the terms supposit for singulars themselves. And the Philosopher does not deny that science is about singulars according to (*iii*), but [he denies that science is about singulars] according to (*ii*), since the terms of the propositions that are known are not singular things but are universals, about which there is science according to (*ii*), for universals are the terms of the propositions that are known. And if he were at times to be found [to say] that science is about universal things, he ought to be understood as [saying] that science is about universals that are predicable of things.

Briefly, then, regarding the Philosopher’s intent, it should be said that real science is not distinguished from rational science in that real science is about things, such that the things themselves are the propositions that are known (or parts of those propositions that are known), and that rational [science] is not about things in this way, but rather [real science is distinguished from rational science] in that the parts, namely the terms of the propositions that are known by real science, stand and supposit for things, whereas the terms of the propositions known by rational science are not this way but those terms stand and supposit for other [items], [namely for concepts or understandings]. Clear examples of the former are:

Every man is risible

All men are capable of learning

and so on for the other [propositions] that are known by real science. [Clear examples] of the latter are:

The genus is predicated *in quid* of [things] differing in species

The most specific species is only predicated of individuals

and so on for the other [propositions that are known by rational science].

[Reply to the Third Argument]

I state that this word ‘man’ does not primarily signify some thing, if the ‘primarily’ be taken positively. However, if it be taken negatively, then I state that [‘man’] signifies some thing primarily, since it signifies primarily any given singular thing of which it is predicated.

[Objection]: If it were objected that then the word [‘man’] would be

an equivocal word, since an equivocal word is that which equally primarily signifies many—

[Reply]: I reply that it happens that some word “[equally] primarily” signifies many in three ways, [as follows].

- (i) [It happens that some word “equally primarily” signifies many”] because it is thus imposed on one as if it were not imposed on another, and it is imposed by two impositions.

For example, this is the case for the name ‘Socrates’ imposed on two men, since the one person imposing this name ‘Socrates’ on this man did not know anything about another man, and in the same way [the other] person imposing [this name ‘Socrates’] on that man did not know anything of this one. A word of this sort is equivocal, and is called ‘equivocal by chance.’

- (ii) It happens that some word “equally primarily” signifies many because it is equally imposed on many, but by one imposition, such that the person imposing [the word] no more intended that it signify this thing more than another [thing].

If nothing further should happen, the word can be called equivocal—yet not [equivocal] by chance, but in some way [equivocal] by design. For example, if someone were to impose this name ‘Peter’ on precisely these three men, and does this by one imposition (|# which nevertheless is equivalent to many impositions #|), then this name [‘Peter’] is not equivocal by chance. Nor is it strictly univocal, since to any given univocal word there corresponds one concept that is convertible with it. However, there is no concept that is convertible with this word [‘Peter’], since either (a) the ultimate concept is either specific, and consequently common to all individuals of the same *ratio*; or (b) [the ultimate concept] is a concept proper to some individual, and consequently there is no middle that is precisely common to these [three] individuals and not to others. Thus the word [‘Peter’] is not strictly univocal but rather equivocal, and this by design, and this because it is imposed on these [three men] together in virtue of a certain deliberation.

- (iii) It happens that some word “equally primarily” signifies many because it is imposed by one imposition on all those [things] to which a determinate concept, possessed by the person imposing [the word], is common, such that they would be (as it were) ordained as signs—not that the word would primarily signify that concept, but because it is imposed for signifying primarily and precisely all that of which the concept is predicated, such that if the concept were predicated of some at one time and others at another time, the word varies its significates

in the same way.

A word of this kind, equally primarily signifying many according to (iii), is simply univocal. The word ‘man’ is of this kind. Hence [‘man’] is simply univocal. For the person imposing this word ‘man’ intended that it signify every thing of which the determinate mental concept is predicated, such that when this concept is predicated of a thing that the word signify it, and when not, not.

[Reply to the Fourth Argument]

I state that (|# according to one view #|) the intellect, understanding man [but] not understanding some singular man, does not understand one thing of the genus Substance, but only understands a certain mental concept. What that concept is will be stated later, [in *Ord.* 1 d. 2 q. 8]. [# But according to another view any given singular man is genuinely understood, not by a proper or equivalent cognition but only by a common [cognition] #].

[Reply to the Fifth Argument]

I state that for something to be the “adequate object of some potency” can be understood in two ways, [as follows].

- (i) [Something can be said to be the “adequate object of some potency”] because it is something apprehensible by the potency primarily, such that nothing is apprehended by the potency except under that *ratio*. Now according to (i), I state that nothing is the adequate object of some potency—and especially of a sensitive [potency], since this color is equally primarily apprehended by sight as that [color], and nothing is apprehended before this color or that one, and so on for the other sensitive potencies.
- (ii) Something can be said to be the “adequate object of some potency” not literally, but in that it is equivalent to one designated² act, which will be this: “there is something of which being an object of such a potency or being apprehensible by such a potency is primarily and adequately predicated.”

According to (ii), there is some adequate object for any given sensitive potency. For there is something of which being the object of such a potency is adequately and primarily predicated. Nevertheless, the truth of the matter is that it is not an object of such a potency, nor can it be apprehended—neither *per se* nor *per accidens*—by such a potency.

For example, what is common—[for example] color—is that of which apprehensible by the power of sight is primarily and adequately predicated.

² Reading *signato* for *significato*.

For what is common, namely color, is predicated of all that which is apprehensible by the power of sight, and of only such—and this according to the view that holds that light is not apprehended *per se* (whether this view be true or false is irrelevant to the matter at hand). Nevertheless, what is common, [namely] color, can be apprehended by the power of sight neither *per se* nor *per accidens*, since the power of sight is only able to apprehend the singular thing, or at least [the power of sight] is not able to apprehend the genus.

[Reply to the Proof of the Major]: When it is claimed that “nothing is the adequate object of a sensitive potency except a genuine thing,” it should be said that this claim is literally true. Nevertheless, in that [the claim] is equivalent to this designated act: “being the object of a sensitive potency is predicated of nothing but a genuine thing” (|# namely [a thing] that is outside the soul #|), [the claim] is simply false. For being the object of the power of sight is predicated of what is common, color, by saying “every color is visible.” Still, what is common is not a genuine thing |# outside the soul #|. The reason is because being the object of the power of sight is not predicated of what is common for itself but rather for what falls under it. Hence, in a proposition of this kind, [what is common] has personal and not simple supposition. Indeed, the [proposition]:

Color is visible

is true only for a singular color.

[Reply to the Sixth Argument]

I state that ‘real attribute’ is taken in two ways:

- (i) [‘Real attribute’ is taken] for something that is a genuine thing and an accident of another thing.
- (ii) [‘Real attribute’] is strictly called a real attribute—that is, it is strictly called an ‘attribute’ because it is predicable *per se secundo modo*, and it is called ‘real’ because it is an attribute bringing in a genuine thing outside the soul, yet it is not [itself] a thing outside the soul.

With regard to (i): I state that the subject of a real attribute is a genuine thing, and a genuine singular thing. And in this way, an attribute is no more predicated of many than is its subject (which is a singular thing).

With regard to (ii): the subject of a real attribute is not a thing outside the soul but a certain mental concept suppositing for things outside the soul. For example, in this proposition:

Every man is risible

it is clear that the subject is not some thing outside the soul but rather is a certain mental concept suppositing precisely for singular men themselves, since for the truth of that proposition it is precisely sufficient that ‘risible’

is truly predicated of any given particular man, and it is not required that ['risible'] be predicated of any universal thing. For then a universal of this kind could never be sufficiently induced from its singulars—which is against true logic.

An argument for the principal conclusion can be constructed on the basis of this, since all universal propositions are equally induced from their singulars. But there is some universal proposition that is sufficiently induced from its singulars such that the predicate is incompatible with anything other than singulars—for example, the [universal proposition]:

Every man is singular and numerically one

Hence singulars suffice for verifying such universal propositions *a parte rei*, and so it is completely useless to postulate universal things of this kind. And the whole reason is because the terms in such propositions supposit personally and not simply (*i. e.* they supposit for singulars and not for themselves).

[Objection]: If it were objected that this proposition:

Man is primarily risible

is true; hence either (*a*) [it is true] in that 'man' has personal supposition—and then [the proposition] is simply false, since no man is primarily risible; or (*b*) [it is true] in that ['man'] supposits for a concept—and then too [the proposition] is false, since then it is denoted that the concept is primarily risible, which is obviously false, since that concept neither primarily nor secondarily is able to laugh; hence [the proposition] must be true in that it supposits for something mediate between the singular thing and the concept –

[Reply]: I reply, as stated to the fifth argument, that [the proposition]:

Man is primarily risible

is literally false, just as the [proposition]:

Something is the primary and adequate object of some potency

[is literally false]. Yet it is true according to the understanding of those who speak correctly, because they understand one designated act through that [proposition], namely this: "risible is primarily predicated of man." And in that designated act, 'man' has simple supposition and supposits for a concept, since being risible is primarily predicated of that concept, [though] not for itself but for singular things. Hence in the corresponding exercised act, which will be this [proposition]:

Some man is risible

'man' will have personal supposition. Just as in the designated act "the genus is predicated of the species" [the term] 'genus' supposits for a concept (since the concept of the genus is predicated of the concept of the species not

for itself but for things), so too in the corresponding exercised act, which ought not to be exercised as:

The species is a genus

but rather as:

Man is an animal

the terms will have personal supposition.

[Replies to the Confirmations of the Sixth Argument]

[Reply to the First Confirmation]: I state that sometimes an attribute is present in many through a common nature outside the soul, since there is something that is the same in them, remaining in them successively. However, sometimes [an attribute] is said to be present in them through the common nature not through informing [them] but rather through predication, since [the attribute] is predicated primarily of the common nature, *i. e.* of something common to their natures. The Philosopher understands it in the second of these two ways [in the passage cited in the first confirmation of the sixth argument for Burleigh's view], as [will be shown in *Ord.* 1 d. 2 q. 6].

[Reply to the Second Confirmation]: The same point applies to the [second confirmation]. For numerically the same transparency only remains if numerically the same subject were to remain, since even according to those [philosophers who hold this view] an accident that is numerically one is primarily in a subject that is numerically one.

[Reply to the Seventh Argument]

I state that a natural agent, in acting, tends to a genuine singular thing, since it tends to that which is primarily and *per se* produced. But the singular thing is primarily and *per se* produced. Hence [the natural agent tends to the singular thing]. And when it is said [in the seventh argument for Burleigh's view] that [the natural agent] tends to one singular thing no more to than another, since it is equally related to all, I reply that it determinately tends to one [singular thing], namely that [singular thing] that will be determinately produced [by the agent]. Accordingly, since the same [singular thing] is what is tended towards by the agent before and after [the production], and since the agent tends to some one [singular thing] determinately as primary, that is the thing tended towards by the natural agent. Nor is the natural agent equally related to any given singular, just as not any given [singular] is indifferently produced. More will be said about this point, nevertheless, in [*Ord.* 4 q. 1].

[Objection]: If a quibbling objection were raised against this [reply] and against the other preceding [replies] that this [proposition]:

Some person promises that he will give another person some horse is true, and, at that point, I [who raise this objection] ask: either he promises to the other person (*a*) some singular thing; (*b*) a universal [thing]; or (*c*) a concept. [With regard to (*a*): Not a singular thing, since he no more promises one [horse] rather than another. Thus either he promises no horse, and so could keep his promise while giving no horse, or he promises any horse whatever, and so could not keep his promise except by giving any horse whatever. [With regard to (*b*): If he were to promise a universal thing, what was to be proved will be established. [With regard to (*c*): If [he were to promise] a concept, then this is not true, since he promises a genuine thing. Likewise, then he could keep his promise while not giving some real horse but only a certain concept.—

[Reply]: That quibbling only ought to have been put in here because some [philosophers], proclaiming themselves to know logic, ponder such childish matters, due to which they hold many absurdities regarding the supposition of terms. But treating this would be an exceedingly lengthy and tedious matter. Hence I pass over it, and state that he promises a genuine singular thing, since in that proposition:

He promises another person a horse

the [term] 'horse' supposits personally for singular horses. Accordingly, such a person would never fulfill his promise if he were to give something universal, [but] only were he to give some particular horse. Accordingly, just as he promises a singular thing by saying "I promise you one particular horse," so too [he promises a singular thing] by saying "I promise you a horse."

And it does not follow when it is said [in the objection] that he no more promises one singular thing rather than another, and so either promises no [horse] or any given [horse]. Rather, it is the fallacy of 'figure of speech,' going from one mode of supposition to another—just as [the same fallacy is present] in arguing as follows:

Every man is a singular man, but is no more one singular man than another; hence every man is either any given singular man or nobody.

For in the first [premiss] 'singular man' supposits merely confusedly, and in the second [premiss 'singular man'] supposits confusedly and distributively. So it is in the case at hand. In the proposition:

I promise you a horse

the [term] 'horse' supposits merely confusedly (or in some similar way), since it does not supposit confusedly and distributively, and it is the case that any given singular is inferred under a disjunction, such that the consequent would be a disjunctive predicate and not a disjunctive [proposition]. For

[the consequence]:

I promise you a horse, and so I promise you this one or that one or that other one (and so on for all present or future [horses])

correctly follows, but the disjunctive [proposition] does not follow; indeed, [the consequence]:

I promise you a horse; hence I promise you this horse or I promise you that horse or I promise you that other horse (and so on for the other [horses])

does not follow—just as [the consequence]:

Every man is an animal; hence every man is this animal or that animal (and so on for each [man])

correctly follows, but the disjunctive [consequence]:

Every man is an animal; hence every man is this animal or every man is that animal (and so on for the other [men])

does not follow. It is so in many such cases, since often the predicate-term has merely confused supposition, or some [supposition] consimilar to [merely confused supposition], without a preceding distributive sign. |# Yet at the present I do not care whether it literally would have merely confused supposition or not, and so #| let these matters be omitted, since they pertain to logicians. Nevertheless, ignorance of these matters produces many difficulties in theology and in other real sciences, which, if these and similar childish matters were perfectly known, would be quite easy or would include no difficulty at all.

[Reply to the Eighth Argument]

I state that the generalissimum is a mental concept. Yet how it is one genus will be clear in [the reply to the tenth argument].

[Reply to the Ninth Argument]

I state that Porphyry holds that the species is one and collective of many into one nature—not a real [nature], but into one [term] that brings in the natures of many. Hence it is called one nature ‘by signification,’ since it is one [term] bringing in many [items]. And in the same way, [Porphyry’s remark] “many men are one man by participation in the species” [should be understood] as neither numerically one man nor one common man, since even according to those [philosophers who hold this view] no man is the common man. Rather, [Porphyry] holds that one ‘man’ is predicated of many men contained under one species (since another participation is not possible). That is, one term of which ‘man’ is predicated when ‘man’ supposit simply, yet if it were predicated of many men it would supposit personally.

[Reply to the Tenth Argument]

It should be said that since the Philosopher [writes] as a logician in the *Categories*, he principally treats names and terms in propositions, and so frequently attributes something to a term in a proposition that is attributed to a thing, and sometimes conversely. And the reason for this is that the pure logician does not have to say whether universals, which are the terms of propositions, be things outside [the soul] or only in the soul, or in speech or in writing, and so he does not draw the distinction.

Thus I state that his understanding in the [complete] passage [partially cited in the tenth argument for Burleigh's view] is this. OF THESE [THINGS] THAT EXIST, *i. e.* of the names and terms bringing in those [things] that are truly outside the soul and genuine things, SOME ARE SAID OF A SUBJECT, *i. e.* [some are said] of primary substance, since the very terms themselves are said of primary substance not for themselves but for primary substance itself, AND nevertheless ARE NOT IN A SUBJECT, *i. e.* they do not bring in some thing existing in the subject. AND, conversely now, SOME ARE SAID OF A SUBJECT, not for themselves but for a thing, AND ARE IN A SUBJECT, *i. e.* they bring in a thing existing in a subject. Thus the term always has the same supposition in the designated act, and yet in the two corresponding exercised acts it has varied supposition, since in one [exercised act it has] simple or material [supposition], and in the other personal [supposition].

[Reply to the Eleventh Argument]

I state that [in the cited passage] there is no division of something into distinct things when [substance] is divided into primary and secondary [substance], but there is a division of those [items] that are put into the categorial line, of which some can be genuine things and others are simply not things that are substances. The reason for this is that substance, which is a generalissimum, is predicated of all such [items] *per se* and *in quid*. Although it is predicated of some [items] *per se*, *e. g.* [it is predicated] of things (!# if a thing be predicated #!)—however, it is predicated of other [items], *e. g.* [it is predicated] of concepts, not for themselves but for things, since in such propositions the terms do not supposit for themselves and simply, but rather [they supposit] for singulars themselves and personally. For example, in this proposition:

Man is an animal

and in this one:

Every animal is a body

and in this one:

Every body is a substance

the terms do not supposit for themselves and simply, but instead for singulars and personally. Still, any of these [propositions] is *per se primo modo*.

Likewise, the term ‘substance’ is predicated of any of those [terms]. In the same way, and on this account, those terms are put into a categorial line; and these terms alone (or consimilar [terms]) are related as higher-level and lower-level. Thus the division of substance, which is a generalissimum, is into those [items] that are predicated of many and into those [items] that are not predicated of many.

[Reply to the Confirmation of the Eleventh Argument]: Species are called “more substance than the genus” because some more imperfect [elements] are brought in through the genus than through the species (|# at least [through] some [species] #|), since [species] are closer along the categorial line to the individual itself, which alone is a real thing (*res*) in the genus, even according to the Philosopher’s arguments that he puts forward in the same passage [cited in the confirmation of the eleventh argument for Burleigh’s view].

[Objection]: If the objection were raised [to this reply to the confirmation] that the Philosopher assigns some properties to be common to primary and secondary substance that are only suitable to a thing, such as [the property] being susceptible to contraries—

[Reply]: It should be stated that [Aristotle] says that they are common not through real inherence, but rather through true predication. And such [properties] can be truly predicated of concepts, not for themselves but for things. For example, being an animal is truly predicated of this word ‘man’ when this proposition:

Man is an animal

is spoken. Yet [the property being an animal] is not predicated of this word ‘man’ for itself, but rather for the singular thing for which this word ‘man’ supposit. Accordingly, it is not denoted that this word ‘man’ is an animal, but that the thing that this word signifies is truly an animal.

[Reply to the Twelfth Argument]

The same point [applies]. That [division] is a division of terms bringing in genuine things, since some are universals and others singulars, and they are called ‘things’ because they bring in genuine things.

[Reply to the Thirteenth Argument]

I reply that identity is threefold: (*i*) real, because it is appropriate to real things themselves; but (*ii*) numerical identity is appropriate to one thing alone; furthermore, (*iii*) specific identity is not appropriate to one individual alone but is appropriate to many individuals, such that it is not predicated of any given one [individual] but rather of many [individuals]. And that this is the Philosopher’s intent is clearly obvious, since in the same

passage he says ([*Top.* 1.7 103^a8–14]):

[Things] [are the same] in number of which the names are many, whereas the thing is one, for example a tunic and a coat. [Things are the same] in species that, although they are many, are indifferent according to the species, for example a man [is indifferent] to a man, and a horse to a horse. For any given [things] that fall under the same species are called ‘the same in species.’ Likewise, any given [things] that fall under the same genus are called the same in genus, for example a man and a horse.

From this passage it is clear that ‘the same in species’ or ‘the same in genus’ are not said of anything that is not an individual. Instead, they are said of the very individuals themselves, such that Socrates and Plato are the same in species, and this man is the same in genus as that horse—that is to say, as Aristotle explains, that Socrates and Plato are contained under the same species, and this man is contained under the same genus under which that horse is contained. |# Thus I concede that there is some identity that is less than unity or numerical identity, but such identity is not of some universal, but rather is of the singulars themselves taken together, as Socrates and Plato are one in species. #|

[Replies to the Positive Principal Arguments]

I reply to the first [positive] principal argument that this [proposition]:

The universal **man** and a particular man are essentially one is literally false. Nor does the Commentator intend this. Instead, he intends that they are one essentially because one is essentially predicated of the other and brings in the essence of the other, yet it does not really pertain to the essence of the other.

It should be stated [in reply] to the second [positive principal argument] that universals, whether they be incorruptible or not, are not incorruptible real things (*res*). Nevertheless, they can be called ‘incorruptible’ because, according to the Philosopher’s intent, being is always predicated of them, such that this [proposition]:

Man exists

is always true (|# if that proposition be formulated #|). However, being is not always predicated of some sensible singular, according to the intention of the Philosopher, since this [proposition]:

This exists

(picking out any given singular) is contingent.

[End of the Question]